Chapter 3 Direct line to Beeching and beyond? The failure of the 1950s railway modernisation plan

Introduction

Britain’s railway heritage is deeply embedded in the public’s consciousness. From televisual travelogues to trainspotting reminiscences to a network of preserved ‘heritage’ railways, the development and history of the country’s railways is never far away. Similarly, the contemporary railway network, and its potential future, is frequently in the media. At the time of writing, this is most recently due to the UK Labour government’s plans for Great British Railways, a planned re-nationalisation of at least parts of the railway infrastructure.¹

Nevertheless, despite this long-standing attachment, there has been relatively little socio-legal exploration of the relationship between the origins and development of the railways, their current position, and the legislative developments which have influenced these. Instead, much of the available literature focuses largely upon technical or economic considerations.² The current chapter addresses this gap by focusing upon the 1955 British Transport Commission plan for the ‘Modernisation and Re-Equipping of British Railways’ (‘the Modernisation Plan’).³ It conceptualises the design, implementation and failure of this plan as a key catalyst in the history of Britain’s railways. The Modernisation Plan fully exposed longstanding problems facing the railways, with several stemming from the legislative approach taken to the historical development of the railway system. At the same time, it was instrumental in the creation of the famous (or infamous) ‘The Reshaping of British Railways’ report (commonly referred to as ‘the Beeching report’ after the name of its main author), which changed the landscape of Britain’s railways in a manner that still reverberates today.⁴

In synthesising the legislative development of the railways with the catalytic nature of the 1950s Modernisation Plan, this chapter also establishes railway history as an important site for future socio-legal research. The historical and continuing development of the UK’s railways allow researchers to draw upon economic, political and even geographic contexts in which to site the ‘legal’.⁵ To demonstrate this, the chapter will take a socio-legal perspective to analyse two aspects of the railways which were both, it is argued, relevant to the failure of the Modernisation Plan. Namely, the legal restrictions around freight and passenger traffic which were imposed during the Victorian era (via legislative action) and the lack of an overall plan for the initial construction of the railways in the same period (driven by a lack of governmental and parliamentary vision). It is not suggested that these are by any means the sole determinants of the fate of the Modernisation Plan. Many others, including the increase in road traffic and political wranglings, also played a part. For example, Loft, discussing the Modernisation Plan and its subsequent review, argues that the evolution and final form of each can be attributed to political wrangling.⁶ However, the two aspects chosen both foreground the specific interaction between forms of legislative action (and lack thereof) and the wider social conditions which accompanied the Modernisation Plan. As such, they reflect Charlesworth’s call for ‘socio-legal historical reconstructions of law’s pervasiveness’.⁷ They also act as illustrations of the importance of constructing a detailed socio-legal history of the railways in a way which centres external legal history, exploring the intersections between law and the wider development of the system.⁸

The origins of the railways

The railway industry is possibly unique among modern transport modes in the extent of its linkages with developments that occurred long enough ago to be regarded as history.⁹

The opening of the first passenger railway line, from Manchester to Liverpool, in September 1830, with Stephenson’s Rocket, is seen by many as synonymous with the start of railway travel, with Wolmar describing it as ‘the start of the railway age’.¹⁰ However, prior to that, smaller railways already existed, funded by merchants and manufacturers to serve quarries, mines and other industrial infrastructure.¹¹ Despite some mixed reviews for these ‘monstrous locomotives … obliterating everything beneath their smoke’, the potential for both freight and passenger travel was noted by many entrepreneurs and investors.¹² This was an interest encouraged by the repeal of the Bubble Act 1720, during 1825, which facilitated the formation of joint-stock companies to invest in railway schemes.¹³

Given this boom in railways was taking place against a backdrop of Victorian free trade laissez faire,¹⁴ it is perhaps unsurprising that there was relatively little state planning involved in the early railways. Construction was driven by private individuals and interests who combined to incorporate railway companies, with around twenty already formed prior to 1821.¹⁵ Private Bills were required to incorporate such companies, allow for compulsory purchase of land and approve proposed schemes, but these were subject to little debate.¹⁶ The committees who determined the progress of these Bills viewed themselves ‘primarily as umpires’ between landowning and railway interests.¹⁷ There was no overall governmental or parliamentary vision for the railways, instead, the development, location and frequency of lines were determined piecemeal via a combination of commercial, personal and other interests, without reference to an overall vision or blueprint.¹⁸ Crompton captures this well, noting that ‘The UK was unusual in the absence of direct inputs by the state into the design, building or financing of its railway system’.¹⁹

Attempts to introduce a broader set of principles to govern parliamentary decisions were largely unsuccessful or short-lived.²⁰ Fierce competition between companies exacerbated these issues; for example at Hastings, both the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway and the South Eastern Railway built train lines, running parallel to each other.²¹

Running alongside this lack of broad governmental and parliamentary vision were a series of narrower, but highly significant, legislative interventions. Railway companies were subject to the Carriers Act 1830, establishing them as ‘common carriers’ whose services were available to the public. This Act applied to any ‘mail contractor, stage coach proprietor, or other common carrier by land’.²² However, the railways’ growing dominance during the subsequent decades meant that they were still able to impose restrictive terms on companies seeking to transport goods, leading to concerns being raised. This resulted in a succession of legislation, the Railway and Canal Traffic Acts, being introduced from 1854 to 1894 in an attempt to re-balance this unequal bargaining position and refine the ‘common carrier’ duties owed by the railways.²³

