Chapter 5

The trade union movement: a fifth column?

Dunkirk or Grimethorpe?

For many, communists and communist agitation were the root of all industrial stoppages, strikes and supply shortages. A notable episode of this type of thinking occurred in 1947 during the five-week Grimethorpe stint strike. The strike began in the aforementioned village in south Yorkshire when, on 11 August 1947, 200 coalminers in a pit walked off the job over an issue resulting from the application of the Five-Day Agreement.⁸ This resulted in 2,600 more coming out on strike. Ten days later, miners at neighbouring collieries walked out in sympathy. By 28 August, the strike increased in severity, with the dispute spreading through west Yorkshire. By the first week of September, a third of all Yorkshire’s pits were idle.

For various reasons, the events in Grimethorpe alarmed the UK. For Labour Party supporters, the strike came as a dreadful realisation; it was the first instance of industrial action following the nationalisation of the coal industry five months prior. It showed the hollowness of claiming that nationalisation would permanently solve such industrial matters. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the union of which the striking coalminers were members, viewed the unsanctioned strike as a blatant disregard of control over its members and was perplexed about how to regain control of the situation. Concerned over output and economic recovery, the national government found the loss of over 600,000 tons of coal in the five-week shutdown devastating towards its production plans for the British state.⁹ Adding to the headache of the situation came the negative press reaction in the US. A New York Times editorial on 9 September harshly criticised the British for permitting the prolongation of such an action. It questioned if American foreign aid to the UK should remain a foregone conclusion. It summated with:

Under the Marshall Plan each participating nation will be expected to contribute the goods or services it is best equipped to produce. In the case of England this clearly can mean only one thing – coal. Unless the Labour government can demonstrate its ability to get coal mined it is difficult to believe that the Marshall Plan will produce the enthusiasm and the hope which it merits and which are so essential to its success. Messengers Attlee, Bevin etc. have made much in recent months of ‘the spirit of Dunkirk’. Sooner or later they will have to demonstrate, not with figures of speech, but by their own actions, whether it is to be the spirit of Dunkirk or the spirit of Grimethorpe.¹⁰

The New York Times ran a succeeding article three days later. It argued that US Treasury Secretary John Snyder and President of the World Bank John McCloy could not possibly help but ‘draw the worst sort of conclusions from the Grimethorpe Strike’. With the British economy dependent on continued American aid, such sentiments were a formidable warning that for the US, industrial actions such as Grimethorpe were intolerable.

The striking miners showed no signs whatsoever of having been fomented by communist agitation; political motivations were not inspiring their actions. Yet one of the nation’s most prominent communists was in the middle of the maelstrom regarding Grimethorpe. As general secretary of NUM, Arthur Horner sought a resolution to the industrial action occurring within his union. He refused to back the miners and classified their action as a wildcat strike without any official sanction. Horner, alongside the CPGB and its general secretary Harry Pollitt, were in general agreement with the rest of the UK that the miners were damaging the nation and the situation needed resolving. Addressing a meeting at Hyde Park, Pollitt told the audience he supported the miners but urged them to quit the strike and return to work. Denouncing the strike, Horner warned the ‘lack of coal can bring down any government in this country. It is not even the fate of the government which is involved. It is the fate of the country’. Although in complete agreement with the government, public opinion and NUM, Horner and his political party were still suspected of causing the crisis.

The leadership of the newly formed National Coal Board (NCB), the public corporation created to run the nationalised coal mining industry, suspected communists were somehow to blame for the strike. In a meeting with Guy Liddell of MI5, NCB member Charles Ellis stated that with the Grimethorpe situation the communists, and Horner in particular, were ‘playing a very tricky double game’ and sought to ‘bring the whole [coal] industry down in ruins’. From other sources, Liddell had surmised that NCB chairman John Hindley felt the same as Ellis. Liddell and MI5 totally disagreed. They claimed it was in the interests of the Communist Party to get the government over the crisis, otherwise it might bring the Conservatives to power. ‘It would be better for them to have a Labour government’, Liddell deduced, ‘and push it more and more left until they obtained power by constitutional means’. ‘The Grimethorpe issue was not a good one’ for the communists, since they ‘would not gain credit with the public as a whole if they were to aggravate the hardships of the householder.’¹¹ Disagreeing with the professional assessment of the security service, and voicing aloud the sentiments of NUM, was Labour MP for Wednesbury, Stanley Evans. Like Ellis and Hindley, Evans pointed the finger for Grimethorpe at Horner and the CPGB. Speaking on the situation, Evans accused the ‘communist-infiltrated’ NUM for the present troubles:

Never in its history was the coal industry the sport of politics as it was today. The mineworkers’ organization was being used as an instrument of ideological political tactics. For those who were Kremlin addicts first and British socialist a bad second, coal in abundance was politically undesirable … The Miners’ Union, a great and influential organization representing a loyal band of Labour supporters, was being used as a pawn on the communist chessboard.¹²

Such accusations occurred against NUM even before Grimethorpe. Alluding to Horner’s affiliations, Fred Woods, general secretary of the Clerical and Administrative Workers’ Union, referred to ‘the sinister propaganda of the Communist Party within the trade union movement’ when he opposed an executive motion being argued to allow miners ‘to withdraw their labour’ if deemed necessary.¹³

Ultimately, on 15 September, the miners agreed to return to work on pre-strike conditions, ending the month-and-a-half-long ordeal. Both the NUB and NUM agreed to set up a commission to sort out the miner grievances which sparked the situation. Shortly after the strike, the search began for culprits to blame for it snowballing into a national crisis. Horner stated the blame lay at the door of the British newspapers. ‘The capitalistic press had done everything possible to create confusion’, he accused. They sought to ‘drive a wedge between the men and National Coal Board, to drive a wedge between the men and the government and to drive a wedge between the men and the union’.¹⁴ The Marxist economist Edgar Hardcastle blamed the lack of leadership of all involved, including Horner: ‘Whatever else may come out of the Grimethorpe strike it should teach some miners at least not to put their trust in nationalisation, or in Labour administration of capitalism, or in leaders, communists included.’¹⁵ Although Horner admonished the strikers and came out resolutely against the strike, for many – including Evans, Ellis and Hindley – they suspected the communist Horner of instigating the whole affair – probably on direct orders from the Kremlin.

Although general secretary of the union, Horner’s communist affiliation did not sit easily with the rest of the NUM leadership. He had a tense and often rancorous relationship with Will Lawther, the president of NUM. Although close allies in the prewar period, the two had come to exemplify the divide between the communist and the non-communist left inside the trade union movement. Prior to the Second World War, Lawther had been a committed Marxist and worked closely with Horner in coordinating union support for the anti-Franco Republican cause. During the Grimethorpe strike, Lawther broke with Horner and announced the fault directly rested with the striking miners. The NUM president called for the prosecution of the strikers by the coal board. As might be expected, this sentiment did not go down well in the region; in the midst of the strike, a graffitied wall in Grimethorpe read ‘Burn Will Lawther’ with gallows inscribed beside the words.¹⁶ A year later in 1948, when Horner travelled to France to support a communist-backed miner strike, Lawther condemned his NUM colleague and the French strikers. Horner maintained that Lawther took this position because of American pressure originating from the State Department.¹⁷ In 1949, the NUM national executive appointed a special subcommittee to investigate statements made by Horner in which he argued that right-wingers in the trade union movement were preparing the UK for a war against the Soviet Union. Horner maintained there was a plot to remove him from the secretaryship by these same elements, since it would prove less inconvenient than imprisoning him when the war he was warning of actually started. The subcommittee’s report called Horner’s assertions ‘ridiculous’. It went on to state:

To suggest that those of us who are regarded by the communist as right wing leaders, because we refuse to accept that party’s principles, have prepared for war, is a slander without foundation … we are satisfied that our abhorrence [towards war] is shared by every member of the socialist government but the government and its supporters would be lacking in foresight and open to severe criticism if they failed to take such precautionary measures as are necessary, so that, if called upon, this country could withstand any attack on this great democracy, no matter from what quarter danger threatened.¹⁸

The report concluded with a direct swipe at the communist Horner: ‘We shall resist any attempt on the part of the communists to use trade union organizations for the sole purpose of advancing their lust for power.’ In addition to their perceived ability to foment industrial action, prominent communists in leadership roles of NUM, such as Horner, raised another concern. Both the TUC and Labour politicians, such as Evans, viewed the union as being vulnerable to a full-blown takeover by the Communist Party. Such an occurrence would endanger the Labour Party since at past party conferences NUM had wielded the second largest number of block votes. Although the CPGB had been denied affiliation by Labour, through the control of the voting blocks of the unions, communists could wield substantial influence or even potentially take full control of the party. Writing on the topic, George Orwell stated:

The British Communist Party appears to have given up, at any rate for the time being, the attempt to become a mass party, and to have concentrated instead on capturing key positions, especially in the trade unions. So long as they are not obviously acting as a sectional group, this gives the communists an influence out of proportion to their numbers. Thus, owing to having won the leadership of several important unions, a handful of communist delegates can swing several million votes at a Labour Party conference. But this results from the undemocratic inner working of the Labour Party, which allows a delegate to speak on behalf of millions of people who have barely heard of him and may be in complete disagreement with him.¹⁹

Echoing this sentiment, at the height of the Grimethorpe strike, in September 1947 George Gibson, former chairman of the TUC, warned in the Sunday Times of infiltration of communists into key positions in various trade unions, trade councils and even the TUC itself. He argued that an insignificant body of communists had succeeded in placing a disproportionate number of their members into positions of national influence throughout trade unionism. Gibson estimated communists were within measurable distance of capturing the entire trade union movement. Warning of the danger, he urged trade unionists to regularly attend their branch meetings to combat those seeking to disseminate ‘theories dictated from abroad’.²⁰

Grimethorpe educated many in the UK about the power organised labour could wield and, if unleashed, how difficult such a force was to control. If allowed to continue longer, the loss of coal stock caused by the Grimethorpe shutdown directly threatened the jobs of 50,000 Yorkshire industrial workers and endangered the Sheffield steelworks and Lancashire gas companies and cotton mills.²¹ In a matter of weeks, the unsanctioned actions of a mere 200 miners turned into a mounting crisis affecting millions of Britons. If it was allowed to progress, the strike had the power to both topple the national government and jeopardise Marshall Plan aid. The peril of future Grimethorpes became a sword of Damocles hanging over the British Isles.

