3. Attitudes towards the Falklands–Malvinas War: European and Latin American left perspectives

Fernando Pedrosa

This chapter takes a different approach to the issue of the Malvinas– Falklands War, which saw Argentina and England confront each other in 1982. The war has been studied mainly from the military point of view or according to the impact it had on the countries engaged in the conflict. However, the consequences of the military conflict between two western-block countries were broader and have not been properly tackled. The following pages will consider, first, the characterisation of the positions adopted by European and Latin-American political parties, many of which were members of the Socialist International (SI).¹ Then this chapter will delve more deeply into different visions of the Anglo-Argentine conflict, evaluating the way in which it influenced inter-party relations, the social democrats’ transnational organisational strategies and regional policy in general. This will allow a mapping of the transnational political actions taken which is quite different from that usually presented in the specialised literature on the subject, above all because of the inclusion of the parties as main characters in the political processes of the time on the international stage. Furthermore, this approach will allow us to observe more fluid and ambiguous actions taken by the different left-wing organisations that were far from being a collective characterised by rigid or inflexible strategies.

The Malvinas war

On 2 April 1982, the infantry forces of the Argentine Navy landed on the biggest of the Islands, expelling the British authorities and sending them to Uruguay. A day after that, England would break off diplomatic relations and decide on the dispatch of troops. Shortly after that, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 502, which demanded Argentina’s withdrawal from the Islands and the immediate start of negotiations. This resolution, considered a diplomatic defeat for Argentina, was at the core of every discussion and negotiation that aimed to avoid, and later stop, the war. A week after the conflict started, the US secretary of state, Alexander Haig, arrived in London to begin a mediation agreed upon by both parties. However, this US intervention would prove to be fruitless due to the participants’ intransigence. In addition, there was the dispute within the US government itself with regard to the role it should play in the conflict. This US ambiguity enabled the Argentine military to maintain the illusion of US abstention from the conflict. On 30 April 1982, Haig’s mediation was declared officially over. Consequently, President Reagan made US support for England official. At the same time, he backed the European position of imposing economic sanctions on Argentina. After other failed mediation proposals introduced by Fernando Belaunde Terry, then President of Peru, and the UN Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the conflict moved forward to a military solution (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1997). On 14 June 1982, the war ended with the return of the Islands to British control thanks to military victory by their troops.

Democratic processes of the third wave in Latin America

The conflict between Argentina and England took place in a changing global environment. Shortly before the war a time characterised by a significant easing of tension between the US and the Soviets had come to an end. An important part of this period – known as the détente – occurred during US president Jimmy Carter’s administration (1977–81) (Halliday, 1983). The détente had allowed other political and social actors who sought, by means of transnational actions to avoid becoming trapped in the Cold War polarisation, to have a higher profile. It is no coincidence that several revolutions occurred within that period: Nicaragua, Iran and Grenada, as well as the radicalisation of the official parties in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Guyana. Thus the Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean (COPPPAL) was created, as well as the revitalisation of the Non-Aligned Movement and the signing of the Treaty for the Panama Canal by Omar Torrijos and Carter (Pastor, 1984). That is how, seizing the opportunity created by the lack of tension, these non-aligned actors increased their activity in favour of their own projects and interests over those of the so-called ‘super powers’. The leaders and political parties became key instruments in the process that had transnational organisations as the main actors (for example, SI, the Christian Democrat International and Liberal International, among others (Grabendorff, 2001)).

Gradually, international tension started to mount again, even under the Carter administration. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) and the hostage situation at the US Embassy in Iran (1979–81) triggered a change during this period. However, it was not before the Republican Ronald Reagan came to office (1981–89) that the conditions that prevailed during the détente changed drastically for Latin America (Carleton and Stohl, 1985). Paradoxically, the increase in geo-political conflict also coincided with many democratic openings in Latin America (Sikkink, 2004). The transition from dictatorships to democratic governments in southern Europe in 1974 (Spain, Greece, Portugal) commenced a process of regime change that ended with the establishment of democracies in a great number of Latin American countries (Huntington, 1994). This enabled new opportunities to arise for the transnational actors to continue their political activity beyond the limits imposed by this ‘second cold war’ (Pedrosa, 2012; Scott and Walters, 2000).

In this sense, the South Atlantic conflict was a key moment in the process of democratisation in the region since the English victory hastened the downfall of Argentina’s military government. The rapid return to a democratic system was important for speeding up the same process in neighbouring countries that were still ruled by dictatorships of different kinds. On the winning side, Margaret Thatcher consolidated her political power, since the war would have an impact on the electoral process in 1983 (Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley, 1990). Thatcher’s image became relevant worldwide. Together with Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II, she became part of the trinity that some years later would put an end to the global communist project.

The recent history and third-wave democratisation

During the last decades, the interest in third-wave democratisation processes in Latin America has decreased considerably. Social scientists have been drawn to other investigative agendas and new open problems in the changing Latin American democratisation processes. However, parallel to this, historians have turned their attention to the subject, particularly in a disciplinary field calling itself ‘recent history’ (Mira and Pedrosa, 2016). Works on this subject – numerous, eclectic and of differing quality – have not continued a dialogue with the former literature on the subject (López, Figueroa and Rajland, 2010), or, more importantly, with what was published in the fields of political science and international relations. The latest literature has focused on politics viewed through the prism of democracy (Lesgart, 2002).

Academic developments relating to democratisation in Latin America started in the 1980s. These agendas, novel for the time, were put into practice by a group of political scientists who, besides pursuing their own academic goals, wished to use their work to influence and improve the quality of the democracies that were being established (Guilhot and Schmitter, 2000). These experts engaged with democracy, with the idea that it provided national political leaders – the political elite – with a good chance to build a system capable of channelling the conflicts of each society harmoniously. They recommended that a minimum version of democracy be introduced which, because of its ‘minimalism’, would generate better consensus and avoid the appearance of new dictatorships (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1994).

