Although politicians enact statutes with a view to regulating human affairs, human ingenuity always manages to circumvent procedures and rules laid down in an attempt to provide for certainty. As a result, judges have been required to exercise their powers to test the definition of a signature, and what is acceptable in the legal context. The case law illustrates that, in general, judges assessed the validity of a signature in relation to the functions it performed. Different factual problems required a broader understanding of these functions. Whatever form a signature took, judges looked to the intent behind the use of the signature. Thus the range of forms a signature can take is wide, as demonstrated by the discussion in this and subsequent chapters.
In England, an early record of a manuscript signature is that of Edward III of 1362, who signed a document with his name. It is suggested it was already the custom to do this in Castile, and because he was writing to the king of Castile, he also appended his manuscript signature. The manuscript signature acted to confirm his recognition of the contents of the document, but not to replace the seal.1
A mark can be in the form of any shape, including the sign of the cross, an ‘x’, a shape or a number of lines that intersect.2 One example is the mark on a memorandum dated 16 October 1666 of words spoken by Elizabeth Daniel of Eyam in the County of Derby as her last will and testament. Rebecca Hawksworth appended her mark on the memorandum as a witness to what was spoken and written down. Probate was granted on 24 April 1667. The mark consists of an incomplete line that is roughly in the shape of a heart, intersected with a further horizontal line.3
A case dating from 1798 is that of Adam v Kerr,4 concerning a mark on a bill of exchange and whether the particular mark used by custom in Jamaica was acceptable as a valid signature. In 1830 the case of George v Surrey5 dealt with the validity of a bill of exchange in which Tindal CJ accepted a bill with a mark which included the endorsement ‘Ann Moore her mark’.6
In respect of the transfer of property, in the United States case of Mitchell v Mills,7 a general warranty deed conveying property and signed by affixing a mark to the document before a notary public and witnesses was a sufficient signature, as was the sale of an erf (plot of land) in South Africa, where the mark was considered an act of the signer and signified assent to the content of the document.8
Before the majority of people could read and write, the provisions of some statutes meant that where a person could not write their name, they were still required to provide a mark on a will,9 even when the will was signed with a signature but the codicil was signed by a mark,10 and also where the will was signed by a mark where the testator was able to write.11 This also applied to a witness,12 and where a witness signed a will by marking the document with a cross.13 Where an interested person added a mark to a will, the presumption was that the will was not valid.14 The act itself was not invalid, but strict proof was required, as noted by Lord Watson in the case of Donnelly v Broughton,15 where he pointed out, at 442, that ‘the onus of proof may be increased by circumstances, such as unbounded confidence in the drawer of the will, extreme debility in the testator, clandestinity and other circumstances which may increase the presumption even so much as to be conclusive against the instrument’.
In the United States, the case law has covered a wider range of examples where judges have been required to determine the legal implications of various forms of mark and other signs, including fingerprints and an account number. A mark on a bill has been held sufficient as a means of authentication,16 as it has on deeds,17 insurance documents18 and notices of appeal,19 including in the form of a fingerprint,20 under the relevant Statute of Frauds (including a trade mark),21 with respect to trover and conversion,22 and wills.23
It is rare for illegible writing to be the subject of legal proceedings, although in 1862 the surname on a notice of objection was disputed because it was not legible.24 The appeal court reversed the decision of the revising barrister, and held that the notice of objection was sufficient. Earle CJ observed, at 39:
Lastly, it is one thing to say that the statute enjoins a legible signature, and another thing to say that such legibility is a condition precedent to the validity of the notice. Were we to hold this notice bad, questions would arise on the notice or claim of every man who might have written his name very badly or spelt it incorrectly. The object of the act of parliament, which calls to its aid persons of very imperfect education, might be defeated by adopting a rigorous construction, and furthered by a more benignant one.
In Scotland, an illegible signature by the testator on a codicil was accepted as a signature in Stirling Stuart v Stirling Crawfurd’s Trustees.25 In this case, Mr Crawfurd was not able to write, not even his own name, without becoming affected with a tremor, which meant that his writing was shaky and irregular. The Lord President made an interesting observation at 625–626 on the issue of illegible writing:
it is said that if you examine this particular signature without reference to any other signature of the testator, it is utterly illegible, and that the Court is not entitled to give effect to an illegible signature. That proposition is stated a great deal too broadly. Illegible signatures are not uncommon even when the writer is not suffering from the infirmity under which Mr Crawfurd suffered, but from other infirmities altogether. The infirmity of affectation is perhaps, of all others, most productive of illegible signatures. Many persons of the highest ability and skill in penmanship sign in such a manner that it is impossible for anyone seeing their signatures for the first time to say what is meant by them. Now, are all those illegible signatures to be disregarded? I think that a very dangerous doctrine, and I am not prepared to accede to it. Does it then make any difference if the illegibility arises from an infirmity such as Mr Crawfurd suffered from? I think not. If it is clear that this is written by him, and if it is made out that that is the kind of writing by which he was in the habit of representing his name in deeds, how does the case differ from illegibility arising from other causes? You require evidence in both instances to enable you to say what the writing is; here you require someone to tell you that what is written stands for ‘William Stuart Stirling Crawfurd’, while in the other cases I have referred to you require to be instructed that that is the ordinary way in which the writer signs his name.
In Ireland, two scrawls that were undecipherable but intended to be initials were accepted as a mark under the Wills Act 1837,26 and in Canada it was held that a manuscript signature of a justice of the peace does not render the information invalid if it is not legible, because of the presumption of regularity.27 In the United States, judges have also been required to consider illegible scrawl,28 and in the 1890 Pennsylvanian case of Appeal of Knox29 it was held that a note written by the deceased and signed with her first name ‘Harriet’ was a signature. Mitchell J remarked, at 1023, that ‘Custom controls the rule of names, and so it does the rule of signature’. He went on to note, in relation to the difficulty in reading a signature:
So the form which a man customarily uses to identify and bind himself in writing is his signature, whatever shape he may choose to give it. There is no requirement that it shall be legible, though legibility is one of the prime objects of writing. It is sufficient if it be such as he usually signs, and the signatures of neither Rufus Choate nor General Spinner could be rejected, though no man, unaided, could discover what the ragged marks made by either of those two eminent personages were intended to represent. Nor is there any fixed requirement how much of the full name shall be written. Custom varies with time and place, and habit with the whim of the individual. Sovereigns write only their first names, and the sovereign of Spain, more royally still, signs his decrees only, ‘I, the King’ (Yo el Rey). English peers now sign their titles only, though they be geographical names, like Devon or Stafford, as broad as a county. The great Bacon wrote his name ‘Fr. Verulam’, and the ordinary signature of the poet-philosopher of fishermen was ‘Iz: Wa’. In the fifty-six signatures to the most solemn instrument of modern times, the Declaration of Independence, we find every variety from Th. Jefferson to the unmistakably identified Charles Carroll, of Carrollton. In the present day it is not uncommon for business men to have a signature for checks and banking purposes somewhat different from that used in their ordinary business, and, in familiar correspondence, signature by initials or nickname or diminutive is probably the general practice.30
In South Africa, Murray J concluded in the case of Van Niekerk v Smit31 that a letter on headed notepaper with the name and address of the firm was properly signed, even though indecipherable marks were made with a lead pencil, perhaps representing initials, over the concluding words in type ‘Ferreira en van Zyl’. In SAI Investments v Vander Schyff NO32 it was held that extrinsic evidence was admissible to indicate the identity of an illegible signature on the agreement where the signature of the person signing as purchaser on the last page was indecipherable, as were the names of the two witnesses who attested to the signature. A similar finding was made on appeal in the case of Van der Merwe v Kenkes (Edms) BPK,33 where the appellant was clearly identified in an agreement as the purchaser, but the signatures of both the purchaser and the seller were illegible. Extrinsic evidence to indicate that the illegible signature was that of the appellant or her husband was admissible.
