By way of introduction, at one time a seal may well have been considered sufficient to bind without a signature. For instance, the National Heritage Centre for Horseracing & Sporting Art in Newmarket, England, is in possession of the original indenture, dated 28 March 1654, between the Council of New Sarum and Sir Edward Bayton for the establishment of a prize fund of £320 to provide a silver-gilt cup to the value of £18 for an annual horserace on Salisbury Plain. It has been known as the City Bowl since 1813. This race was the only one that appeared in the first Historical List of 1727, and has been run ever since on a proper racecourse. The indenture is on vellum with a wax seal. There are no signatures.
The impression of a seal on documents has a long history, especially in relation to wills, and their use continues today. An early case after the passing of the Statute of Frauds where a seal was the subject of a decision is that of Lemayne v Stanley,1 where the devisor wrote his will in his own hand, and added his seal to the will, but did not sign it. It was unanimously held that this was a good will because he had written it himself and identified himself in the will by name. There was disagreement as to whether the imprint of the seal was sufficient to satisfy the requirement for a signature. Three members of the court, North, Wyndham and Charlton JJ, considered signing was no more than a mark, and sealing was a sufficient mark. The report is ambiguous and states that the majority held that the mark was sufficient, because ‘for signum is no more than a mark, and sealing is a sufficient mark that this is his will’ (emphasis in the original). The second part of this sentence may be construed to mean either that the sealing was sufficient to authenticate that it was the devisor’s will, or that the sealing was sufficient because the devisor wrote the will in his own hand and clearly identified himself.2
This decision may well not have been acceptable to many judges, for in Smith v Evans3 Lord Chief Baron Parker and Clive and Smythe BB denounced it as ‘a very strange doctrine’. It was considered that signing with a seal would open the possibilities of forgery, a comment that reflected a change in judicial attitude from the Middle Ages, indicating the reduced importance given to a seal in England and Wales. In a later case, that of Warneford v Warneford,4 Raymond CJ ruled that the sealing of a will was also a signing within the Statute of Frauds 1677. The report of this case is merely a statement of the decision, which does not make it a persuasive authority. In any event, this case predated the comments made in Smith v Evans. The reporting of decisions such as this were clearly in the mind of a later Chief Justice when he commented upon this issue in Ellis v Smith.5 Willes CJ quashed the notion that a seal could be a substitute for a signature:
Nor do I think, sealing is to be considered as signing; and I declare so now, because, if that question ever comes before me, I shall not think myself precluded from weighing it thoroughly and decreeing, that it is not signing, notwithstanding obiter dicta, which in many cases were nunquam dicta; but barely the words of reporters; for upon examination I have found many of the sayings ascribed to that great man, Lord Chief Justice Holt, were never said by him.6
Two arguments were put forward to distrust a seal. In Grayson v Atkinson,7 the Lord Chancellor suggested that it was not possible to determine whose seal was used:
how can it be said, that putting a seal to it would be a sufficient signing? For any one may put a seal; no particular evidence arises from that seal: common seals are alike, and one man’s may be like another’s; no certainty or guard therefore arises from thence.8
Another reason for rejecting the use of a seal was given by Sir John Strange,9 suggesting that the nature of a seal was such that it cannot serve to identify an act:
that sealing is signing, I am not convinced; for sealing identifies nothing; it carries no character … and most seals are affixed by the stationers, who prepare the paper.
It seems the court in the case of Ellis v Smith had sufficient weight of authority, comprising, as it did, the Lord Chancellor, Master of the Rolls, Chief Justice and Chief Baron, to prevent future submissions that a seal could be a substitute for a signature.
A further variation of the use of a seal occurred in the case of Re Emerson’s Goods,10 where a handwritten document ended with the words ‘Signed, sealed, and delivered by me, the first day of February, 1881’. The seal marked, with his initials, was added in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, and the testator also placed one of his fingers on the wax impression and stated before the witnesses ‘This is my last will, and this is my hand and seal’. Warren J granted probate on the basis that the testator used the words ‘this is my hand’, intending this statement to be his signature. This decision was followed by Warren J in the case of R Lemon’s Goods,11 where the testator was too ill to write, so he stamped his initials in wax on the paper in the presence of the witnesses.
Seals used to be attached to an indenture respecting an interest in property, and Lord Eldon LC took up the discussion relating to the use of a seal in the case of Wright v Wakeford,12 where indentures were signed, sealed and delivered. However, the memorandum of attestation stated only that they were signed and delivered. Bearing in mind the value of the estate, at £15,988, this became a technical issue of great importance to both parties. After the death of Thomas Wood the elder, who was a party to the indenture, the two attesting witnesses endorsed a further memorandum, stating they witnessed the signing at the same time as the original document was sealed and delivered. Eldon LC rejected the proposition that a subsequent attestation was acceptable. He accepted that the document may have been signed, sealed and delivered, but it was not attested to this effect. As a consequence, he held that the members of a jury could not presume that the act of signing was done in the presence of the attesting witnesses. In comparison to the other cases cited in relation to whether a seal is sufficient as a signature, the decision in this case was decided upon the technical issue of regularity of the attestation. Lord Eldon took the opportunity, at 458–459, to make further observations about the use of a seal as a means of authentication:
It is true, at one time it was decided, that sealing was signing (Lemayne v Stanly, 3 Lev. 1. Warneford v Warneford, 2 Sir. 764); and when it was urged, that the Legislature meant more than sealing, first, from the circumstance, that sealing is not mentioned as to Wills: secondly, as the Legislature must have proposed some evidence from the hand-writing of the party, the objection was, that a person may sign by his mark: an act affording no material testimony; and upon such reasoning it was decided originally, that sealing was signing: but upon a review of that the contrary has been held for a long time; and, so far as sealing from being equivalent to signing, that it is determined, that sealing is not necessarily; and that sealing without signing is not a sufficient execution of a Will (see Ellis v Smith, 1 Ves, jun. 11; and that attestation by a mark is good, Harrison v Harrison, Addy v Grix, 8 Ves. 185, 405): the converse holding as to a deed; which cannot be without sealing and delivery: if signed, it may be a writing: but, if delivered, it may be a good deed, whether signed, or not, and, if it is to be executed under a power with signature and sealing, both are required.
This decision may have been unique to the facts of the case given the value of the estate in question, and can be distinguished from Re Emerson’s Goods13 for this reason.
By comparison, another technicality arose in Lord Lovelace’s Case,14 where a swaynemoote roll was authenticated with one seal by an officer of the forest by the assent of all the verders, regarders and other officers.15 In this instance, it was held that a single seal was a good obligation of them all. Similarly, in Ball v Dunsterville16 one partner executed a deed for himself and his partner, by authority of the partner and in his presence. This act was a sufficient execution, even though only one seal was used. In Cooch v Goodman,17 two people entered into a lease in their capacity as governors of a hospital. The defendant signed the lease and added his seal, and the lessors affixed a common seal to the lease, but did not sign it. No decision was made, because the seal was that of a corporation, not of the individuals, which meant the wrong parties initiated the action. Lord Denman CJ commented, at 598, that a single seal might serve a number of people:
It is true that one piece of wax may serve as a seal for several persons, if each of them impress it himself, or one for all, by proper authority, or in the presence of all, as was held in Ball v Dunsterville (4 T.R. 313), following Lord Lovelace’s Case (W. Jones, 268).
More recently, the case of First National Securities Ltd v Jones18 considered the effect on a legal charge sealed with a circle printed on the document containing the letters ‘L.S.’ with the signature of the first defendant affixed across the seal. It was held to be sufficiently executed where the seal had been placed with the intention of serving the purpose of a seal. Buckely LJ indicated at 118 C–D:
it is a very familiar feature nowadays of documents which are intended to be executed as deeds that they do not have any wax, or even wafer, seal attached to them, but have printed at the spot where formerly the seal would probably have been placed, a printed circle, which is sometimes hatched and sometimes the letters ‘L.S.’ within it, which is intended to serve the purpose of a seal if the document is delivered as the deed of the party executing it.
In the present case there is not only the circle with the letters ‘L.S.’ within it upon the document, printed as part of the printed version of the document, but also there is the feature that the mortgagor has placed his signature across the circle. In my judgment those features and the attestation, in the absence of any contrary evidence, are sufficient evidence to establish that the document was executed by the first defendant as his deed.
Goff LJ emphasized at 119 E that the intent behind the act was important: ‘In my judgment, in this day and age, we can, and we ought to, hold that a document purporting to be a deed is capable in law of being such although it has no more than an indication where the seal should be’, and Sir David Cairns suggested at 121 B what the modern view might be on the use of seals: ‘Moreover, while in 1888 the printed indication of a locus sigilli was regarded as being merely the place where a seal was to be affixed, I have no doubt that it is now regarded by most business people and ordinary members of the public as constituting the seal itself.’ The decision reached in this more recent case mirrors the approach taken by the members of the court in Re Sandilands,19 where a deed had pieces of green ribbon attached to places where the seals should be, but no wax or other material to receive an impression. It was held there was sufficient evidence that the deed was sealed. Bovill CJ observed, at 413, ‘Here is something attached to this deed which may have been intended for a seal, but which from its nature is incapable of retaining an impression’, while Byles J also offered the opinion at 413 that ‘The sealing of a deed need not be by means of a seal; it may be done with the end of a ruler or anything else’.