‘Defend democracy’

According to Nina Fishman, Morgan Phillips fired the first shot of the ‘British domestic Cold War on trade union terrain’ in December 1947.²² In an open declaration of war entitled ‘The Communist: We Have Been Warned’, the Labour Party chairman described the coming battle and the methods the enemy would use:

We can expect that a campaign of sabotage against the Labour government and all it stands for will be carried out by the communists and their fellow travellers during the coming months. We can expect communist-inspired attempts to foment discontent in the factories and workshops, which may result in slowing down and hampering the production drive, on which our national prosperity and recovery depends … We can also expect intensified attempts to continue their efforts to undermine and destroy the Labour movement from within, particularly by activities within the trade union movement in the interests of the Communist Party … Now is the time for all Labour people to go out on a great campaign against communist intrigue and infiltration inside the Labour movement.²³

A year later another declaration came, which echoed Phillips’s words. The issuing of this additional document could be termed the second shot of the war, since it marked, for many, the time when the industrial side of labour joined the political side in its anti-communist crusade. In 1948, the general council of the TUC issued a six-page, forty-two-paragraph document pledging the TUC to fight communism inside the trade union movement. Entitled Defend Democracy: Communist Activities Examined, the pamphlet consisted of two anti-communist policy statements issued by the TUC. In them, the general council claimed it had obtained evidence ‘of the ways in which communist influence within and outside the trade unions are seeking deliberately to obstruct economic policy … and to disrupt the unity of the trade union movement’. Under the direction of the Cominform, the Communist Party had ‘been specifically ordered to oppose the Marshall Plan’ and ‘sabotage’ it. It charged the communists also ‘promoted political agitation’ both to ‘magnify industrial grievances’ and ‘bring about stoppages in industry’. The joint statements urged the executives of all affiliated unions, their district branches and ‘responsible officers and loyal members to counter act every manifestation of communist influences within their unions’. The TUC general council beseeched all ‘workpeople to open [their] eyes to the dangerous subversive activities which are being engineered’ against ‘the declared policy of the trade union movement’.²⁴ Directly after its release, the TUC sent a letter to all of its affiliated organisations urging them to purchase copies of Defend Democracy for immediate distribution.²⁵ ‘Glad to act’, the assistant national agent of the Labour Party assured the TUC, the party would aid in ‘a wide circulation of the pamphlet’.²⁶ It proved wildly popular; by February 1949, demand for the pamphlet caused it to be on its eighth printing since the preceding ones had all sold out.²⁷

Defend Democracy caused a stir throughout the trade union movement. The pamphlet divided unions and brought forth numerous trade council resolutions both condemning and praising its anti-communist stance. TUC archival files in the Modern Records Centre house hundreds of letters from union branches and individual trade unionists which attest to its controversial reception. One unsigned and undated correspondence simply reads: ‘Perjurers and Skunk. Our Answer to You!’ Another one, written in a sincere fashion, states: ‘Wishing you and all concerned success in your “witch-hunting”, and trusting that it will not be rigidly confined to professed communists.’²⁸ In a letter of solidarity, the Congress of Irish Unions General Secretary Leo Crawford wrote to TUC General Secretary Vincent Tewson after the issuing of the statement. Crawford reported: ‘the problem is not so great here, although there are still active members of the Communist Party’ in unions needing to be dealt with, just as there were in the UK.²⁹

Despite the unequivocal language of the statement, the TUC leadership contemplated even stricter measures. Tewson considered issuing a blanket prohibition of communists as delegates at all trade councils associated with the congress. He stopped short, surmising with such a move ‘the initiative would then pass again to the communists.’ Since every ‘Trade Council and Federation would month after month have to deal with resolutions that the ban should be lifted’. Tewson also conceded ‘administratively [it would be] impossible for this office to operate the ban’.³⁰ However, Tewson did recommend that trade councils should be encouraged to exclude communists on a local level. Working off Tewson’s playbook, many councils did just that. In early 1949, the Darlington Trade Council voted at its annual meeting to expel all ‘known and vowed’ communists from its ranks. After the meeting, the council president announced that any communists present must leave forthwith.³¹ In an interview afterwards, the member who proposed the resolution stated his reasoning: ‘I think as a council we should all play our part in trying to defeat the communist terror.’³² The Plymouth Trade Council banned all communists from attending future meetings and accordingly notified its branch unions that they should not attempt to send communist delegates.³³ Joining Plymouth, the trade councils of East Ham, Irlam, Cadishead and Wandsworth all began refusing the credentials of affiliated branch delegates who were communists.³⁴ In August, the general council of the National Society of Painters, in an eleven to four majority, voted to bar known communists from holding office in the society as well.³⁵

On 11 July 1949 the UK’s largest trade union, the TGWU, banned all Communist Party members from holding office inside the union. The measure, proposed by its general secretary Arthur Deakin, was endorsed at its annual conference by an overwhelming vote of 426 to 208.³⁶ Several unions, including the General and Municipal Workers and the National Union of Railwaymen, already had such bans in place.³⁷ The TGWU decision occurred at its biennial conference after members proposed a resolution denouncing Defend Democracy. Instead of a resolution denouncing the document, the conference endorsed ‘the TUC policy contained in the pamphlet Defend Democracy’ by a vote of 508 to 123. ‘We then went on to discuss the question of eligibility of office on the part of members of the Communist Party’, explained Deakin in a press conference announcing the ban.³⁸ ‘We have decided that no member of the Communist Party shall be eligible to hold office within the union’, he said.³⁹ The ban had an immediate impact on the course of the TGWU. It halted nine communist members of the union’s national executive (out of thirty-four) from standing for re-election and scores of others in the over 4,000 TGWU local branches. With a membership of 1.5 million, the union’s anti-communist action dwarfed Attlee’s civil service purge.

Not all of the larger unions followed the TGWU. The Civil Service Clerical Association (CSCA) refused to endorse the TUC proposal. Its general secretary L.C. White remarked: ‘The TUC document, Defend Democracy, in which it called for action against communists in trade unions, was an attempt by the general council to incite political discrimination in a union which had no political ties.’⁴⁰ Speaking in regards to the CSCA, he added: ‘We are quite capable of dealing with any people of the left, right or centre who abuse their position. The time has come for the TUC to mind its own business and let us mind ours.’⁴¹ Although the CSCA’s central council was not swayed by the TUC’s brand of anti-communism, Defend Democracy did embolden some in the union to speak out about their fears. A London branch secretary of the CSCA wrote to Tewson, explaining:

Now that the TUC have issued their documents condemning the infiltration and have encouraged trade unions to take positive action to combat such activities we feel that we may officially ask for support. Our association suffers from communist infiltration to a large degree. I speak in confidence when I say that our general secretary [L.C. White] and deputy secretary are believed to be communists – or near-communists – and some 13 members of our present national executive committee support the communist ‘line’ even if they may not be members of the party. That is the problem we have to face and the battle we have to fight.⁴²

A special meeting of the British Actors’ Equity Association, chaired by Leslie Banks and attended by fellow film-stars Richard Attenborough, Sheila Sim and Gertrude Lawrence alongside over 700 other union members, voted its support for Defend Democracy. But the meeting rejected, by a three to one majority, a resolution that barred communists from holding any office in Equity. Speaking on the significance of the meeting’s decisions, an attending actor remarked, ‘It means that while keeping in line with the general TUC policy there is not going to be any purge or witch hunt in Equity.’⁴³

Effectively, Defend Democracy brought with it a declaration of war against communists in the trade union movement. The TUC took its propaganda war against communism international. With the assistance of the IRD of the FO, the TUC disseminated its pamphlets throughout the British colonies. By 1949, the TUC began sending hundreds of copies of its anti-communist pamphlet entitled The Tactics of Disruption to Nigeria.⁴⁴

The author of these pamphlets and press releases was future TUC general secretary Victor ‘Vic’ Feather, who held the post from 1969 to 1973. A dedicated and committed trade unionist, Feather’s anti-communist activities began much earlier in his career when he worked as TUC liaison to the individual trade councils. During the interwar period, he advised the council on anything and everything. He gained a reputation as a jack of all trades. Working in this capacity as a de facto trouble-shooter, Feather had his first dealings with the communist ‘threat’. In this role, Feather was tasked to strengthen trades councils’ resistance to communist pressure and also bring back in line communist-dominated ‘heretical councils’. As a natural brawler, he relished the fight; so much so that on one occasion in 1938, the fight turned literal. To the chagrin of his TUC superiors at a trade council meeting in Watford, Feather ejected two communist troublemakers by physically hoisting them through the doors. A communist opponent once described Feather as an individual not to be underestimated. ‘We knew Victor’, he reflected. ‘He was the kind of man who caresses your back looking for the right place to put the knife.’⁴⁵ Yet his earlier pre-Cold War undertakings were the mere skirmishes of a junior official. After having risen in the ranks of the TUC in the 1940s, Feather transformed his anti-communist activities into a sustained full-time campaign.

In the battle for the soul of the trade councils, Feather had one ultimate weapon. The trade councils, which represent all the union branches in a town or district, derive their authority from the TUC. If a certain trade council did not conform to the TUC’s rules and guidelines, the offending council lost its legitimacy, and the unions were expected to withdraw their branches forthwith. In practice, this sanction was invoked very sparingly. Yet Feather and the TUC employed it to break up the largest trades council in the nation. Their target was the London Trade Council, which worked as both a district federation of local councils and the centre of the district committees of individual unions. By the early 1950s, it held an affiliated membership of over 800,000 trade unionists – including Clement Attlee and Herbert Morrison.⁴⁶ What troubled Feather about the council was its leadership. Both its general secretary, Julius Jacobs, and members of the council’s executive were communists – a fact they proudly proclaimed. Fearing the London Council was sliding into dangerous hands, anti-communist trade union leaders began withdrawing their district committees from the umbrella organisation.⁴⁷ Still unsatisfied with the direction of the council in 1952, the TUC took the bold step of withholding its registration. The TUC justified the action by saying there ‘appeared to have been collaboration between some of the council’s executive and the Communist Party in arrangements for recent demonstrations, although the affiliated organisation had not agreed to such collaboration which was contrary to the council’s rules’. The council refused to accept the validity of the action against it and refused to disband. In response, the TUC formed a new London Trade Council, registered under the title ‘London Trade Council (1952)’.

Alongside government support and liaison situated across the Atlantic, the TUC also had powerful international allies in its fight against internal communists. Elements in the American government and the US trade unions both backed the TUC cause. Writing from Moscow in 1945, George Kennan warned that ‘communist circles’ considered the international labour movement as one of the most promising instruments to promote Soviet foreign policy. Kennan observed, ‘it seems now to have been decided in Moscow that political parties especially those bearing the name “communist” are not always the most effective medium for such assertion of influence and emphasis had shifted … above all to organized labour’.⁴⁸ US labour attaché in London Samuel Berger in December 1947 described the situation there as such: ‘It is axiomatic, that US financial aid alone cannot defeat the communists. They can only be permanently defeated if their influence in the trade union movements is broken.’⁴⁹ Yet policymakers in Washington, DC, understood that a light touch was needed and the US must hide its involvement to halt any type of anti-American blowback. Like their British counterparts, they surmised the war inside UK trade unions needed to be fought from within the union movement. As Hugh Wilford pointed out, attempted direct intercession by agencies of the US government into British labour unions all ended in complete failure.⁵⁰ So it fell to the American unions to support their comrades in the UK in taking up the fight against communism.

It is true from their inception that the American trade unions diverged greatly from their British counterparts. Whereas organs like the TUC was strongly associated with socialism from the late 1800s, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, did not seek to involve itself with an ideology. Gompers and the AFL focused on higher wages for skilled workers instead. ‘Following on from this denial of a broader, social purpose’, Wilford wrote, ‘was marked reluctance on the part of the AFL to identify itself with any political party – Gompers believed that political entanglements would lead inevitably to the domination of labour by more powerful economic interests.’⁵¹ This contrasted with the British trade unions’ strong association with the Labour Party. Labour – as a party and as a movement – were intrinsically linked. While British labour leaders were on the whole stalwartly anti-communist, prior to the Second World War they still generally avoided a direct confrontation with the communists in their ranks. They preferred to promote instead a policy of improving the poor working conditions on which communism thrived. The same cannot be said about their American counterparts, who were quite aggressive and open in their anti-communist tactics. The early years of the Cold War era saw this divergence between the British and American strategies towards communists narrow considerably.