The problems associated with people who are too ill or too weak to sign a document are well illustrated in the South African case of Matanda v Rex,34 where a boy of thirteen could not write. He made a statement to a magistrate, described at 436:
My practice, which we adopted in this case, is for the witness to come up to me, I hand the pen to him, he touches the pen and then I make the mark for him. I hold one end of the pen and he holds the other, after he is told to what he is deposing. He is not actually holding the pen at one end while I am making the mark. I hand him the pen, holding it myself. He fingers it. Then I take it and I make the mark. That is what happened in this case.
A similar point was discussed in Fulton v Kee,35 where the members of the Court of Appeal distinguished between a will signed by the testator with assistance or by direction. In the 1975 New York case of In re Estate of McCready36 and the 1927 Pennsylvania case of Brehony v Brehony,37 the mark of a person who was blind that was made with the assistance of another was considered a signature.
Where a person is too ill to sign a document, one question might be whether there is any evidence to demonstrate the person intended to sign. In the case of Wilson v Beddard,38 the testator made a will dated 7 September 1826 and died the following day. The will was signed by the testator’s mark, his hand being guided by another person. Before making the mark, the testator made faint strokes on each of the sheets containing the will. On the motion for a new trial, the Vice-Chancellor, Sir L Shadwell, agreed with the trial judge, Parke B, that the will was signed by the testator. It was decided that the act of making the faint strokes provided evidence that the testator intended to sign the will, and the fact that he was helped by another person to place his mark on the document did not make the mark any less of a signature.
There are occasions when a person makes a promise that they later refuse to fulfil for some reason. Such was the case in Knight v Crockford,39 where Crockford agreed to sell a public house to Knight. Given the evidence in this case, Eyre CJ determined that the draft agreement was a sufficient agreement, and although only Knight had affixed his signature to the document, the words ‘I, James Crockford, agree to sell, &c’ written by Crockford were considered a signature within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds 1677.
Sometimes humans make mistakes, and in circumstances where the better response is to render an equitable result, judges have, on occasion, disregarded minor issues in respect to wills. For instance, in Re Clarke’s Goods40 the testatrix was described as ‘Susannah Clarke’, and executed the will with a mark, against which was written ‘Susannah Barrell, her mark’, Barrell having been her maiden name. Sir C. Cresswell was satisfied that the mark was that of Susannah Clarke, and thought the additional words next to the mark did not matter.41
Administrative mistakes tend not to be considered an adequate reason for preventing people from casting their vote. In R v Thwaites42 the names of a number of men entitled to vote were listed on the burgess roll incorrectly. When they voted, they signed the voting papers with their correct names. It was held that the men had a right to vote, and although they voted with different names in comparison to the names listed on the roll, they were the men mentioned in the burgess roll and this was a mere case of misnomer within the provisions of s142 of the Municipal Corporation Act of 5 & 6 Will. 4 c76 1853.
There are times when some people will adopt alternative names for a variety of reasons. For instance, they may forget to write their present name, as in the case of In the Goods of Glover,43 where a woman signed her will with the name of her first husband, ‘Susan Reeve’, and then placed the will into an envelope marked by her ‘The will of Susan Glover’. Alternatively, a person might use a substitute name.44 In Scotland, a letter written and sent from one sister to another was capable of constituting a holographic will, and the subscription of her Christian name ‘Connie’ was also a sufficient authentication.45
A range of variations of a name have been tested in the United States courts, including the use of a fictitious name on deeds,46 and using the name of another without permission on a promissory note.47 More commonly, mistaken or partial names have appeared in matters relating to a lien,48 the Statute of Frauds,49 mortgages,50 the name of a partnership on an arbitration bond51 and on a writ,52 and it is not surprising that the range of human behaviour is more widely reflected in the cases of wills,53 although the liberal approach in extending the meaning of a signature was not applied to the 1914 Pennsylvanian case of In re Brennan’s Estate,54 where a testamentary paper ending with ‘your miserable father’ was held not to have been executed correctly.
The use of initials has been held sufficient to be a mark or signature to indicate the intent of a party under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, as in the case of Phillimore v Barry.55 Messrs Fector and Minet of Dover stored a quantity of rum, the cargo of a Danish prize, which was to be sold by auction in various lots on 28 April 1808. Before the day of the sale, the defendants wrote to Fector and Minet asking them to buy thirteen puncheons of the rum. As a result, Mr John Minet Fector of the firm bid for several lots, which were duly knocked down to him. The auctioneer wrote down in the printed catalogue the initials ‘I.M.F.’ opposite each lot sold to the defendant. On 11 May 1808 the defendants subsequently wrote a letter to Fector and Minet, recognizing and approving the purchase. The warehouse accidentally caught fire on 18 May 1808, and a quantity of gunpowder stored in the building exploded (that is, it burnt rapidly at a subsonic speed), destroying the rum. There was no evidence that a deposit had been paid. The defendants claimed the contract was void under the Statute of Frauds on the basis that there was no memorandum in writing. It was also submitted that the auctioneer was not the authorized agent of the defendants, and even if he were, the inclusion of the initials against each lot could not be considered a memorandum of agreement. It was also contended that the rum remained at the risk of the sellers for thirty days, and the property did not vest with the defendant.
Lord Ellenborough held that Mr Minet was the agent to the defendants, and that his initials as written by the auctioneer in the catalogue, together with the defendant’s letter confirming the sale, constituted a sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. He also held that the property vested absolutely in the purchasers from the moment of sale, and the provision of storage for thirty days was part of the consideration for which the purchase money was to be paid. While the finding by Lord Ellenborough was not relevant to whether the initials represented a signature, nevertheless they were considered part of the evidence to demonstrate that a contract existed between the parties.
In Chichester v Cobb,56 the defendant wrote a letter to Mary Ann Williams, as follows:
Kensington, 21st July 1865
My dear M. A. – So soon as all pecuniary and necessary arrangements are made to constitute an unquestionable legal marriage as proposed, I will be prepared to pay over for your behalf 300l., and concur in every practicable measure by which an equitable share, or its equivalent, in the settled property can be assured to you. I shall expect to see Edward here this evening, as requested in my note to him of last evening. – Yours ever affectionately, E.C.
