Finding 300 £10 householders

In February 1831 the Grey ministry discovered that 87 English boroughs due to survive reform contained fewer than 300 houses assessed to the inhabited house duty at over £10 per annum. In order to ensure that each reformed English borough contained 300 £10 householders, the government proposed to extend these boroughs into their surrounding, or adjoining, parish. This proposal was conceived as a watered-down version of the boundary reforms that had taken place in the boroughs of New Shoreham, Cricklade, Aylesbury and East Retford since the late eighteenth century. These boroughs had been thrown into their surrounding hundred or hundreds – an administrative unit between the size of a parish and a county – as a means of purifying their corrupt electorates by adding 40S. freeholders from the surrounding county. As discussed in Chapter 1, during the 1820s this method of electoral reform became associated with the partisan advocates of the corn laws, who realised its electoral benefit for increasing the representation of MPs associated with the agricultural and landed interests.

When the government announced its reform legislation in March 1831 it did not go so far as to recommend the extension of over eighty English boroughs into their surrounding hundreds. Doing so would have been impractical, given that most boroughs only required an addition of around 100 voters, and that such extensive boundary reform would have removed large swathes of voters from the counties. It was also unpalatable to the more progressive cabinet members, two of whom – Durham and Russell – had already sought to disfranchise Shoreham, Cricklade, Aylesbury and East Retford when drafting the reform legislation. The association of these boroughs with the landed interest made them politically contentious, and their untraditional form as half-borough, half-county was inconsistent with Russell’s notion of reform as a means of constitutional restoration.⁵ Creating a new set of Shorehams and Cricklades also threatened to disturb the 60:40 balance for the redistribution of seats between the landed and commercial interests that the cabinet hoped might secure parliamentary approval.⁶

The compromise solution of extending each of these boroughs into their parish remained in place until August 1831, when Drummond commenced planning for the boundary commission. After preliminary investigations in London, he advised the cabinet that the parishes surrounding most of these boroughs contained very few potential £10 voters, and that an alternate means of boundary extension was required to satisfy the 300 £10 householder requirement. In response, the cabinet set an upper geographical threshold for boundary extension in these boroughs of seven miles from existing borough limits. On 1 September, the government advised the Commons that other than this seven-mile limit, the commissioners were to ‘be left at full liberty to draw up instructions’ for how to extend the boundaries of these boroughs.⁷

In keeping with his desire to identify a means of redrawing England’s electoral map in a uniform, disinterested manner through socio-economic investigation, Drummond established several principles to guide the commissioners in these boroughs. It was hoped that some boroughs with fewer than 300 £10 householders would contain a sufficient electorate if their boundaries were extended to encompass their modern town (see Chapter 5). If this did not work the commissioners were advised to identify the most appropriate population grouping with which to enlarge a borough within seven miles of its existing limits. First, the commissioners were to consider the ‘principal lines of communication’ that existed between a borough and its surrounding country as well as the direction in which a borough’s population was likely to develop.⁸ Then, Drummond informed the commissioners: ‘the employment of the surrounding population, their connection with the town or with the country, their municipal or rural character, may become proper objects of inquiry and consideration’. Drummond also established that the commissioners did not need to use the boundaries of ancient administrative divisions (such as parishes, townships and chapelries) to establish new borough limits – although he did recommend their use where possible. Instead, the commissioners were given the power to design boundaries using arbitrary lines (that might cut through a parish or township) to ensure that the most suitable population grouping within seven miles of a deficient borough could be added to its boundary.⁹

Of the 146 ancient boroughs initially visited by the commissioners, 51 contained fewer than 300 £10 householders. Only 6 of these were found to contain more than 300 £10 householders when their boundaries were extended to encompass their modern town (Truro, Totnes, Sudbury, Tavistock, Lymington and Chipping Wycombe). In eleven instances the commissioners discovered that a borough’s surrounding parish, or its adjoining parish, provided an obvious means of extension. The populations of Ashburton, Horsham, Honiton and Liskeard were found to have a similar socio-economic profile to those living in their surrounding parish.¹⁰ The boroughs of Shaftesbury, Huntingdon, Bewdley, Bridgnorth, Malton, Richmond and Cockermouth were all found to have an adjoining administrative division that contained a population with a similar economic or social interest and sufficient £10 householders. For instance, commissioners Sheepshanks and Tallents recommended that the parish of Godmanchester (which contained 129 £10 householders) be added to the ancient borough of Huntingdon (which contained 276 £10 householders). Both parishes shared a similar agricultural profile. Godmanchester’s other neighbouring parish, Brampton, was unsuitable, however, as it was ‘liable to be overflowed and wholly unfit for sites of houses’.¹¹