From the early days of the railways, once incorporated companies were (on an individual basis) given a set of maximum charges they could apply for freight, based upon the division of goods into different categories or classes.²⁴ The Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854 required all railway and canal companies to ‘afford all reasonable facilities for the receiving and forwarding and delivering of traffic’ and required that ‘no such company shall make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to or in favour of any particular person or company, or any particular description of traffic’.²⁵ It was also specified that they should not be subjected to ‘any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage’.²⁶ Courts were granted the power to issue injunctions or interdicts to prevent such behaviour, together with an award of costs, backed with a £200 maximum daily fine for non-compliance.²⁷ This effectively required the railway companies to transport any and all goods (with limited exceptions), regardless of their value or quantity. Subsequent legislation attempted to further curb the powers of railway companies to enforce agreements which would impose additional ‘tolls, rates or charges’ in respect of traffic.²⁸ However, Cain notes that by the 1880s a system existed with ‘literally millions of rates nearly all below the maximum allowed and based upon an eclectic policy colloquially known as “charging what the traffic will bear”’.²⁹

It should be noted that the ‘common carrier’ duty and the references to ‘traffic’ in the Railway and Canal Traffic Acts 1854 to 1894 also encompassed passengers as well as freight.³⁰ Further specific restrictions relating to passengers were also introduced, notably, the Railway Regulation Act 1844 required the provision of third-class travel³¹ and the Cheap Trains Act 1883 required railway companies to run a significant number of cheap trains, aimed at workers until its repeal in the 1920s.³² However, it was arguably the restrictions on freight which had the longest lasting impacts.

Amidst growing complaints from traders around issues including charges for the provision of ‘terminal services’ such as porterage,³³ the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888 was introduced. Section 24 of this Act gave the Board of Trade powers to review and ultimately determine the railway companies’ charging practices.³⁴ The product of this, a revised set of maximum tariffs, contributed to what Cain refers to as a ‘coup’ in 1893, with railway companies raising many former ‘special’ rates to the maximum permitted. This resulted in public outrage, led by disgruntled traders who relied on the railways’ freight operation.³⁵ Following a Select Committee and complex negotiations, the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1894 was passed, further limiting the railway companies’ ability to compete on price.

After the 1894 Act, the railways continued to evolve, notably with 130 railway lines being taken into public ownership under the auspices of a Railway Executive Committee in 1914 at the outset of the First World War.³⁶ Afterwards, the Railways Act 1921³⁷ amalgamated the majority of different railway companies (120) into four groups: the Southern Group; the Western Group; the North Western, Midland, and West Scottish Group; and the North Eastern, Eastern, and East Scottish Group.³⁸ By creating regional monopolies and fixing standard charges, this Act ameliorated the waste and duplication generated by such extreme competition. However, the sprawling network of railways this had spawned, together with the restrictive protections on freight rail traffic, remained in place. This was despite a ‘Square Deal’ campaign by the ‘Big Four’ railway companies seeking the repeal of restrictions.³⁹ The campaign was mounted in the face of increasing competition from road haulage operators, who were not constrained by the requirements placed upon the railway companies as ‘common carriers’, required to transport all and any freight.

The onset of the Second World War in 1939 effectively ended the Square Deal campaign, but instead led to a renewed prominence on the part of the railway, who played a crucial role in the war effort, from carrying evacuees to moving troops to catering for the needs of wartime industries. The railways were once again brought under Government control with the (re)formation of a Railway Executive Committee, but with the Big Four each retaining a number of distinctive features.⁴⁰ However, the post-war period saw a sharp decline in income with the railway companies’ income roughly halved from 1945 to 1946, and a backlog of maintenance and renewals requiring urgent attention, all against a backdrop of post-war material and labour shortages.⁴¹ The newly elected Labour party’s commitment to nationalisation of the railways arguably diverted the railway companies’ attention from longer term strategy, further exacerbating these issues.⁴²

The railways of the 1950s and the Modernisation Plan

Economically, the early 1950s were a time of emerging from austerity, including the ending of rationing (1954) and growing affluence.⁴³ At the same time, socially, there were contradictions discernible between the desire for a post-war return to stability and convention and demands for social change.⁴⁴ One example of this is the way in which gender and working identities intersected during this period, with women increasingly obtaining part time work, whilst at the same time the large disparity in pay between women and men remained almost static.⁴⁵ Similar contradictions can be discerned in relation to transportation generally. Traditional pre-war aspects of public transport including trains, trams and buses were retained.⁴⁶ However, at the same time the decade marked the beginning of a wider shift to the use of roads for the majority of freight and passenger traffic.⁴⁷ Such a transition has had longstanding impacts upon spatial, and even social, mobility.⁴⁸ Loft refers to the development of ‘two discernible strands in political debate and cultural commentary during the late 1950s and 1960s: decline and modernization’.⁴⁹ He argues that the problems experienced by the railways ‘seemed to epitomize the problems identified by the “what’s wrong with Britain?” debate’, in contrast to the perception of road traffic as supporters of modern industries and cars as symbols of individual affluence.⁵⁰