In October 1945, in an attempt to keep up the spirit of unity and cooperation fostered during the war, a number of international trade unions formed the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Its mission was to do for organised labour what the newly formed UN did for nation states, which was to create a body where all trade unions could be represented on a global scale. The WFTU brought together major union organisations from the three central allied powers – the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS), the American Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the British TUC. Its formation marked a key event in international labour history; it represented the only time when the mass workers’ organisations of the Soviet Union and the US participated in a union federation. It had a lofty goal: to de-ideologise international labour relations by bringing together trade unions from nations with starkly different economic systems and forms of government.⁵²

Not all valued or wished for such international cooperation to thrive. A notable absence of union associations which refused to join the WFTU was the AFL. Being staunchly anti-communist, the AFL thought any cooperation with the Soviet Union was unwise and unpatriotic. The AFL labelled the WFTU a worldwide communist ‘controlled Frankenstein’ and was determined to ‘sabotage it at any cost’.⁵³ The AFL representative in Europe, Irving Brown, explained to American diplomat Samuel Berger that the WFTU could not be allowed to continue since it lent legitimacy to the communist-controlled trade unions behind the Iron Curtain. He counselled Berger:

[Their] association with bona fide trade unionists in the WFTU had enabled the communists to parade as bona fide trade unionists. The WFTU has been a mantle of respectability. If the WFTU could be split, the mantle would be torn away and the true character of the communists revealed.⁵⁴

The AFL, through its liaisons with the TUC, sought to impress these sentiments onto their Atlantic cousins. Initially, these attempts proved unsuccessful; although the TUC was decidedly anti-communist, its leadership saw little harm in participating in the WFTU. In 1946, Arthur Deakin was selected as WFTU president; the TUC held no question regarding his anti-communist bona fides.⁵⁵ In the early years of the WFTU’s existence, the AFL’s lobbying against the federation to the TUC did not gain much traction. Part of the difficulty came from having developed an image as a respectable body with a good reputation in international circles.⁵⁶ However, the situation rapidly shifted with the introduction of the Marshall Plan.

The vast majority of British trade union leaders considered Marshall Plan funding necessary for the economic life of the UK. Since the Soviet Union and its allies were fundamentally opposed, for political reasons, to US aid to Europe, the plan caused rifts inside the WFTU. For anti-communist opponents of the WFTU, it created the ideal conditions to further their agenda.⁵⁷ On the urging of the AFL, the US State Department and the FO attempted to convince the TUC to propose a general European trade union conference on the Marshall Plan independent of the WFTU. Brown applied pressure to the TUC leadership to act urgently, but they demurred, fearing that left-wing elements in the British unions would see this as an obvious ploy to undermine the WFTU. After further consultations with FO and AFL officials, the TUC decided to bring the Marshall Plan debate into the WFTU and have its member organisations vote to endorse it. They brought this action knowing full well it would result in an irrevocable split, since the communists’ unions would refuse to come to terms with such a resolution. Instead of coming to a showdown, the situation petered out after the WFTU postponed a meeting scheduled to discuss the issue. At the TUC 1948 annual conference, Arthur Deakin labelled the WFTU as ‘nothing more than another platform and instrument for the furthering of Soviet policy’.⁵⁸ The conference elected to turn the matter of the WFTU over to the TUC general council. After consulting the CIO leadership, the council decided to push for the suspension of the WFTU for a year. The FO was in full support of such a move. It assessed the Soviets would refuse to accept such a proposal, thus giving the CIO and the TUC a justified reason to break with the international federation.⁵⁹

At the final meeting of the united WFTU in January 1949, Deakin put the TUC motion to a vote. Linking domestic and international events, Deakin claimed the ‘machinations and Machiavellian tactics of the agents of communism in Great Britain’ forced the TUC to proceed in this manner.⁶⁰ Immediately after the call for a vote, pandemonium erupted as members protested Deakin’s proposal. In response, Deakin merely stated ‘the situation is clear’. He then got up from his chair and brazenly waved goodbye as he walked out of the hall. Exiting with Deakin were the entire delegations of the TUC and CIO. At the next TUC annual conference, a challenge to the TUC’s withdrawal from the WFTU was put to a vote. It was overwhelmingly defeated, yet over a million votes still favoured continued affiliation.⁶¹

Fighting from the shadows: covert anti-communism

Six months after the Grimethorpe strike, the Official Committee on Communism (Home), also known as the Brook Committee, began meeting. Alongside the purging of communists in the civil service, another major priority of the top-secret committee was how to deal with the communist threat inside the trade unions. A working committee report, which reviewed anti-communist security measures, laid out the situation the government faced. It concluded that the CPGB’s ‘penetration of the trade unions’ had one overarching goal – simply, ‘the installation of a communist government’. ‘Though this goal may at present seem remote’, the authors of the report conceded, at present the communists, through the trade unions, could exert pressure ‘to modify the policy and composition of the government of the day or to embarrass it in the hope that it will collapse’. The government viewed any communist success achieved inside the trade unions as a step towards this nightmarish outcome. The report warned: ‘It has already made considerable progress towards attaining this aim’ and claimed ‘there is hardly a union in which a [Communist] party member does not hold a position of some prominence’. The report went on to state that since the CPGB wished to ‘preserve the air of patriotic respectability’, communists had not yet turned to promoting ‘unofficial industrial unrest’ in case they appear as ‘irresponsible agitators’. It concluded that as a whole the matter of communist influence inside trade unions ‘is superficially a satisfactory one … It is, however, a dangerous situation for the future’.⁶²

A consensus arose that overt governmental anti-communist actions within the trade union movement were impossible because of the need to appear impartial towards internal trade union affairs. A light, and more importantly a hidden, touch was deemed the best approach. The government did not find it wise to follow in the footsteps of Morgan Phillips and his publicly announced declaration of war on trade union communists. Such a tactic had the potential to ruffle many feathers. A Times article on Phillips’s methods highlighted such likely criticisms:

It is an open secret, however, that many trade union leaders are unhappy about Mr. Morgan Phillips’s public appeal for a campaign against communists … We do not wish to see in this country the persecution of any left-wing opinion now common in the United States. If a campaign to remove an enemy within is allowed to develop until it becomes the rigid imposition of the views of those at the top, then the cure will be worse than the disease.⁶³

Government officials recommended to Attlee that support and assistance to anti-communists in the trade union movement should be actively promoted but only through covert methods. The committee believed any ham-fisted approach had the potential of backfiring: ‘This is not a matter on which the Security Service or government departments as such can be of any direct help. It is one which the responsible elements of the trade unions ought to settle for themselves, helped by publicity and other measures to ensure a healthy and informed state of public opinion.’⁶⁴ Working towards such ends, the government influenced the Catholic Church to roll back its anti-communist activities inside unions. In April 1948, the Roman Catholic bishops of the UK issued a statement, saying: ‘No Catholic can be a communist, no communist a Catholic.’ They urged all Catholic workers to ‘join their appropriate trade unions’ to influence the unions’ activities.⁶⁵ A Brook Committee meeting only a few weeks later commented that such Catholic combativeness towards communists in trade unions ‘had produced some useful results’, but there were warning signs: ‘if pressed too far, it would provoke a reaction in the opposite direction’. On the advice of the committee, Nye Bevan visited the Cardinal of Westminster, warning of such a danger.⁶⁶ The CPGB responded to the Church’s prohibition of all communists a month later. It released a pamphlet entitled Catholics and Communism: The Communist Case. Written by MP William Gallacher, it argued that Catholicism and communism were compatible and emphasised the exploitations Catholic coal miners had to endure in the past under capitalism.⁶⁷

The Labour ministry, headed by George Isaacs, was decided as the best department to liaise with the trade unions vis-à-vis anti-communist activities. Like Attlee, Isaacs’s aversion to communism bordered on the fanatical. One such example of this occurred in 1950; Attlee and Isaacs ordered MI5 to investigate ‘communist influence’ over all ‘Irishmen in this country’.⁶⁸ Alongside their worries over red Irishmen – about which the security service said ‘there is no cause for any particular alarm’ – both men were obsessed with red agitators in unions. On Isaacs’s instructions, the labour ministry held discussions with the TUC over their dissemination of anti-communist propaganda.⁶⁹ To the satisfaction of Attlee, the Labour minister reported that by the spring of 1948 the TUC general council was ‘now fully alive to the dangers of communist encroachment in the trade unions, and more active steps were now being taken to combat this’. Mirroring the Brook Committee, the TUC formed a small and secret group of ‘leading members of the council’ to ‘watch the problem’ and ‘ensure that useful information about communism was disseminated to the unions’. Alongside propaganda, another urgent task was halting additional communists from being elected to key union positions. Here the government could be of little direct help, since it feared blowback inside the unionist movement if it got caught attempting to rig elections. The Brook Committee did propose indirect clandestine aid to be given to anti-communist elements. At a committee meeting, the question was raised to what extent trade union leaders were aware of ‘which of their officials were communists or crypto-communists’. The committee members agreed ‘it would be desirable that they should be enlightened’ regarding the information held by MI5 on this subject ‘whenever possible’. However, they deemed it too risky to hold regular briefings with trade union leaders over the matter, since the chances of such an arrangement could leak to the public and thus damage the impartial reputation of the government. Instead, a backchannel was set up, in which the ministry of labour would convey MI5-collected information on individual communists ‘to completely reliable’ union leaders for use against individuals. Although the arrangement between the labour ministry and the trade union leaders remained informal, the information sharing between MI5 and the ministry became compulsory. The committee decided that MI5 reports would be sent to the labour ministry ‘as a matter of routine, and any information about communists in important positions in the unions should be provided to the Ministry of Labour’.⁷⁰

Alongside the reporting of MI5 intelligence through the ministry of labour to trade union leaders, the IRD also developed a strong partnership with high officials inside the movement.⁷¹ During Labour’s time in office Denis Healey – then just a young party official working at Transport House – conducted liaisons for the IRD. Through Healey, the IRD held frequent communications with Herbert Tracey, the chief TUC publicity officer and editor of Labour Industrial News. Neither MI5 nor IRD needed to worry in the slightest with regards to where Tracey’s loyalties lay. He wore his aversion to communists as a badge of honour, even going so far as accepting a seat on the grand council of Common Cause.⁷² Christopher Mayhew had already sought Tracey’s help by offering to fund and revamp Tracey’s anti-communist newsletter Freedom First.⁷³ Contact between IRD and the TUC leadership went higher on both ends of the connection than simply Healey and Tracey. As early as January 1949, meetings were being arranged between the aforementioned TUC assistant secretary, Victor Feather, and the director of IRD, Ralph Murray.⁷⁴ The relationship between Feather, who rose to the top of the TUC with his election as general secretary in 1969, and the IRD blossomed into a full-blown partnership. During the early 1950s, Feather authored several books warning of the dangers of communism in the trade union movement (Trade Union – True or False? and The Essence of Trade Unionism). The publisher of these works was a small company (Ampersand Ltd) secretly controlled and funded by the IRD.⁷⁵

Shouting from the rooftops: Labour’s reaction to unofficial strikes

A fundamental disagreement arose in both future Brook Committee meetings and correspondences between the Labour government and the security service. The disagreement was regarding how much of a threat communists in the trade union movement posed. By 1947, Attlee and his ministers, most notably Herbert Morrison and George Isaacs, believed that the CPGB had disregarded attempts at ‘patriotic respectability’ and were undermining the government through industrial action. Labour considered from 1948 until leaving office in 1951 the majority of wildcat strikes as being directed by communist elements inside the trade unions who were following directives from the Soviet Union. Despite scant evidence, the Labour Party and trade union leaders routinely accused communists of directing an assault against the nation’s economy and the Attlee government.⁷⁶ The allegations were mainly directed towards a number of the nation’s dockworkers, who held a series of strikes between 1949 and 1951. These unsubstantiated claims led to the most vicious piece of strikebreaking done by a Labour government.