‘Recent history’ proposed itself as a radical break with these academic traditions; interest in democratic regimes, institutions and political elites received diminished attention. Besides, this new approach no longer showed much interest in the already extant democracies (Oberti and Pittaluga, 2004/5). Thus, issues were highlighted which related to the traumatic events that characterised the period, such as genocides, dictatorships, social crisis, political violence, state terrorism and the different ways society found to offer resistance. To this end, it supported itself, sometimes exaggeratedly, with memory and the testimonies of the main actors as privileged sources for investigation (Sarlo, 2003). Thus, interest in the role played by human rights organisations, trade unions, armed groups and intellectuals, and the biographical works of the victims of state repression, was strengthened. At the same time, the left-wing universe reduced itself to those who kept radical and anti-system stances. This occurred to the detriment of other left-wing democratic projects that, like those of social democrats, were overlooked by specialised literature.²

Nevertheless, in this alleged theoretical and discursive cut, the works framed in recent history kept some of the characteristics of the preceding literature and of that from which they sought to differentiate themselves. This could be seen, for example, in the privileging of national methodologies of historical processes (Lvovich et al., 2011). At the same time, academics in recent history ignored the actions of politicians and their organisations in the study of democratisation processes (Soto, 2004). If regime change towards democracy was no longer a subject for investigation, nor could political parties be.

An earlier version of this discussion was made when historians applied the idea of ‘transnational politics’ (Keohane and Nye, 1971) to debates, making reference to world interactions in which at least one of the participants was non-state in nature, such as political parties or their international party organisations. The systematic application of this concept gave way to a prolific literature that began to extend to the Latin American case. It was acknowledged that processes of democratisation had been strong globally and that, in many cases, transnational actors had been important in their development. Studying transnational activity enables us, in a less forced fashion, to describe political actions of domestic actors outside their countries at the same time as acknowledging their national interests (Keck and Sikkink, 2000). However, this transnational academic approach failed to integrate the political parties and the networks of which they were part, prioritising the role of organisations dedicated to human rights, women, indigenous communities or the environment (Markarian, 2004). The transnational activity of the European social democrat parties and SI in particular, were crucial in the third-wave democratisation processes in Latin America (Mujal León, 1989). However, it is only recently that academic studies have started to account for this (Pedrosa, 2012). To analyse their action within the processes of democratisation might incorporate another perspective that contributes new information and, at the same time, stimulates dialogue between the many social disciplines.

Malvinas: the political background of Socialist International

The conflict between two western-block allies not only surprised the US and Great Britain, it also blindsided SI. However, the political echoes of the dispute had already appeared on the SI agenda in 1976, when there was an increase in tension between the governments of Isabel Perón and the Labour prime minister James Callaghan (Trías, 1977). An English government mission to the Islands territory had been the trigger and resulted in the mutual withdrawal of their ambassadors.

During the SI meeting held in 1977 in Madrid, the Argentine socialist leader Víctor García Costa intended to incorporate the topic of the Malvinas into the discussion. The issue had not been discussed in the meeting held in London the previous year, even though it had been formally scheduled. However, it was not discussed on the second occasion either due to ‘time issues’. The conflict surrounding the Malvinas was something social democrats intended to avoid, since it challenged two long-time SI members. The British Labour Party (BLP) was a classic exponent of the social democratic family. At the same time, Argentine socialism had been the first of its kind within Latin America and a historical partner to European social democracy against Marxism since the times of the Second International.

Argentina’s mission to Madrid succeeded in having the issue accepted for the next SI meeting, to be held in Rome. For this, it was important that the Dominican leader José F. Peña Gómez had rallied to Argentina’s position. Peña Gómez had growing influence within the organisation at the time. At the end of the meeting, the BLP delegation asked for a bilateral interview with Argentina’s socialists.³ Participants in the meeting were Ian Mikardo (Deputy and International Secretary for the BLP), Víctor García Costa (Argentina People’s Socialist Party [PSP]) and Carlos Parra (Chile Radical Party) as the interpreter. Later, Parra’s position was severely criticised by García Costa on the grounds of alleged favouritism shown towards the English.⁴

In spite of their belonging to the same ‘political family’, it was a very tense meeting. Deputy Mikardo started it by stating his alienation because socialists cared more for the Malvinas issue than they did for human rights. The BLP was the most critical of Argentina’s ruling dictatorship and upheld that argument until the end of the conflict. García Costa replied cryptically, ‘Sovereignty does not admit exclusionary considerations’.⁵ As the meeting went on, some common positions appeared and Mikardo was authorised publically to announce that the Labour Party’s position was different from that of Callaghan’s Labour government. At the same time, he asked the Argentines to submit a document that showed commitment to a common position in order to avoid ‘a discussion which was not easy to become engaged with’.⁶ The leader of the Argentine PSP agreed to the request and, soon enough, sent a document entitled ‘The SI requests the Labour Party’s attention to the most urgent acknowledgment of Argentina’s sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and its immediate restitution’.⁷ The title itself left no place for reaching an agreement, not even a common position between both parties. That is why Labour made no attempt to answer it.

In the following meeting, held in Rome, SI once again avoided taking a position. Thus, the parties passed a resolution that supported UN Resolution 2065 from 1965, aimed at reaching a negotiated way out of the conflict over Malvinas sovereignty. However, SI added a significant point to the text: Argentina’s government could not exercise sovereignty since the National Congress had sole legal authority on the matter and the Congress had been dissolved after the military coup.