The start of this period can be identified as the coming into force in 1948 of the Transport Act 1947.⁵¹ Part II of this Act enacted Labour’s stated intentions by nationalising the railways and placing them under the administration of the Railway Executive.⁵² Cowie, reflecting upon this nationalisation, notes that ‘It was driven more by circumstances and political ideology rather than any great strategic vision for a modern railway’.⁵³ After a change to a Conservative government, the Transport Act 1953 placed the railways under the control of the British Transport Commission (with a supposedly decentralised management system).⁵⁴ This Act also gave the railways greater flexibility in terms of charges, removing some of the traditional restrictions placed on the railways’ treatment of freight traffic.⁵⁵ However, the restrictions placed upon the railways as ‘common carriers’ and under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854 persisted until the 1960s.⁵⁶ There was still little sense of an overall vision or blueprint, and this was reflected in a half-hearted legislative response which retained the most problematic provisions. The main drive for the changes was the Conservative government’s commitment to promoting competition, with the removal of some restrictions acting as a form of ‘compensation’ to the British Transport Commission for the removal of some of its functions.⁵⁷

Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, despite the changes that were made, by the mid-1950s, the general perception was that Britain’s railways were now inefficient, ill-equipped and unprofitable.⁵⁸ Drawing upon initial plans developed in 1953, the British Transport Commission’s Modernisation Plan, written in 1954 and published in January 1955, was designed to tackle this.⁵⁹ It proposed a full upgrade of the railway system within fifteen years at a cost of £1,200 million.⁶⁰ The key items included improving the track and signalling, the introduction of hundreds of diesel trains and the electrification of hundreds of miles of line (ending the production of steam engines after 1956), the improvement of its 42,000 passenger carrying vehicles and stations, the remodelling of freight services and a mere £35 million on what are described as ‘sundry other items’, such as staff welfare and office mechanisms.⁶¹ The overall aim was the transformation of ‘virtually all the forms of service provided by British Rail’, generating an additional £85 million revenue for the railways per year.⁶² The plan itself states:

[A]s regards passenger services, remodelling of the operations will provide fast, clean, regular and frequent services, electric or diesel, in all the great urban areas; inter-city and main-line trains will be accelerated and made more punctual; services on other routes will be made reasonably economic, or will be transferred to road … as regards freight services, there will be a complete re-orientation of operations designed to speed up movement, to reduce its cost, and to provide direct transits for main streams of traffic; and to attract to the railway a due proportion of the full-load merchandise traffic which would otherwise pass by road.⁶³

The wording ‘or will be transferred to road’ is one of a few indications contained within the Modernisation Plan that its implementation would require some form of cuts to the network. There are acknowledgments that some forms of both passenger and freight traffic may be better suited to road transport,⁶⁴ although for passenger traffic it is suggested that the ‘normal’ approach will be to replace steam trains with diesel on such lines where there was a ‘reasonable prospect’ of obtaining more traffic.⁶⁵ There is also explicit reference to the closure of a number of marshalling yards and goods depots.⁶⁶ However, overall the tone of the Modernisation Plan is positive, suggesting ‘the yield to be expected from the Plan in due course … is such as to make it an economic venture of the most promising sort’.⁶⁷

Despite its overall tone of optimism, the Modernisation Plan does note that its success in terms of freight requires the railways to offer ‘improved services’ at ‘lower costs’,⁶⁸ a comment which seems to disregard the complex web of legislative restrictions already in place, and the challenges these had caused to the profitability of the railways.

The Modernisation Plan was announced with government support and included in a Parliamentary motion on 3 February.⁶⁹ Speaking on 8 February 1955, as part of a debate on increasing the borrowing powers of the transport sector (including providing £75 million towards the Modernisation Plan), the then-minister of transport and civil aviation, Mr Boyd-Carpenter, stated:

The purpose of the modernisation proposals is not only to make the railways solvent, but to enable them to render service which only an efficient and up-to-date railway system can render to the economy of the country and to the comfort and convenience of the travelling public.⁷⁰

In early 1956, the British Transport Commission requested an increase in its charges for freight and passenger traffic, to address an increased surplus resulting from industrial action and increasing costs and wages.⁷¹ The government, in a departure from its usual policy on nationalised industries, intervened to require less significant increases, allowing the Commission to continue running at an increased deficit for a further six months.⁷² As part of this arrangement, the government required the British Transport Commission to provide ‘the necessary proposals’ for reversing this deficit, with Mr Harold Watkinson, the then-minister of transport and civil aviation, noting, ‘this may well include much more drastic closure of branch lines, and many more drastic economies that will be necessary’.⁷³ These proposals eventually formed part of an extensive review of the financing and structure of the British Transport Commission via the White Paper, Proposals for the Railways.⁷⁴ This White Paper notes that:

The Commission have, in the Government’s view, presented a convincing case showing that, by such measures as the acceleration of the schedule for the modernisation and rationalisation of the railways, the use of greater freedom in charging policy and the steady development of greater productivity, they should be able to overcome their present financial difficulties, reaching a state of current balance by 1961 or 1962 and eventually a position of considerable strength.⁷⁵

The paper therefore proposed providing ‘special advances’ to the British Transport Commission to cover their revenue deficits for a period, to be repayable in instalments at a later date, and to extend the Commission’s borrowing powers to cover interest payments on sums required for capital expenditure.⁷⁶ A parliamentary debate on this paper ranged in focus from whether the Modernisation Plan was overly optimistic in its forecasts, to means of funding, to the impact on both freight and passengers, to the comparative position of the railways with other parts of the transport industry.⁷⁷ However, the paper’s proposals were then successfully encapsulated in the Transport (Railway Finances) Act 1957.⁷⁸

In late 1957, the Commission informed the government that the cost of the plan had been revised to £1.5 million partly due to rising costs, partly due to more precise evaluations.⁷⁹ A further Bill to extend the British Transport Commission’s borrowing powers was then introduced (later becoming the Transport (Borrowing Powers) Act 1959).⁸⁰ During the debates on this, the government indicated that it had required a further review of the Modernisation Plan, particularly in light of falling levels of freight traffic and broader industrial and economic shifts which impacted the railways, such as a move from the production of coal (transported by rail) towards cheaper oil (transported by road).⁸¹