In solidarity with the Canadian Seamen’s Union, dockworkers at Avonmouth refused to unload a cargo ship on 14 May 1949. They contended it was a ‘black ship’ manned by scab sailors. When management threatened to penalise the workers for the refusal, the unofficial work stoppage turned into a lockout. A few days later, 600 Bristol dockers began striking in support of their Avonmouth brethren. In response, the government sent troops into Avonmouth to unload perishable food goods. The addition of soldiers to the situation only sparked more agitation. On 30 May, 1,400 Liverpool dockworkers joined the strike.⁷⁷ By June, the number of dockers on strike had reached 11,000. From its earliest inception, the strike was considered by Attlee and his government as a communist-inspired attack against the nation, even though both MI5 and the local police stated to the cabinet that little indication existed that communist activities were fomenting the various dock strikes.

Without any proof, Isaacs took to the BBC to lay the blame for the strike solely on communist involvement. In the 11 June broadcast, the minister of labour claimed ‘the communists in this country are doing their best to mislead the workers’. Appealing directly to the striking dockworkers, he warned them that they were being used by the ‘communists in this country to dislocate trade and thus retard our economic recovery’.⁷⁸ On 14 June, the Avonmouth dockers returned to work. But the struggle had meanwhile flared up in London. Here employers refused to hire labourers for newly arrived ships unless they agreed to unload two other ‘black’ Canadian ships. By the beginning of July, over 8,000 London dockworkers had joined this new industrial action. Commenting on this renewed strike, Cabinet Minister Philip Noel-Baker stated: ‘Once again our good-hearted dockers have been duped by communist lies.’⁷⁹ Speaking in the Commons on 8 July, the home secretary labelled the whole affair a red-instigated threat to the nation:

The only reason why we are having to deal with the trouble in this country is that the communists see in it a chance of fomenting unrest, injuring our trade and so hampering our recovery and with it the whole process of Marshall Aid on which the recovery of Western Europe depends. The issue with which we are faced is not one of a legitimate industrial dispute. We are faced with a challenge to the whole authority of the state, and it must be met.⁸⁰

An emergency committee created to deal with the strike asserted that ‘the effect and timing of these and other industrial troubles clearly demonstrated the existence of a communist attempt to cause industrial trouble and financial damage’.⁸¹ Speaking to a crowd of over 12,000 in Manchester, Attlee denounced such unofficial strikes as ‘foolish actions’ backed by communists. He urged the exposure ‘of these hypocrites’ who were ‘merely the instruments of a foreign dictatorship’.⁸²

On 11 July, the prime minister announced a national state of emergency, declaring ‘the situation is such as gravely to injure the economy of this country at a critical period in its history’.⁸³ Two days later the House of Commons debated the measure. During the debate, frontbenchers in the Liberal and Conservative Parties questioned Attlee’s narrative over the communist involvement in the strike. Responding to the prime minister, Anthony Eden wondered aloud how much of the fault laid at the feet of communists. He said it was not a sufficient explanation to say they led the dockers blindly, as Labour argued. ‘There is the maximum of communist intrigue and manoeuvre’, asked Eden, ‘but does the government really feel that that, and nothing but that, is a sufficiently searching diagnosis of this problem?’⁸⁴ The leader of the Liberal Party, Clement Davies, echoed Eden’s doubts on communist involvement:

No one dislikes the communists and the totalitarians more than I do, because they would take away the liberties that we regard as safeguards. One dislikes their methods and ideas, but it is wrong to attribute all that goes wrong today to the communists … The right thing is not to blame the communists but to try to remove the grievance and to cure the sore. In that case, the communists would not have any influence at all. I do not believe that the 13,000 men who are out of work are communists to a man.⁸⁵

Parliamentary criticism and sceptical reports from the intelligence community did little to stymie the governmental belief that communism agitation had brought on the strikes. Joining the chorus against the governmental charges was Major General Robert Neville, an officer commanding the troops who had replaced the striking dockers. Neville told Attlee he had ‘over-played’ the communist issue and it was backfiring – since the majority of the strikers ‘are, of course, not communists, but the amount of emphasis thrown on the fact that they have been duped by the communists tends to make them bloody minded’.⁸⁶ Yet, still many inside the Labour Party and the civil service were as adamant about the guilt of communists as Attlee and Isaacs. Writing on the strike, Keith Jeffery and Peter Hennessy stated, ‘The government’s concern about communist activities was rapidly turning into an obsession.’⁸⁷

Four Labour MPs, who represented the docklands affected by the strike, conducted their own informal investigation into the matter. Once finished, they handed a copy of their report to Home Secretary James Chuter Ede, claiming the dispute ‘was riddled with communist activity so serious [a] nature that the facts should be investigated by MI5’.⁸⁸ Joining in on the red-hunt, a member of the Labour government took matters into his own hands. Looking for a justification to prosecute the strike leaders, Attorney General Hartley Shawcross searched for signs that communists were directing the industrial action. Guy Liddell stated that Shawcross ‘seemed to be searching round for something in the nature of the Zinoviev Letter, which would show that on the direction of Moscow strikes are being started in Canada, Australia and the UK, with the object of wrecking the Marshall Plan’.⁸⁹ MI5 took a dim view of this personal scavenger hunt conducted by Shawcross. It believed no such ‘Zinoviev Letter’-type document existed, since guidance from Moscow could simply come from the open press.⁹⁰ Writing directly to Attlee about the situation, MI5’s Graham Mitchell reminded the prime minister ‘that the Security Service is really the focal point for information on these matters’ and the attorney general had no authority to trample on its ‘preserves’. Mitchell also stated that with regards to the strike ‘the general picture was fairly clear’ the Communist Party had not instigated it. Liddell also considered Shawcross’s mission as flawed, since no court case could legally be made against the strikers even if communists had provoked the industrial action. Refusing to let the matter rest, Shawcross requested the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions to ask MI5 and Special Branch for an assurance that they ‘were doing all they could in connection with the dock strike’.⁹¹ Also perpetuating the anti-communist frenzy over the strike was Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Transport Gilmour Jenkins. He delivered an unsigned memorandum entitled ‘Communism and the Dock Strikes’ to his fellow civil servant, Home Office Permanent Secretary Frank Newsam. The note claimed that ‘three weeks of careful investigation have shown the London dock strike … is under direct control of the Cominform itself’.⁹² Newsam passed the memo to MI5. The security service was ‘inclined on its face value to doubt its reliability’, though it did investigate the memo.⁹³ MI5 discovered it originated ‘from right-wing sources in Europe of dubious reliability’.⁹⁴ The co-authors of the note turned out to be Conservative MP John Baker White and Colonel Robert Hoare, both leaders of the Economic League. Angered over the situation, the Home Office reported ‘a good deal of time and labour might have been saved if the Ministry of Transport had told us from the start that the information had come from the Economic League’.⁹⁵

Despite governmental efforts, by 20 July over 15,000 men were on strike. They only returned to work on 22 July when the Canadian Seamen’s Union, having obtained concessions, withdrew their pickets from certain ships and announced that they were terminating their dispute. The cessation of hostilities did not last long. On 19 April 1950, a strike on the London docks began again. It was in direct succession to the Canadian seamen’s strike the year prior. Three of the major figures in the previous year’s strike were expelled from the TGWU, thereby threatening the men’s livelihood. Six thousand dockers immediately walked out in sympathy.⁹⁶ Again, the striking dockers had no grievance about their conditions of work. They struck only in protest against the expulsions. One of the expelled men was Ted Dickens, who was a member of the executive committee of the Communist Party. When the strike began, party action followed immediately. But no evidence existed that the CPGB had planned or wished for this industrial unrest. Attempts were made, however, by the CPGB to arrange an immediate expression of support for the dockers in various provincial ports.⁹⁷ Regardless of the lack of evidence, and echoing the same sentiments of the year before, Isaacs laid the blame directly on the ‘red menace’. In the House of Commons, he declared:

The present stoppage is clearly communist-inspired and is nothing else than an attack on the democratic and constitutional rules of the Transport and General Workers’ Union … This stoppage shows once again the lengths to which the communists are prepared to go in their attempt – and I am glad to say in their losing attempt – to gain control of the trade union movement. No consideration of hardship to the workpeople or their families, or the country generally, is allowed to interfere with their plans.⁹⁸

In the estimation of the Labour government, communists were not limiting their attacks only to the nation’s docks. It blamed communist incitement as the primary reason for unofficial strikes occurring throughout the industrial and transport sectors of the country. So even after the ending of that specific dock strike, Isaacs’s accusations continued. Like the American Joseph McCarthy, Isaacs showed an ever-growing mania over supposed communist infiltration. In September 1950, the minister of labour claimed that the CPGB ran a secret organisation inside the trade union movement, which sought to disrupt essential services and destroy the unions from within.⁹⁹ Responding to the allegation, the CPGB issued a statement refuting the charge and daring Isaacs to provide proof to back up his words. ‘The fact that he has not done so’, the statement read, ‘is complete confirmation that his attempt to launch a red scare has no foundation in fact.’ It added, ‘For a cabinet minister to fool and deceive parliament and people by making allegations which he is unable to back with proof is a scandalous, shameful and cowardly action.’¹⁰⁰ In the House of Commons, Isaacs also faced questions over his claims that such a secret organisation existed. Conservative MP Bernard Braine asked what ‘steps have been taken to deal with the subversive organization’. Isaacs awkwardly answered that such activities were being watched. Braine followed up by stating many concerned parties do ‘not believe in the existence of such an organization and believe that the government are using the communists as a scapegoat’.¹⁰¹ MI5 records of the period do not show any evidence of such an organisation ever existing, but the belief was widespread inside the Labour government.¹⁰² Isaacs was not the sole public promoter of such a notion. Speaking of unofficial stoppages, Minister of Agriculture Tom Williams claimed ‘inside knowledge that they are mostly inspired by a half dozen members of the Communist Party’.¹⁰³

Any type of industrial unrest occurring after 25 June 1950 was considered by governmental circles as being of an even more sinister nature. With British troops poised to fight in Korea, such actions were seen as impeding the national struggle. With the UK now in open conflict against communist forces, many Britons naturally assumed that their domestic communist compatriots would work to sabotage the country’s war effort. Such a belief brought with it more unsubstantiated charges against domestic communists. On the night of 14 July, an explosion of eight fifty-foot ammunition barges occurred at Portsmouth harbour. The blast injured six workers and shattered hundreds of windowpanes of nearby buildings.¹⁰⁴ Accounts stated the aftermath resembled the destruction wrought from wartime air raids conducted by the Luftwaffe. From the onset, many suspected the bombing was a deliberate act of sabotage to disrupt the upcoming British military efforts in Korea. The most prominent purveyor of this view turned out to be the nation’s prime minister. Even before an official board of inquiry reported on the cause, Attlee took to the floor of the Commons to declare the explosion a case of sabotage.¹⁰⁵ Although the prime minister refused to speculate on the probable perpetrators, few needed to guess the most likely source of the ‘attack’. Attlee’s brazen announcement shocked MI5, since, contrary to what the prime minister stated, ‘recent evidence seemed to indicate that the explosion was due to faulty construction of a depth charge’. MI5’s Deputy Director Guy Liddell speculated that ‘political wishful thinking about a communist plot’ is what motivated Attlee to make such a charge.¹⁰⁶ The evidence points to Liddell being correct. The nation’s press picked up the prime minister’s sentiments; the following day, headlines ran declaring ‘War on Britain’s 5th Column’ and warning of ‘The Enemy Within’.¹⁰⁷ In a 31 July broadcast to the nation about the situation in Korea, Attlee linked the ‘ruthless and unscrupulous’ communist ‘menace’ with the ‘outrage at Portsmouth’.¹⁰⁸