After the marriage, the defendant refused to pay the £300. Blackburn and Shee JJ in the Queen’s Bench agreed that the initials constituted a sufficient signing of the contract or memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
There is a case where a judge in England and Wales signed a bill of indictment with his initials. In R v Morais (Carlton),57 a bill of indictment was signed in manuscript ‘Cor. The Honourable Mr. Justice Roch’ and underneath, in the judge’s handwriting, the words ‘Leave to prefer’ and his initials, ‘J. R.’, with the date ‘23.9.87’ and the words ‘A Justice of the High Court’. This form of signature was held not to be a signature by Lord Lane CJ in the Court of Appeal. A new trial was ordered.58
Judicial officers in the United States have used initials, although the decisions do not always indicate approval of the use of initials in the absence of a full signature.59 In the 1933 Federal case of George A. Ohl & Co. v A. L. Smith Iron Works,60 the use of a judge’s initials followed by ‘D. J.’ was held as a signature authenticating a bill of exceptions, and the initials ‘D. J.’ were added for the purpose of indicating his judicial office. Hughes CJ commented on the use of initials at 176–177:
Signature by initials has been held to be sufficient under the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills, and in other transactions. It has been held in some states that a different rule obtains in the case of the official signature of certain judicial officers, but the Congress has not established such a rule for the judges of the federal courts. Nor, in the absence of special statutory requirement, is there a uniform custom in relation to official signatures. It may be assumed that a requirement of the officer’s signature, without more, means that he shall write his name or his distinctive appellation; but the question remains as to what writing of that character is to be deemed sufficient for the purpose of authenticating his official act. There is no rule that he shall adhere to the precise form of his name as it appears in his commission. The full name of the officer may or may not be used. Not infrequently Christian names are omitted, in part or altogether, or are abbreviated or indicated by initials. In some of the most important communications on behalf of the federal government, only the surname of the officer is used. When an officer authenticates his official act by affixing his initials he does not entirely omit to use his name; he simply abbreviates it; he uses a combination of letters which are part of it. Undoubtedly that method is informal, but we think that it is clearly a method of ‘signing’. It cannot be said in such a case that he has utterly failed to ‘sign’, so that his authentication of his official act, in the absence of further statutory requirement, is to be regarded as absolutely void.
The cases of Origet v United States61 and Kinney v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company62 were neither cited nor referred to as being overruled, although the comments by Hughes CJ appear to indicate that initials are acceptable. The initials of a judge on a judgment were held to be sufficient in the Illinois case of Robertson v Robertson,63 and in the 1905 Nebraska case of Griffith v Bonawitz64 the initials of two judges, written on the back of a number of ballots, were also held to be signatures.
Initials have been used in wills, as in the case of Re Savory’s Goods65 where the testatrix executed the will by writing her initials in the presence of two witnesses who duly attested.66 See also In the Goods of Clark,67 where the deceased, who was too ill to sign his will, requested his wife to sign for him, which she did, with her mark. This was a sufficient compliance with the Act, although the executrix lost a legacy that was granted to her under the terms of the will. In the case of In the Goods of Christian,68 H. H. Christian, a rear admiral in the Royal Navy, left a will that included the signature of a witness in the form of initials, which was also a sufficient subscription. For a line of cases in England with respect to wills, see Re Blewitt’s Goods,69 and in Scotland, initials were considered a form of signature in Speirs v Speirs or Home Speirs.70
In South Africa, a will signed with initials was considered signed in the case of In re Trollip,71 in which the decision in Van Vuuren v Van Vuuren72 was overruled and the decision in the case of In re Ebden’s Will73 approved. De Villiers CJ observed, at 245, that ‘If a mark is a sufficient signature, a fortiori initials must be sufficient’. A modern example of a will in which initials were accepted as sufficient evidence of a signature is the Canadian case of Re Schultz.74
In respect of rights in property, the initials of a landlord in a rent book served to renew a lease and enable an option to buy to be exercised,75 and directors adding their initials to a clause providing a guarantee in a contract were bound by the guarantee under the provisions of s2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 in the New Zealand case of Doughty-Pratt Group Limited v Perry Castle.76 Although it was accepted that initials can be considered a signature in Newell v Tarrant,77 in the particular circumstances of that case the initials in question did not amount to an execution and authentication to create an equitable charge over Chase Farm, and the initials also failed to comply with the strict requirements of s2(3) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.78
In the nineteenth century voting papers had to be signed with the name of the burgess voting under the provisions of s32 of the Municipal Corporation Act 1853. In 1852, in the case of R v Avery,79 it was held that a person could sign as they ordinarily write their signature, such as, in this instance, the surname and initial of the Christian name.
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
Schedule 3, para 1(1) requires that ‘A consent under this Schedule, and any notice under paragraph 4 varying or withdrawing a consent under this Schedule, must be in writing and … must be signed by the person giving it’. In Jefferies v BMI Healthcare Ltd (Human Fertilisation and Embryology),80 the question was whether initials constituted a signature. Sir James Munby P determined that initials are acceptable as a signature under the provisions of the schedule.
In the United States, decisions relating to the use of initials covers a range of situations, including bills,81 cheques (checks),82 the Statute of Frauds,83 trusts84 and wills,85 although the evidence does not always indicate that initials served as a means of authentication, as in the 1945 Wisconsin case of North American Seed Co. v Cedarburg Supply Co.,86 where the initials ‘H. Z.’ for Harvey Zirtzlaff were placed in such an odd position that it was determined they did not serve as a signature. Attempts are made on occasions to retrieve a small scintilla of hope from an otherwise impossible position, which is what was attempted in the federal eighth circuit case of Vess Beverages, Inc. v The Paddington Corporation,87 where the initials of those attending a meeting that were added by the person who took a note of the meeting did not constitute individual signatures, and thus did not qualify as a means of authentication.
People use many variations of their name when signing a document, and the use of first name or family name is not unusual. In the context of the Statute of Frauds, the question about what could be construed as a signature was argued before Lord Denham CJ and Patteson, Coleridge and Wrightman JJ in the case of Lobb and Knight v Stanley in 1844.88 Interestingly, the comments made both by counsel and Patteson J in this case seem to imply that contemporaries would have preferred to reverse the liberal approach relating to the meaning of a signature. However, the authorities were too well established to be reviewed or ignored. In this instance, one Stanley, a certified bankrupt, gave a written promise signed by him after his bankruptcy. Three undated letters were produced, one of which read:
Mr Stanley begs to inform Mr Lobb that he will be glad to give him a promissory note or bill for the amount of Mr Stanley’s account, payable at three months, as Mr Stanley has of late been put to heavy expenses, and hopes this arrangement will be satisfactory to Mr Lobb. 3 Crescent. Thursday morning.
At the trial before Lord Denman CJ, a verdict was found for Lobb, and leave was given to appeal. Whately, counsel for Stanley, submitted that all the previous decisions relating to what was meant to be a signature were not correct. He argued: ‘Those decisions, however, are scarcely to be defended on principle; and, if the question were new, probably a different doctrine would be adopted.’89 This view was noted and commented upon by Patteson J:
It is true that the word ‘signed’ occurs in the statute: and, if this had been the first time that we were called upon to put a construction on that word, and if the decisions on the Statute of Frauds had not occurred, I should perhaps be slow to say that this was a signature.90
Lord Denham CJ agreed that in one sense the letters were not signed. However, he then considered the intrinsic evidence of the documents, and pointed out that:
it is a signature of the party when he authenticates the instrument by writing his name in the body. Here, it is true, the whole name is not written, but only ‘Mr Stanley’. I think more is not necessary.91
Coleridge J reinforced the significance of the mechanism by which the document was authenticated when he pointed out that:
Is it not enough if a party, at the beginning of a document, writes his name so as to govern what follows? Does he not then use his name as a signature?92
It was unanimously agreed that Stanley had signed the documents. Stanley had written the letters himself. He had identified himself by surname in the body of the letters. By identifying himself in this way, he had demonstrated his intention that the recipient should rely on the promise contained in the letter. The signature was, in effect, his assertion, by writing his surname within the text of the message, that the contents of the letters were to be acted upon by the recipient.93
A note written in the third person was accepted as a signature in the 1811 case of Morrison v Turnour,94 as was an unsigned statement that began ‘Mr Wilmot Parker has agreed’ in an action for specific performance in respect of a contract for the purchase of a leasehold house.95
In Scotland, Lord Dervaird held that a deed executed by the subscription of the granter’s surname alone was not of itself improbative or invalid in the case of American Express Europe Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc,96 following the decision in Gordon v Murray97 where it was upheld that the subscription to an assignation, being ‘Fullerton of that Ilk’ without a Christian name, was valid. The case of Traquair (Earl of) v Janet Gibson98 in which the use of initials was considered, was also canvassed. For the modern position in Scotland, see s7(2) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.