Then in 1959 a reappraisal of the Modernisation Plan was published. In it, the Commission concluded:

This Re-appraisal has shown that the Modernisation Plan drawn up four years ago, and the financial appreciation made in the White Paper of 1956, were soundly based. Subsequent events now make desirable some modifications to the Plan but they are not many and are principally in the direction of accelerating its execution. Where the financial forecasts made in 1956 have not been realised, the causes lie predominantly in factors which were expressly excluded from the forecasts as being outside the control of the Commission.⁸²

The reappraisal put the blame for worsening deficits upon a fall in production amongst key industries serviced by the railways, causing a decline in freight traffic, although this was believed to be temporary.⁸³ It also explicitly identifies two key focuses moving forward, not only modernisation but also rationalisation.⁸⁴ In relation to the latter, it indicates that there will be ‘a substantial acceleration’ of this process.⁸⁵ This shift from largely emphasising modernisation marked a significant change in direction. Aldcroft notes that in the period 1948 to 1959 progress in ‘reshaping’ had been ‘remarkably slow’ with only around 5.3 per cent of the 1948 route mileage being completely closed.⁸⁶ The somewhat chaotic legacy of the Victorian railway system had remained substantially in place. The reappraisal’s requirement for more closures at a faster pace clearly foreshadows the sweeping changes of the 1960s which sought to thoroughly tackle this legacy.

Overall, at the end of the 1950s there were therefore contradictory currents shaping the progress of the railways. The Modernisation Plan and its reappraisal envisaged overcoming temporary setbacks to achieve a financially viable railway system which met the needs of contemporary society. At the same time, the legislative restrictions placed upon the railways had not been fully removed and the legacy of Victorian railway-building was still evident in the patchwork of lines which remained in service under the British Transport Commission’s auspices. The Modernisation Plan and the level of parliamentary and public scrutiny it entailed was catalytic: it placed attention firmly on the railways, putting them at the heart of economic and political concerns. In doing so, it exposed, but could not fully ameliorate or resolve, a range of contradictory and complex currents.

The Beeching Report and the journey to the current day

In 1961 the British Transport Commission published the British Railways Modernisation Progress Report which provided optimistic commentary on reaching a ‘turning-point’ in the 1960s and referring to visible successes of the programme.⁸⁷ A further report in May 1962 was also buoyant in tone, noting:

The re-equipped railways are ready to challenge competitors for the right to supply the transport needs of industry and the public. A modern outlook goes with re-equipment; it holds that railways should be free of shackles that compel them to render services that cannot earn their economic value. The move to acquire freedom to compete on level terms has also been part of the year’s progress.⁸⁸

This is in contrast to the views of the Ministry of Transport, as reported in a 1960 Parliamentary Select Committee on Nationalized Industries.⁸⁹ The permanent secretary to the minister indicated to the Committee that it was only upon the publication of the 1959 reappraisal that the detailed calculations behind the Modernisation Plan were fully investigated and found to be unrealistic.⁹⁰ The findings of the Select Committee and a Special Advisory Group were drawn together in a Government White Paper of December 1960.⁹¹ This noted that the British Transport Commission was about to reach a deficit of around £500 million, with the railways at the ‘heart of the problem’.⁹² In effect, it was the railways reaching a state of financial crisis, with the Modernisation Plan as a catalyst, which led finally to a government acceptance that the railways required an overall vision or blueprint for their future.

The paper called for the abolition of the British Transport Commission, viewing its remit as too large and unwieldy for it to deal with the railways efficiently.⁹³ Instead, the paper proposed the creation of a series of separate bodies, with control of the railways passed to a newly created British Railways Board under the Transport Act 1962.⁹⁴ As indicated earlier, this is the Act which also finally abolished the restrictions placed upon the railways as common carriers and under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854. Jackson notes that ‘British Railways was at last free to wash its hands of the inefficient and expensive sundries and wagon load freight business’.⁹⁵

Following the passing of the 1962 Act, the Commission’s duties were duly passed to the British Railways Board from 1 January 1963 under the management of its new head, Richard Beeching and in 1963 the Beeching Report was published.⁹⁶ Providing a detailed overview of the railway system at that time, it proposed the closure of approximately 2,000 stations and the withdrawal of approximately 250 train services on the grounds they were uneconomical.⁹⁷ Bonavia summarises the eventual impacts of the report as follows: ‘route-miles open for traffic had been 18,214 at the end of 1961; at the end of 1969, there were 12,098. Total stations in 1961 had been 7,025; in 1969 there were 3,002.’⁹⁸

These cuts had numerous long-standing economic and social impacts.⁹⁹ Whether they were necessary and suitable is heavily debated. For example, Henshaw characterises the Beeching Report as the zenith of an anti-railway conspiracy, designed to ensure the supremacy of road traffic.¹⁰⁰ There is also some evidence it led to the defeat of the Conservative government in the subsequent 1964 General Election.¹⁰¹ In contrast, others point out that there had already been (less drastic) cuts prior to 1964, and suggest Beeching was simply being realistic about the state of the railways and the type of radical solution required.¹⁰² Regardless of the viewpoint taken, it is clear that the failure of the Modernisation Plan was the catalyst for such cuts – rationalisation, not modernisation, was now the dominant theme.