Taking Attlee’s lead, right-wing union leaders continued the prime minister’s narrative on the Portsmouth incident and widened the charges of sabotage. Writing in his union’s journal, Tom Yates, general secretary of the National Union of Seamen, called the Portsmouth explosion ‘only one incident of many’ of supposed sabotage. ‘There have been other cases of mysterious damage to naval vessels by fires, explosions and breakdowns, which could not have occurred by accident’, he wrote.¹⁰⁹ Yates went on to warn seafarers against communists who might lure them into causing breakdowns of ships about to leave port and told them to keep an eye on colleagues who acted suspiciously. ‘There is only one course to take with them’, he wrote about communists’ inside unions, ‘they must be hunted out, run down, and driven out of our movement.’¹¹⁰ He also reminded his readers that sabotage could take many forms, not only violent explosions – hinting that unofficial strikes worked as a type of sabotage. Yates’s accusations did not go unnoticed or unanswered by the CPGB. In response to Yates’s article, Communist MP William Gallacher sent letters to Yates, the director of public prosecutions and General Secretary of TUC Vincent Tewson. The letters all called for Yates to provide proof for his charges. Gallacher argued that by the tone of Yates’s words, ‘he knows the people responsible’ and should make a statement to the police if such was the case.¹¹¹ The recipients refused to respond to Gallacher’s challenge. Shortly after the Plymouth explosion, TGWU leader Arthur Deakin joined the chorus in blaming communists inside trade unions of sabotage. He also added that they were resorting to threatening violence in achieving their goals within the movement.¹¹² Deakin considered it his ‘duty’ to warn trade unionists of the pitfalls into which they are being advised to go. He called the battle against communism an attempt to halt ‘a national policy as defined and determined by an agency outside this country’ which sought ‘to keep alive industrial unrest’.¹¹³ Deakin proposed a simple solution: outlaw and ban the CPGB. When questioned if such a move would only make communists more dangerous, since they would be less easy to detect, Deakin retorted, ‘they couldn’t be more underground than they already are’.¹¹⁴

The security service held a dim and critical opinion of the alarmist assertions made by the government. In a meeting with Brigadier R.F. Johnstone (deputy director of military intelligence at the War Office), Liddell stated MI5 felt the ‘attitude on the question of communism’ by members at the top level of government had ‘rather worried’ them. He claimed that high-level officials held the impression that communist conspiracy was ‘directing strikes and sabotage over the country’. Liddell explained to Johnstone these ‘were not our views … our view was that the disturbances in the country were due to a lack of trust by the rank and file in their trade unions leaders, whom they regarded as too much identified with the policy of the government’. These disenfranchised workers ‘therefore took matters into their own hands’.¹¹⁵ Speaking directly about the threat of the communists with regards to strikes, he went on to state they ‘were generally a bit slow off the mark … and hardly initiated anything’. Liddell confided that MI5 felt that regarding the communist threat it was ‘somewhat dangerous that they [the government] should be misguided at the top’. By early 1951, it became quite understandable why MI5 felt this way. Time after time, the agency reported that the CPGB had not initiated the vast majority of the unofficial strikes. When party members were involved, it was on an individual and usually isolated basis. While it was true the party did support existing industrial action, its reasoning had more to do with showing solidarity with the strikers than seeking to halt production or topple the government. As well, no evidence existed that communists were engaging in acts of sabotage. For Attlee, his ministers and their allies in the trade union movement to state otherwise was only needlessly stoking public fears. Wholeheartedly agreeing with this warning, Johnstone explained the refusal of MI5’s intelligence being accepted by their superiors. Johnstone claimed ‘a number in government’ felt MI5 ‘had an enormous job which was overwhelming them’, hence the agency was missing the warning signs of communist agitation inside the trade union movement.¹¹⁶ While not a direct criticism of the security service, such a supposition allowed members of the Labour government to continue to make baseless charges which were not supported by any evidence provided by the intelligence community. Neither Isaacs nor Attlee consulted MI5 before they alleged communistic involvement with strikes and sabotage.¹¹⁷ MI5 labelled Isaacs’s charges of communist conspiracies ‘stupid’ and said they would be ‘likely to recoil on our heads’ since Isaacs had ‘little or no evidence on which to base’ such statements.¹¹⁸ The only impact they had was a negative one. Since, as Liddell maintained, they ‘caused a good deal of anxiety in the US’, MI5 needed to assure their American counterparts of ‘the real position’.¹¹⁹ The ‘real position’ was that such a communist conspiracy was non-existent.

Seeking to curb both sabotage and industrial unrest during the period, the cabinet considered enacting some stricter form of legalisation to make it a criminal offence to impede in any way the measures being taken which affected state security.¹²⁰ It appeared a similar action had been contemplated during the 1949 dock strike. Speaking to Deakin on 30 May, Home Secretary James Chuter Ede said a benefit of the strike was that it allowed the government to deal with ‘the elements which fomented these continual strikes’. Agreeing with Ede, Norman Brook argued that such a law would only be useful if it covered unofficial strikes, such as ones initiated by the dockworkers. Brook believed if the government failed to act in this matter, it would be ‘highly detrimental to the security and efficiency of the country’. Herbert Morrison voiced his agreement with Brook on the matter. Both were overruled after governmental consultations with trade union leaders discovered that these union officials were opposed to such a restrictive measure.¹²¹ In September 1950, the full cabinet approved a small group of three ministers to organise a plan ‘to counter communist endeavours to cause industrial unrest’.¹²² The trio consisted of Herbert Morrison, George Isaacs and James Chuter Ede. At a cabinet meeting four days later, Attlee instructed Morrison, the head of the unnamed committee, to ‘consider whether the criminal law could with advantage be strengthened to counter a communist conspiracy to foment industrial unrest in this country’.¹²³ As Morrison and his fellow committee members were busy deliberating, Attorney General Harry Shawcross found it necessary to act. He ordered the prosecution of ten leaders of an unofficial London gas workers’ strike. The ten were charged with violating the 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act that made it a crime for utility workers to break their contracts of service. They were initially sentenced to a month’s imprisonment.¹²⁴ The government believed a communist-controlled union had instigated the strike. When publicly questioned about the prosecutions, Shawcross argued they were necessary because communists were attempting to prolong the strike.¹²⁵ In the meantime, the Morrison-headed committee assessed that any new legislation would have to be presented in parliament. Brook argued to Attlee that such a move was politically unwise, since such a proposed bill needed overwhelming public support. Brook stated that Attlee’s efforts in claiming sabotage and subversion had not led to a widespread belief that such communist subversion existed. Thus no new legislation was introduced, since it was likely to fail.¹²⁶ But this did not stop further prosecutions. In February 1951, Special Branch arrested seven members of a committee of London dockers who were heading an unofficial strike.¹²⁷ They had recently been denounced as communists by the TGWU. The arrests placed Deakin on the defensive since a number of the strikers suspected that he masterminded the arrests.¹²⁸ No evidence ever came to light to link him directly with the arrests; but Deakin clearly showed sympathy for the police action, stating, ‘If it can be proven that these seven men have been engaged since October 1950, in a conspiracy, then they should have been dealt with long ago.’¹²⁹

The government had sanctioned their arrests by the revival of a wartime measure titled the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, more commonly known as Order 1305. The order effectively banned strikes and forced any side in a dispute to bring their case to an arbitration panel rather than go on strike. The governmental action boomeranged, since the arrests sparked more than 19,000 dockers to go on strike. Within forty-eight hours, all of the UK’s major ports were locked out.¹³⁰ These peacetime arrests and prosecutions did not go over well inside the trade union movement. Even the stalwart anti-communist TUC was disturbed by such extreme measures. Fearful of losing key trade union allies, the government agreed to a revision of the Order that deleted the prohibition on strikes and lockouts.

A shift in policy: the Conservatives take power

The results of the October 1951 General Election reinvigorated the threat of communist-inspired strikes and industrial unrest in quarters of the government and political society. Because of the CPGB attitude towards the right-wing Conservative Party, such a shift made perfect sense. Since the party had concentrated much of its propaganda activities in denouncing the Tories since 1945, an attempt to bring down Churchill’s new government through industrial action seemed a likely CPGB strategy. Even MI5, which consistently doubted communist involvement in the industrial sector, believed it was something which needing watching. At a July 1952 meeting, Percy Sillitoe warned Home Secretary David Maxwell Fyfe, ‘Since the end of 1951 the Communist Party … instructions to its followers in British industry are that strike action must be achieved where possible.’¹³¹ The fear of communist-inspired strikes gained the Conservatives support from places that they would have found baffling in any other circumstance. A few months after the Conservative victory, the National Council of Labour unanimously passed a resolution condemning any unofficial strikes protesting the new government. The council, a consultative body set up to coordinate the policies and actions of the TUC and the Labour Party, stated in the ‘strongest terms its condemnation of the attempts now being made by irresponsible elements to persuade trade unionists to take industrial action in order to achieve political ends’. It went on to argue that any strike ‘being organized under the pretext of protesting against the action of the present reactionary government is in fact part and parcel of a world conspiracy to undermine the industrial power of the nation’.¹³² Articles in the press kept such a narrative alive as well. G.L. Wilson, the industrial correspondent for the Yorkshire Post, blamed unrest growing in northern coalfields on ‘the price that is being paid for the sense of power and indispensability which has gone to the heads of an irresponsible minority of workers’. Echoing the same suspicions which accompanied the Grimethorpe shutdown, Wilson maintained ‘it is communism which is benefiting from the increasing number of strikes’.¹³³

Unlike Attlee and Isaacs, Churchill and his minister of labour, Walter Monckton, were unmoved by these charges of communist unrest in trade union action. A review of the cabinet conclusions attests to the fact. Although oftentimes strikes occurring were discussed, they were very rarely suspected of being caused or instigated by communists. When communists were mentioned during these discussions it was always as a secondary reference. In September 1952, Monckton remarked that a dispute at Park Royal Vehicles had attracted the attention of ‘the communists’. He did not argue they were the cause of the unrest, just that they were seeking to capitalise from it.¹³⁴ When 2,000 workers at the Austin Motor Works in Birmingham went on strike in 1953, Monckton stated the union calling for the action was ‘under communist control’. But he assured the cabinet that since other unions were also involved, ‘it seemed likely that different views on the merits of the strike would develop’ among the men being affected by it.¹³⁵ In 1954, after renewed dock strikes, Monckton told the cabinet he was investigating the part ‘played by the communists in organising this series of strikes’ but did not accuse them of being involved with starting them.¹³⁶ Only in one case did Monckton label a strike ‘communist-inspired’. This was in 1955, over one occurring at the Rolls Royce factories in Scotland.¹³⁷