The war and the parties of Socialist International

The conflict took place in a region that was not very important to the SI, which was more involved in Central America and the Caribbean where the Cold War had one of its main scenarios. However, the war had a direct impact on the SI: once the hostilities began in April 1982, the Latin American leaders of the SI manifested, publicly, against the European Social Democratic leaders. The motives for the conflict were the positions taken towards the Central American conflict, especially those in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Latin American parties such as Democratic Action from Venezuela (commonly abbreviated as AD), the National Liberation Party from Costa Rica (PLN) and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) were openly opposed to the approach to Cuba of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The Europeans, on the other hand, were more sympathetic to those revolutionary movements. The exception was Felipe González from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), who aligned himself with the Latin Americans (Blázquez Vilaplana, 2006).

Towards 1982, the situation in the Argentine and English parties affiliated to SI was quite different from that of the mid 1970s. Argentina’s socialism was divided into several factions competing for SI recognition. All of them were minuscule and in continuous conflict among themselves. The official party, the PSP, remained suspended on the verge of expulsion. Thus, there was no Argentine representation within SI at the time the war broke out. The British Labour Party was in no better position. It was distanced from the new SI leadership and in the middle of an internal crisis that had led it into division and out of government. The crisis had resulted in the creation of the Social Democrat Party (26 March 1981) in which were grouped many of the historical leaders of Labour’s moderate wing (Crewe and King, 1996). The left-wingers were left to the traditional Labour Party (Freeman, 1984). With the Malvinas invasion in mind, the British Labour Party’s first statement addressing the international scenario left no doubt as to the political characterisation it was making. It was based on the anti-democratic attack launched by Argentina’s government and on its actions. Finally, it contemplated the Kelpers’ right to live under the sovereignty of whomever they chose and the necessity to protect them.⁸

On 22 April 1982, in a telegram addressed to SI and the British Labour Party, Argentina answered, claiming that siding with the British government would mean committing treason against SI’s fundamental principles.⁹ At the same time, it would mean an attack on Latin America as a whole. The message made it clear that the pacifists’ efforts were not enough in themselves, but should contain the express recognition of Argentina’s sovereignty. The other political parties in the country unanimously supported government action (Romero, 2012). The Labour position was to cling to the UN’s position. In this way, they found an intermediate position that allowed them to avoid direct confrontation with their own government at a time of war. Thus, they claimed Thatcher should obey Resolution 502 and call a ceasefire; and they claimed that Argentina should abandon the Islands immediately, as the resolution itself demanded. In turn, they rejected the British government’s use of its veto and supported the UN Secretary General’s mediating efforts.¹⁰ In the uncertain climate and confusion to which the war had led, SI seemed not to take any position other than to issue an appeal to end the conflict and to state their respect for UN. However, things would not be that easy. Without consulting SI authorities, the Socialist International Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean (SICLAC) issued a statement that placed the Malvinas issue at the centre of the social democrats’ agenda.

SICLAC and the war

The SICLAC was an internal organism of SI that grouped together the region’s parties and their main leaders. This organism was led by the Dominican José F. Peña Gómez, who had already supported Argentina’s position for some years. The communication issued by SICLAC had the immediate effect of introducing the problem within SI. This was reinforced by the existence of conflicts between Latin American and European Parties on the Central American conflict. The war exacerbated the internal SI problem and placed SICLAC in the eye of the climate storm.

SICLAC’s communication (enclosed in a letter from Peña Gómez to Bernt Carlsson)¹¹ had been a direct reaction to the European Economic Community’s decision – with the support of social democrat governments – to apply sanctions to Argentina. The document adopted several positions implying support for Argentina’s claim. At the same time, no mention was made of its government’s non-democratic characteristics:

In addition to taking a stand for Argentina, the SICLAC communication used the name of ‘SI’. This fact generated broader repercussions and forced the SI authorities to include the issue in the organisation’s agenda. Besides this, the communication was widely distributed by the secretary general Bernt Carlsson himself, who harboured an old resentment towards the Labour movement. SICLAC’s statement not only embittered the climate within SI, but also seriously complicated the situation of the British Labour Party, which was in the middle of a serious electoral dispute. The nationalist climate grew as the war progressed until it became one of the main issues of the British electoral campaign.

Labour’s response to SICLAC’s statement came swiftly and was widely disseminated. Labour’s secretary general, Ron Hayward, telephoned Carlsson to ask him whether the statement had been issued by SI’s office. The affirmative answer deepened the existing tensions with Carlsson and ended in his resigning his post in 1983. In a telephone call to the SI secretary general’s office, a leading British Labour MP, Gwyneth Dunwoody¹³ questioned Latin America’s position in harsh terms, threatening to withdraw the British Labour Party from SI.¹⁴ The BLP issued a highly diplomatic, but robust statement through the national executive committee (NEC). It started by sharing the concern expressed by SICLAC in its own recent statement about the Malvinas crisis but went on to demolish the points made by SICLAC one by one. The NEC agreed that the Argentine military government was behaving anti-democratically, however, and this criticism became central to their argumentation:

The war in the political parties’ transnational scenario

Latin American political parties also began to take a position on the war. Support for Argentina came from the entire political forum, even from those parties which tended to reject its government. In this regard, the conflict was exploited to suit each actor’s interests. For example, Argentina received support from countries in conflict with the US; and these nations – mainly those closer to the Soviet bloc, such as the Communist Party of Cuba and the members of the Non-Aligned Movement – thus used the situation to settle the account of their own realities. On the other side, English-speaking Caribbean parties with a strong English influence supported Britan. Manley and Trotman’s case was notorious within SI.