After the Beeching era (which only in fact lasted a short but significant four years), the railways then remained nationalised until the mid-1990s. Morse refers to the 1970s and 1980s as “a time of contrasts and contradictions”.¹⁰³ The nationalised entity was known as British Rail from 1965, as part of a shift in corporate branding and marketing.¹⁰⁴ However, despite its sleek and now-iconic corporate logo and improvements in a range of technical matters, it was also regularly pillorised as unpunctual and inefficient, with popular jokes often focused upon the standards of catering.¹⁰⁵ During the 1980s, general economic growth coupled with increased commercial pressure from the then-Conservative government meant that by the 1990s “the network was investment-starved but effective at controlling costs”.¹⁰⁶ The government’s ideological perspective led to a focus upon privatisation during this period, with state-owned institutions being placed in private hands to stimulate competition.¹⁰⁷ As part of this, following the Railways Act 1993,¹⁰⁸ British Rail underwent a process of (re)privatisation, although Albertson notes that this deviated from the norm as public subsidies continued to be provided.¹⁰⁹

Privatisation in the 1990s was achieved through regional franchising to Train Operating Companies, with a separate company (initially Railtrack, then Network Rail) having ownership of the track infrastructure, and several further companies taking responsibility for its maintenance and renewal and for rolling stock.¹¹⁰ The impacts of privatisation have been as heavily contested as those of nationalisation.¹¹¹ For example, Pollitt and Smith provide a largely positive cost-benefit analysis.¹¹² In contrast, Bowman challenges the narrative of rail privatisation as economically successful.¹¹³ In recent years, several Train Operating Companies have moved to being under government control again, for example, Northern Rail in 2020.¹¹⁴ As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, at the time of writing the current Labour government intend to renationalise the railways, with the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 already passed and a Railways Bill planned for the current Parliamentary session.¹¹⁵

The Modernisation Plan as a catalyst

The railway system in 1950s Britain was the subject of somewhat tortuous political wrangling. This encapsulated a range of contradictory and complex currents around transportation, shaped by wider economic, political and social changes and transitions, including the decline of traditional British industries and the shift to road transport.¹¹⁶ The British Transport Commission, and its governmental and parliamentary overseers, failed to successfully navigate these, leading to the failure of the Modernisation Plan, which in turn led directly to the swingeing cuts imposed following the Beeching Report.

This chapter has highlighted that two of these contradictory and complex currents stem directly from the Victorian development of the railways and the legislative approach taken during this period. Firstly, the government, parliament and the British Transport Commission were still dealing with an inheritance forged by the restrictions on traffic, particularly freight, imposed via the Railway and Canal Traffic Acts 1854–1894. Gourvish highlights the continuing relevance of these early legislative attempts ‘designed to encourage a “public service” obligation in management’ and mitigate the virtual monopoly on Victorian transportation.¹¹⁷ The emphasis on modernisation of the railways through diesel, electrification and other means was not matched by any attempt to remove such ‘outdated statutory obligations’.¹¹⁸

Secondly, alongside these legislative restrictions, the British Transport Commission was attempting to impose a form of economic and geographical logic onto a system which had lacked this from its earliest inception. The railway system had developed piecemeal via a series of individual Acts of Parliament without an overall vision or blueprint.¹¹⁹ Even during the period of implementation of the Modernisation Plan, there still arguably remained a lack of clear and shared vision amongst those involved in its implementation. In a debate on the 1960 Parliamentary Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, the then-minister of transport, Ernest Marples, noted that ‘There is not much sense in looking at individual projects unless we are reasonably clear about the basis and sense of the whole problem, including the future size and shape of the railways.’¹²⁰ The vision that was then imposed, that of the Beeching Report, was focused on rationalising the railway system’s Victorian inheritance, with modernisation relegated to something of a side-note.

Overall, the Modernisation Plan was a catalyst, synthesising long-standing issues arising from the Victorian period’s legislative approach to the railways with contemporary 1950s concerns and challenges. The significant sums required by the British Transport Commission to execute its Modernisation Plan, and the accompanying governmental and parliamentary scrutiny, brought the shortcomings of Britain’s railway system into sharp relief. Such issues could no longer be ignored or their tackling postponed. Therefore, its failure led directly to the seismic intervention of the Beeching Report.

The ‘direct line’ which can be traced from the Victorian legislative approach to the railways to the Modernisation Plan and then to the Beeching report is a vivid illustration of the role of the socio-legal within railway history. It is one which establishes the railways as an important site for further socio-legal work moving forwards.

Conclusion: a direct line with varied gradients

‘How the greatest engineering triumph of the Victorian age will streamline itself to fit the age of the motor car and the atom is, in some ways, a fascinating study. I am sure that no one will disagree that that is the crux of the problem facing us.’¹²¹ Although these words were stated within a discussion of the 1950s Modernisation Plan, they remain pertinent today. The planned (re)nationalisation of the railway system has once again foregrounded the future of the railways as a topic for debate and discussion. Given the continuities which can be discerned throughout the history of the railways, there are lessons which can be learnt from the Modernisation Plan and its failure. This chapter concludes by highlighting three which can be discerned from its socio-legal interpretation of events. Firstly, the Modernisation Plan provides an illustration of the railways’ importance and symbolism within British society. The railway system and its future stands in the centre of a mass of contradictory and complex political, economic and social currents which each engender strong beliefs and views. The railways do not represent a ‘stand-alone’ issue but instead encompass many wider elements. Secondly, it is important for the specific legislative provisions surrounding nationalisation to be clear, comprehensive and fully consider existing legislation, something which was not achieved when tackling the legacy of the Railway and Canal Traffic Acts 1854–1894. Thirdly, it is vital that such specific legislation forms part of a wider governmental and parliamentary vision for the future of the railways which understands and appreciates their wider functions, rather than repeating the ideologically restricted, piecemeal response to innovation of the Victorian legislature. Drawing on these lessons and appreciating the socio-legal development of the railways can assist in the steep gradient to be navigated over the next few years.