The use of a trade name by a party may be sufficient to indicate an intention to enter into a contract, as in the case of Johnson v Dogson,99 where an agent for the plaintiff signed a memorandum retained by the defendant ‘for’ Johnson, Johnson & Co. In Cohen v Roche,100 the printed name of the firm on the front page of the auction catalogue was held to constitute a signature by Mr Roche. In reaching his judgment in this case, McCardie J considered that the insertion of the name in the catalogue served to authenticate the catalogue, and this authentication was reinforced ‘in that the defendant himself wrote down in his auctioneer’s book the price realized by lot 145, and also entered the names of the purchasers’.101 However, the mere insertion of the name of the seller in a memorandum where the sale of the property was subject to the approval of the seller, even where the buyer had signed the document with his mark, did not indicate authentication of the document, and the inclusion of the name of the auctioneer on the particulars of sale only acted to announce that he would sell the premises.102 In the 1842 New York case of Miller v Pelletier,103 the clerk to the auctioneer wrote down the name of the highest bidder for 7 Barclay Street, New York, in the sales book. The successful bidder subsequently took action to recover the deposit because the seller claimed they had not subscribed to the contract. The Vice-Chancellor concluded that the purchaser was bound by the addition of his name to the sales book by the clerk to the auctioneer, but in the absence of the seller’s name or subscription in the sales book, the contract was void, and the deposit was returned to the buyer.
Sudden changes in life expectancy can cause a person, as they near the end of their life, to review the arrangements for the disposal of their worldly goods. On such occasions, ensuring the disposition is made in the proper form can be overtaken by the imminent demise of the testatrix. In Chalcraft’s Goods, Re,104 as Mrs Chalcraft’s life ebbed away, her doctor administered greater doses of morphia to alleviate the pain she was experiencing. She wanted to sign a codicil to her will, and took hold of a pen and wrote ‘E. Chal’, but never completed her name because she died, and the signature came to an abrupt end. One of the issues before the court was whether what the deceased wrote was intended to be her signature. Willmer J found that whether the partial signature could be considered to be her signature within the provisions of the Wills Act 1837 was a ‘very difficult point to decide’.105 He suggested that there must be a question of degree involved in any decision, and he interpreted the words used by the Lord Chancellor in Hindmarch v Charlton106 broadly. Taking into account the circumstances the deceased found herself in at the end of her life, he decided that the mark she made did amount to a signature.107 Compare this with the case where a witness began to sign their name, but through infirmity only signed with their first name and failed to complete their name. Given such a set of facts, it was held that the witness intended to write their full name and failed to do so. This meant the signature was not a perfect subscription to the will.108
In comparison, in 1892 Mitchell J concluded that there was no signature where a testator began to sign a codicil, but stopped after making a stroke of the pen resembling the first part of the first letter of his name, and said to those present ‘I can’t sign it now’. Given the nature of the evidence, the judge concluded that the testator did not intend the scrawl on the document to be a signature.109 The Outer House in Scotland reached the same decision in the case of Donald v M’Gregor,110 where the matron of the hospital, at the request of the deceased, wrote a codicil on a postcard. The deceased tried to sign it, but desisted after writing ‘Mary T. M’Gr’, adding a cross as her mark. Two witnesses appended their signatures. Lord Ashmore noted, at 105, that ‘the deceased did not herself subscribe the codicil; for although she began to write her name she did not complete it, probably because she was too weak and too ill to write more than she did, and no one executed the writing for her’ and went on to indicate that in Scotland, ‘as regards the cross which she added – signing by a mark is not sufficient in law’. Neither her partial signature nor the cross acted as a signature.
Occasionally, people will not refer to each other by name but by reference to their relationship with each other, such as between parents and children, where a child may call their parents ‘mum’ and ‘dad’, ‘mater’ or ‘pater’, or some other form of address. Equally, parents may well do the same with their children, especially when writing to them. They may not sign a letter or card with their name, but with the words ‘mother’ or ‘father’. In the case of Cook, In the Estate of,111 the testatrix drew up a holograph will on two sheets of notepaper, which was duly properly attested by two competent witnesses. The document ended ‘Please Leslie be kind to Dot. Your loving mother.’ Leslie was her son and Dot referred to one of her daughters. The question was whether the words ‘Your loving mother’ constituted a signature within the meaning of the Wills Act 1837. Collingwood J, having cited various authorities, came to the conclusion that the testatrix intended the words ‘Your loving mother’ to identify herself as the person attesting.112 This case illustrates the concern that judges have in establishing whether the person signing the document intended the words they used to apply to the terms of the document they signed.
In the United States, there is a line of case law to illustrate the use of similar words and phrases,113 although the 1940 Californian case of Berdan v Berdan114 demonstrated that this liberal approach can only be taken so far. In this instance, a father wrote a letter to his son on a typewriter, and his wife added further handwritten script on the reverse of the letter: ‘Dad signed this with his signature and also “Dad” below. The signature in case you might want to use it. Lawfully. Mother.’ The word ‘Mother’ was capable of being a legally binding signature, but was taken not to be because it was assumed, in the absence of any evidence, that the language illustrated that she did not believe the word ‘Dad’ was a legally binding signature.
In contrast to the examples above, the use of the word ‘mother’ was not held to be a signature in an earlier case of Selby v Selby,115 where a letter addressed to the son beginning ‘My Dear Robert’ and ending in the words ‘Do me the justice to believe me the most affectionate of mothers’ was not satisfactorily signed within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds 1677. The Master of the Rolls held that it was not sufficient that a party to a document can be identified in such a way because the Statute required the document to be signed. He rejected the proposition that where the writer of the document has been identified, it could therefore be construed that there was a signature within the meaning of the Statute. Lord Skerrington also concluded, in Pentland v Pentland’s Trustees,116 that a holograph codicil signed ‘Yr Loving Mother’ was not signed. The basis of the objections to accepting such terms as a form of signature were set out by Interim Sheriff-Substitute Kermack in Allan and Crichton, Petitioners,117 where a witness had subscribed as ‘Mrs Bernard’ without adhibiting her Christian name or initial, which was not considered to form a signature.
It is instructive to compare the decision of the Master of the Rolls in Selby v Selby to that of the comment made by Maule J in Morton v Copeland, that a ‘Signature does not necessarily mean writing a person’s Christian and surname, but any mark which indicates it as the act of the party’.118 This view was also considered in the case of Sperling,119 where Thomas Saunders was directed by George W. Harris, solicitor to the deceased, to sign as a second witness to the will, saying ‘Now sign yourself as servant to Mr. Sperling’, upon which he wrote ‘Servant to Mr. Sperling’. Sir J. P. Wilde held that there was sufficient attestation and subscription because he was satisfied that Mr Saunders wrote the words on the will intending to identify himself as the person attesting. The decision by Lord Hunter in Rhodes v Peterson120 from Scotland reached the same conclusion. In Rhodes v Peterson, Mrs Dorothy Macandrew wrote a letter to her daughter in her own handwriting, and signed it ‘Lots of Love. Mum’. Lord Hunter was required to determine whether the word ‘Mum’ was sufficient to establish that the holograph will was duly signed. He noted some latitude in the law of Scotland towards the meaning of what is meant by a signature, and went on to observe, at 100(a):
It clearly is not essential that the subscription should consist of a surname preceded by either an initial or initials or a Christian name or names, nor is it essential that the surname should appear at all or, indeed, that there should be comprised in the subscription or signature any of the Christian names or surnames written in full.