Despite the reluctance of some judges to accept a seal as a signature in the eighteenth century, the members of the Exchequer of Pleas in the nineteenth century decided a seal was sufficient in relation to office copies from the Insolvent Court, being a court of record, in the case of Doe d. Phillips, Jones, and Morris v Evans and Lloyd.20 It was possible for an office copy to be adduced as evidence without further proof, although it had to be signed by an officer of the court. Having discussed the relevant statutory provisions in his judgment, Bayley B came to the conclusion that where an office copy was sealed with the seal of the Insolvent Debtors’ Court, ‘The seal of the Court then becomes the signature of the Court and of the officer’.21 It seems that this decision provided for the authentication of the insolvency petition either where the document contained the signature of the officer or his deputy and the seal of the court, or where the document only contained the seal of the court. Given the comment by Bayley B, it appears that the seal of the court was sufficient for the purpose of authentication. In R v St Paul, Covent Garden Inhabitants,22 relating to the settlement of an illegitimate child, it was not considered necessary that an order of the justices be sealed with wax. Two Justices of the Peace signed the order. The order was made on a pre-printed form. From time to time the parish officers of St Martin in the Fields caused a printer to print a large number of the forms, and on each sheet a stationer was employed to impress two marks in ink with wooden blocks, and these impressions, when made at the foot, were intended to serve as seals for the justices when they signed such orders. The court in the Quarter Sessions held that the impression in ink made by such blocks was a sufficient seal to make the order, and when signed and delivered by the justices, it constituted a good and valid order.
In the United States, seals have generally been upheld, although there seems to have been a divergence between adopting the word ‘seal’ as an acknowledgement that a document has been sealed, and refusing to accept a document has been sealed unless an impression of a seal has been affixed.23 Recognition of the Japanese seal is illustrated in the Pennsylvanian case of Zenith Radio Corporation v Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd,24 where Becker DJ commented, at 1224, that a Japanese seal ‘should be given weight equivalent to a signature’. The 1916 New York case of Matter of the Probate of the Will of Severance25 dealt with an unusual form of seal. The testator affixed a holiday seal (containing the inscription ‘Merry Christmas. American Red Cross, 1912 Happy New Year’) to his will and inscribed it with his initials. It was held to constitute a subscription where the testator intended the holiday seal and inscription as a signature.
In the same way that a mark is accepted as a form of signature, in what seems to be a unique case in England the impression of a thumb smeared in ink was accepted as a signature, although Langton J commented that the method did not commend itself to him.26 Thumb prints are also accepted in South Africa,27 and in China where, if a party affixes a fingerprint to a contract, it has the same effect as a signature or stamp.28
The legal constraints relating to commerce were gradually amended during the nineteenth century, and the case of Saunderson v Jackson29 at the beginning of that century serves to illustrate how the judges began to deal with the practical issues relating to contractual disputes where the ‘signature’ was affixed by the use of technology. In this instance, a bill of parcels was delivered, part of which was printed with ‘London. Bought of Jackson and Hankin, distillers, No 8 Oxford Street’ and there followed in manuscript writing ‘1000 gallons of gin, 1 in 5 gin £350 7s’. A dispute occurred, and Lord Eldon articulated the single question as follows: ‘Whether if a man be in the habit of printing instead of writing his name, he may not be said to sign by his printed name as well as his written name?’30 In this instance, the bill of parcels was not considered to be of sufficient evidence on its own to be viewed as a note or memorandum of the contract, although a subsequent letter signed by one of the parties acted to connect the two documents, and thus took the matter outside the Statute of Frauds.
The later case of Schneider v Norris31 distinguished the facts in Saunderson v Jackson.32 In this instance, Messrs John Schneider bought cotton yarn and piece goods from Thomas Norris, who acted as agents. The bill of parcels read as follows: ‘London, 24 October 1812. Messrs John Schneider and Co bought of Thomas Norris and Co, Agents. Cotton yarn and piece goods. No 3 Freeman’s Court, Cornhill’, all of which was printed, except the words ‘Messrs John Schneider and Co’, which were handwritten by an agent or employee of the defendant. The defendant refused to deliver the yarn. At the subsequent trial, the defendants did not accept that a contract had been formed, and relied on the absence of a note or memorandum in writing of the contract, as required by the Statute of Frauds 1677. Lord Ellenborough CJ overruled this objection and Schneider and Co obtained a verdict. On appeal, Lord Ellenborough reiterated his opinion at the trial, and considered that the printed name of the defendants, as it appeared on the bill, was recognized as a signature. This occurred when the name ‘Messrs John Schneider and Co’ was added to the bill of parcels that included the printed name of Norris and Co. By writing the name of the firm on the bill, Schneiders identified themselves with the other party to the transaction. Le Blanc and Bayley JJ concurred with this decision, and Dampier J added that the act of a person handwriting the name of the plaintiffs on the bill served to authenticate it as a memorandum of the bargain struck between the parties, and went on to explain, at 290: ‘The defendant has ratified the sale to Schneider and Co by inserting their name as buyer to a paper in which he recognizes himself as seller’. Thus the names of the two firms on the same bill provided evidence of the agreement.
There is a fine distinction between these two cases. The additional manuscript comments to the bill of parcels in Saunderson v Jackson referred to the price and quantity of the order. This was not considered sufficient evidence, in the absence of the later signed letter, to demonstrate that a contract existed. In comparison, the additional manuscript comments in the bill of parcels in Schneider v Norris contained the name of one of the parties to the contract. This meant that both parties to the contract in Schneider v Norris were identified in the bill of parcels, and this was sufficient to establish a commercial relationship between them.33
At the same time as these cases were being determined, another problem of a similar nature occurred in circumstances where one of the parties retained evidence of the orders they received in loose cases and memorandum books. The 1809 case of Allen v Bennet34 illustrated the problem. Wright, the agent for Bennett, agreed to sell goods to Allen, writing the orders into a book owned by Allen. The book was described as ‘a sort of waste book, containing various memoranda of different natures’. Mr Allen’s name was not written upon or in any part of the book. Bennett failed to deliver the goods. It was considered that the orders entered by the agent for Bennett were made in that capacity, and in conjunction with the exchange of correspondence between the parties, this was sufficient as a memorandum and a signature by Bennett. Mansfield CJ observed a wider question that occupied the courts on this issue at the time when he said, at 176:
every one knows it is the daily practice of the Court of Chancery to establish contracts signed by one person only, and yet a court of equity can no more dispense with the statute of frauds than a court of law can, there is no reason therefore to set aside the verdict, and the rule must be discharged.
A similar set of facts occurred in 1856 in the case of Sarl v Bourdillon,35 where the defendant, about to go to India, ordered goods from the plaintiff. Having selected the goods, a list of them was entered into an order book retained for the purpose, with the words ‘Order Book’ printed in gold letters on the outside and the names ‘Sarl & Son’ written on the flyleaf at the beginning. At the foot of the entry, the plaintiff wrote the name and address of the defendant. The defendant failed to pay for the goods, and claimed there was no sufficient memorandum of the sale as required by s17 of the Statute of Frauds. It was held that the names of the contracting parties sufficiently appeared to satisfy the statute.36 The judgments did not explain the reasoning for this decision. Jervis CJ indicated at the end of the submissions by counsel that there was only one point worth considering at length, and merely commented, at 195, that ‘We also think that the names of the contracting parties sufficiently appear, to satisfy the statute of frauds’. Cresswell J delivered the judgment of the court more fully at a later date, and he said, at 195:
In this case, inasmuch as the defendant declined to go to the jury, and insisted that there was no evidence of a memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds, it may be assumed that the defendant wrote his name in the plaintiff’s book, intending it as a signature to an order to the plaintiffs, whose order-book it was, and whose names were written in the beginning of it in the usual way. This, with the observations made in the course of argument, disposes of all the objections raised.
It is interesting to note that Cresswell J mentioned that the name ‘Sarl & Son’ was written in the front of the order book ‘in the usual way’. It might be inferred from this comment that Cresswell J was referring to the usual method of taking an order, and that it was common knowledge that notebooks containing pages to enter orders were widely used. If this was the case, the importance of this decision should not go unnoticed, because a decision the other way would have caused business people to alter the way they conducted business, and it is usually the case that judges in England and Wales looked to the common custom in reaching a decision.37
The use of a printed name was also challenged in the case of Evans v Hoare38 where an employer authorized a clerk to draw up a contract of employment, which was signed by the employee, as follows:
5, Campbell-terrace, Cannhill Road, Leytonstone, E. Feb 19, 1890. Messrs Hoare, Marr, and Co., 26, 29, Budge Row, London, EC. Gentlemen, In consideration of your advancing my salary to the sum of £130 per annum, I hereby agree to continue my engagement in your office for three years, from and commencing January 1, 1890, at a salary at the rate of £130 per annum as aforesaid, payable monthly as hitherto. Yours obediently, George E Evans.
The members of the jury found a verdict for Mr Evans, but the assistant judge of the Mayor’s Court did not accept there was a memorandum signed by the firm in accordance with s4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677, so gave judgment for the defendants. This decision was reversed on appeal on the basis that the clerk was authorized by the firm to draw up the document.39 Reference was made to the firm by the use of ‘your’ in the text and the name of the firm was included at the top of the document. The comments by Cave J reflected the difference in procedure between the passing of the statute and the time this case was heard:
The Statute of Frauds was passed at a period when the legislature was somewhat inclined to provide that cases should be decided according to fixed rules, rather than to leave it to the jury to consider the effect of the evidence in each case. This, no doubt, arose to a certain extent from the fact that in those days the plaintiff and the defendant were not competent witnesses … No doubt, in attempting to frame a principle, one is obliged to depart somewhat from the strict lines of the statutes.40
A variation of this theme, which also indicated the way people conducted their daily business, is illustrated by the case of Jones Brothers v Joyner,41 where an order for hops was written down in a notebook owned by the Jones Brothers, and Joyner signed the order. The paper book in which this order was placed was, in turn, slipped into a leather cover, upon which the name ‘James Jones’ was stamped. When the paper memorandum book was full, it could be withdrawn and a fresh one inserted in the same leather cover. Mr Joyner contended there was no sufficient memorandum to satisfy s4 of the Statute of Frauds, as re-enacted by s4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, because the name of the plaintiff did not appear in the memorandum signed by him. Jones Brothers contended that the name on the cover constituted a sufficient signing. Sir Richard Harington held that the cover and the book were two distinct articles, distinguishing the decision in the case of Sarl v Bourdillon. The decision at first instance was reversed on appeal before Darling and Bucknell JJ. In reaching his decision, Darling J focused on the relationship between the notebook and the cover, at 769:
when the memorandum was made they were only one. Take the case of the letter and envelope. First of all the letter is written, it is placed in an envelope, and the name of the other person appears on the envelope. In such a case there may be two distinct articles, which are used as one. Further, I think it makes no difference that the words ‘order book’ do not appear. In fact, the orders were placed in a book which was used for that purpose.42
Hall VC in Tourret v Cripps,43 where Mr Cripps wrote in his own hand on a sheet of memorandum paper an offer to lease property, followed the principles set out in Schneider v Norris.44 The memorandum was not signed, but contained, at its head, the words ‘From Richd. L Cripps’ and his address. Tourret accepted the offer, and was subsequently granted judgment for specific performance. The letter was in the handwriting of Cripps, it contained his name and it was actually sent by him, thus the court inferred that his intention was to grant the lease, and his name at the head of the letter authenticated this intention.45 In Ireland, the members of the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in the case of Casey v Irish Intercontinental Bank Limited,46 where a memorandum for the sale of a property was typed on the headed notepaper of the auctioneers, with the names of the directors printed at the bottom of the letter. The only manuscript signature was that of the buyer.