Although the Churchill government did not publicly continue ringing the alarm over communist-inspired strikes, this did not mean the issue was suddenly laid to rest. In 1954, again the dockers of London went on strike. Charges of communist agitation by trade unionist leaders quickly followed – especially by Arthur Deakin. The Churchill government reacted quite differently to its predecessor. During the 1949 and 1950 dock strikes the Labour government issued white papers which blamed ‘communist agitation’ for their occurrences. In the midst of such a similar strike, the Conservatives refused to follow suit. The lack of a white paper was intentional, done to take the wind out of the sails of Deakin’s accusations that communists were again to blame. Although Deakin was a stalwart ally and vocal supporter of Labour’s allegations of communist agitation, the Conservatives wished to temper his more bombastic rhetoric; supporting this, no doubt, was MI5. Although a darling of the Labour government, the security service viewed Deakin as problematic. They labelled his ‘irresponsible statements about communist interference in industry’ as ‘damaging’ and categorised Deakin as someone ‘ready to take any political advantage which presented itself’.¹³⁸ In one particular incident, MI5 was alarmed after they discovered Deakin spreading false charges of communist agitation. In February 1951, Deakin called together sixty reporters and distributed a document entitled ‘Agent Provocateur’ which he alleged the CPGB were dispensing among seamen on merchant ships. After an investigation, MI5 determined ‘the document was almost certainly a fake, since the Communist Party would be unlikely to distribute anything of the kind’.¹³⁹ However, when police in Cardiff began investigating the document, MI5 did not release this information but cautioned them to be ‘circumspect’ over the issue. No need to embarrass a prominent trade unionist; though overzealous, Deakin was still on the right side. A similar assessment took place during a meeting of the Brook Committee during a 1954 dock strike. Contrary to what Deakin said in the press, MI5 reported ‘the strike had been the product of an industrial grievance, accentuated by inter-union rivalry’. The security service suggested it might be useful ‘in dispelling Mr. Deakin’s myth of communist instigation’. Although considered by the committee, it was determined there was ‘nothing to be gained’ by pricking ‘Mr. Deakin’s bubble’, since ‘nothing would alter his conviction that the strikes were communist inspired’.¹⁴⁰

The key factor for this shift of governmental attitudes against the likelihood of communists causing unofficial strikes came through the acceptance of intelligence gathered by MI5. Sillitoe’s warning to the home secretary of communist resistance to the new Conservative government proved alarmist. The security service did not uncover any evidence which supported the cautionary counsel. In 1954, MI5 found it safe to report to the Home Office that it was ‘generally true to say that the [Communist] party now dares not take the initiative in starting a strike. The most it can, and does, do is to try to cash in on strikes and disturbances started by someone else’.¹⁴¹ This situational assessment would not diminish over time but strengthened into the late 1950s.

As mentioned previously, governmental concern over communists in trade unions was divided into two main issues: one was their ability to foment unrest and the second was their growing influence inside the hierarchy and apparatuses of the trade union movement. Unlike with the first, when dealing with the latter the Conservatives stayed the course set by Labour. The fundamental blueprint of combating communism inside trade unions did not vary with the changing of power in 1951. Such was the case with the number of anti-communist measures enacted under Labour (governmental vetting, visa restrictions, efforts of the IRD, and so on); the Conservatives kept the anti-communist policy towards trade unions in place. This meant the strategy of a light touch and covert assistance to trusted and reliable anti-communist trade unionists remained unaltered. Here the government did show favourable progress. Despite the natural distrust of trade unionists towards the right-wing Conservatives, the two parties found the hatred of communism as a common ground on which to foster a working relationship. The rapport between the two became so cordial that Harold Macmillan reported to Prime Minister Anthony Eden that several trade union leaders had become very sensitive about the accusation of acting as ‘Tory stooges’.¹⁴² Working off intelligence from MI5, the Conservatives grasped the true objective of CPGB inside the trade union movement. The formation of strikes and sabotage did not interest the Churchill and Eden governments. What did was limiting and rolling back the political influence/power communists held through the trade union movement.

Six months into the Churchill government, the ministry of labour produced a memorandum giving its appraisal of communist activities in industry. In it the ministry endorsed the current covert efforts against communists and ‘stressed the importance of avoiding any government interference with the unions in this matter’.¹⁴³ On that very critical subject, the report went into great detail about the reasoning behind the continued policy:

It is most important to remember that trade union opinion is extremely sensitive towards any semblance of a threat to its complete freedom and independence. Intervention by the government, however mild in form or benevolent in intention, would set up violent reactions in the trade unions, even in those which have pursued the most strongly of anti-communist policy. It is easy to guess at the political capital which could be made if it became known that the government was passing information or advice to one section of the trade union movement to use against another section of the movement. This would be constructed as an attempt to set one official against another and to split trade union solidarity for what would be described as reactionary purposes, and as an attack upon the democratic procedure by which trade union officials are elected.¹⁴⁴

It went on to state that on the whole ‘relations with the trade unions were good’ and that trade union leaders ‘were very forthcoming in their efforts to fight communist penetration’.¹⁴⁵ But the ultimate goal should not be forgotten: ‘the government must see to it that communist trickery does not capture the trade union movement’. In its final assessment, it stressed continued vigilance against ‘signs of communist intervention in the labour field’ and a willingness towards counter-action when such opportunities arose. However, it did again warn that governmental agencies ‘should not attempt to take a hand in the wider fight against the communist in the unions’, since ‘that fight is already being waged vigorously and with reasonable success, and the anti-communist forces would not be likely to welcome outside intervention in the struggle which might indeed react to their disadvantage’.¹⁴⁶ At a meeting of the Brook Committee in October 1952, Guy Liddell reaffirmed the passage of MI5’s confidential information to the labour ministry for dissemination to trade unionist allies. Speaking of the arrangement, Robert Gould said although it was an informal practice, because of concerns over secrecy, ‘this process … was going on all the time’. Gould went on to say that in respect of its anti-communist activities, ‘the Ministry of Labour were already taking more action than was generally known or talked about’. Such actions included directing trade unionists to discredit ‘those advocating extreme measures’.¹⁴⁷

A fundamental problem the government had to deal with was the exuberance and over-eagerness of leaders of the trade union movement. A key facet of the government’s plan to fight communism hinged on these anti-communist unionists. MI5 and the ministry of labour both relied on them as the vanguard in the war waging within the trade union movement. But past experiences, particularly with the likes of Deakin, had made them come to the realisation that ‘TU leaders could not be trusted where their own interests were concerned’. With this in mind, the security service rebuked a TUC attempt to liaise directly with the agency. ‘It would be quite impossible for us to enter into any kind of exchange which might facilitate the task of the TUC in getting rid of their communists’, Liddell determined, since ‘they would be almost certain to misuse the information that was given to them, with possibly disastrous results’.¹⁴⁸ This wariness about using these trade unionists undoubtedly hindered the efforts by the government in this sector. To this point, by 1954 MI5 had assessed the situation of communists in trade unions as static. Despite covert governmental efforts to roll back communist influence, Dick White dolefully reported, ‘in the past six years the communists in the unions have held their ground surprisingly well’. White also acknowledged the CPGB had not been able to widen its power, stating the ‘party has broken little new ground and in the unions where its foothold was precarious’.¹⁴⁹ In a complete reversal of what occurred under Labour, the ministry of labour held a more optimistic opinion of the situation than the security service. Its representative on the Brook Committee, Robert Gould, reported communists were suffering ‘several severe defeats’ in the trade union movement.¹⁵⁰

In 1956, the security service produced a report that caused an immediate paradigm shift in the relevant governmental departments dealing with trade unions and communism. Descriptively titled ‘Industrial Unrest 1953–1955: The Role of the Communist Party’, it consisted of an overall assessment of the situation for the purpose of a re-evaluation of governmental policies concerning the topic. In certain governmental circles, its findings were quite shocking and, more than anything else, unexpected. The report began by setting the scene:

The past two years have seen an increase in industrial unrest in this country. There have been a number of major strikes, and though relations between employers and the unions have remained much the same, relations between the unions themselves have deteriorated. Responsibility for a substantial proportion of this unrest has been attributed to the British Communist Party both by the popular press and by responsible trade union opinion.¹⁵¹

After outlining its findings, the report stated in a very definitive and very unequivocal way what it ultimately discovered:

The examination shows that none of the strikes was directly inspired by the Communist Party and throughout the party’s industrial staff, work failed to measure up to its task. In some instances, the party was unaware that trouble was brewing in the particular industry, despite the presence of communists in many of the danger spots, and in other instances where the party had received warning it was slow both to appreciate the depth of feeling involved and to exploit its opportunities.¹⁵²

The authors of the report measured the lack of CPGB involvement as arising from a Machiavellian mindset in which the party operated. The central goal of the party in industrial affairs was to capture and consolidate positions of strength in the trade union movement as a first stage towards ‘the attainment of political power in the United Kingdom’. This turned out to be a completely accurate assessment.¹⁵³ Involvement with unofficial strikes was considered harmful to this objective because of the negative reactions the instigators of such strikes often received. The report made sure to emphasise that in the minds of the party the fomenting of industrial unrest was no more than a tactical method, not the main objective.

The rest of MI5’s findings held in the memorandum were not as sanguine. The report stated influence inside the trade union movement of the CPGB had been routinely underestimated. Although CPGB members averaged less than one in 500 of the entire trade union membership, communists controlled the executive committees of three national unions and held the post of thirteen general secretaries, and with ‘thirteen more the holder of this post had exhibited communist sympathies in recent years’. At executive committee level, communists held control over the Electrical Trade Union (a key industrial union with over 200,000 members), the Association of Scientific Workers and the Fire Brigades Union. It was also believed that the CPGB had sufficient members or sympathisers on the national executive bodies of the United Society of Boilermakers, Shipbuilders and Structural Workers, the Constructional Engineering Union and the Association of Building Technicians. Even more frightening was that at least one in eight of all trade union officials could now be classified ‘on the basis of recent evidence’ as either a communist or communist sympathiser.¹⁵⁴ In summation, the report marked communist penetration of the trade union movement as substantial and a vital security threat. This threat came not from communists’ capability to foment industrial unrest but from them accumulating legitimate influence inside the fifth estate.

The report came as a shock to the members of the Brook Committee; no one was more shocked than the committee chairman. During the Attlee years, Norman Brook had been a firm proponent of the belief that communists were behind a large number of unofficial strikes. After reading MI5’s assessment, he then proposed that a concerted effort be made to correct this misconception both inside the trade unions and to the public. Too much time had been misspent on the strike issue and not enough on the real danger of the growing communist influence. He declared it was now up to the committee to propose countermeasures to combat it. Speaking to the committee, Brook reminded them of the obvious. For reasons they all knew, and despite the increased threat, ‘the government could not take direct action to prevent further communist penetration of the trade unions themselves’.¹⁵⁵

On the sunnier side, Brook said evidence existed that leaders in the trade union movement felt they could do more to halt the spread of communist influence ‘if the rank and file knew which of the leading trade unionist were communists’. If the government gave them the names of communist trade unionists MI5 and Special Branch had collected, the trade unions leaders could disseminate them ‘to ensure that non-communist candidates were elected’. The committee suggested that the minister of labour could approach ‘certain trade union leaders in confidence’ with the information they desired. Alongside the constant eagerness of a number of trade union officials to do more, the committee also noted the ‘considerable propaganda’ being carried out in the unions by anti-communist organisations. The most notable were the Economic League, Common Cause and Aims of Industry. While the committee believed these bodies were achieving useful results, it understood their impact was limited since many trade unionists considered such groups as ‘bosses’ organizations’.

The committee then considered a new alternative which sought to bring a bipartisan measure to the problem. It was suggested that the Conservative government approach for assistance ‘the other parliamentary parties, in particular the Labour Party’, since it ‘had a keen interest in preventing the spread of communist influence in the unions’. It hoped the Labour Party ‘might be urged to take the communist challenge on a political level’. However, such a plan did have complications, since ‘it might lead to jealousy and ill-will between the industrial and political sides of the Labour movement’.¹⁵⁶

Alongside reinvigorating the Brook Committee, which had been dormant for many months, the MI5 report also spurred Minister of Labour Iain Macleod to gather several trade union leaders together. In July 1956, he met with Vincent Tewson (TUC general secretary), Tom Williamson (National Union of General and Municipal Workers general secretary) and Wilfred Heywood (National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers general secretary) to discuss communist influence in the trade union movement along the lines pointed out in the memorandum by the security service. Macleod described the meeting as ‘a very long and rather inconclusive discussion’. Although he classified his guests as ‘very fierce anti-communists’, he judged their influence as quite limited, only reaching ‘unions where communist influence is negligible’. The meeting did not reach a consensus, but the union leaders did express that they did not consider government inference to be the solution, stating ‘it was very much their battle’ to be fought.¹⁵⁷

Conclusion

Although more influential than in any other sector of British society, the successes of communists inside the trade union movement were by no means a threat to the UK from an existential standpoint. A comparison with the influence wielded by their compatriots in the Italian and French trade unions points to the fact that CPGB successes in the fourth estate were actually quite limited. The fact they sought to disrupt or topple the government through industrial action also did not hold much credence. But the question still remains: why did Attlee, his ministers and their trade union allies continue to persist in arguing the contrary?