Lord Hunter also indicated that the use of a familiar or pet name could be a valid signature provided it was proved that the writer usually signed their name in such a way. He went on to suggest, at 100(b), that the use of such a form of signature was ‘as apt to signify that the writing is the completed and concluded expression of the writer’s intention as a signature by initials or by abbreviated Christian name’. In particular, he considered it settled authority that where a holograph writing consisted of a name other than the Christian name or names, or initials followed by the surname, of the writer, there must be sufficient evidence to identify that whatever name was used by the writer (in this case, ‘Mum’) was used regularly. The form by which people identify themselves does not necessarily affect the validity of the document, especially where a person writes a document with their own handwriting and uses a phrase as a means of identification.
Professional firms tend to accumulate long names over time, although the present fashion is to adopt a shortened version. Long names can be tedious; one partner in the firm of Bartlett Gluckstein Crawley & de Reya sought to reduce the requirement of signing the firm’s name in full, and a client decided to challenge this practice.121 Mr Byrne was sent a bill of costs. The bill had a printed heading with the full name of the partnership, its address and the names of the partners. The bill was signed ‘Bartletts’ by a partner. The full name was printed below the signature, but not immediately beneath it. The bill was sent with a letter headed with the firm’s full name, which was also signed in the same abbreviated name. Mr Byrne refused to pay because the signature on the bill did not comply with the requirements of s69(2) of the Solicitors Act 1974. The firm brought an action to recover the costs. McDonnell J gave judgment for Mr Byrne. He accepted the sum was owed, but agreed that the bill was not signed in accordance with the required form. On appeal, Fox LJ determined that the bill was properly signed, and offered the following comments:
There had been legislation relating to solicitors’ bills of costs over several centuries. The question was whether as a matter of construction it could be said that the bill was signed ‘in the name of the firm’.
Those words could not require that the whole name of the firm, which in the present case was a long one, had to be set out in full. If a solicitor was required to sign in his own name he did not have to sign all his names in full nor write all his initials.
If the name of the firm had been printed immediately below the signature ‘Bartletts’ it could hardly have been doubted that the bill was signed in the name of the firm.
There was a signature on the bill of costs by a solicitor of the Supreme Court. That signature was intended to authenticate the bill and the defendant treated it as a bill issued with the authority of the firm itself ….
The signature could only be regarded as a signature in the name of the firm, and anyone reading it would take it to be a convenient and obvious contraction of the full name of the firm.122
Bush J agreed with this analysis and the appeal was allowed. Interestingly, between the trial and the appeal a fresh bill of costs was prepared and delivered to Mr Byrne, signed with the full name of the firm. It was paid before the hearing in the Court of Appeal took place.
1 Harvey and McGuinness, Guide to British Medieval Seals, 2 and n. 2.
2 Or a totemic signature: J. Walter Fewkes, ‘Tusayan totemic signatures’ (1897) 10(1) The American Anthropologist 1; also a pictogram, such as that of Massasoit on a land deed dated 1657 held at the Plymouth County Commissioners Office, Plymouth, Massachusetts, illustrated in Nathaniel Philbrick, Mayflower A Voyage to War (HarperPress 2006), 195.
3 A copy of this document is on display in the museum at Eyam, England, together with another document with the marks of three men; each of these marks is different in shape.
4 (1798) 1 B & P 360, 126 ER 952.
5 (1830) 1 M. & M. 516, 173 ER 1243.
6 In the South African case of Hanse v Jordan and Fuchs 1909 19 CTR 530, the sum of £21 4s was due on a promissory note. The defendant claimed not to have added his mark. The magistrate at first instance, having heard the case, believed the plaintiff’s account of the facts. On appeal, Buchanan J commented, at 530, ‘The defendant denied this [adding his mark to the note], but the mere fact that he can write, and only signed by his mark, is not sufficient ground upon which the Court can upset the finding of the Magistrate upon the fact.’
7 264 S.E.2d 749 (1954).
8 Chisnall and Chisnall v Sturgeon and Sturgeon 1993 (2) SA 642 (W). For Scotland, see M. C. Meston and D. J. Cusine, ‘Execution of deeds by a mark’ (1993) Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 270.
9 In the case of Crosbie v Wilson (1865) 3 M. 870 in Scotland, a will was attested but had the testator’s name at the end in words only with the statement ‘her mark’. This was held to be ineffective as a signature.
10 Baker v Dening (1838) 8 AD & E 94, 112 ER 771; Patterson J indicated that when a document is signed by a mark, an enquiry may be undertaken as to the circumstances of the signing to ensure a will was properly attested. See also Re Field’s Goods (1843) 3 Curt 752, 163 ER 890, although note Hindmarch v Charlton (1861) 8 HL Cas 160 and Re Holtam, Gillett v Rogers (1913) 108 LT 732.
11 Taylor v Denning (1838) 3 Nev. & P. 228, where the illness from which the testator was suffering made it difficult to write. In the 1929 New York case of In the Matter of the Estate of Stegman, 133 Misc. 745, 234 N.Y.S. 239, probate was denied where a testator, who was able to write, subscribed a third will with a mark. The proponent failed to prove the third and final will was valid. Evans S indicated, at 747, ‘This manner of execution is not rare but it is unusual, for a person to sign by a mark that is able to write. This fact in itself does not invalidate a will but it is obvious that it calls for greater scrutiny on the part of the court.’ For a contrary decision in Wisconsin in 1925, see In re Mueller’s Will, 188 Wis. 183, 205 N.W. 814, 42 A.L.R. 951, where the testator made her mark even though she could write, and where a witness added the words ‘her’ above and ‘mark’ below the cross.
12 Harrison v Harrison (1803) 8 Ves Jun 185; 32 ER 324.
13 A will was held to be sufficiently signed where a testatrix signed with a mark without her name appearing on the document in Re Bryce’s Goods (1839) 2 Curt 325, 163 ER 427.
14 Paske v Ollat (1815) 2 Phill 323, 161 ER 1158.
15 [1891] AC 435 PC.
16 Federal: Zacharie v Franklin, 37 U.S. 151, 12 Pet. 151, 1838 WL 3945 (U.S.La.), 9 L.Ed. 1035 (the mark of Joseph Milah in a bill of sale comprising slaves, their children, and stock and household furniture had the same effect as a signature) (1838).
Indiana (1867): Shank v Butsch, 28 Ind. 19, 1867 WL 2925 (Ind.).
New Hampshire: Willoughby v Moulton, 47 N.H. 205, 1866 WL 1982 (N.H.) (a promissory note signed by a mark may be valid against the person signing, even though there was no subscribing witness).
New York: Brown v The Butchers & Drovers’ Bank, 6 Hill 443, 41 Am.Dec. 755 (a person writing ‘1. 2. 8.’ on the back of a bill of exchange as a substitute for his name served to endorse the bill) (1844).
Tennessee: Brown v McClanahan, 68 Tenn. 347, 1878 WL 4292 (Tenn.), 9 Baxt. 347, 2 Leg.Rep. 59.
South Carolina: Zimmerman v Sale, 37 S.C.L. 76, 3 Rich. 76, 1846 WL 2269 (S.C.App.L.) (a mark that was not accompanied by the name of the person making the mark remains a signature) (1864).