The use of a printed name was beginning to be used by local authorities in the late nineteenth century. In the case of Brydges (Town Clerk of Cheltenham) v Dix,47 the Cheltenham council required the town clerk to execute certain works. When the owner of the property refused, the council sent a notice to the owner on a printed form, duly filled in, with the name of the town clerk printed at the foot of the notice. The council subsequently undertook the work and then sought to recover their costs. Matters dealing with the authenticity of the notice were set out in s266 of the Public Health Act 1875, as follows:
Notices, orders, and other such documents under the Act may be in writing or print, or partly in writing and partly in print, and if the same require authentication by the local authority the signature thereof by the clerk to the local authority, or their surveyor or inspector, shall be sufficient authentication.
An objection was made that the signature of the clerk was a requisite and that it should be affixed by hand. The magistrates accepted this argument and refused to make an order for payment. Pollock B and Charles J heard the appeal in the Queen’s Bench Division. They allowed the appeal and came to the conclusion that if a signature was required, a manual signature was not necessary: ‘all that was necessary was that the notice should be authenticated as coming from the town clerk, and that sufficiently appeared in this notice.’48 The printed signature was held to be sufficient. This observation was also to be noted by Romer LJ in Goodman v J Eban Limited,49 where he pointed out that the recipient could verify the authenticity of the notice by confirming its contents directly with the clerk.
Generally, judges in the United States, in combination with the approach adopted in various model acts to provide a degree of uniformity to the law, have agreed with their brethren in England. The range of illustrations includes printing on bank notes,50 bills of lading,51 bonds,52 brokers contracts53 and court papers54 – although printed names have not always been accepted55 and a printed name can be the subject of forgery (including a name on a rubber stamp)56 – promissory notes (subject to suitable evidence),57 public documents,58 Statute of Frauds generally (with rare exceptions),59 with respect to letterheads60 and in matters pertaining to voting.61 The burden of proving a printed name was adopted is on the party asserting the nature of the signature, as illustrated by the 1949 Californian case of Felt v L. B. Frederick Co., Inc.62 In addition, care must be taken over proving the link between the printed name or letterhead and the intent to authenticate, as in the 1949 Californian case of Marks v Walter G. McCarty Corporation,63 where use of letterhead stationery containing the name of a hotel to provide carbon copies was not sufficient to show intention to adopt the letterhead as a signature, as indicated by Shenk J at 822: ‘Here the defendant’s letterhead was printed on its stationery at some earlier time for a purpose unconnected with the transaction in suit.’ Carter J gave a strong dissenting judgment in this case, which has much to recommend it.
The use of a lithographed name
The use of printed forms to reduce wasted time is an accepted way of doing business. However, there are occasions when a manuscript signature is required under statute, more particularly with respect to the rules governing the running of a firm of solicitors. In the case of R v Cowper (Fitzroy),64 the name of the firm of solicitors was lithographed in bulk onto a county court bill of particulars. Spaces were left blank to fill in the form as necessary. A claim was made in respect of a debt and costs. At the hearing, the registrar refused an order for costs because the solicitors had not signed the particulars in accordance with the County Court Rules, 1889, order VI, r 10. The matter was then heard before the Divisional Court, which upheld the decision of the registrar. An appeal was subsequently heard in the Court of Appeal. Lord Esher pointed out that the name of a firm was included on the particulars to ensure the court may control its officers, and asked, at 535, ‘If that was the object, how is it affected by the objection, that the name appears in a lithograph form?’ and concluded that if the forms were misused, such misuse would inevitably be found out and punished. Further, he went on to demonstrate the reason for the rule at 535:
The whole object of the rule seems to me to be to get the document authenticated as coming from a solicitor’s office, and if the solicitor has authorized the issue of the lithograph form that object is attained. He means it to be his signature and sends it forth as his, and that seems to me sufficient compliance with the Act.
However, Fry LJ disagreed with Lord Esher. He thought that blank forms that can be filled up at any time did not offer any guarantee that the solicitor or a person authorized to act on their behalf had given their personal attention to a particular form. Also, and more compellingly, he argued, at 536, that ‘the signature required is intended to be something to authenticate the particulars and the accuracy of the copies, and to make the solicitor responsible for them as an officer of the Court’. Thus attempts by solicitors to ease the burden of filling in forms has not always met with agreement from the bench, and in this case, because the members of the Court of Appeal did not agree, the decision of the Divisional Court was not changed. In comparison, a lithographed name on bonds has been held to be a valid signature in the United States, although the position would not be any different in England and Wales.65
An early record of the use of a stamp, although not made with rubber, is that of the signature of a monarch from the Tudor period in England. Apparently the signet of Mary Tudor occurs with a stamp signature of the queen, of which more than twenty specimens appear on signet warrants. Also, there are examples of rubber stamps being used instead of seals in the nineteenth century by various sheriffs for official documents.66 From the case law in relation to rubber stamps, it is generally, if reluctantly in some instances, accepted that a rubber stamp is capable of being accepted as a form of signature, providing the stamp is used with the authority of the person whose signature it is: for instance, in Macdonald v Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada67 a medical expert retained by the defence was not permitted to testify after he stated that his signature stamp had been affixed to a medical report without his authority. The question of his signature arose when it became clear that the report he referred to during his testimony differed substantially from the one served on the plaintiff and filed with the court. The court did not consider any relevant legislation, but determined the issue on the basis of existing principles.
The case of Jenkins v Gainsford and Thring68 illustrates the problems that people suffering from ataxia encounter, and what measures they take to resolve them. Towards the end of his life, John Jenkins had great difficulty in writing and signing his name, so he had an engraving of his signature made. Thereafter, when he was required to sign a letter or other document, he would direct his amanuensis to affix an impression of his name to the document by using the engraving. Mr Jenkins left a will and executed two codicils. An affidavit by his amanuensis accompanied the codicils, stating the manner in which they were executed: he was ordered and directed by the testator to affix the signature to the codicil using the engraving, in the presence of the other subscribing witness. After the signature was affixed, the testator placed his hand on the codicil and acknowledged the signature as his own and said the codicil was to be a codicil to his will. The two witnesses then attested and subscribed the codicil. The same procedure was followed on both occasions. Sir C Cresswell held that the codicils were duly executed. He observed that a testator has sufficiently signed by making their mark, and went on to note at 96:
Now, whether the mark is made by a pen or by some other instrument cannot make any difference, neither can it in reason make a difference that a fac-simile of the whole name was impressed on the will instead of a mere mark or X.
The instrument or stamp was intended to stand for and represent the signature of the testator. The form the signature took was not relevant, providing the evidence surrounding the affixing of the stamp went to show that the testator intended to be bound by the content of the codicils.69
However, in Scotland the use of a stamp on a will is not acceptable in accordance with the provisions of Statute 1540, chapter 117. In Stirling Stuart v Stirling Crawfurd’s Trustees,70 the testator signed a second deed by means of a stamp he was in the habit of using because he suffered from scrivener’s palsy, and had great difficulty with writing.
The case of Bennett v Brumfitt71 was brought under s17 of the Parliamentary Voters Registration Act 1843 before the Court of Common Pleas. The usual signature of William Brumfitt was engraved in facsimile and made into a stamp, which was subsequently used to sign a notice of objection. Bovill CJ observed at 31:
The ordinary mode of affixing a signature to a document is not by the hand alone, but by the hand coupled with some instrument, such as a pen or pencil. I see no distinction between using a pen or a pencil and using a stamp, where the impression is put upon the paper by the proper hand of the party signing.
It is the personal act of the signatory that is relevant. Byles and Willes JJ agreed, and as to the genuineness of a signature, Keating J could not see why a document ‘is better authenticated by a signature by means of a pen than by means of an impression of a stamp affixed by the party’s own hand’.72
The development of technology permits actions that are repetitive in nature to be less onerous in their execution. Thus the use of a rubber stamp can alleviate the requirement that a manuscript signature be affixed to numerous documents by the same person in circumstances where the intention is to authenticate a document. Changes in technology included the adoption of stamps in the courts. In Blades v Lawrence,73 a case was transferred to the City of London court by the order of a Master. The order was, in the words of Blackburn J, issued in the ordinary way ‘according to the practice long established at Judge’s Chambers, by the clerk of the judge, having on it the signature of the judge, stamped by the clerk’.74 The judge in the London court inquired into the circumstances under which the order was made, and because the judge had not signed the order, he refused to hear the case and ordered the entry to be struck out. It was unanimously held by Cockburn CJ, Blackburn, Quain and Archibald JJ that such an order was properly authenticated and it was not for the judge of the London court, in the words of Cockburn CJ, ‘to determine the validity or invalidity of the order bearing the proper authentication on its face’.75 Where it was doubted that the order was genuine, the judge should have applied to a superior court to set the order aside. In this instance, the judge was ordered to pay the costs of the case.