Notes

1. 1. Labour, ‘Getting Britain Moving. Labour’s Plan to Fix Britain’s Railways’, The Labour Party, 25 April 2024, https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GETTING-BRITAIN-MOVING-Labours-Plan-to-Fix-Britains-Railways.pdf.

2. 2. For an example of an economics-focused approach, see Nicholas Crafts, Timothy Leunig and Abay Mulatu, ‘Were British railway companies well managed in the early twentieth century?’ The Economic History Review 61, no. 4 (2008). For an example of a technical-focus, see Roderick A. Smith, ‘Railway technology: the last 50 years and future prospects’, Ratio 1950 (1998).

3. 3. British Transport Commission, Modernisation and Re-Equipment of British Railways (London: Curwen Press, 1955).

4. 4. British Railways Board, The Reshaping of Britain’s Railways. Part 1 – Report (London: HMSO, 1963).

5. 5. Sally Wheeler, ‘Socio-Legal Studies in 2020’, Journal of Law and Society, Special Supplement: Celebrating Phil Thomas at 80, Journal of Law and Society 47, no. 52 (2020).

6. 6. Charles Loft, ‘Reappraisal and reshaping: government and the railway problem 1951–64’, Contemporary British History 15, no. 4 (2001): 71–92. doi:10.1080/713999426.

7. 7. Lorie Charlesworth, ‘On historical contextualisation: some critical socio-legal reflections’, Crimes & Misdemeanours 1 (2007): 1.

8. 8. Philip Handler, ‘Legal history’, in Research Methods in Law (2nd ed.), ed. Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (London: Routledge, 2018), 107–8.

9. 9. Paul Truelove, ‘Movement towards the privatisation of British Rail’, in Transport Deregulation, ed. Kenneth Button and David Pitfield (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21616-1_9, 177.

10. 10. Christian Wolmar, Fire and Steam: How the Railways Transformed Britain (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), 20.

11. 11. Rande W. Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825–1875 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 14; Leigh Shaw-Taylor and Xuesheng You, ‘The development of the railway network in Britain 1825–1911’, in The Online Historical Atlas of Transport, Urbanization and Economic Development in England and Wales c.1680–1911, ed. Leigh Shaw-Taylor, Dan Bogart and Max Satchell (Cambridge: Cambridge Group for the History of Population, 2018). https://www.campop.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/transport/onlineatlas/railways.pdf, 4–9.

12. 12. Philip G. R. Ransom, The Victorian Railway and How It Evolved (London: Heinemann, 1990), 45.

13. 13. Bubble Act 1720 (UK); Kostal, ‘English Railway Capitalism’, 14.

14. 14. Anthony Howe, ‘Free trade and the Victorians’, in Free Trade and Its Reception 1815–1960, ed. Andrew Marrison (London: Routledge, 2002), 182.

15. 15. Edward Cleveland-Stevens, English Railways, Their Development and Their Relation to the State (London: Routledge, 1915), 6.

16. 16. Ian Gregory and Jordi Marti Henneberg. ‘The railways, urbanization, and local demography in England and Wales, 1825–1911’, Social Science History 34, no. 2 (2010): 203.

17. 17. Tanya Jackson, British Rail: The Nation’s Railway (Stroud: The History Press, 2013), 11.

18. 18. Cleveland-Stevens, English Railways, 10; One arguable exception to this is William Gladstone (Mark F. Bailey, ‘The 1844 Railway Act: a violation of laissez-faire political economy?’ History of Economic Ideas 12, no. 3 (2004)).

19. 19. Gerald W. Crompton, ‘Railways and the state in the UK’, Revista de Historia Actual 5, no. 5 (2007): 57.

20. 20. Mark Casson, The World’s First Railway System: Enterprise, Competition, and Regulation on the Railway Network in Victorian Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), chapter 6.

21. 21. John Daniel ‘Introduction to the Railways Act of 1921’, Great Western Archive, 2013, http://www.greatwestern.org.uk/absorbed.htm.

22. 22. Carriers Act 1830, Chapter 68 (UK) Section 1.

23. 23. Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Transport Act, 1962’, The Modern Law Review 26, no. 2 (1963): 175.

24. 24. Peter J. Cain, ‘Traders versus railways: the genesis of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1894’, The Journal of Transport History 2, no. 2 (1973): 66.

25. 25. Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854, Chapter 31 (UK) Section 2.

26. 26. Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854, Chapter 31 (UK) Section 2; see also Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888, Chapter 25 (UK) Section 25.

27. 27. Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854, Chapter 31 (UK) Section 3.

28. 28. Railway Clauses Act 1863, Chapter 92 (UK) Section 22.

29. 29. Cain, ‘Traders versus railways’, 67.

30. 30. Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854, Chapter 31 (UK) Section 1; Kahn-Freund, ‘Transport Act, 1962’, 175.

31. 31. Railway Regulation Act 1844, Chapter 85 (UK), repealed by the Transport Act 1962, Chapter 46 (UK); see also Mulley, ‘Passenger transport in the UK 1920–50’.