Numerous Latin American leaders, such as the Uruguayan socialist leader José Cardozo, made public statements in favour of Argentina. However, these were the first ones explicitly to refer to the democracy issue: ‘Latin America awaits some reflection about SI, far from European emotiveness with regard to old wounded hegemonies, based on the Argentine people’s right to achieve not only the recovery of that territorial space, but also the sovereignty of its internal dignity based on social justice and essential democratic freedoms’.¹⁶ An article published in Barricada, a Nicaraguan Sandinista newspaper, denounced US solidarity with British naval aggression, a stance which showed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, a kind of NATO of the Americas, to be a farce. The Sandinista National Liberation Front argued that the attack on Argentina was an attack on Latin America’s people and urged Great Britain to embrace UN and international law. While criticising the US repeatedly, at the same time they cryptically stated that Nicaragua was ‘on friendly terms with Great Britain’.¹⁷

However, within European countries, although not unanimously, the position was favourable to Great Britain. The big picture seemed more varied than the one which Latin Americans appeared to recognise: in Italy because of their historical relationship with Argentina; in Ireland because of their historical differences with Great Britain; and also in Spain, related to the Gibraltar situation. Argentina reaped support especially from the PSOE¹⁸ and the Communist Party of Spain.¹⁹ European support for Argentina even came from the most radical British left wing²⁰ and from international trade union organisations.²¹ The SI youth branch issued a statement as well, which was very favourable to Argentina’s position, although it contained strong criticism of their government and maintained Labour’s position.²² The German Social Democrat Party tried to keep a difficult balance between the need to keep SI together under Willy Brandt’s leadership and their allegiance to German socialist Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who was in charge of supporting the pro-British policies. Meanwhile, the socialist French president Francois Mitterrand gave his firm support to Britain from the start: in NATO, in the UN Security Council as well as in his voting on sanctions in the European Community. Active French participation on Britain’s side was due to a number of different reasons. At the time, their bonds to Latin America were weaker than those of the Germans, Swedes and Spanish. Besides, France had been a marginal participant in the process led by Brandt in order to renew SI. At the same time, French socialism firmly opposed the military government in Argentina. That could be seen in the influence of the determined activism by exiles that found its high point in the boycott of the football World Cup in 1978. However, the French government never stopped providing Argentina with arms.

There was a perception that the US and Europe had ‘betrayed’ Latin America and that Latin America found itself alone in facing developed countries’ governments and political parties around the continent, even those not related to social democracy or the left.²³ As the war progressed and the US’s position moved closer to Britain’s, its position in Latin America became more complicated and its influence seemed to re-enter a moment of crisis.²⁴ Other international and transnational organisations gave their support to Argentina, such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean (COPPPAL). The Non-Aligned Movement gave a strong endorsement of Argentina’s position. Its president at the time, who was no other than Fidel Castro, notoriously welcomed the Argentine chancellor Nicanor Costa Méndez to the plenary of the organisation held in Havana. The same thing happened in the following meeting held in New Delhi. The COPPPAL resoundingly supported Argentina. At the same time it harshly criticised the US and British positions. Only at the end of the statement did it say anything that could be understood as a request to the Argentine government to become more democratic.²⁵

In the absence of an Argentine leader within SI, it was Carlos Andrés Pérez who took the main action in favour of the South American country. Given the influence of the Venezuelan leader both inside and outside SI, his position would certainly increase the pressure exerted on the transnational social democrat organisation’s leadership to put the issue on the agenda at the next formal meeting of the decision-making body. Pérez consolidated his extended international leadership (Gamus, 1990) to prove the strength of his influence in Latin America but also vis-à-vis his European partners, with whom, due to the differences with Nicaragua and El Salvador, he was not on the best of terms at the time. The Venezuelan ex-president immediately understood that the Malvinas War was the final blow for the North–South project with which Willy Brandt had seduced the national leaders of the then so-called Third World.²⁶

The prevailing logic of east versus west in the Cold War had prioritised the superpowers while relegating the other countries to secondary roles. On the other hand, the imposition of ‘North–South’ logic would include developing countries as main actors on the geo-political agenda (Quilligan, 2002). Thus, they were incorporated into the centre stage of international politics with their own needs and not as mere locations where foreign conflicts took place. The conflict in the Malvinas decreed the end of this intention, which could only be sustained during periods of détente in Carter’s era. As Carlos Andrés Pérez cogently pointed out, the war would have political consequences in the region, for it would alter relations between countries from Latin America, the USA and Europe.²⁷ The situation in Latin America was complex because of insurmountable differences on Central America, the economic crisis that started to bite (that same year the so-called ‘debt crisis’ was unleashed) and the political alienation that Latin American countries suffered from the polarisation of the geo-political map. The Malvinas War challenged Latin American politicians to address their influence in the world.

The war within Socialist International

The next I meeting was scheduled for 26 and 27 May in Helsinki. The topic of the Malvinas was not originally included on the agenda for the meeting, which was to be devoted to the Middle East, Central America and disarmament. The meeting had large press coverage but, in order to avoid public repercussions of their internal problems, an unprecedented measure was taken: to ban public and press presence. The Malvinas issue ‘came in through the back door’, generating broad discussion and dominating the meeting’s development. Its inclusion on the agenda was suggested by Carlos Andrés Pérez, supported by most of the Latin American delegates, and emphasised the terms included in the SICLAC’s communication.

The answer to this was under the charge of the British delegate Alex Kitson, who, besides condemning the use of force, proposed to take into consideration the Islanders’ right to self-determination, to condemn Argentina’s dictatorship and to highlight Great Britain’s anti-colonial tradition in Africa and India.²⁸ However, it was the French delegate’s intervention that generated a strong reaction among the Latin Americans and finally caused the meeting to be adjourned.