Consideration was given to the judicial use of rubber stamps in Ireland in the case of The State v His Honour Judge P. J. Roe,76 where it was determined that a justice of the peace may sign a committal warrant by means of a rubber stamp. Gavan Duffy P said, at 186–187:
As to the rubber stamps, if one man may sign by a mark, another may use a rubber facsimile as a signature; but, where the device is questioned by a man entitled to call for proof, the affixing of the stamp by the Justice must be proved, either by the Justice himself or by another witness who can swear positively to the making by the Justice of the particular signature questioned; and that may not be easy evidence for a Court clerk to give, if a Justice makes a habit of stamping his name on a sheaf of documents at one time. If the fact be that pressure of work makes the use of a rubber stamp a necessity, or almost a necessity, for a very busy Justice, one would expect to see the need expressly recognised in the code, with stringent rules for the safe custody of the stamp and a peremptory veto upon any delegation of its use to a clerk or any other person.
The acceptance of the use of a rubber stamp in legal proceedings is also illustrated in the Canadian case of R v Burton,77 in which an informant affixed a facsimile signature to an information by means of a rubber stamp, which in turn was sworn before a justice of the peace, who signed the information with a manuscript signature. The information was held to be a sufficient signature in absence of proof that the officer who signed the jurat failed to comply with the duties imposed upon him. In reaching his decision, Lacourciere J observed, at 387:
In my opinion the use of a rubber stamp signature by the informant is a practice that should be discouraged and indeed deprecated, as it detracts from the solemnity of an important step in the machinery of law, and may give rise to public suspicion that the officer taking the oath has done less than his duty. The partially stamped information, however, is not a nullity, in the absence of proof that the officer who signed the jurat failed to comply with the requirements set out above.
In comparison, an Ontario Court of Appeal held in the case of R v Welsford, Re78 that an information charging an accused with a summary conviction offence under a provincial statute was a nullity if the jurat bore a facsimile rubber stamp signature of the justice of the peace.
In McDonald v John Twiname Ltd79 the plaintiff entered into an apprenticeship with the company, but an authorized representative from the company failed to sign the agreement. The name of the company was stamped on the document with a rubber stamp. In this instance, Evershed MR and Birkett LJ agreed that not only had the document been signed by the company, but there was also sufficient evidence to show they had adopted, acted upon and affirmed the existence of the agreement.
The ecclesiastical use of rubber stamps is demonstrated in De Beauvais v Green,80 where the bishop of Gloucester issued an order to the new incumbent to pay for repairs. One of the points raised in argument was that the bishop failed to sign the relevant order in triplicate in his own hand, as required by ss35 and 60 of the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act 1871, but authorized the use of a stamp for this purpose. It was held that the order by the bishop was sufficient in form to satisfy the requirements of the relevant sections.
Solicitors, in the normal course of events, are required to sign bills of costs. In the case of Goodman v J Eban Limited,81 a sole practitioner sought to recover for professional services provided to the defendant company. The solicitor affixed his name to the bill by means of a rubber stamp. The solicitor sent a bill of costs to the defendants, which was accompanied by a letter which ended in the words typewritten at the bottom of the letter ‘Yours faithfully, Goodman, Monroe & Company’. Below the name, the solicitor affixed a facsimile of his signature by means of a rubber stamp. The defendants refused to pay the solicitor because the bill of costs did not satisfy the requirements of s65(2)(i) of the Solicitors Act 1932. It was held, with Denning LJ dissenting, that the bill had been signed for the purposes of s65, although, as Evershed MR observed at 554, ‘as a matter of good practice, the “signature” of a bill of costs, or of a letter enclosing such a bill, by means of a rubber stamp seems to me in general undesirable’. He went on to comment that the purpose of the statute was to impose a personal responsibility for any bill of costs delivered, and the client was to have the assurance by means of personal authentication that the bill was a proper bill.82 Romer LJ noted that the rubber stamp did not, on the face of it, constitute a signature,83 although he accepted that when the matter was considered in the light of authority and the function that a signature was intended to perform, the conclusion must be that the rubber stamp did constitute a signature. He also concluded that a repetition of the name of the firm under the typewritten name would be otiose if it was only to repeat the typed name of the firm. It was plain that Mr Goodman intended the rubber stamp to ‘be regarded as a signature for the purpose of authenticating the letter’.84 Should the client doubt its authenticity, all they had to do was ask Mr Goodman, by telephone or letter.85 Romer LJ might have also adopted, had he been aware of it, the reasoning of Clay J in the 1934 Kentucky case of Wurts v Newsome,86 where a judge signed ballots by means of a rubber stamp. Clay J stated, at 450:
The opportunities for fraud when a rubber stamp is used are no greater than the opportunities for fraud by forgery. It would be just as difficult to ascertain that the ballots had not been signed, and have a rubber stamp prepared, as it would be to employ one to imitate the signature of the judge who failed to sign. Besides, the statute, though designed to prevent fraud, has operated in several instances to defeat the popular will. In numerous contests that have come before this court, the successful candidate has lost by the failure of one of the judges, either through ignorance, mistake, or fraud to sign the ballots. In the circumstances we are not inclined to go further and adopt a construction so technical as to make the situation even worse. A rubber stamp identifies the ballot just as clearly as the written signature of the judge. If not placed on the ballot either by him, or someone else in his presence, and at his direction while the election is being conducted, that may be shown in a context just as it may be shown that the written signature appearing on the ballot was not his act. We therefore conclude that the signing of the ballots by a rubber stamp was a substantial compliance with the statute, and that all the ballots so signed should have been counted.
Dissenting, Denning LJ suggested that a person must make their mark, whatever the format, by themselves. In discussing the way in which rubber stamps were used, he introduced extraneous opinion to support his assertion, at 561, which was no more than prejudice and irrelevant to the matter being dealt with: ‘This is such a common knowledge that a “rubber stamp” is contemptuously used to denote the thoughtless impress of an automaton, in contrast to the reasoned attention of a sensible person.’ He overlooked several points. A rubber stamp is used to sign hundreds of letters or forms for convenience and saving in labour, as the case law illustrates, rather than the contemptuous use by a thoughtless automaton, the purpose of which is different to a solicitor’s bill. Also, he clearly did not appreciate – and if he did, did not acknowledge – the fact that some people do not have the ability to sign documents. The issue was not the widespread use of rubber stamps in various other activities. In this judgment, Denning LJ refused to distinguish between the form a signature took and the function it was to perform, which has been the main thrust of judicial decision-making over the past two hundred years. Interestingly, the use of a stamp by judges and bishops during the nineteenth century was not raised or discussed in this case. If Denning LJ thought the personal signature of a solicitor was so necessary on a bill of costs, it may be equally as desirable when a judge orders a case to be transferred to another court, as in Blades v Lawrence.87
The decisions from other jurisdictions, together with the rationale articulated for accepting rubber stamps, also provide an instructive counterpoint to the comments by Denning LJ. In Canada, the judgment in Goodman v J Eban Limited was discussed in R v Burton,88 where an informant affixed a facsimile signature to an information by means of a rubber stamp; this was held to be a sufficient signature in the absence of proof that the officer who signed the jurat failed to comply with the duties imposed upon him. In the 1976 North Carolina case of State of North Carolina v Watts,89 the mechanical reproduction of the name of an authorized officer placed on a public record of the Division of Motor Vehicles was held to be properly authenticated where the officer intended to adopt the mechanical reproduction as his signature. Branch J indicated, at 392, why the physical reality of the mechanical means of rendering a signature had become relevant:
The purpose of authentication and certification of records is to avoid the inconvenience and sometimes the impossibility of producing original public documents in court. Obviously the admission of certified records tends to expedite the trial of cases. It is just as obvious that to require the manual signing of every record certified from the Division of Motor Vehicles would be extremely time-consuming and expensive.
Branch J’s comments were reinforced by Hallet J in Re United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd,90 where proxy forms submitted with a facsimile or mechanically rendered signature were considered to be sufficient. Hallett J explained the rationale at 289 paragraph 17:
Today’s business could not be conducted if stamped signatures were not recognized as legally binding. The affixing of a stamp conveys the intention to be bound by the document so executed just as effectively as the manual writing of a signature by hand. I would point out that no one questions the validity of millions of payroll cheques signed by facsimile signatures.
He also addressed the fallacious argument that one form of signature was more prone to fraud than any other at 305 paragraph 64:
In my opinion, in view of the obvious opportunities for fraud with respect to votes to be cast by registered shareholders where a bare signature is normally accepted, I cannot see any reason to differentiate between the degree of proof required by a chairman to be satisfied that a proxy has actually been executed by the registered individual shareholder (the degree of proof being virtually nothing) and the degree of proof urged upon the court by the Buckley group with respect to proxy voting of brokers for their clients. In the absence of evidence that there was no authority for the execution of proxies by brokers by facsimile signature, the proxy vote should be accepted and counted as is apparently the practice. To conclude otherwise, the chairman is presuming dishonesty on the part of the brokers who tendered the proxies on behalf of their clients. In the absence of evidence, such a conclusion is unwarranted.
