Unusually, the Scottish Court of Session had to decide whether an incorrect signature was sufficient in the case of Williamson v Williamson.¹ In this case, the issue was whether one of the witnesses, Mr David Carment Reid Wilson, a solicitor, failed to subscribe his name or signature as a witness on the will of the late Mrs Rachel Macintosh Macrae Williamson dated 11 April 1988. The solicitor wrote the name ‘D C R Williamson’. The defenders urged the court to accept the signature as valid. In delivering the opinion of the court, Lord Marnoch discussed the authorities, but indicated that, when considered objectively, it was clear that Mr Wilson had failed to adhibit his normal or customary signature, or any customary equivalent to his signature, on the occasion in question.

Three further illustrations demonstrate the willingness of judges to imply a document has been signed in the absence of a manuscript signature. In the case of Rist v Hobson,² an agreement for the sale and purchase of an estate had been drawn up but not signed by either party. The vendor sought an order for specific performance, and Sir John Leach VC reached the conclusion that where the agreement was in writing, it would be presumed the document was signed unless evidence to the contrary was adduced to rebut the presumption. It is not clear from the report whether the agreement had been committed to writing by either of the parties in this instance. In the later case of Bleakley v Smith,³ the agreement had been written in the hand of one of the parties. Mr Bridges agreed to sell five houses in Liverpool to John Bleakley. The only evidence to this agreement was a memorandum, written by Mr Bridges: ‘July 26th, 1839. John Bleakley agrees with J R Bridges to take the property in Cable Street for the net sum of £248 10s’. Mr Bridges died on 10 February 1840, but had not conveyed the property. In an action against Mr Bridges’ executors, the Vice-Chancellor made a declaration that the memorandum was a valid and binding contract and ordered specific performance and execution of a conveyance of the properties. The Vice-Chancellor merely stated that the agreement was sufficiently signed to take it out of the Statute of Frauds. In all probability, the reason for so finding was partly because the memorandum was drawn up in the hand of Mr Bridges and he had received the purchase price. In such circumstances, there was sufficient evidence to show he intended to sell the properties. It appears that the obligation was considered to be ‘entire’, thus permitting an order for specific performance.

In the 1910 Massachusetts case of Meads v Earle,⁴ the testatrix, Sarah J. Armstrong, was shortly to sail for Italy. She was described as an ‘intelligent, self-reliant woman’. She wrote her own will without assistance on a blank wills form. Although she obtained signatures of the requisite number of witnesses, she failed to sign the will at the end of the document. The judge at first instance and the members of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts concluded that the will had been signed, because she wrote the entire document in her own hand. In giving the judgment of the appellate court, Hammond J acknowledged, at 918, that the case law was ‘not in complete harmony’, and listed the relevant cases. It appears that the judges, in reaching their decision, were impressed with the evidence of her being strong-minded and self-reliant.

These cases illustrate that, despite failing to comply with formal requirements, the content of a document can be authenticated where there is sufficient evidence to show the person signing the document adopted the content.