17 Carolina (1891): Devereux v McMahon, 108 N.C. 134, 12 S.E. 902, 12 L.R.A. 205.
Kentucky: Blair v Campbell, 45 S.W. 93, 19 Ky.L.Rptr. 2012 (a deed signed with a mark and acknowledged before the county clerk was held to be sufficient as a signature) (1898); Stephens v Perkins, 273 S.W. 545 (in the conveyance of property, the marks of nine heirs were sufficient as signature of the conveyance) (1925).
Georgia: Horton v Murden, 117 Ga. 72, 43 S.E. 786 (a deed signed ‘I, J. R., sign my hand to it X here’ was sufficiently signed) (1903).
18 Georgia: Thurmond v Spoon, 125 Ga.App. 811, 189 S.E.2d 92 (a mark affixed to a beneficiary card was a sufficient signature) (1972). Dissenting, Evans J articulated the view that the name of the person must be affixed to the document as well as a mark.
Pennsylvania: Tomilio v Pisco, 123 Pa. Super. 423, 187 A. 86 (it was a signature where the person signing was too weak to sign their name, but made an undecipherable series of curves and strokes) (1936).
19 North Carolina: State v Byrd, 93 N.C. 624, 1885 WL 1753 (N.C.).
Wisconsin: Finley v Prescott, 47 L.R.A. 695, 104 Wis. 614, 80 N.W. 930 (appeal papers may be signed by a mark, and there was no statutory requirement to have the signature of a person in the form of a mark witnessed) (1899).
20 Illinois: Matter of the Estate of Deskovic, 21 Ill.App.2d 209, 157 N.E.2d 769, 72 A.L.R.2d 1261 (1st Dist. 1959).
New York (1937): In the Matter of the Estate of Romaniw, 163 Misc. 481, 296 N.Y.S. 925.
21 Federal: Bibb v Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 13 S.Ct. 950, 37 L.Ed. 819, 50 L.R.A. 240 (telegrams containing orders in the form of Shepperton’s Code, and which directed the sales delivery for accounts of designated names, such as ‘Albert’, ‘Alfred’, ‘Alexander’, ‘Amanda’, ‘Andrew’ and ‘Winston’, were intended and understood to represent the firm name of B. S. Bibb & Co. and held to be sufficient as a signature) (1893); Federal 4th circuit: Barber & Ross Co. v Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1987), 3 U.C.C. Rep.Serv.2d (CBC) 41 (a trademark printed on a written sales brochure met the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and signature requirement).
Missouri: Defur v Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 677 F.Supp. 622 (E.D.Mo. 1988) (writings with the defendant’s trademark printed on them constituted signed writings).
22 Massachusetts: Foye v Patch, 132 Mass. 105, 1882 WL 10891 (Mass.) (adding a mark to a written agreement was a satisfactory signature).
23 Illinois: Cunningham v Hallyburton, 342 Ill. 442, 174 N.E. 420 (1930); In re Westerman’s Will, 401 Ill. 489, 82 N.E.2d 474 (1948) (the will of Minnie Westerman (her maiden name) dated 13 April 1942 revoked an earlier will dated 9 April 1942 and executed under her married name of Wilhelmina Frederichs, when both wills were signed with her mark, notwithstanding she was not authorized to resume using her maiden name in her second divorce proceedings).
New York: 1809 case of Jackson v Van Dusen, 5 Johns 144; 1847 case of Butler v Benson, 1 Barb. 533; Jackson v Jackson, 39 N.Y. 153, 12 Tiffany 153, 1868 WL 6249 (N.Y.) (after trying for some time to apply the pen to the paper to sign his name, the hand of the deceased trembled so much that he made a cross on his will); In the Matter of the Estate of Galvin, 78 Misc.2d 22, 355 N.Y.2d 751 (a mark added to a will by the daughter and at the request of the deceased was a valid signature of the deceased) (1974).
Pennsylvania: Main v Ryder, 84 Pa. 217, 4 W.N.C. 173, 1877 WL 13243 (Pa.) (signing a will with a mark while touching the writing instrument held and controlled by another person) (1877). Note: in Pennsylvania, a new Act was enacted in 1833 requiring the manuscript signature of a testator, and a mark was no longer permitted, for which see Assay v Hoover, 5 Pa. St. 21 (1846); Grabill v Barr, 5 Pa. 441, 5 Barr. 441, 1846 WL 5049 (Pa.), 47 Am.Dec. 418; but see Long v Zook, 13 Pa. 400, 1850 WL 5764 (Pa.), 1 Harris 400 where Gibson CJ, in applying the revised Act of 1848, commented that the 1833 Act probably defeated more true wills than false ones; also note the comments of Gibson CJ in the earlier case of Greenough v Greenough, 11 Pa.St. 497, 1849 WL 5732 (Pa.).
Texas: 1934 case of Short v Short, 67 S.W.2d 425; 1937 case of Mortgage Bond Corporation v Haney, 105 S.W.2d 488.
Virginia: Clarke v Dunnavant, 10 Leigh 13, 37 Va. 13 (1839).
Wisconsin: Will of Susan Jenkins, 43 Wis. 610, 1878 WL 3217 (Wis.).
24 Trotter v Walker (1862) 13 CB (NS) 29, 143 ER 12.
25 (1885) 12 R. 610.
26 In the Goods of Kiernan, deceased [1933] IR 222.
27 R v Kapoor, 52 CCC (3d) 41.
28 Alabama: Dew v Garner, 7 Port. 503, 1838 WL 1335 (Ala.); Mississippi (1896): Sheehan v Kearney, 82 Miss. 688, 21 So. 41, 35 L.R.A. 102; Pennsylvania (1936): Tomilio v Pisco, 123 Pa. Super. 423, 187 A. 86; Wyoming (1929): In re Iverson’s Estate, 39 Wyo. 482, 273 P. 684, 64 A.L.R. 203.
29 131 P. 220, 18 A. 1021, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am.St.Rep. 798.
30 Note his comments at 1022 about Vernon v Kirk, 30 Pa.St. 222 (1858); Assay v Hoover, 5 Pa. St. 21 and Grabill v Barr, 5 Pa. 441, 5 Barr. 441, 1846 WL 5049 (Pa.), 47 Am.Dec. 418 and the subsequent change of the law.
31 1952 (3) SA 17 (T).
32 1999 (3) SA 340 (N).
33 1983 (3) SA 909 (T).
34 1923 AD 435 (B).
35 [1961] NI 1, CA (NI).
36 369 N.Y.S.2d 325, 82 Misc.2d 531.
37 289 Pa. 267, 137 A. 260.
38 (1841) 12 Sim 28, 59 ER 1041.
39 (1794) 1 Esp 190, 170 ER 324; the insertion of names into a document that the parties intended to sign did not equate to the document being signed: Hubert v Treherne (1842) 3 Man. & G. 743, 133 ER 1338.
40 (1858) LJR 27 NS P & M 18, 1 Sw & Tr 22; 164 ER 611.
41 Re Douce’s Goods (1862) 2 Sw & Tr 592, 164 ER 1127 where the deceased was mistakenly described as John Douce, but his name was actually Thomas Douce. This case was considered in the New Zealand case of In re McNamee (1912) 31 NZLR 1007, where the deceased executed a will giving all his property to his wife, then executed a second will giving all his property to his wife, but in the blank space for his name he merely inserted a cross for his name. Williams J concluded that there was sufficient proof to grant letters of administration, given that there was an affidavit by the witness to the execution of the will, and the name of his wife appeared in both wills.
42 (1853) 22 LJQB 238.