In the remaining thirty-four cases the commissioners were unable to identify such conveniently matched, adjoining, administrative divisions. This problem had become increasingly apparent by the end of September 1831, by which point the commissioners in Districts A, B and E had encountered difficult cases in Reigate, Christchurch and Droitwich. The number of £10 houses associated with the modern town in each of these boroughs was considerably fewer than 300, and in each case an appropriate nearby town within seven miles was identified with which to augment the original borough’s electorate. However, the commissioners reported that these towns were separated from their respective boroughs by large swathes of countryside, whose scattered populations appeared to have a different social and economic profile. Although the commissioners had been granted permission to draw arbitrary lines to connect comparative areas, their original instructions required they connect any area to an original borough using ‘continuous lines’. This meant that in order to extend the original borough to include its nearby similarly profiled town, some portion of the intervening non-matching countryside had to be included. The example of Droitwich (for which a full run of correspondence survives in the working papers of the boundary commission) provides an illustrative case study of how the commission attempted to deal with these boroughs.

Droitwich, grouping and the subtleties of interest representation

When commissioners Ord and Chapman visited Droitwich in September 1831, they reported to Drummond that the entire population associated with the town consisted of 128 £10 householders and that its local economy was based on salt production.¹² By contrast, the nine parishes and 20,000 acres of countryside that surrounded the borough were found to contain 123 ‘wholly rural’ £10 voters. Based on their interpretation of Drummond’s instructions, the commissioners felt that the most appropriate population within seven miles with which they could increase Droitwich’s electorate was Bromsgrove (Map 6.1). The town contained over 200 £10 householders, its population was engaged chiefly in nail-making and the inhabitants of both towns, when asked, had suggested ‘Bromsgrove as the only source’ of similarly interested voters with which to increase Droitwich’s electorate.¹³ The difficulty that the commissioners discovered was that in order to unite the two towns, their instructions recommended they do so via arbitrary, continuous lines that required the inclusion of some of the intervening agricultural district. For the commissioners, this appeared to defeat the object of creating borough electorates with broadly similar social and economic interests. They also expressed concern that an arbitrary boundary would remove freeholders in Droitwich’s surrounding agricultural districts from the county franchise. They advised Drummond that such a recommendation would:

… be liable to much objection, because the interposed agricultural population will find themselves overwhelmed by their more powerful and numerous neighbours in the election of a single member [in the borough of Droitwich] – and will be deprived of their privilege of voting for two members in the county [of Worcester].¹⁴

Although it was not clear whether they had the power to do so, the commissioners suggested that it might be more appropriate to assign distinct boundaries around Droitwich and Bromsgrove, and group both towns in the franchise, as was commonplace in Welsh boroughs and Scottish burghs (Map 6.1).¹⁵

When Drummond received this report in late September, the same commissioners had already enquired into the viability of grouping Evesham with nearby Pershore.¹⁶ Drummond had also received a similar report from commissioners Drinkwater and Saunders, who had suggested grouping Reigate with Dorking.¹⁷ Although the government had not sanctioned grouping, Drummond discovered that both pairs of commissioners had made their own interpretation of the 7 September draft of the reform bill, since its publication in the national press. This version of the bill stated that in boroughs with fewer than 300 £10 householders, the commissioners were empowered to include ‘any part of any one or more parishes, townships or other places … within seven statute miles of such city or borough’.¹⁸ After clarifying the issue with the government, Drummond advised Ord and Chapman that:

It is not required by the [reform] Act [sic] that the line connecting the two places should be continuous … it is not the intention of government to introduce any restriction into the clause – and all admit that as it now stands we have the power [to propose grouping].¹⁹

Drummond’s discussions with the government revealed that, while grouping was allowed, there had to be clear economic and social similarities between the two towns being connected, and some evidence that the boundary changes would be accepted in the locality. On the matter of Droitwich, he advised:

is this town of the same description as Bromsgrove? Are its inhabitants more connected with manufactures than with agriculture; are the interests of both these towns essentially the same; if you reply in the affirmative, then your recommendation will most probably be approved of.

Drummond expressed concern that the salt producers of Droitwich might actually be more closely associated with their surrounding agricultural parishes than the nail-makers of Bromsgrove. He warned both commissioners to be cautious not to ‘injure the interest to which that constituency [Droitwich] is attached [in the Commons]’, advising against simplistic definitions of interest that conflated ‘town’ with ‘manufacturing’, and ‘agricultural’ with ‘rural’.²⁰ Setting boundaries, in Drummond’s mind, required a subtle conception of interest representation – one that accepted that as much difference of interest could exist between two town populations, as between a town and an agricultural district, and that scattered rural populations could also be connected to town settlements.