The inconvenience of affixing a manuscript signature to documents was also tested in administrative proceedings in the case of British Estate Investment Society Ltd v Jackson (H M Inspector of Taxes),91 where an Additional Commissioner personally affixed his signature to certificates of authenticity by using a rubber stamp. The Additional Commissioner or the Clerk to the Commissioners retained the rubber stamp. Danckwerts J rejected all of the arguments by British Estate, and on the matter of the stamped signature he observed:
Of course, this is a case, if ever there was a case, in which the signing by means of a stamped signature is proper, because everybody knows that Commissioners of this kind have to deal with numerous documents, and it is an onerous duty if they have to be signed by the writing of the Commissioner himself.92
In the contemporaneous case of Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley,93 documents in the form prescribed by the Housing Repairs and Rents Act 1954 were signed with the name of the company by means of a rubber stamp. No objection was taken as to the validity of the signature in the county court, and the matter could not be addressed on appeal. However, Denning LJ could not resist commenting, at 710, that:
The statutory forms require the documents to be ‘signed’ by the landlord, but the only signature on these documents (if such it can be called) was a rubber stamp ‘Lazarus Estates Ltd.’ without anything to verify it. There was no signature of a secretary or of any person at all on behalf of the company. There was nothing to indicate who affixed the rubber stamp. It has been held in this court that a private person can sign a document by impressing a rubber stamp with his own facsimile signature on it: Goodman v J Eban Limited [[1954] 1 QB 550; [1954] 2 WLR 581; [1954] 1 All ER 763, CA], but it has not yet been held that a company can sign by its printed name affixed with a rubber stamp.
This comment by Lord Denning was not to the point, and in the light of the extensive case law relating to this topic, from both England and Wales and the United States, it may be safe to indicate that Lord Denning’s remarks on the topic are irrelevant. Of interest is the case of Fitzpatrick v Secretary of State for the Environment and Epping Forest DC,94 in which enforcement notices signed with the rubber stamp of the appropriate official bearing their facsimile signature were held to be valid in accordance with the provisions of s234(2) of the Local Government Act 1972. The members of the Court of Appeal reached their decision without, it appears, reference to any relevant case law.95
The use of rubber stamps as a means of authenticating documents in the United States has only been tempered with the need to ensure that the version of the signature in the form of an impression of a rubber stamp was used with the intent to authenticate the document. The range of uses to which rubber stamps have been put, and which judges have accepted with minor exceptions, include cheques (checks),96 matters pertaining to the Fifth Amendment,97 elections,98 finance statements,99 and when affixed to letters100 and public documents,101 but not receipts.102 The judicial use of rubber stamps appears to have been widely taken up in various states, and although a federal court accepted that a search warrant signed with a rubber stamp by a magistrate was held to be valid in the seventh circuit case of United States of America v Juarez,103 Tone CJ did not fully approve, commenting at 1114:
Defendant also contends that the search warrant should be invalidated because the magistrate used a signature stamp instead of signing it personally. We do not approve the use of a signature stamp by a magistrate. Its use creates the appearance that the user lacks the sensitivity a federal judicial officer should have to the important values which the warrant is designed to protect.
Nevertheless, in this case the magistrate testified unequivocally that he remembered placing the signature stamp on the warrant, and the District Court credited this testimony. We cannot say that it was clearly erroneous for the court to have done so. We therefore do not find that it was in error to refuse to declare the warrant invalid and thereby exclude the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, despite our condemnation of the magistrate’s practice.
At a state level, the use of rubber stamps has been widely accepted,104 and Hood AJ indicated how widely rubber stamps were used in the 1943 Columbia case of McGrady v Munsey Trust Co.,105 where the chief deputy clerk personally applied a facsimile representation of his signature to a summons. Hood AJ indicated the general use of the methods in his comments at 106: ‘This practice was adopted many years ago and is a matter of great convenience since more than 4,000 landlord and tenant complaints are filed in the trial court each month.’ The legal and practical position of rubber stamps was put into context by Lattimore J in the 1930 Texas case of Stork v State,106 in which the facsimile signature of a justice of the peace affixed by rubber stamp to an affidavit and liquor search warrant was held to be a sufficient signing. Lattimore J considered a number of cases, and stated, at 735:
The writer is of opinion that when it appears without question, as in this case, that the magistrate in person took the affidavits of those who swore to same, and also so issued the search warrant, and that to each he affixed his name, it would be a matter of no moment whether he so affixed said name by one stroke as by the use of a stencil or rubber stamp, or whether he sat down at a typewriter and wrote his name with same upon such document, or that he wrote it out in what we commonly call longhand, provided that in each such case the facts must allow the name to have been affixed by the officer himself, or under his immediate authority and direction and in his presence.
An interesting variation of technology for appending a copy of a manuscript signature was used in the case of Whyte v Watt,107 before the Registration Appeal Court in Scotland. An objector signed a notice of objection using an instrument called a stencil-pen. The letters forming his signature were perforated upon a prepared wax skin, stretched on a frame. He then placed the notice under the waxed skin and passed an inked roller over the waxed skin. As the ink from the roller passed through the perforations in the waxed skin, it produced the signature on the notice. Mr Watt formed the signature; no other person was employed in the operation. When letters or words have been formed on the waxed skin by the stencil-pen in this way, up to 100 sheets of paper – or more – can be placed successively under the waxed skin, and as the inked roller passes over the waxed skin, so the letter or words are produced on the sheet of paper immediately under the waxed skin. The validity of the signature was challenged, in that it did not comply with the provisions of s4 of 19 & 20 Victoria chapter 58, Registration of Burgh Voters (Scotland) Act 1856 in particular, according to forms 4 and 5 of schedule A. Kinnear, Trayner and Kincairney LL dismissed the appeal without calling on counsel for the respondent. They followed the judgment of the English court in the case of Bennett v Brumfitt,108 and held that the provisions of the statute requiring that the objector should sign a notice of objection had been satisfied. It was noted that such a signature would not be sufficient to satisfy the conditions of the statute regulating the subscription and attestation of probative deeds, but that was not necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of the statute under construction. Kinnear L said, at 166–167:
The word ‘signed’ is not a technical word but a word of ordinary language. Subscription is a method of signing. It is not the only method. We are therefore to consider whether the method of authentication described in the case can properly be called ‘signing’. Now, upon that question, we have the advantage of a decision of the Court of Common Pleas, in the construction of a similar provision in the 6th of the Queen, chapter 18, which requires that a ‘notice of objection shall be signed by the objector’. In Bennett v Brumfitt, L. R., 3 C. P. 28, the Court held that this requirement was satisfied although the objector had not subscribed the notice but had affixed his name to it by means of a stamp on which was engraved a facsimile of his ordinary signature. I cannot suppose that when the Legislature has employed the same language in a Scots Act as in a previous English Act, it intended to prescribe one method of authentication in England and another in Scotland, and I should be very slow to differ from the learned Judges in England as to the meaning of an ordinary word in the English language.
1 (1681) 3 Lev 2, 83 ER 545.
2 In the case of Dormer v Thurland (1728) 2 Eq Ca Abr 663, 22 ER 557, 2 P Wms 506, 24 ER 837, a will had to be signed and sealed to be effective, and because it was signed but not sealed, it was declared void for want of being sealed.
3 (1751) 1 Wils K B 313, 95 ER 636.
4 (1727) (Easter 13 Geo 1) 2 Strange 764, 93 ER 834.
5 (1754) 1 Ves Jun 11; 1 Ves Jun Supp 1; 30 ER 205, 34 ER 666.
6 (1754) 1 Ves Jun 11 at 13 [emphasis in original].
7 (1752) 2 Ves Sen 455, 28 ER 291; Ves Sen Supp 382, 28 ER 556.
8 28 ER 556 at 292.
9 Ellis v Smith (1754) 1 Ves Jun 11 at 13 and 15.
10 (1882–23) 9 LR Ir Ch 443.
11 (1896) 30 IrLTR 127.
12 (1811) 17 Ves Jun 455, 34 ER 176.
13 (1882–83) 9 LR Ir Ch 443.
14 (c1632) W Jones, 268, 82 ER 140, W Jones, 270, 82 ER 141.
15 The words ‘swaynemoote’ and ‘verder’ do not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edn on CDROM, version 4.0, 2009). A regarder is defined as ‘an officer charged with the supervision of a forest’. Some references in the OED in relation to this definition include the following:
1594 CROMPTON Jurisd. 169 If a man be indited of Trespasse done in the forrest before verdors, regardors, agistors, and other Ministers of the Forrest [etc.]
1667–8 Act 19 & 20 Chas. II, c. 8 s5 New Elections shall be made … of all Verderors, Reguarders and other Officers of and for the Governing of the said Forrest [of Dean].
1865 Morn. Star 13 Apr., The Crown have neglected to appoint a warden, forester, regarder, and verderer of the said [Epping] forest.
See Jean Birrell, ‘Common rights in the medieval forest: disputes and conflicts in the thirteenth century’, (1987) 117 Past & Present 22, where the author indicates, at 24, ‘Unfortunately, evidence about common rights in the medieval period is surprisingly difficult to find’. A swaynemoote roll might have been a document setting out rights before a manorial, royal or forest court (Birrell, 25).
16 (1791) 4 TR 313, 100 ER 1038.
17 (1842) 2 QB 580, 114 ER 228.
18 [1978] Ch 109, [1978] 2 WLR 475, [1978] 2 All ER 221, [1977] 11 WLUK 24, (1977) 121 SJ 760, Times, 9 November 1977, [1978] CLY 793.
19 (1871) LR 6 CP 411.
20 (1833) 1 C & M 450, 149 ER 476, (1833) LJ Ex 2 NS 179.
21 (1833) 1 C & M 450 at 461.
22 (1844) 5 QB 671, 114 ER 1402, (1845) 7 QB 232, 115 ER 476.
23 For a list of cases relating to the adoption of seals, see Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts (4th edn, Thompson West 1990), 2:2.
24 505 F.Supp. 1190 (1980).
25 96 Misc. 384, 161 N.Y.S. 452.