43 (1847) 11 Jur. 1022, 5 Notes of Cases 553.
44 Re Reddings Goods (1850) 14 Jur 1052, 2 Rob Ecc 338, 163 ER 1338. The two law reports differ as to whether the testatrix signed her first name with the initial ‘C’ or ‘Charlotte’.
45 Draper v Thomason 1954 SC 136, 1954 SLT 222.
46 Arkansas (1947): Walker v Emrich, 212 Ark. 598, 206 S.W.2d 769.
New York: David v Williamsburgh City Fire Insurance Company, 83 N.Y. 265, 38 Sickels 265, 1880 WL 12653 (N.Y.), 38 Am.Rep. 418 (where a person adopted a fictitious name with intent to convey title, he was bound by the name he adopted when executing a conveyance of the property).
47 New Hampshire: Grafton Bank v Flanders, 4 N.H. 239, 1827 WL 744 (N.H.) (a person putting the name of another on a promissory note without authority from any person of that name was liable for the note).
48 Federal 2nd circuit: In the Matter of Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (1965) (use of the name ‘Excel Department Stores’ instead of the correct name ‘Excel Stores, Inc’ was a minor error and not seriously misleading when the contract was properly signed by an appropriate officer of the company).
49 Massachusetts: Fessenden v Mussey, 65 Mass. 127, 1853 WL 4969 (Mass.) (the name ‘Benj. Mussey’ as recorded at the time of the auction was held to be a signature, even though it omitted the middle letter of the defendant’s name); Walker v Walker, 175 Mass. 349, 56 N.E. 601 (a marriage contract was deemed to be signed where the defendant signed the document with her first name only) (1900).
Missouri: Great Western Printing Co. v Belcher, 127 Mo.App. 133, 104 S.W. 894 (the words ‘Guaranteed. Belcher’ written in lead pencil across the face of the original account was a signature, even though the signature did not include the first name) (1907).
50 California: Middleton v Findla, 25 Cal. 76, 1864 WL 629 (Cal.) (a grantor who signed a deed using an incorrect name (Edmund Jones) with his correct name in the body of the deed (Edward Jones) did not invalidate the conveyance).
Indiana: Zann v Haller, 71 Ind. 136, 1880 WL 6236 (Ind.), 23 Am.Rep. 193 (a woman signing a mortgage deed with her first name only was accepted as a signature).
51 New York: Mackay v J. and L. Bloodgood, 9 Johns. 285 (the affixing of the name and seal of a firm by one partner bound the other partner) (1812).
52 Maine: Sawtelle v Wardwell, 56 Me. 146, 1868 WL 1770 (Me.) (the surname of an attorney on the back of a writ of endorsement was a sufficient signature), although note the dissenting judgment of Kent J.
53 Kentucky: Wells v Lewis, 190 Ky. 626, 228 S.W. 3 (the signature ‘Ant Nanie’ appended to a letter as a testamentary writing was a sufficient signature) (1921).
54 91 A. 220, 244 Pa. 574.
55 (1808) 1 Camp 513, 170 ER 1040.
56 (1866) 14 LTNS 433.
57 [1988] 3 All ER 161, [1988] 3 WLUK 82, (1988) 87 Cr App R 9, (1988) 152 JP 355, [1988] Crim LR 459, (1988) 152 JPN 383, [1988] CLY 654.
58 Surprisingly, no case law on signatures appears to have been cited or referred to in the appeal, which is particularly interesting bearing in mind the comments by Buxton and Brooke LJJ in Copeland v Smith [2000] 1 WLR 1371, [2000] 1 All ER 457, [1999] 10 WLUK 381, (1999) 143 SJLB 276, Times, 20 October 1999, [1999] CLY 457.
59 Federal: Origet v United States, 125 U.S. 240, 8 S.Ct. 846, 31 L.Ed. 743 (the initials ‘A.B.’ were held not to be a signature of the judge, nor sufficient authentication of a bill of exceptions) (1888); Kinney v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 222 U.S. 283, 32 S.Ct. 101, 56 L.Ed. 200 (a paper in the record styled ‘Exceptions to the Charge to the Jury’ upon which the initials ‘J. P. McP., Trial Judge’ were placed was not a bill of exceptions) (1911).
Kentucky: Wurts v Newsome, 253 Ky. 38, 68 S.W.2d 448 (there was no signature where a judge signed a ballot with his surname and initial, or with his initials) (1934).
60 288 U.S. 170, 53 S.Ct. 340, 77 L.Ed. 681.
61 125 U.S. 240, 8 S.Ct. 846, 31 L.Ed. 743 (1888).
62 222 U.S. 283, 32 S.Ct. 101, 56 L.Ed. 200 (1911).
63 462 N.E.2d 712 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1984).
64 73 Neb. 622, 103 N.W. 327 (1905).
65 (1856) 15 Jur 1042.
66 In Scotland initials were not accepted in the case of a witness initialling a will in the case of Meek v Dunlop [1707] Mor 16806.
67 (1839) 2 Curt. 329, 163 ER 428.
68 (1849) 2 Rob. Ecc. 110, 163 ER 1260.
69 (1879–81) 5 PD 116.
70 (1879) 6 R. 1359, although see Meek v Dunlop [1707] Mor 16806.
71 1895 12 SC 243.
72 (1855) 2 Searle 116.
73 (1885–86) 4 Juta 495.
74 (1984) 8 DLR (4th) 147.
75 Hill v Hill [1947] 1 Ch 231, [1947] 1 All ER 54, [1946] 12 WLUK 8, 176 LT 216, (1947) 91 SJ 55, [1947–51] CLY 5569.
76 [1995] 2 NZLR 398 (CA).
77 [2004] EWHC 772 (Ch), [2004] 4 WLUK 193, (2004) 148 SJLB 509.
78 For a similar decision in Scotland regarding the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874, see Gardner v Beresford’s Trustees [1878] SLR 15 359.
79 (1852) 21 LJQB 430.
80 [2016] EWHC 2493 (Fam), [2016] 10 WLUK 243, [2017] 2 FLR 664, [2016] Med LR 656, [2017] CLY 1141.
81 New York (1845): Palmer v Stevens, 1 Denio 471.
82 New York: The Merchants’ Bank v Spicer, 6 Wend. 443 (the initials of the defendant on a cheque was held to be a sufficient endorsement) (1831).
83 Federal: The Salmon Falls Manufacturing Company v Goddard, 55 U.S. 446, 14 How. 446, 1852 WL 6760 (U.S. Mass.), 14 L.Ed. 493 (the initials ‘R.M.M.’ and ‘W.W.G.’ were sufficient to be signatures) (1852); Federal 5th Circuit: Jones v Fox Film Corporation, 68 F.2d 116 (the initials ‘J.T.J.’ for John T. Jones were held to be a signature) (1934); Federal 7th Circuit: Monetti, S.P.A. v Anchor Hocking Corporation, 931 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1991) (the initials ‘SS/mh’ typed by a secretary was held to be the signature of Steve Schneider, who dictated the letter to the secretary).
Iowa: Burns v Burrows, 196 N.W. 62, 196 Iowa 80 (the initials ‘R.A.S.’ were held to be a signature of R. A. Santee) (1923).
Massachusetts: Irving v Goodimate, Co., 320 Mass. 454, 70 N.E.2d 414, 171 A.L.R. 326 (the initials ‘RL/s’ of the president of the company were typed at the bottom of a letter); Sanborn v Flagler, 9 Allen 474, 91 Mass. 474, 1864 WL 3510 (Mass.) (initials of both parties, ‘J.H.F.’ and ‘J.B.R.’, were signatures) (1946).