Prior historians contended the realistic fear of the Soviet Union held by Attlee and his ministers gave credence to their behaviour. It was argued the Labour government’s actions came not from paranoia but from ‘clear-headed suspicions of subversions at home’.¹⁵⁸ Phillip Deery wrote that ‘communism, insofar as it was the central to the government’s evaluation of the London dock strike of 1949, was not an irrational concoction arising from fevered imaginings’.¹⁵⁹ More recently released governmental files (most notably the Liddell diaries opened to the public in 2002) showed such was not the case. This newer evidence helps to form a more accurate narrative, one showing Attlee and other Labour politicians simply disregarded MI5’s intelligence reports on the matter.

It is relatively easy to put a pessimistic spin on their actions. From the perspective of trade union leadership, attacks against internal communism did have their net benefits. Aside from the typical rhetoric against the ‘red menace’, trade union leaders had another reason to fear communist involvement in their movement. Much more than just the political beliefs of the communists inspired concern in many leaders. They disrupted the status quo and questioned the authority of the union hierarchy. Often communists were articulating the rank-and-file sentiments and grievances of the ordinary worker concerning the undemocratic nature of the union structure. Colin Davis argued that Arthur Deakin embodied this critique by using anti-communism as ‘part of a personal crusade to protect his political power within the TGWU’.¹⁶⁰ He used the issue of red infiltration to take the spotlight off the fact that through these unofficial strikes Deakin had lost de facto control over his own members and thus used the issue to request governmental support in reining in these rebels. His pleas for assistance allowed Attlee to despatch troops into the docks as liberators of the national interest, not as strike-breakers of the working man. Another problem that Deakin, and other trade union leaders of his ilk, routinely encountered was CPGB members questioning their close relationship with the state. Communist trade unionists were quick to point out the sycophantic allegiance organs such as the TUC and TGWU displayed towards government policies and directives. Criticising the close relationship, Arthur Horner stated in 1947 that the leaders of the TUC were nothing more than puppets of the current regime. When he reflected on the period, Vic Feather held no regrets for his leading part in the anti-communist campaign. He did not see himself leading a witch hunt but participating in a fair fight against his Marxist-Leninist-inclined compatriots.¹⁶¹

With the legislating of nationalisation, frustration fomented inside Labour, since the government’s policies received a backlash – not only from the Conservatives but also from one-time supporters inside the industrial sector. To Labour’s dismay and outrage, the unofficial strikes which occurred under the past National and Conservative governments continued unabated. It makes perfect sense that when seeking a reason for this continuation, Attlee and his ministers turned to the spectre of the ‘red peril’. As Labour was successfully eliminating the social conditions that bred communists and fomented Marxist revolution, these forces would inevitably lose viability. So, as the theory went: to halt the success of social democracy, the CPGB, using conspiratorial means, fomented strikes and work stoppages. If this was not the case, then the Attlee government had no one to blame for the industrial unrest. Speaking about Labour’s frustration after the Grimethorpe affair, the left-leaning Aneurin Bevan let loose a tirade:

It is necessary to tell some of our people in industry that they are beginning to lose heart, and that some of them appear to have achieved material prosperity in excess of their moral status. Some of them have got what they have got too easily, and they are in danger of throwing it away by a few months of dissipating anarchy what we have spent our lifetime in building up. We shall keep faith with the people but the people must keep faith with us.¹⁶²

Especially for the idealist Bevan, the indication that the people were losing faith in the socialist reforms must have come as an unfathomable notion. The belief in sinister forces conspiring against the national interest must have seemed a more plausible scenario. Industrial stoppages in the postwar era brought with them the question of how workers should behave in the newly nationalised industries. Here, Labour governmental attitudes did not reconcile with substantial segments of the trade union movement. Widespread unofficial strikes raised existential questions for Labour politicians ‘who believed that they were reconstructing economic and social relationships in a way that required a new morality’.¹⁶³ Hence, the use of anti-communist stereotyping by Labour essentially kept the government from admitting structural problems which its new economic reforms could not entirely alleviate.

Although MI5 consistently reported that communists were rarely instigating strikes, the Labour leadership continued to hold a different opinion. The Conservatives, in regards to Labour, took a very different view. Unlike their blindness towards treasonous upper-class penetration, the Conservatives were not shackled to the same societal blinders when examining communists of the working-class variety. That was the case when in government they chose a less confrontational response to the matter than their Labour predecessors. Part of this divergence had to do with a more complacent reliance of the Conservatives on following the guidance of MI5. When the security service reported that communists were not the instigators in industrial unrest, such reports were believed. This was not typically the case with the previous government, which often disregarded the advice of MI5, preferring to place increased emphasis on gut feelings rather than the facts of individual cases. After an examination of the media of the time and governmental documents, one does not find the same sense of urgency of an impending crisis under the leadership of Churchill and Eden. Worrisome industrial action was not less worrisome to the government. But now the communistic threat was shown not to be the cause of the situation. However, the opposite trend in the Labour leadership persisted into the 1960s. In 1966, following the lead of Clement Attlee, Prime Minister Harold Wilson once again blamed communist elements inside the trade union movement for industrial unrest. Angered after months of unconstructive negotiations during a seaworkers’ strike, Wilson took to the floor of the Commons to state the leaders of the strike had bowed to undemocratic pressures. Although he did not mention ‘communism’, the press and the public knew this is what he was alluding to. A few days later Wilson gave a list of eight names of union officials he claimed were communists or under the influence of the CPGB. Breaking with his party leader, Anthony Benn labelled Wilson’s actions as McCarthyite.¹⁶⁴

Starting from a highpoint at the end of the Second World War, communist influence inside the trade union movement remained static because of an onslaught of anti-communist measures, activities and propaganda. While communist membership decreased within the movement, the CPGB influence remained considerable.¹⁶⁵ Effectively, the battle remained a draw; neither side achieved the outright success it struggled to obtain over its foe. Such a stalemate favoured the anti-communist cause. By the late 1950s, communist elements in the trade union movement remained effectively contained, and right-leaning trade union leaders were still firmly at the helm of the movement.

Notes

1. 1.  Daily Herald, 15 December 1947, p. 1.

2. 2.  Audio interview by Fred Lindop with Jack Dash, MSS.371/QD7/Docks 1/10a/ii, MRC.

3. 3.  J Callaghan, ‘The plan to capture the British Labour Party and its paradoxical results, 1947–91’, Journal of Contemporary History, 20 (2005): 707–25, at p. 711.

4. 4.  A. Deighton, ‘Britain and Cold War, 1945–1955’, in Cambridge History of the Cold War vol. 2, ed. M. Leffler and O. Westad (Cambridge, 2017), 112–32, at p. 124.

5. 5.  W. Thompson, ‘British communists in the Cold War, 1947–52’, Contemporary British History, 15 (2001): 105–32, at p. 124.

6. 6.  N. Fishman, ‘The phoney Cold War in British trade unions’, Contemporary British History, 15 (2001): 83–104, at p. 96.

7. 7.  J. Callaghan, ‘Towards isolation: The Communist Party and the Labour government’, in Labour’s Promised Land?, ed. J. Fyrth (London, 1995), p. 108.

8. 8.  B. McCormick, Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry (London, 1979), pp. 180–1.

9. 9.  Gloucester Citizen, 29 September 1947, p. 1.

10. 10.  New York Times, 5 September 1947, p. E10. The editorial made news in the UK as well; see Liverpool Echo, 9 September 1947, p. 2.

11. 11.  Liddell diary, 1 October 1947.

12. 12.  Daily Herald, 10 October 1947, p. 3.

13. 13.  Nottingham Evening Post, 5 April 1947, p. 4.

14. 14.  New York Times, 15 September 1947, p. 5.

15. 15.  ‘The Grimethorpe Miners’, Socialist Standard, October 1947.

16. 16.  Sphere, 6 September 1947, p. 5.

17. 17.  A. Horner, Incorrigible Rebel (London, 1960), p. 185.

18. 18.  Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 14 January 1949, p. 1.

19. 19.  G. Orwell, ‘Burnham’s view of the contemporary world struggle’, 29 March 1947, in The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, vol. 4, 1945–50, ed. S. Orwell and I. Angus (London, 1970), p. 320.

20. 20.  Truth, 12 September 1947, p. 5.

21. 21.  Coventry Evening Telegraph, 5 September 1947, p. 1.

22. 22.  N. Fishman, ‘Phoney Cold War’, p. 89.

23. 23.  Morgan Phillips, ‘The communist: We have been warned’, press release, 22 December 1947.

24. 24.  Defend Democracy, TUC pamphlet, 1948.

25. 25.  Vincent Tewson, ‘Trade union movement and communism’, 24 November 1948, MSS 292-777.5-1, MRC.

26. 26.  L. Williams to Vic Feather, 4 January 1949, MSS 292-777.5-1, TUC, MRC.

27. 27.  ‘Statement on trade unions and communism’, 17 February 1949, MSS 292-777.5-1, TUC, MRC.

28. 28.  H.W. Andrews to Vincent Tewson, 29 November 1948, MSS 292-777.5-1, TUC, MRC.

29. 29.  Leo Crawford to Tewson, 15 November 1948, MSS 292-777.5-1, TUC, MRC.

30. 30.  Tewson to Ray Boyfield, 3 February 1949, MSS 292-777.5-2, TUC, MRC.

31. 31.  Yorkshire Post, 3 February 1949, p. 1.

32. 32.  Northern Despatch, 3 February 1949, p. 1.

33. 33.  P.H. Wadge to Boyfield, 7 April 1949, MSS 292-777.5-2, TUC, MRC.

34. 34.  Tewson to Boyfield, 3 February 1949, MSS 292-777.5-2; Ray Boyfield to P.H. Wade, 1 March 1949, MSS 292-777.5-2, TUC, MRC.

35. 35.  S. Horsfield to Tewson, 4 August 1949, MSS 292-777.5-5, TUC, MRC.

36. 36.  P. Deery and N. Redfern, ‘No lasting peace? Labor, communism and the Cominform: Australia and Great Britain, 1945–50’, Labour History, 38 (2005): 63–86, at p. 78.

37. 37.  H. Pelling, The British Communist Party (London, 1958), p. 154.

38. 38.  For an in-depth analysis for Deakin’s anti-communist positions, see V. Allen, Trade Union Leadership (London, 1957), pp. 274–88.

39. 39.  Belfast Newsletter, 12 July 1949, p. 6.

40. 40.  Herald Express, 24 May 1949, p. 1.

41. 41.  Daily Herald, 27 May 1949, p. 5.

42. 42.  W.E. Brough to Tewson, 3 February 1949, MSS 292-777.5-3, TUC, MRC.

43. 43.  Daily Mirror, 14 February 1949, p. 1; Belfast Newsletter, 14 February 1949, p. 4.