26 Re Finn (1935) 105 LJP 36; both parties accepted that a thumb print was capable of being a signature in the case of Borman v Lel [2001] 6 WLUK 189, [2002] WTLR 237, [2002] CLY 4329 also known as: Parsons, In the Estate of. Although use of fingerprints as a signature was probably common in some parts of the world at one time, for which see Iris Agmon, ‘Recording procedures and legal culture in the late Ottoman Shariʿa court of Jaffa, 1865–1890’ (2004) 11(3) Islamic Law and Society 333, 333377, 360361; as a result of the changes described by Agmon, the signatures of women began to be recorded for the first time, indicating the possibility that women initiated or took part in legal proceedings, 363–364.
27 Putter v Provincial Insurance Co. Ltd, 1963 (3) SA 145 (W).
28 ‘Supreme People’s Court, interpretation on several issues concerning the application of the PRC contract law’ (2009) 23 China Law & Practice 41, 69.
29 (1800) 2 Bos & Pul 238, 126 ER 1257.
30 (1800) 2 Bos & Pul 238 at 239.
31 (1814) 2 M & S 237, 105 ER 388.
32 (1800) 2 Bos & Pul 238, 126 ER 1257.
33 In Hubert v Treherne (1842) 3 Man & G 743, 133 ER 1338 the names of the parties appeared in the body of a draft agreement that neither party had signed: it was held that the agreement was not signed. Both Saunderson v Jackson and Schneider v Norris were cited, and Tindal CJ indicated, at 754, that the decision in Saunderson v Jackson depended ‘for its authority more upon the subsequent recognition than upon the printed names’.
34 (1809) 3 Taunt. 169, 128 ER 67; the spelling of Bennet differs as between the name of the case and the description of the firm in the report.
35 (1856) 1 CB (NS) 188, 140 ER 79.
36 Jacob v Kirk (1839) 2 M & R 221, 174 ER 269 was argued on different facts.
37 In Joshua Buckton and Co. (Limited) v London and North-Western Railway Company (1917–18) 34 TLR 119 a contract signed with the printed name of the firm ‘Joshua Buckton and Co. (Limited)’ was accepted by Astbury J as a regular business practice at 121: ‘having regard to the long practice of signing these consignment notes and to the fact that notes so signed have been accepted and recognized by the Court as fulfilling the requirements of the section’, the printed name was a signature under the provisions of s7 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854.
38 [1892] 1 QB 593, (1892) 66 LTR NS 345.
39 A hop factor is capable of acting as the agent for both parties to a contract: Durrell v Evans (1862) 1 H & C 174, 31 LJ Ex 337, 9 Jur NS 104, 10 WR 665, 7 LT 97, 158 ER 848, Ex Ch; an auctioneer was an authorized agent for the vendor where the auctioneer entered the name of the vendor on a printed agreement form for the sale of real property: Leeman v Stocks [1951] 1 Ch 941, [1951] 1 All ER 1043, [1951] 2 TLR 622, [1951] 4 WLUK 30, (1951) 95 SJ 368, [1947–51] CLY 10616.
40 [1892] 1 QB 593 at 597. For a more robust and less polished version of this part of the decision by Cave J, see (1892) 66 LTRep NS 345 at 347.
41 (1900) 82 LTNS 768.
42 Compare the decisions in Champion v Plummer (1805) 5 Esp. 239, 170 ER 798, 1 Bos. & P. (NR) 252, 127 ER 458; Allen v Bennet (1810) 3 Taunt. 169, 128 ER 67; Jacob v Kirk (1839) 2 M & R 221, 174 ER 269.
43 (1879) 48 L J Ch 567, 27 WR 706; these cases were reviewed by Buckley J in Hucklesby v Hook (1900) 82 LT 117.
44 (1814) 2 M & S 237, 105 ER 388.
45 As with the case of Lobb and Knight v Stanley (1844) 5 QB 574, 114 ER 1366; (1843–44) Law Times, 2, 366, this case was not cited in J Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta [2006] EWHC 813 (Ch), [2006] 1 WLR 1543, [2006] 2 All ER 891, [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 885, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 244, [2006] 4 WLUK 182, [2006] Info TLR 203, Times, 16 May 2006, [2006] CLY 774.
46 [1979] IR 364.
47 (1890–91) 7 TLR 215.
48 (1890–91) 7 TLR 215 at 216(a).
49 [1954] 1 QB 550 at 564.
50 Federal, 7th circuit: Hill v United States, 288 F. 192 (the facsimile signatures of the governor and cashier of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis on bank notes were true and genuine signatures) (1923).
51 Pennsylvania: Carna t/d/b/a/ T.C. Trucking Company v Bessemer Cement Company, 558 F.Supp. 706 (1983) (the pre-printed company name on a bill of lading was held to be a sufficient signature).
52 California: Pennington v Baehr, 48 Cal. 565, 1874 WL 1399 (Cal.) (a bond signed by a printed facsimile of the signature of the president of the Reclamation Fund Commissioners was held to be sufficient) (1874). It is reported that the Attorney-General argued, at 567, that ‘A printed fac simile … could be more easily forged than an autograph; and such a signature would be no more protection than no signing at all’; Williams v McDonald, 58 Cal. 527, 8 P.C.L.J. 23, 58 Cal. 527, 1881 WL 1946 (Cal.) (a resolution of intention with the printed name of the clerk affixed was sufficient because he intended the printed name to be adopted).
53 Nebraska: Berryman v Childs, 98 Neb. 450, 153 N.W. 486 (where the plaintiffs signed a contract with their printed name, they were entitled to the benefit of that contract) (1915).
54 California: Hancock v Bowman, 49 Cal. 413, 1874 WL 1548 (Cal.) (a judgment was not void because the name of the plaintiff’s attorney is printed on the complaint) (1874); Ligare v California Southern Railroad Company, 76 Cal. 610, 18 P. 777 (a summons signed with the printed signature of the clerk accompanied with the seal of the court was held to be sufficient signature) (1888); Smith v Ostly, 53 Cal.2d 262, 1 Cal.Rptr. 340, 347 P.2d 684 (a name printed on a notice of appeal could be adopted as a signature providing the petitioner intended to authenticate the document) (1959).
Indiana: Hamilton v State, 103 Ind. 96, 2 N.E. 299, 53 AmRep. 491 (it was sufficient that the name of the prosecuting attorney appeared in print on an indictment) (1885).
Iowa (1908): Cummings v Landes, 117 N.W. 22, 140 Iowa 80 (an original notice was signed when the name of the attorney was printed thereon).
Minnesota: Ames v Schurmeier, 9 Minn. 221, 1864 WL 1409 (Minn.), 9 Gil. 206 (a summons in a civil action was void where the name of the plaintiff or their attorney was printed where handwriting was required); Herrick v Morrill, 37 Minn. 250, 33 N.W. 849, 5 Am.St.Rep. 841 (a summons in a civil action may be subscribed by the printed signature of the plaintiff or his attorney) (1887).
New York: Barnard v Heydrick, 49 Barb. 62, 32 How. Pr. 97, 2 Abb.Pr.N.S. 47 (a summons issued by an attorney with his name typed at the end was subscribed by him within the meaning of the provisions of the Code of Procedure) (1866). Note the cases cited and discussion of the decision of Ingraham J in The Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company v Dickson, 9 Abb.Pr. 61 (1859).
Wisconsin: Mezchen v More, 54 Wis. 214, 11 N.W. 534 (a summons in a civil action with the printed names of the attorneys was subscribed) (1882).
55 Arkansas: Lee v Vaughan Seed Store, 101 Ark 68 (1911), 141 S.W. 496, 37 L.R.A.N.S. 352 (a printed name was not accepted as evidence of authentication); California: Marks v Walter G. McCarty Corporation, 33 Cal.2d 814 (1949), 205 P.2d 1025; New York: The Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company v Dickson, 9 Abb.Pr. 61 (a summons issued by an attorney with his name typed at the end was a nullity) (1859).
56 Massachusetts: Commonwealth v Ray, 3 Gray 441, 69 Mass. 441, 1855 WL 5701 (Mass.) (a printed or engraved name can be forged) (1855); Wellington v Jackson, 121 Mass. 157, 1876 WL 10902 (Mass.) (a person who knows a signature is forged on a promissory note, but who acknowledges it as his own, assumes the note to be his as if it was signed with his authority).
Oklahoma: Boyer v State, 68 Okl.Cr. 220, 97 P. 779 (a person can forge a name if they use a rubber stamp) (1939).
57 Illinois: Weston v Myers, 33 Ill. 424, 1864 WL 2948 (Ill.) (a printed name adopted on an instrument for value).
Minnesota: Brayley v Kelly, 25 Minn. 160, 1878 WL 3577 (Minn) (a printed name on a promissory note was not admissible as the act of the party without further evidence).
Oregon: Toon v Wapinitia Irrigation Co., 117 Or. 374, 243 P. 554 (a printed signature attached to an interest coupon payable to the bearer was sufficient to authenticate the instrument) (1926).
58 North Carolina: State of North Carolina v Watts, 289 N.C. 445, 222 S.E.2d 389 (the mechanical reproduction of the name of an authorized officer placed on a public record was properly authenticated where the officer intended to adopt the mechanical reproduction as his signature) (1976).
Wisconsin: Potts v Cooley, 13 N.W.Rep. 682 (a tax certificate with the words ‘Assigned May 19, 1877. J P. Carpenter, County Clerk’ partly written by hand and partly printed on the face of the certificate was sufficient for the purposes of the statue) (1882).
59 Arizona: Bishop v Norelld/b/a Al Norell Company Realtors, 88 Ariz. 148, 353 P.2d 1022 (a name and address printed on a listing agreement was signed in accordance with the statute provided it was done with the intention of signing) (1960).