Michigan: Archbold v Industrial Land Co., 264 Mich. 289, 249 N.W. 858 (an instrument signed ‘Approved: J.S.L’. and ‘O.K. with me: O.T.B.’ and ‘O.K. with me: O.T.M.’ was held to be signed by O. G. Bowker and J. S. Lille, respectively president and vice-president of the Industrial Land company, and O. T. Morse, vice-president of the American Blower Corporation) (1933); Borkowski v Kolodziejski, 332 Mich. 589, 52 N.W.2d 348 (defendant signed his name with the initials ‘L.S.’ after it) (1952).
Missouri: Kamada, M.D. v RX Group Limited, 639 S.W.2d 146, (Mo.App. 1982) (initials on a lease sufficient).
New Jersey: Smith v Howell, 11 N.J.Eq. 349, 1857 WL 4462 (N.J.Ch.), 3 Stockt. 349 (the initials of Walter Kirkpatrick were used by him as his signature to form a trust) (1857); Crabtree v Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation, 305 N.Y. 48, 110 N.E.2d 551 (the initials of Robert P. Johns, executive vice-president and general manager, subscribed to a payroll card was a signature for the purposes of establishing an employment contract) (1953).
Washington: Degginger v Martin, 48 Wash. 1, 92 P. 674 (the initials of an agent were added by him in his own hand underneath his typewritten name; the contract held to be sufficiently executed) (1907).
84 California: Weiner v Mullaney, 59 Cal.App.2d 620, 140 P.2d 704 (the initials of George J. Mullaney typed at the end of several letters to his sister comprised a signature sufficiently signed in the formation of a trust) (1943).
85 Virginia: Pilcher v Pilcher, 117 Va. 356, 84 S.E. 667, L.R.A. 1915D 902 (a will written by the testator in the form ‘I give to my wife, Alice McCabe Pilcher, all of my property, real and personal. E.M.P.’ was held to be sufficiently signed) (1915).
86 247 Wis. 31, 18 N.W.2d 466, 159 A.L.R. 250.
87 941 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1991).
88 (1844) 5 QB 574, 114 ER 1366, Law Times, 2 (1843–44) Law Times (2), 366.
89 (1844) 5 QB 574 at 579.
90 (1844) 5 QB 574 at 582.
91 (1844) 5 QB 574 at 581.
92 (1844) 5 QB 574 at 582.
93 As with the case of Tourret v Cripps (1879) 48 LJ Ch 567, 27 WR 706, this case was not cited in J Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta [2006] EWHC 813 (Ch), [2006] 1 WLR 1543, [2006] 2 All ER 891, [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 885, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 244, [2006] 4 WLUK 182, [2006] Info TLR 203, Times, 16 May 2006, [2006] CLY 774, also known as Metha v J Pereira Fernandes SA.
94 (1811) 18 Ves. 175, 34 ER 1204, 18 Ves. Jun. 175, 34 ER 284.
95 Propert v Parker [1830] 1 Russ & M 625, 39 ER 240.
96 1989 SCLR 333, 1989 SLT 650, OH.
97 (1765) Mor. 16818.
98 (1724) Mor. 16809.
99 (1837) 6 LJ Ex 185, 1 Jur 739; 2 M & W 653, Murp & H 271, 150 ER 918.
100 [1927] 1 KB 169, [1926] 6 WLUK 88.
101 [1927] 1 KB 169 at 175–176.
102 Dyas v Stafford [1882] 9 LR Ir 520.
103 4 Edw. Ch. 102 (1975).
104 [1948] P 222, [1948] 1 All ER 700, 65 TLR 246, [1948] 3 WLUK 52, [1948] LJR 1111, (1948) 92 SJ 181, [194751] CLY 10955, also known as Chalcraft v Giles.
105 [1948] P 222 at 232.
106 (1861) 8 HL Cas 160 at 167 ‘I will lay down this as my notion of the law: that to make a valid subscription of a witness, there must be the name or some mark which is intended to represent the name’.
107 In Scotland, the court held that a partial signature was not sufficient in Moncrieff v Monypenny [1710] Mor 15936.
108 In the Goods of Maddock (1874) LR 3 P & D 169.
109 In re Plate’s Estate, 148 Pa. 55, 23 A. 1038.
110 1926 SLT 103.
111 [1960] 1 WLR 353, [1960] 1 All ER 689, [1960] 2 WLUK 75, 75 ALR2d 892, (1960) 104 SJ 311, [1960] CLY 3327, also known as Murison v Cook.
112 The most persuasive comment to support his decision in this context was the opinion of Lord Campbell LC in Hindmarch v Charlton (1861) 8 HL Cas 160 at 167.
113 Arkansas (1906): Arendt v Arendt, 80 Ark. 204, 96 S.W. 982 (after William Arendt shot himself, a letter addressed to his wife was discovered, including the statement ‘Whatever I have in worldly goods, it is my wish that you should possess them’. At the end of the letter, he signed with a shortened version of his first name, ‘Will’. Held to be a signature by the members of the jury and affirmed on appeal); Boone v Boone, 114 Ark. 69, 169 S.W. 779 (testator omitted the letter ‘n’ in his signature in writing his first name, Emanuel, on one of the sheets of the will; this did not affect the validity) (1914); Cartwright v Cartwright, 158 Ark. 278, 250 S.W. 11 (a letter sent by an American soldier killed in action on 14 October 1918 to his wife, part of which was testamentary in its effect, and signed with the abbreviation of his first name ‘Lus’; held to be a sufficient signature) (1923).
California: In re Henderson’s Estate, 196 Cal. 623, 239 P. 938 (The phrase ‘From A Loving Mother’ was a sufficient signature) (1923); In re Button’s Estate, 277 P. 758 reversed 287 P. 964 (‘Love from Muddy’ was a valid signature) (1930).
Kentucky: Word v Whipps, 28 S.W. 151, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 403 (in the absence of fraud or suspicious circumstances, the misspelling of a name did not affect the validity of a signature: ‘A. J. Whpps’ written instead of ‘A. J. Whipps’) (1894); Wells v Lewis, 190 Ky. 626, 228 S.W. 3 (‘Ant Nanie’ appended to a letter as a testamentary writing was a sufficient signature) (1921).
Pennsylvania (1890): Appeal of Knox, 131 P. 220, 18 A. 1021, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am.St.Rep. 798; In re Kimmel’s Estate, 278 P. 435, 123 A. 405, 31 A.L.R. 678 (a testamentary letter ending with ‘Father’ was held to be signed) (1924).
Texas: Barnes v Horne, 233 S.W. 859 (a letter by the deceased to his brother was considered a will, and the shortened version of his name ‘Ed’ at the end was accepted as a signature) (1921).
114 103 P.2d 622.
115 (1817) 3 Mer 2, 36 ER 1.
116 (1908) 16 SLT 480.
117 1933 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 2.
118 (1855) 16 CB 516 at 535. A footnote was added to this comment: ‘Provided it be proved or admitted to be genuine, and be the accustomed mode of signature of the party’, 139 ER 861.
119 In the Goods of Sperling (1863) 3 Sw. & Tr. 273, 165 ER 1279.
120 [1970] ScotCS CSOH_1, (1971) SC 56, (1972) SLT 98.
121 Bartletts de Reya v Byrne [1983] 1WLUK 17, (1983) 133 NLJ 1101, Times, 14 January 1983, (1983) 127 SJ 69, [1983] CLY 3604.
122 Times, 14 January, 1988.