32. 32. Cheap Trains Act 1883, Chapter 34 (UK); see also Mulley, ‘Passenger transport’.

33. 33. Alexander Kaye Butterworth, A Treatise on the Law Relating to Rates and Traffic on Railways and Canals (2nd ed.) (London: Butterworths, 1889), 36.

34. 34. Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888, Chapter 25 (UK) Section 24.

35. 35. Cain, ‘Traders versus railways’, 65.

36. 36. Michael Foley, Britain’s Railways in the First World War (Yorkshire and Philadelphia: Pen & Sword Transport, 2021), 1.

37. 37. Railways Act 1921, Chapter 55 (UK).

38. 38. Railways Act 1921, Chapter 55 (UK), Schedule 1.

39. 39. E. A. Gibbins, Square Deal Denied (London: Leisure Products, 1998).

40. 40. Foley, Britain’s Railways, chapter 2.

41. 41. Terence R. Gourvish, British Railways 1948–73: A Business History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3.

42. 42. Gourvish, British Railways 1948–73, 6.

43. 43. Peter Hennessy, Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Penguin, 2007).

44. 44. Nick Thomas, ‘Will the Real 1950s Please Stand Up?’ 5, no. 2 Cultural and Social History (2008).

45. 45. Stephen Brooke, ‘Gender and working class identity in Britain during the 1950s’, Journal of Social History 34, no. 4 (2001): 774.

46. 46. Colin G. Pooley and Jean Turnbull, ‘Modal choice and modal change: the journey to work in Britain since 1890’, Journal of Transport Geography 8, no. 1 (2000): 11–24.

47. 47. Andrew Rosen. The Transformation of British Life, 1950–2000: A Social History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 25.

48. 48. Simon Gunn, ‘Spatial mobility in later twentieth-century Britain’, Contemporary British History 36, no. 1 (2022).

49. 49. Charles Loft, Government, the Railways and the Modernisation of Britain. Beeching’s Last Trains (London: Routledge, 2006), 13.

50. 50. Loft, Government, 14.

51. 51. Transport Act 1947, Chapter 49 (UK)

52. 52. Transport Act 1947, Chapter 49 (UK), Part II and Schedule 12.

53. 53. Jonathan Cowie, ‘Britain’s railways were nationalised 70 years ago – let’s not do it again’, The Conversation, 1 January 2018, https://theconversation.com/britains-railways-were-nationalised-70-years-ago-lets-not-do-it-again-89545#:~:text=The%20British%20Transport%20Commission%20formally,in%20dire%20need%20of%20investment.

54. 54. Transport Act 1953, Chapter 13 (UK).

55. 55. Derek H. Aldcroft, British Railways in Transition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1968), chapter 4.

56. 56. Transport Act 1962, Chapter 46 (UK).

57. 57. Gourvish, British Railways 1948–73, 139.

58. 58. Michael R. Bonavia, British Rail: The First 25 Years (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1981), 94.

59. 59. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 5.

60. 60. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 5.

61. 61. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 6–7.

62. 62. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 7.

63. 63. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 7.

64. 64. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 8.

65. 65. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 20.

66. 66. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 22.

67. 67. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 9.

68. 68. British Transport Commission, Modernisation, 8.

69. 69. ‘British Railways’, Vol. 536: Debated on Thursday 3 February 1955, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1955-02-03/debates/48d85e43-05db-4421-adf1-7b792f4d1333/BritishRailways?highlight=railway%20modernisation%20plan#main-content.

70. 70. ‘Transport (Borrowing Powers) Bill’, Vol. 536: Debated on Tuesday 8 February 1955, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1955-02-08/debates/1300bc87-8da2-4725-83ef-a5334abcfc1f/Transport(BorrowingPowers)Bill?highlight=railway%20modernisation%20plan#contribution-fd318372-06f0-48fa-a3e0-51f4392bd7dc. This Bill later became the Transport (Borrowing Powers) Act 1955, Chapter 10 (UK).

71. 71. ‘British Transport Commission (Freight Charges and Fares)’, Vol. 550: Debated on Monday 19 March 1956, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1956-03-19/debates/76deddb7-7745-4675-9e2b-0cdb138ee7b2/BritishTransportCommission(FreightChargesAndFares).

72. 72. ‘British Transport Commission (Freight Charges and Fares)’.

73. 73. ‘British Transport Commission (Freight Charges and Fares)’.

74. 74. British Transport Commission, Proposals for the Railways, 2 Cmd. 9880, October (London, HMSO, 1956).

75. 75. British Transport Commission, Proposals for the Railways, 3.

76. 76. British Transport Commission, Proposals for the Railways, 7.

77. 77. ‘Proposals for the Railways, Vol. 100: Debated on Tuesday, 27th November 1956’, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1956-11-27/debates/aa297ff7-488d-4a52-81f7-de1b4d7f30a1/ProposalsForTheRailways?highlight=railway%20modernisation%20plan#main-content.

78. 78. Transport (Railway Finances) Act 1957, Chapter 9 (UK).

79. 79. ‘British Transport Commission Bill (By Order)’, Vol. 583: Debated on Tuesday 25 February 1958, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1958-12-11/debates/8527aec8-66c4-4b5b-9e2a-e4d9763a1554/Transport(BorrowingPowers)Bill?highlight=british%20transport%20commission%20bill%201958.

80. 80. Transport (Borrowing Powers) Act 1959, Chapter 16 (UK).