A participant in that meeting reported in an interview conducted for this investigation that ‘There was a moment of disruption; besides, I remember that, for France, Lionel Jospin was very hard on the Latin-Americans – very hard! Just imagine how he was if Brandt asked, “Please, let us stop for 15 minutes”’.²⁹ In a further letter delivered by the Argentine socialists, the French position was answered with strong criticism:

The discussion was postponed until the following day, as requested by the British delegation. However, according to information from a personal interview with one of the delegates, the climate of division was such that Brandt himself had to call the meeting off and ask a PSOE delegate to find a solution to the conflict:

Finally, a group coordinated by Thorvald Stoltenberg (International Committee of the Norwegian Labour Party) was formed; they wrote a resolution that contained some of the generic points agreed on by all parties. The points included rejection of the use of force (without clarifying which side had initially used it) and support of the UN Secretary General’s efforts at mediation.

Given the magnitude of the internal conflict caused by the war, SI decided to create a Falklands–Malvinas commission that included everyone interested in the issue to avoid repercussions from the conflict striking the whole organisation. The commission had eight members: three from Latin American political parties, three from European ones, plus Labour and an Argentine representative. It aimed at supervising the conflict and keeping the SI leadership informed.³² Its coordination was under the charge of the Norwegian Labour Party and its first meeting was to be held on 21 July 1982 in Paris. However, the war developed faster than the SI commission and, according to the forecasts, would end before the commission could be brought together. The high level of internal conflict and Latin America’s claims forced the meeting to be brought forward. Due to the turmoil of the moment, it was not held in Helsinki, as would have been most natural (since the delegates were already there), but in Portugal,³³ with the aim of making progress in organisational matters before the subsequent gathering in Paris.

The meeting was chaotic. It enjoyed the presence of those who were able to travel and endured the criticism of those who were not.³⁴ Given important absences, the commission abstained from beginning political discussions and limited itself strictly to exchanging points of view about the commission’s future work programme. Everything developed too slowly. According to those present, the commission was right to include debates on the ongoing conflict but should have focused mainly on exploring ways to avoid endangering future relations between SI members. There were some informal conversations about Argentina’s representation within the commission, since SI had no Argentine member party. It was agreed that the Argentine representative should be accepted by every socialist party and groups in Argentina and inform all these groups and parties on the matter.³⁵

From June 1982, Argentina’s position on the military was unsustainable.³⁶ All that remained to be seen was the time when the final assault by the British troops would come. A decision had to be taken on whether to continue with the commission and its activities or not. In one of his personal notes, Brandt Carlsson showed that he was aware of the challenge posed by SI: ‘The moment of truth has come for SI. The South Atlantic conflict has opened up a gap between most European and Latin American parties. […] The commission we created for the Malvinas crisis will probably not do much to solve the conflict. However, what we can actually do, at least, is to avoid the conflict from extending itself within SI’.³⁷

On 23 June the commission’s first official meeting was finally held in Paris.³⁸ At that time, since the war was already over, significant changes were introduced to the meeting’s objectives. However, the political conflict among the parties in SI continued. In the following meeting of the Falklands–Malvinas commission, Argentina’s SPP raised its own political situation within SI, while Labour sent a second-line delegation. The few agreements reached were on the basis of the repetition of commonplace arguments. Latin American representatives were among the most eager to continue this discussion in order to re-position themselves and increase their influence, which the war had been shown in its true proportions. The contents agreed in the text already openly included references to Argentina’s political situation and to the democratic process. Latin American parties began to emphasise this subject, leaving aside the demands for sovereignty that had characterised the time prior to the surrender of Argentina’s troops.

One of the few agreements reached at this meeting was to hold another meeting, this time in Caracas, on 20 and 21 July. By then, gathering the SI Falklands–Malvinas commission together once again seemed of no relevance, to the extent that it was held without the presence of the British Labour Party. The British claimed that they had no funding for the trip. This circumstance was exploited by those present to settle an agreement without the British present and thus to improve SI relations with the Latin American parties.³⁹ Taking advantage of the BLP’s absence and a certain European lack of interest in continuing with the subject, the Latin Americans reached a consensus with the German social democrats, some Nordic parties and the SI secretary general on a final statement by the commission. It demanded that negotiations be quickly reactivated and, in the meantime, that the Malvinas be under UN administration. It did not acknowledge Britain’s presence in the Islands. The most remarkable detail of the document was that it decisively moved forward in Argentina’s democratisation, a fact that, until then, had only been supported by European parties. The end of the conflict and the British victory left no place for the insistence on a ceasefire or for Argentina’s claims to sovereignty.

After the war and General Galtieri’s resignation as president of Argentina, Latin American parties changed the focus of their claims tying the conflict’s final resolution to the immediate restoration of democracy.⁴⁰ They insisted there was now no reason to delay elections.⁴¹ To exert pressure in this regard, the commission also called for an international campaign⁴². The statement also upon the SI authorities to embrace the conclusions without waiting for November’s SI general meeting.⁴³ The document (agreed unanimously) was an attempt by Latin American countries to demonstrate a political triumph, something they had been unable to do elsewhere. At the same time, it showed the SI leadership’s intention to give its Latin American partners the kind of compensation that had been missing during the development of the conflict.⁴⁴ Labour stated their rejection of the document and issued another statement.⁴⁵ Repeating their previous criticism of the need to condemn the actions of the Argentine military junta, they noted that this matter was not made explicit in the commission’s document. The BLP argued that calling for negotiations in the short run was not realistic since the wounds were still open and Argentina’s political future was unclear. Finally, they asked for their points of view to be included in the SI Falklands–Malvinas commission’s final statement. The SI secretary general proposed adding such a statement to the commission’s official statement as a minority view, but the BLP rejected the proposal. British Labour Party leaders wished to incorporate their own arguments into the final statement, which is why they asked for another meeting of the commission.⁴⁶ Somewhat belatedly, the BLP realised that the final statement was a political defeat and that it would be exposed to the whole community of social democrat parties. Carlsson answered, once again, that it was impossible to accomplish the British demand and, as a possible solution to this (in consensus with Brandt), he suggested calling a meeting in 1983 to see if positions could become more flexible.⁴⁷ This never took place, partly because the conflict was already in the past and also because Carlos Andrés Pérez rejected such a possibility.⁴⁸