Georgia: Kohlmeyer & Company v Bowen, 126 Ga.App. 700, 192 S.E.2d 400 (the name of a securities brokerage firm printed on a confirmation statement for the sale of securities was held to be intended as a means of authentication and thus met the signature requirement under the Statute of Frauds) (1972). Note the dissenting judgment of Evans J and his comments in respect of Evans Implement Company v Thomas Industries, Inc., 117 Ga.App. 279, 160 S.E.2d 462, (Ga. Ct. App. 1968).
Idaho: Paloukos v Intermountain Chevrolet Company, 99 Idaho 740 (1978), 588 P.2d 939, 25 UCC Rep.Serv. 655.
Illinois: Prairie State Grain and Elevator Company v Wrede, 217 Ill.App. 407 (the name ‘Ben. B. Bishopp, Grain Broker’ printed on a memorandum was sufficient for it to have been adopted and signed by him as if this text had been personally placed on the memorandum, especially because he had used such a signature for years) (1920).
Kansas: Southwest Engineering Company, Inc. v Martin Tractor Company, Inc., 205 Kan. 684, 473 P.2d 18 (the name ‘Ken Hurt, Martin Tractor, Topeka, Caterpillar’ printed on a memorandum with the details of specifications for a generator written by hand was sufficient authentication) (1970).
Michigan: Grieb v Cole, 60 Mich. 397, 27 N.W. 579, 1 Am.St.Rep. 533 (a warranty printed on the back of a purchase order with the vendor’s printed signature binds the warrantor) (1886).
Missouri: Defur v Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 677 F.Supp. 622 (E.D.Mo. 1988) (a Relocation Policy/Home Sale Program had the defendant’s name printed on every page, and was held to constitute a writing signed by the defendant).
New York: Vielie v Osgood, 8 Barb. 130 (names printed at the foot of a contract were held not to be a sufficient subscription within the Statute of Frauds) (1849); 1913 case of Goldowitz v Henry Kupfer & Co., 80 Misc.Rep. 487, 141 N.Y.S. 531; 1920 cases of Pearlberg v Levisohn, 112 Misc. 95, 182 N.Y.S. 615 and United Display Fixture Co., Inc. v S. & W. Bauman, 183 N.Y.S. 4.; Cohen v Arthur Walker & Co., Inc., 192 N.Y.S. 228 (the printed name of the defendant corporation on an order for goods was sufficient compliance with the statute) (1922); Mesibov, Glinert & Levy, Inc. v Cohen Bros. Mfg. Co. Inc., 245 N.Y. 305, 157 N.E. 148 (no proof of intent is demonstrated when a paper has the name of a firm printed at the top but is not signed) (1927); Reich v Helen Harper, Inc., 3 UCC Rep.Serv. 1048, 1966 WL 8838 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct.) (sales confirmation sent on stationery imprinted with the name of the seller’s agent upon which the name of the seller’s principal was handwritten was signed within the meaning of the UCC) (1966).
60 Federal 3rd circuit: Associated Hardware Supply Co. v The Big Wheel Distributing Company, 355 F.2d 114 (1966).
Federal 7th circuit: Monetti, S.P.A. v Anchor Hocking Corporation, 931 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1991).
Connecticut: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Cole, 189 Conn. 518, 457 A.2d 656 (Conn. 1983).
Georgia (1974): Evans v Moore, 131 Ga.App. 169, 205 S.E.2d 507; Troutt v Nash AMC/Jeep, Inc., 157 Ga.App. 399, 278 S.E.2d 54 (the seller’s standard printed form with the seller’s company name, address and other information on the letterhead amounted to a signature) (1981).
Indiana: Owen d/b/a Clark’s Greenhouse and Clark’s Greenhouse, Inc. v The Kroeger Company, 936 F.Supp. 579 (S.D.Ind. 1996), 31 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 56.
Illinois: Automotive Spares Corp. v Archer Bearings Company, 382 F.Supp. 513 (1974) Bauer J at 515: ‘This Court recognizes the need to use common sense and commercial experience in regards to this signature question. Often times merchants exchange documents which control the transaction that do not bear their signature.’
Maryland: Drury v Young, 58 Md. 546, 1882 WL 4502 (Md.), 42 Am.Rep. 343.
Michigan: Benedict Manufacturing Co. v Aeroquip Corp. 2004 WL 1532280, 53 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 888; MFS & Company, LLC v Caterpillar, Inc., 2011 WL 4693897, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 743.
Mississippi: Dawkins and Company v L & L Planting Company, 602 So.2d 838 (Miss. 1992) (a letter on the buyer’s letterhead with the name of the sender typewritten at the bottom of the document was a sufficient signing to meet the merchant’s exception to the Statute of Frauds).
New Jersey: First Valley Leasing, Inc. v Goushy, 795 F.Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1992).
New York (1980): B & R Textile Corp. v Domino Textiles, Inc., 77 A.D.2d 539, 430 N.Y.S.2d 89, 29 UCC Rep.Serv. 396.
Ohio: Alarm Device Manufacturing Company v Arnold Industries, Inc., 65 Ohio App.2d 256, Ohio App., 417 N.E.2d 1284 (the letterhead on the seller’s invoice was sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds) (1979).
Texas: Cox Engineering, Inc. v Funston Machine and Supply Company, 749 S.W.2d 508 (Tex.App. 1988), 6 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1399.
61 Kentucky: Lamaster v Wilkerson, 143 Ky. 226, 136 S.W. 217 (trustees caused their names to be printed on a notice prepared by them of the time and place of holding an election to issue bonds: the printed names were sufficient providing the trustees had authorized the printing of their names and had adopted them as their legal signatures) (1911).
Massachusetts: Henshaw v Foster, 9 Pick. 318, 26 Mass. 312, 1830 WL 25334 (Mass.) (in the election of the governor, votes may be printed).
New Jersey: Matthews v Deane, 201 N.J.Super. 583, 493 A.2d 632 (names printed on recall petitions are valid) (1984).
62 92 Cal.App.2d 157, 206 P.2d 676.
63 33 Cal.2d 814 (Cal. 1949), 205 P.2d 1025.
64 (1890) 24 QBD 533, [1890] 2 WLUK 7, (1890) 59 LJKB (NS) 265, CA, on appeal from R v Cowper (Fitzroy) (1889) 24 QBD 60, [1889] 12 WLUK 4.
65 California: Hewel v Hogin, 3 Cal.App. 248, 84 P. 1002 (the lithographic signatures of a secretary of an irrigation district were sufficient evidence of his signature to the bonds) (1906).
Missouri: McKee v Vernon County, 3 Dill. 210, 16 F.Cas. 188, No. 8851 (railroad bonds were valid where the signature of the presiding justice and clerk of the county were lithographed on the bond) (1874).
Mississippi: Town Council of Lexington v Union National Bank, 75 Miss. 1, 22 So. 291 (railroad bonds were valid with the signature of the clerk of the council lithographed on the bond) (1897).
66 Barnes and Hector, Guide to Seals, 47 notes 2 and 52; articles that the reader might find of interest are Leonard W. Labaree and Robert E. Moody, ‘The Seal of the Privy Council’ (1928) 43 (170) The English Historical Review 190 and Clive Holmes, ‘John Lisle, Lord Commissioner of the Great Seal, and the last months of the Cromwellian Protectorate’ (2007) 122(498) The English Historical Review 918.
67 [2006] OJ No 4428 (Sup Ct) (QL), 2006 CanLII 41669 (ON SC).
68 (1863) 3 Sw & Tr 93; 164 ER 1208, (1862–63) 11 WR 854.
69 For almost identical facts where the deceased could no longer write because of arthritis and a stroke, see Phillips v Najar, 901 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995).
70 (1885) 12 R. 610.
71 (1867–68) 3 LRCP 28.
72 (1867–68) 3 LRCP 28 at 32.
73 (1873–74) 9 LRQB 374, (1874) 43 LJR QB 133.
74 (1873–74) 9 LRQB 374 at 377.
75 (1873–74) 9 LRQB 374 at 376.
76 [1951] IR 172.
77 [1970] 3 CCC 381, [1970] 2 OR 512, 8 CRNS 269 (Ont HCJ).
78 [1967] 2 OR 496, [1968] 1 CCC 1, 2 CRNS 5.
79 [1953] 2 QB 304, [1953] 3 WLR 347, [1953] 2 All ER 589, [1953] 6 WLUK 103, (1953) 97 SJ 505, [1953] CLY 1758.
80 (1905–06) 22 TLR 816.
81 [1954] 1 QB 550, [1954] 2 WLR 581, [1954] 1 All ER 763, [1954] 3 WLUK 22, (1954) 98 SJ 214, [1954] CLY 3173.
82 The signature of a lawyer on a document usually indicates that the document has been read by that lawyer, as noted in the litigation following foreclosure claims as a result of the banking crisis in 2008, for which see November Oversight Report [Submitted under Section 125(b)(1) of Title 1 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343 Examining the Consequences of Mortgage Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure Mitigation] (Congressional Oversight Panel, 16 November 2010), http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010313/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-111610-report.pdf; Office of the Inspector General US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Bank of America Corporation Foreclosure and Claims Process Review Charlotte, NC (Memorandum No. 2012FW1802, 12 March 2012), available at https://www.hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/Audit_Reports/2012-FW-1802.pdf; In Re Hill, 437 B.R. 503 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010).
83 [1954] 1 QB 550 at 563.
84 [1954] 1 QB 550 at 564.
85 [1954] 1 QB 550 at 563–564.
86 253 Ky. 38, 68 S.W.2d 448.
87 (1873–74) 9 LRQB 374, (1874) 43 LJR QB 133.
88 [1970] 3 CCC 381, [1970] 2 OR 512, 8 CRNS 269 (Ont HCJ); in R v Blumes, 2002 BCPC 45 (CanLII), it was not possible to determine whether the signature was an original signature, rubber stamp or facsimile signature; see also R v Pearce, 2000 BCSC 0376; R v Parkinson, [2002] OJ No 5478 (Ct J) (QL).