44. 44.  C.A. Grossmith to H.B. Kemmis, 26 October 1949, MSS 292-770-5, TUC, MRC.

45. 45.  E. Silver, Victor Feather, TUC (London, 1973), p. 67.

46. 46.  Silver, Victor Feather, p. 99.

47. 47.  Daily Herald, 27 February 1952, p. 2.

48. 48.  V. Silverman, Imagining Internationalism in American and British Labor, 1939–49 (Chicago, IL, 1999), p. 87.

49. 49.  A. Brogi, Confronting America (Chapel Hill, NC, 2011), p. 100.

50. 50.  H. Wilford, ‘American labour diplomacy and Cold War Britain’, Journal of Contemporary History, 37 (2002): 44–65, at p. 64.

51. 51.  Wilford, The CIA, the British Left, p. 10.

52. 52.  D. MacShane, International Labour and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford, 1992), p. 121.

53. 53.  P. Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War (Stanford, CA, 1988), p. 91.

54. 54.  Quoted in Weiler, British Labour, p. 112.

55. 55.  MacShane, International Labour, p. 126.

56. 56.  A. Carew, ‘The schism within the World Federation of Trade Unions: Government and trade-union diplomacy’, International Review of Social History, 29 (1984): 297–335, at p. 301.

57. 57.  Weiler, British Labour, p. 144.

58. 58.  Trades Union Congress, Report of the 1948 Annual Trades Union Congress, p. 448.

59. 59.  Alfred Gee to A. Gordon, 23 November 1948, TNA FO 371/72856.

60. 60.  P. Weiler, ‘The United States, international labor, and the Cold War: The breakup of the World Federation of Trade Unions’, Diplomatic History, 5 (1981): 19.

61. 61.  M. Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945 (London, 1960), p. 221.

62. 62.  Working Party report of Gen 226, ‘Security measures against the encroachments by communists or fascists in the United Kingdom’, 26 May 1948, TNA CAB 130/37.

63. 63.  ‘Strong influence of active minority’, The Times, 10 February 1948.

64. 64.  Gen 226 report, ‘Security measures against encroachments by communists or fascists in the United Kingdom’, 26 May 1948, TNA CAB 130/37.

65. 65.  Daily Mirror, 9 April 1948, p. 3.

66. 66.  Gen 226 meeting minutes, 1 June 1948, TNA CAB 130/37.

67. 67.  Catholics and Communism, CPGB pamphlet by William Gallacher, 1948.

68. 68.  George Isaacs to Clement Attlee, 9 August 1950, TNA PREM 8/1276.

69. 69.  Committee minutes of GEN 231, 11 May 1948, TNA CAB 130/37.

70. 70.  Official Committee on Communism (Home) minutes, 22 June 1951, TNA CAB 134/737.

71. 71.  ‘The British ministry of propaganda’, Independent, 26 February 1995.

72. 72.  ‘Member of the Grand Council and supporters of Common Cause’, MSS 292-770-6 part 2, TUC, MRC.

73. 73.  ‘Origins and establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department, 1946–48’, report by Library and Records Department, August 1995. Copy located in Mayhew 4/2.

74. 74.  John Brunett to Victor Feather, 17 January 1949, MSS 292-770-5, TUC, MRC.

75. 75.  L. Smith, ‘Covert British propaganda: The Information Research Department: 1947–77’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 9 (1980): 67–83, at pp. 76–7.

76. 76.  K. Jeffery and P. Hennessy, States of Emergency (London, 1983), p. 196.

77. 77.  Cabinet meeting conclusions, 2 June 1949, TNA CAB 128/15.

78. 78.  Broadcast talk by the minister of labour, 11 June 1949, TNA LAB 43/150.

79. 79.  Quoted in Jeffery and Hennessy, Emergency, p. 203.

80. 80.  Hansard, HC, vol. 466, c. 2593 (8 July 1949).

81. 81.  Jeffery and Hennessy, Emergency, p. 204.

82. 82.  Daily Herald, 4 July 1949, p. 1.

83. 83.  Hansard, HC, vol. 467, c. 441 (13 July 1949).

84. 84.  Hansard, HC, vol. 467, c. 447 (13 July 1949).

85. 85.  Hansard, HC, vol. 467, cc. 452–3 (13 July 1949).

86. 86.  Davis, Waterfront, p. 191.

87. 87.  Jeffery and Hennessy, Emergency, p. 205.

88. 88.  Northern Whig, 4 July 1949, p. 1.

89. 89.  Liddell diary, 4 July 1949.

90. 90.  Liddell diary, 15 July 1949.

91. 91.  Liddell diary, 7 July 1949.

92. 92.  ‘Communism and the Dock Strikes’, undated and unsigned, TNA HO 45/25577.

93. 93.  Frank Newsam to Gilmour Jenkins, TNA HO 45/25577.

94. 94.  M.J.E. Bagot to S.H.E. Burley, 28 July 1949, TNA HO 45/25577.

95. 95.  S.H.E. Burley to M.J.E. Bagot, 2 August 1949, TNA HO 45/25577.

96. 96.  Belfast Telegraph, 20 April 1950, p. 7.

97. 97.  ‘Report on British Communist Party’, April 1950, TNA HO 45/25577.

98. 98.  Hansard, HC, vol. 474, c. 331 (20 April 1950).

99. 99.  Belfast Newsletter, 28 September 1950, p. 5; Hansard, HC, vol. 478, cc. 1405–8 (15 September 1950).

100. 100.  Northern Whig, 29 September 1950, p. 1.

101. 101.  Hansard, HC, vol. 478, c. 1859 (17 October 1950).

102. 102.  Cabinet conclusions, 14 September 1950, TNA CAB 128/18.

103. 103.  D. Howell, Respectable Radicals (London, 1999), p. 347.

104. 104.  Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 15 July 1950, p. 1.

105. 105.  Hansard, HC, vol. 478, cc. 35–7 (24 July 1950).

106. 106.  Liddell diary, 26 July 1950.

107. 107.  Newcastle Journal, 25 July 1950, p. 1; Nottingham Journal, 25 July 1950, p. 4.

108. 108.  Nottingham Journal, 31 July 1950, p. 1.

109. 109.  Aberdeen Press and Journal, 2 September 1950, p. 1.

110. 110.  Coventry Evening Telegraph, 1 September 1950, p. 5.

111. 111.  William Gallacher to director of public prosecutions, 11 September 1950; Gallacher to Vincent Tewson, 11 September 1950, MSS 292-770-6 part 1, TUC, MRC.

112. 112.  Gloucester Citizen, 22 September 1950, 5.

113. 113.  Daily Herald, 29 September 1948, p. 1.

114. 114.  Sheffield Telegraph, 19 September 1950, p. 4.

115. 115.  Liddell diary, 7 February 1951.

116. 116.  Liddell diary, 7 February 1951.

117. 117.  Liddell diary, 4 October 1950.

118. 118.  Liddell diary, 18 September 1950.

119. 119.  Liddell diary, 12 October 1950.

120. 120.  G. Bennett, Six Moments of Crisis (Oxford, 2013), p. 32.

121. 121.  Liddell diary, 27 July 1950; cabinet conclusions, 20 July 1950, TNA CAB 128/18.

122. 122.  Cabinet conclusions, 14 September 1950, TNA CAB 128/18.

123. 123.  Cabinet conclusions, 18 September 1950, TNA CAB 128/18.

124. 124.  Sheffield Telegraph, 6 October 1950, p. 5.

125. 125.  J.T. McKelvey, ‘Legal aspects of compulsory arbitration in Great Britain’, Cornell Law Review, 7 (1952): 403–18, at p. 413.

126. 126.  I. Beesley, The Official History of the Cabinet Secretaries (London, 2016), p. 48.

127. 127.  H. Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions since 1889: Volume III (Oxford, 1994), p. 405.

128. 128.  Davis, Waterfront, p. 203.

129. 129.  Statement by the general secretary to the General Executive Council, 8 March 1951, MSS I26/TG2, TUC, MRC.

130. 130.  J. Dash, Good Morning, Brothers! (London, 1969), p. 83.

131. 131.  C. Andrew, The Defence of the Realm (London, 2009), p. 408.

132. 132.  Yorkshire Post, 26 February 1952, p. 1.

133. 133.  Yorkshire Post, 17 April 1952, p. 8.

134. 134.  Cabinet conclusions, 18 September 1952, TNA CAB 128/25.

135. 135.  Cabinet conclusions, 19 February 1953, TNA CAB 128/26.

136. 136.  Cabinet conclusions, 20 October 1954, TNA CAB 128/27.

137. 137.  Cabinet conclusions, 6 December 1955, TNA CAB 128/129.

138. 138.  Minutes of MI5 director general’s meeting, 6 February 1951, TNA KV 4/473.

139. 139.  Minutes of MI5 director general’s meeting, 13 February 1951, TNA KV 4/473.

140. 140.  Official Committee on Communism (Home) minutes, 19 January 1954, TNA CAB 134/739.

141. 141.  Dick White to Frank Newsam, 28 September 1954, TNA HO 45/25577.

142. 142.  P. Dorey and D. Aldcroft, British Conservatism and Trade Unionism, 1954–1964 (London, 2009), p. 66.

143. 143.  Official Committee on Communism (Home) minutes, 24 March 1952, TNA CAB 134/737.

144. 144.  Memorandum by the Ministry of Labour and National Service, ‘The Communists and Trade Unions’, 3 March 1952, TNA CAB 134/737.

145. 145.  Official Committee on Communism (Home) minutes, 24 March 1952, TNA CAB 134/737.

146. 146.  Memorandum by the Ministry of Labour and National Service, ‘The Communists and Trade Unions’, 3 March 1952, TNA 134/737.

147. 147.  Official Committee on Communism (Home) minutes, 20 October 1952, TNA CAB 134/737.

148. 148.  Liddell diary, 27 January 1953.

149. 149.  Dick White to Newsam, 28 September 1954, TNA HO 45/25577.

150. 150.  Liddell diary, 20 October 1954.

151. 151.  MI5 report, ‘Industrial unrest 1953–1955: The role of the Communist Party’, 27 March 1956, CAB 134/1194.

152. 152.  MI5 report, ‘Industrial unrest 1953–1955’, 27 March 1956, CAB 134/1194.

153. 153.  R. Samuel, The Lost World of British Communism (London, 2006), p. 204.

154. 154.  MI5 report, ‘Industrial unrest 1953–1955’, 27 March 1956, CAB 134/1194.

155. 155.  Official Committee on Communism (Home), minutes, 13 April 1956, TNA CAB 134/1194.

156. 156.  Official Committee on Communism (Home), minutes, 13 April 1956, TNA CAB 134/1194.

157. 157.  Iain Macleod, ‘Communism and trade unions’, 5 July 1956, TNA CAB 134/1194.

158. 158.  P. Deery, ‘A very present menace? Attlee, Communism and the Cold War’, Australian Journal of Government and History, 44 (1998): 69–93, at p. 70.

159. 159.  Deery, ‘A very present menace?’, p. 88.

160. 160.  Davis, Waterfront, p. 124.

161. 161.  Silver, Victor Feather, TUC, pp. 101–2.

162. 162.  Quoted in Howell, Respectable Radicals, p. 347.

163. 163.  Davis, Waterfront, p. 347.

164. 164.  D. Sandbrook, White Heat (London, 2006), p. 282.

165. 165.  See R. Stevens, ‘Cold War politics: Communism and anti-communism in the trade unions’, in British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The Post-War Compromise, 1945–1964, ed. J. McIlroy, N. Fishman and A. Campbell (London, 1999), pp. 168–91.