81. 81. ‘Transport (Borrowing Powers) Bill 1958’, Vol. 597: Debated on 11 December 1958, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1958-12-11/debates/8527aec8-66c4-4b5b-9e2a-e4d9763a1554/Transport(BorrowingPowers)Bill?highlight=british%20transport%20commission%20bill%201958.

82. 82. British Transport Commission, Re-Appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-Equipment of British Railways, Cmnd. 813 (London: HMSO, July 1959), 31.

83. 83. British Transport Commission, Re-Appraisal, 6.

84. 84. British Transport Commission, Re-Appraisal, 7.

85. 85. British Transport Commission, Re-Appraisal, 7.

86. 86. Aldcroft, British Railways in Transition, 146–7.

87. 87. British Transport Commission, British Railways Modernisation Progress Report (London: HMSO, May 1961), 3.

88. 88. British Transport Commission, British Railways Progress (London: HMSO, May 1962), 48.

89. 89. Parliamentary Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries Together with Proceedings of the Committee: British Railways (London: HMSO, 1960).

90. 90. Parliamentary Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, Report, xli; Arthur J. Pearson, The Railways and the Nation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964) 94. Chapter 6 contains a detailed description of the government’s relationship with the British Transport Commission in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

91. 91. Ministry of Transport, Reorganisation of the Nationalised Transport Undertakings (London: HMSO, December 1960). The reports of the Special Advisory Group do not appear to be in the public domain.

92. 92. Ministry of Transport, Reorganisation, 5.

93. 93. Ministry of Transport, Reorganisation, 4.

94. 94. Ministry of Transport, Reorganisation, 5; Transport Act 1962, Chapter 46 (UK).

95. 95. Jackson, British Rail. The Nation’s Railway.

96. 96. British Railways Board, The Reshaping of Britain’s Railways. Part 1 – Report (London: HMSO, 1963).

97. 97. British Railways Board, The Reshaping of Britain’s Railways, Schedule 1.

98. 98. Bonavia, British Rail: The First 25 Years, 94.

99. 99. See, for example, Stephen Gibbons, Stephan Heblich and Edward W. Pinchbeck, ‘The spatial impacts of a massive rail disinvestment program: The Beeching Axe’, Journal of Urban Economics 143 (2024), 1.

100. 100. David Henshaw, The Great Railway Conspiracy: The Fall and Rise of Britain’s Railways Since the 1950s (3rd ed.) (London: A to B Books, 2013).

101. 101. Alejandro Quiroz Flores and Paul Whiteley, ‘The “Beeching Axe” and electoral support in Britain’, European Review of Economic History 22, no. 3 (2018).

102. 102. Richard H. N. Hardy, Beeching: Champion of the Railway? (Shepperton: Ian Allan Publishing, 1989).

103. 103. Geoffrey Morse, British Railways in the 1970s and ’80s (London: Shire Publications, 2013), 10.

104. 104. Lewis C. Smith, ‘ “Travel Inter-City like the men do”: Marketing British Rail’s Inter-City in Britain 1964–1979’, Enterprise & Society (2024). doi:10.1017/eso.2024.22.

105. 105. See, for example, the criticisms in the Government’s 1992 White Paper – The Secretary of State for Transport, New Opportunities for the Railway, Cm. 2012, London: HMSO, July 1992.

106. 106. Andrew Bowman, ‘An illusion of success: the consequences of British rail privatisation’, Accounting Forum 39, no. 1 (2015): 53.

107. 107. Michael G. Pollitt and Andrew S.J. Smith, ‘The restructuring and privatisation of British Rail: was it really that bad?’ Fiscal Studies 23, no. 4 (2002): 465.

108. 108. Railways Act 1993, Chapter 43 (UK).

109. 109. Kevin Albertson, ‘Britain’s railways were never properly privatised – here’s how they could return to greater public control’, The Conversation, 20 May 2024, https://theconversation.com/britains-railways-were-never-properly-privatised-heres-how-they-could-return-to-greater-public-control-229586.

110. 110. Pollitt and Smith, ‘The restructuring and privatisation of British Rail’, 468–9.

111. 111. For a detailed critique, see John Nelson, Losing Track: An Insider’s Story of Britain’s Railway Transformation from British Rail to the Present Day (Milton Keynes: New Generation Publishing, 2019).

112. 112. Pollitt and Smith, The Restructuring and Privatisation.

113. 113. Bowman, An Illusion of Success.

114. 114. Department for Transport, DfT OLR Holdings Limited, Network Rail and The Rt Hon Grant Shapps, Government Decision on Northern Rail, 29 January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/Government/news/Government-decision-on-northern-rail.

115. 115. Labour Research Department, Is Labour on the right track over rail re-nationalisation? 18 December 2024, https://www.lrd.org.uk/free-read/labour-right-track-over-rail-re-nationalisation.

116. 116. Aldcroft, British Railways in Transition, 116.

117. 117. Gourvish, British Railways 1948–73, 1.

118. 118. Aldcroft, British Railways in Transition, 116.

119. 119. Cleveland-Stevens, English Railways, Their Development and Their Relation to the State, 10; Crompton, ‘Railways and the State in the UK’, 57.

120. 120. ‘British Railways’, Vol. 627: Debated on Wednesday 26 October 1960, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1960-10-26/debates/12857944-861c-45df-8788-f75ae217910d/BritishRailways?highlight=spirit%20compromise.

121. 121. Harold Watkinson, the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, taken from ‘Transport (Borrowing Powers) Bill 1958’, Vol. 597: Debated on 11 December 1958, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1958-12-11/debates/8527aec8-66c4-4b5b-9e2a-.

Selected bibliography