For SI the Malvinas chapter was closed. Even if the result of the conflict and political process did not enjoy great respect from the Latin American parties, within SI at least, they succeeded in having some kind of compensation. This was shown in the delivery of a final report in the meeting held in Basle in November 1982. The SI leadership was more concerned about healing the wounds than about the arguments that gave rise to the conflict, even though the relations between some Latin American and European parties seemed a one-way street.

Conclusion

The South Atlantic War was irrefutable proof that the path taken by the US under Ronald Reagan’s leadership would not be modified. The main conflict was with the USSR, and every effort was to be directed there, even though it implied abandoning old allies, such as the Argentine military. On the non-aligned and transnational actors’ stage, the war was also a warning in that sense. The phase of détente was over. The growing polarisation left no space for different projects from those led by the world powers. This fact decisively affected the transnational relations that had been articulated among several left-wing groups of SI and, in particular, under the leadership of the German Willy Brandt. The differences between the SI parties were not merely tacit and showed a certain lack of concern from the Latin Americans towards the problem of democracy and their structural bonds to nationalism. The proximity of electoral processes in Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic restricted the SI-affiliated parties’ margins for manoeuvre even more, since their electorate expressed concern about the communist expansion in Central America. To sum up, there was pressure on SI members to prioritise their primary interests as national organisations over collective construction. This eroded the transnational project that the SI had successfully embodied since 1976. Within that framework, to enlarge the focus on the Malvinas War – traditionally reduced to its military aspects – may show the broad framework of relations and political transnational activities of the parties as well as the existing difficulties in consolidating a left-wing democratic space worldwide.

A comprehensive approach to the history of democratisation requires us to deepen our understanding of the interactions in transnational party networks, as well as the current debates about left-wing politics in the region. It must build a full picture of the actors’ universe on the left, its programmatic traditions and the history of its heterogenic strategies and alliances.

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___________

1 This research was conducted between 2007 and 2008 in the archives of Socialist International located in the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG) in Amsterdam (The Netherlands).

2 Some exceptions are Mujal León (1989) and Pedrosa (2012).

3 Letter from Víctor García Costa to Bernt Carlsson, 1 Aug. 1977 (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG).

4 Personal interview with Víctor García Costa (Buenos Aires, July 6, 2012).

5 Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG.

6 Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG.

7 Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG (the original Spanish: ‘La IS solicita al Partido Laborista su atención al más urgente reconocimiento de la soberanía argentina en las Islas Malvinas y su inmediata restitución’).

8 ‘[T]he Labour Party condemns without qualification the actions of the Argentinean military fascist government in taking over the Falkland Islands by force. […] It supports the efforts being made to resolve the situation by diplomatic means and, in particular, welcomes the resolution of the UN Security Council calling for Argentina’s withdrawal from the Falklands Islands, and urges that every action should be taken to make this resolution effective’ (BLP statement, 4 Apr. 1982, signed by Jenny Little (Secretary of International Relations), IISG, Socialist International Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979, IISG).

9 ‘[The] support and colonialist political defense of the British Conservative Party in the Malvinas war ... constitute a total and flagrant violation of the idea that gave rise to the SI. Consequently, the armed aggression towards Argentina will also be an attack against the Latin American countries. That is why an unforgivable responsibility will also fall on the British Labour Party and the SI, if they do not urgently intervene towards a peaceful solution, with express recognition or the sovereignty of Argentina’ (telegram to the SI and PLB signed by Nestor Martinez Eraso, Secretary of International Relations-PSP, 22 Apr. 1982, Socialist International Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979, IISG).

10 BLP statement on the Falklands signed by Michael Foot and Tony Benn, 28 Apr. 1982 (IISG, Socialist International Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979).

11 ‘We held several phone calls with Carlos A. Pérez and the other members of the Committee and we came to the position stated in the annex statement. This document has not been signed by our English-speaking fellows Michael Manley (Jamaica) and O’Brien Trotman (Barbados) for we could not reach a satisfactory agreement’ (SICLAC Circular 3/82, Santo Domingo, 28 Apr. 1982, signed by José Francisco Peña Gómez, Socialist International Archives, Falklands– Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

12 SICLAC Circular 3/82, Socialist International Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG.

13 Gwyneth Dunwoody was a prominent Labour MP and daughter of the first secretary general of the SI and former secretary general of the BLP, Morgan Phillips.

14 ‘With reference to our talk, I write to you to confirm that the statement of April 27, 1982, by the Socialist International Committee for the Latin America and the Caribbean, was sent to the member parties of the Socialist International for information in the form of a press release. Concerning the allegations made by Ms Gwyneth Dunwoody in her phone call to our Secretary today that the “SI member parties in Latin America are fascist in character” and her threat that the British Labour Party is going to leave the SI, I prefer to consider these comments are her private views only’ (confidential letter from Bernt Carlsson to Ron Hayward, 6 May 1982 (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)).