89 289 N.C. 445, 222 S.E.2d 389.
90 (1980) 12 BLR 130, 76 APR 282, 41 NSR (2d) 282 (TD).
91 (1954–58) 37 Tax Cas 79, [1956] TR 397, 35 ATC 413, 50 R & IT 33.
92 (1954–58) 37 Tax Cas 79 at 86.
93 [1956] 1 QB 702, [1956] 2 WLR 502, [1956] 1 All ER 341, [1956] 1 WLUK 543, [1956] 100 SJ 131, [1956] CLY 7545.
94 [1990] 1 WLUK 107, [1990] 1 PLR 8, (1990) 154 LG Rev 72, [1990] CLY 4361a.
95 This is of interest, bearing in mind the comments by Buxton and BrookeLJJ in Copeland v Smith [2000] 1 WLR 1371, [2000] 1 All ER 457, [1999] 10 WLUK 381, [2000] CP Rep 14, (1999) 143 SJLB 276, Times, 20 October 1999, [1999] CLY 457.
96 Pennsylvania: Robb v The Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, 40 W.N.C. 129, 3 Pa.Super. 254, 1897 WL 3989 (Pa.Super. 1897) affirmed by 186 Pa. 456, 40 A. 969; for a dissenting opinion, see 186 Pa. 456, 41 A. 49.
97 Federal 2nd circuit: Biegeleisen v Ross, 158 F.3d 59 (2nd Cir. 1998) (a valid IRS levy based on a notice signed with a signature stamp rather than a manuscript signature did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
98 Kentucky: Wurts v Newsome, 253 Ky. 38, 68 S.W.2d 448 (it was a valid signature where a judge signed ballots by means of a rubber stamp) (1934).
99 Colorado: In the Matter of Colorado Mercantile Co., 299 F.Supp. 55 (1969) (a financing statement submitted with a stamped signature was acceptable, even though the requirement at the time of filing was for a manual signature).
Connecticut: In re Bengston, 1965 WL 8262 (Bankr.D.Conn.), 3UCC Rep.Serv. 283 (a name printed in ink – understood to mean stamped with a rubber stamp – on a standard form financing statement satisfied the requirement that the secured party signed the financing statement).
Texas: Brooks v The State of Texas, 599 S.W.2d 312 (a pen packet reflecting convictions for theft burglary where the facsimile signature of the clerk was affixed by means of a rubber stamp did not bar admission of the pen packet at the penalty stage) (1979).
Connecticut: In re Deep River National Bank, 73 Conn. 341, 47 A. 675 (the signature of Clinton B. Davis, affixed to a promissory note as ‘D., Treasurer’, was held to be a valid signature) (1900).
100 Federal 6th circuit: National Accident Society v Spiro, 78 F. 774, 24 C.C.A. 334 (the facsimile signature of an officer of the company affixed to a printed letterhead of the company was sufficiently proven) (1897).
Wisconsin: Kocinski v The Home Insurance Company, 154 Wis.2d 56, 452 N.W.2d 360 (Wis. 1990) (a facsimile signature stamped on a document with a rubber stamp satisfied the requirement that the document be subscribed).
101 Arizona: Maricopa County v Osborn, 60 Ariz. 290, 136 P.2d 270 (the facsimile signature of the treasurer applied by rubber stamp was sufficient for refunding bonds) (1943).
Carolina: Smith v Greenville County, 188 S.C. 349, 199 S.E. 416 (the signature of the county treasurer on a tax execution affixed with a rubber stamp by someone in his office was the signature of the treasurer) (1938).
Florida: State v City of Fort Lauderdale, 149 Fla. 177, 5 So.2d 263 (facsimile signatures affixed to city hospital revenue certificates and the attached coupons were valid) (1941).
New York: Tenement House Department of City of New York v Weil, 76 Misc. Rep. 273, 134 N.Y.S. 1062 (an order issued under the Tenement House Law containing a facsimile signature affixed by an official by means of a rubber stamp was valid) (1912); Brooklyn City Railroad Company v City of New York, 139 Misc. 691, 248 N.Y.S. 196 (a notice of claim with the signatures of an officer and of a notary public affixed to the document with a rubber stamp was sufficient) (1930).
North Dakota: Andre v North Dakota State Highway Commissioner, 295 N.W.2d 128 (a record of a speeding violation with the words ‘STAT. FEE JUL 24 1979 THOMAS EWING’ stamped on the back of the paper was adequate for the intended purpose of informing the State Highway Department of an admission or adjudication of a traffic violation) (1980); State of North Dakota v Obrigewitch, 356 N.W.2d 105, (N.D. 1984) (an order of suspension and driving record was valid where a rubber stamp was used to affix the signature of the director of the Driver’s License Division of the State Highway Department).
Oklahoma: Moss v Arnold, 63 Okl.Cr. 343, 75 P. 491 (the facsimile signature of the chairman of the Board of County Commissioners applied by means of a rubber stamp was sufficient to authenticate requisitions) (1938); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Independent School District Number One of Tulsa County v Williamson, 352 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1960), 1960 OK 126 (the Uniform Facsimile Signature of Public Officials Act 1959 was valid and officials could use facsimile signatures on public bonds as a substitute for manuscript signatures as required by law).
Utah: Salt Lake City v Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (the signatures of a police officer and city judge to a complaint, affixed by means of a rubber stamp, were sufficient) (1967).
102 Georgia: Bell Bros. v Western & A. R. Co., 125 Ga. 510, 54 S.E. 532 (a freight receipt for a car containing cabbages signed by stencil with the name of the agent of the defendant company was not accepted because there was no proof that the agent signed the receipt, adopted the signature, or that it was his custom to sign his name to receipt by this type of stamp) (1906).
Massachusetts: Boardman v Spooner, 13 Allen 353, 95 Mass. 353, 1866 WL 5009 (Mass.), 90 Am.Dec. 196 (a bill of sale of goods bearing the purchaser’s name stamped upon it was not sufficient proof to show that the stamp was adopted as a signature).
103 549 F.2d 1113 (1977).
Maine: Mahoney v Ayoob, 124 Me. 20, 125 A. 146, 37 A.L.R. 85 (where a disclosure commissioner endorsed a capias signed with his facsimile signature impressed with a rubber stamp, this was not a signature because the signature was not under his hand) (1924).
104 Florida: State of Florida v Hickman, Fla., 189 So.2d 254 (the facsimile signature of a justice of the peace affixed to a warrant by a rubber stamp was valid, even when affixed by the chief clerk under the authority of the justice) (1966).
Illinois: Streff v Colteaux, 64 Ill.App. 179, 1896 WL 2352 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.) (a declaration may be signed with the names of the plaintiff’s attorneys by means of a rubber stamp) (1896); People of the State of Illinois v Stephens, 297 N.E.2d 224 (a search warrant signed by a magistrate with a rubber stamp was not invalid) (1973).
Iowa: Loughren v B. F. Bonniwell & Co., 125 Iowa 518, 101 N.W. 287, 106 Am.St.Rep. 319 (the subscription by a justice with a rubber stamp bearing the facsimile of his signature was sufficient for a notice, even when carried out by another, but with his authority) (1904).
Massachusetts: Wheeler v Lynde, 1 Allen 402, 83 Mass. 402, 1861 WL 6171 (Mass.) (it was a signature where an attorney at law signed the back of a writ by means of a rubber stamp) (1861).
New Mexico: Costilla Estates Development Co. v Mascarenas, 33 N.M. 356, 267 P. 74 (the signature of a court clerk by means of a rubber stamp as a method of endorsement of filing papers was held sufficient) (1928).
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth Department of Transportation v Ballard, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 310, 331 A.2d 578 (the signature of a traffic court judge by means of a rubber stamp was not inadmissible where the seal of the court was also applied to the record) (1975).
Texas: Ex parte Spencer, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 339, 349 S.W.2d 727 (a complaint was valid where the complainant and the deputy clerk both affixed their signatures by means of a facsimile rubber stamp) (1961); Ex parte Britton, 382 S.W.2d 264 (a facsimile stamped signature of the governor on extradition papers did not affect the validity of the warrant) (1964); Parsons v The State of Texas, 429 S.W.2d 476 (a complaint was sufficiently signed with the facsimile signature of the complainant with a rubber stamp) (1968); Estes v State, 484 S.W.2d 711 (a facsimile signature applied to a document from the Department of Corrections by means of a rubber stamp was a sufficient signature) (1972); Huff v The State of Texas, 560 S.W.2d 652 (the facsimile signature of the county district clerk stamped on certified copies of a judgment and sentence was valid) (1978); Paulus v The State of Texas, 633 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (there was no error when an indictment was signed with the facsimile signature of the foreman of a jury by means of a rubber stamp); Benavides v State of Texas, 763 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 1988) (a penitentiary packet stamped with a rubber stamp producing a facsimile of an original signature was an acceptable means of signing legal documents); Kemp v State of Texas, 861 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.App. – Houston 14th Dist. 1993) (the use of a rubber stamp to produce a facsimile of a county judge’s signature on a list of previous criminal records did not affect the authenticity of the signature); In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. 1998) (the signature of a judge affixed by a rubber stamp was a signature on a judgment, even when affixed to the document by an intermediate authority at the direction of the judge).
Utah: State of Utah v Montague, 671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983) (clerk of the court affixing an imprint of the judge’s signature with the authority of the judge to for the purpose of certifying the document as being a true original).
Wisconsin: Dreutzer v Smith, 56 Wis. 292, 14 N.W. 465 (a rubber stamp with a facsimile of the signature of the County Clerk affixed to a tax deed was considered to be writing the name) (1882).
105 32 A.2d 106.
106 114 Tex.Crim. 398, 23 S.W.2d 733.
107 (1893) 21 R. 165; see also Henderson v Watt (1893) 1 SLT 342.
108 (1867–68) 3 LRCP 28.