15 SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG.

16 10 May 1982, San José, Costa Rica (on the occasion of the inauguration of Luis A. Monge as 39th president of Costa Rica), (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

17 Barricada, official organ of the FSLN, 10 May 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

18 ‘Be aware of the relevance the Gibraltar issue has in Spain … and that in Spain neither the right nor the left wing is fond of English people. Curious, isn’t it? This is surely for historical reasons, which are centuries-old. In other words, between England and Argentina we are always on Argentina’s side. But besides that, a colonial fact much like that of Gibraltar makes public opinion side with Argentina and so does the left wing. Besides, there was little time to think of what would have happened if the military in Argentina had won …. We experienced it knowing there was a contradiction as well, didn’t we? Of course we had no doubts about it, not least because of Thatcher being there, for whom we hold a visceral dislike’ (personal interview with high-ranking leader of the PSOE, Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, a regular attender at SI meetings, Brussels February 2007).

19 ‘Reaffirming the acknowledgement of Argentina’s sovereignty [The Spanish Communist Party] pronounced in favour of ending hostilities by means of a cease fire … Spanish national conscience is affected by the uncertainty raised by the fact that a country that wages a war miles away, in order to keep a colonial territory, might feel willing to take the ongoing negotiations with Spain to a conclusion and thus Gibraltar be returned to Spanish sovereignty’ (PCE statement on the Falklands, signed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PCE, 5 May 1982, IISG (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979)).

20 ‘We are not pacifists, we detest the Galtieri dictatorship, we dismiss the notion that the Argentinian seizure of the Falklands is progressive on anti-colonialist grounds. Nevertheless we believe that, in a war between Britain and Argentina, the defeat of British imperialism is the lesser evil. The main enemy is at home’ (Hallas, 1982, p. 366).

21 ‘Act to stop British imperialism’s colonial war adventure in South Atlantic’ (Press communiqué, World Federation of Trade Unions, Praga, 27 Apr. 1982. SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

22 ‘1-Ask for pacific solution to the Anglo-Argentine conflict within the international institutions; 2-Acknowledge Argentina’s claim; 3-Demand withdrawal of troops from the South Atlantic; 4-Condemn US government’s Foreign Policy; 5-Urge European Economic Community governments to lift the ban imposed on Argentina; 6-Demand Argentina put an end to the repression directed by the police against the people, to legalize the political parties, and to organize free elections. Finally, the solidarity with Argentine people on its fight towards a free, plural, just and egalitarian society; 7-Recognize BLP position on its opposition to Thatcher’s Malvinas ‘Policy’ (Bulletin no. 43, International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), June 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

23 ‘Thus, on 5/27/1982, Venezuelan Chancellor, José Alberto Zambrano, criticised the American support for London and requested within the XX American Chancellors’ Consultation Meeting the creation of an inter-American armed force to join Argentina in its war against Great Britain’ (‘Las relaciones con Venezuela’, available at: http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-054.htm (accessed 10 June 2019)).

24 ‘The Ecuadorian president, Osvaldo Hurtado, thanked [Leopoldo] Calvo-Sotelo for the “support that has already been given in the recent crisis in the Malvinas through Spanish diplomatic back-up in the Latin American cause”. … Calvo-Sotelo could prove in … Ecuador, as he would be able to do in … Colombia and Peru, the disenchantment suffered by the Latin American world in regard to US support of British policy on the Malvinas issue, which had opened a breach of unpredictable consequences between these countries and their neighbour from the North’ (Diario, El País (Spain), 7 Aug. 1982). Available at: https://elpais.com/diario/1982/08/07/espana/397519203_850215.html (accessed 10 June 2019).

25 ‘Argentina is assisted by right and reason in its claim, as has been acknowledged … by the progressive thinking of our time. … We reaffirm our solidarity with the just claims of all peoples and nations of Latin America and the Caribbean whose countries have suffered violation or abuse in their rights through … colonial domination. … We demand that, together with an immediate ceasefire, recognition be made of the rights of that people’s claim to sovereignty. … Finally, we express our recognition of the value and patriotism of the Argentine people in their unequal fight aimed at having their sovereignty respected. We hope that as a result of their sacrifice they be granted, henceforth, full exercise of their individual and social freedoms as well as a growing democratic participation in national public life’, signed by Ricardo Valero (Secretary of International Affairs, Institutional Revolutionary Party, Mexico), and sent on behalf of Pedro Ojeda Paullada (President of COPPPAL), 13 June 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

26 In a speech delivered in Algeria during a meeting on the north–south project, Pérez showed his pessimistic view on the future of such projects: ‘Thus it has been proved in the conflict between Britain and Argentina with impressive firmness. We do not hesitate to qualify it as a north– south conflict. […] Beyond the argument used about Argentina’s decision to resort to force in order to recover sovereignty … there is the violent and colonialist reaction of Great Britain and the EEC, as well as the US, in turning their backs on a nation of the hemispheric community … Europe did not even consider the reaction that this aggressive and precipitate conduct would cause in our people, or the unexpected consequences of the punitive measures taken by the EEC with hurry, ignorance and violation of the UN declaration about the economic duties and rights of the states’ (‘North–South economic cooperation and the Falklands War’, a speech by Carlos Andrés Pérez (former president of Venezuela), Algeria, 22 May 1982, SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

27 ‘Contadora group, more than a decision seeking to mediate in the Central American conflict, is a decision that comes after the Malvinas War seeking to find a solution to our differences and problems by ourselves’ (Diario El País (Spain), 18 Aug. 1986).

28 The magazine of the IS, Socialist Affairs, described the meeting, at which the existence of different positions are observed. However, Socialist Affairs makes no mention of the depth of the divide between Latin America and Europe ( Socialist Affairs, 1982, no, 4, pp. 131, 143).

29 Personal interview with Elena Flores, former PSOE delegate to Socialist International (Madrid, March 2010).

30 PSP (National Committee) document, Buenos Aires, 31 May 1982, signed by Víctor García Costa (secretary general) and Nestor Martinez Eraso (secretary of international relations) (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

31 Personal interview with Elena Flores, former PSOE delegate to SI (Madrid, March 2010).

32 Resolution on Falklands Islands–Malvinas (Socialist Affairs, 1982, no. 4, p. 142).

33 ‘Impossible to understand why the meeting was to be held in Lisbon on 29 May when everybody was assembled in Helsinki on 27 May’ (Bernt Carlsson’s notes on a meeting with Leonard Larsen, Ivar Leveraas, Reiulf Steen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, 14 June 1982 (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)).

34 ‘I express our deepest disappointment at the unacceptable procedure for convening the meeting of the eight-member committee of the SI for the Falklands–Malvinas, which has prevented us from participating in this first meeting due to an absolute lack of time. The cable sent on 28 May was delivered on Saturday 29 at the party’s general address and handed over to my office on Monday 31’ (Margherita Boniver, International Secretariat, Italian Socialist Party, to Bernt Carlsson, 3 June 1982, copied to the Norwegian Labour Party (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)).

35 Statement by the Norwegian Labour Party, Oslo, 4 June 1982, signed by Reiulf Steen (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

36 ‘According to Karl L. Hübener, with whom I met this morning, the US and the British government had come to an agreement through which the British will delay the final assault on Port Stanley until after President Reagan’s visit to England and the end of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Bonn’ (Bernt Carlsson’s notes, Socialist International Falklands–Malvinas commission, report from the meeting on 9 June 1982 (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)).

37 Bernt Carlsson’s notes, Socialist International Falklands–Malvinas commission report from the meeting on 9 June 1982 (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG).

38 The meeting was attended by representatives from Argentina, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Barbados, Norway, Venezuela and Chile (Bernt Carlsson’s notes on the Socialist International Falklands–Malvinas commission, report from the meeting on 9 June 1982 (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)).

39 Notes on the conversation between Leonard Larsen and Bernt Carlsson (9 Aug. 1982, Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG).

40 ‘That the SI declares itself fully in favour of the early restoration of the process of democratisation in the republic of Argentina … We consider this objective of paramount importance. We feel strongly that this demand by the people of Argentina should be met by the military without delay. It would have the advantage of contributing considerably to the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the definitive solution to the controversy in the South Atlantic’ (report by the SI working group on the Falklands–Malvinas, Caracas, 7 July 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG)).

41 The document also expressed support for ‘Multipartidaria,’ which grouped together the different Argentine parties that had sent a delegation to the meeting, even though none of them was an SI member.

42 ‘It is for these reasons that we consider the postponement of the electoral process until 1984 to be an unnecessary delay which could well have unforeseen and adverse consequences for the future development of peace and democracy in the Argentine Republic. In view of the foregoing, the Commission proposes that the Socialist International and its member parties conduct an international campaign, in particular directed to the military government with the view to pressuring it to honour its commitment given by President General Reynaldo Bignone for the restoration of the democratic process through free and fair elections’ (report of the SI working group on the Falklands–Malvinas, Caracas, 7 July 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands– Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979, IISG)).

43 ‘To request the president and the general secretary of the Socialist International after consulting with its member parties to implement the conclusions proposed above without waiting for the bureau meeting in November. This proposal arises from the dynamic and fluid nature of the circumstances surrounding this delicate matter’ (report of the SI working group on the Falklands–Malvinas, Caracas, 7 July 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG)).

44 Report of the Socialist International working group on the Falklands–Malvinas, Caracas, 21July 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

45 ‘1-The statement makes no specific condemnation of the act of aggression from the Galtieri junta which precipitated the conflict. This is regrettable and must be rectified. The Labour Party feels it very important that the community of socialist parties loses no opportunity to express its extreme disapproval of all attempts to use violence to resolve international disputes … 2-The Labour Party associates itself fully with the view that the restoration of democracy in Argentina is of “paramount importance” … 4-At this juncture, after deep passions have been aroused on both sides of the Atlantic and after the trauma through which the Falkland Islanders have been forced to live, it is however unrealistic to call for direct negotiations between Britain and Argentina at this stage. Furthermore, the political situation inside Argentina is in state of flux, it is impossible to predict how long this government will last when elections will finally take place, etc etc. … we do not consider it appropriate for at least the immediate future to endorse the policy of direct negotiations’ (BLP statement signed by J.E. Mortimer (general secretary) and sent to Bernt Carlsson on 2 Sept. 1982 (SI Archives. Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG)).

46 ‘Dear Cofrade: Thank you for your letter of 8 October 1982 enclosing the report of the Falklands/Malvinas Commission. I am afraid that it is unacceptable to the Labour Party that the report be circulated in the form you suggest. We obviously wish to see the points we raise considered and we would hope incorporated in the statement. We would not support the report as it now stands. I would like to suggest that either there is a further meeting of the commission prior to the Basle meeting or that if the report goes to the Bureau as it now is, adequate time is given for debate and so that we can submit amendments’ (letter from J.E. Mortimer (general secretary, labour party) to Bernt Carlsson, 20 Oct. 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG)).

47 Letter from Bernt Carlsson to J.E. Mortimer, London, 28 Oct. 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands– Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).

48 ‘With regards to another Commission meeting … I disagree, since this Commission put an end to its meetings in Caracas on 21 July 1982, as stated in the agreement of the same date that was submitted to your consideration and of the president’s, Willy Brandt, as duly clarified in the Basle meeting in late November’ (letter from Bernt Carlsson to J.E. Mortimer, London, 28 Oct. 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG)).