The commissioners revisited Droitwich in November, but only found further complications. Following their original visit, rumours had spread locally that Droitwich might be grouped with Bromsgrove or expanded into its surrounding countryside. Both options, it transpired, were equally unpopular. The inhabitants of Droitwich feared being overwhelmed in future elections by the interests of voters in the larger town of Bromsgrove. Meanwhile, county voters around Droitwich were unhappy about the prospect of sacrificing their two county votes, only to be overpowered by Droitwich’s inhabitants in the election of a single borough member who was unlikely to represent their interests.²¹ Both complaints were considered to be legitimate grievances. Whatever decision the commission made, one population’s legitimate interest had to be marginalised to create a borough that contained 300 £10 householders.

The guidance provided by Drummond over grouping was not published in the official boundary commission reports. However, it was distributed to the commissioners, who by late November had proposed grouping as an option in at least twenty-six boroughs (Table 6.1). The commissioners took two distinct approaches when interpreting this guidance. The first was best exemplified by commissioners Drinkwater and Saunders in District A. They exhibited the same subtlety in their conception of interest representation as Drummond and were unwilling to propose the grouping of two towns without good reason. New Winchelsea, for instance, was felt to be a suitable addition to Rye as both towns were ports. Likewise, Arundel and Littlehampton were felt to have a natural connection due to a connecting river and the manner in which coal distribution in Sussex was managed between both towns.²² By contrast, they opposed grouping Maldon and Heybridge, due to an ongoing rivalry that existed between the two towns following the recent development of a canal that had diverted trade past the latter at the expense of the former.²³ They also advised against grouping Lyme Regis with Axminster as they were in separate counties and had no obvious economic or social connection.²⁴ In general the commissioners in Districts C, D and E approached grouping on this basis.

By contrast, Gawler and Ansley in District B had interpreted their ability to propose grouping simply as a requirement that all future borough constituencies contained 300 predominantly town-based £10 householders – even if there was no obvious economic or social connection between the two towns proposed for association. Their recommendations also had a more overtly reformist bent, in so much as they saw grouping as a necessary means of increasing the political respectability of the small, often economically depressed towns that were associated with small boroughs. For instance, Tetbury was identified as the most suitable place to be grouped with Malmesbury because it was the largest, most respectable town within seven miles. They described Malmesbury itself as ‘a place of no trade whatever, and not a great thoroughfare, [with] no stage-coach of any kind running to or through the town’,²⁵ and lamented privately to Drummond that the town’s inhabitants were generally ‘indifferent about having members to represent them’.²⁶ They paid little attention to the socio-economic profile of the two towns, and even acknowledged that Tetbury was in a different county to Malmesbury. Nevertheless, they felt that the size and respectability of Tetbury marked it out as the most suitable grouping option. All nine of Ansley and Gawler’s grouping proposals were identified in a similar manner, according to the size and respectability of eligible towns, with little attention being paid to the actual interests those towns purported to represent.²⁷ Even though Wrottesley and Tancred in District G were more thorough in terms of reporting on the social and economic profile of the towns they visited, their approach bore more resemblance to that of Ansley and Gawler than of the other commissioners.²⁸

Table 6.1: Boroughs for which grouping options were identified prior to 20 December 1832.1

Of the eight remaining boroughs that were due to remain enfranchised prior to December 1831 and contained fewer than 300 £10 householders, it is impossible to confirm whether grouping was considered, as the commissioners’ original reports have not survived. In five boroughs (St. Ives, Launceston, Helston, Clitheroe and Saltash) it is likely grouping was considered, but in three (Aldborough, East Grinstead and Okehampton, all of which were later disfranchised), no eligible place within seven miles of the borough was identified.²⁹ Until 20 December 1831 the commissioners had considered grouping as the government’s preferred option for ensuring that every reformed borough contained 300 £10 householders. In some boroughs, however, the options available for grouping were far from ideal. Not only did grouping seem potentially unpopular, but in some cases, it threatened to marginalise the interest that an ancient borough had traditionally represented in the Commons. Following the receipt of the commissioners’ individual proposals, it was left to the sitting committee of the commission and the cabinet to agree on how to proceed.

The sitting committee, the cabinet and the Waverers

When Drummond, Littleton and Beaufort, as the sitting committee of the boundary commission, commenced its review of the commissioners’ proposals in late October 1831, their largest source of apprehension derived from the thirty-four proposals in which grouping had been considered.³⁰ Droitwich was one of the first cases considered and became an important test case. On reviewing the commissioners’ report, Beaufort was wary that the commission did not have sufficient authority to recommend grouping Droitwich with Bromsgrove: ‘the policy of associating two distant and independent towns appears to involve considerations of far too great importance to be left to the discretion of the commissioners. Government or the legislature should decide the point’.³¹

For Littleton, grouping threw up important political questions, which, in contrast to Beaufort’s bureaucratic deference, he felt compelled to steer the cabinet towards answering to his satisfaction. First, Littleton feared that grouping would throw the government’s rationale for disfranchisement into disarray. If Droitwich (in Schedule B) was allowed to retain the franchise through grouping, the principle, he remarked, could reasonably be claimed for Schedule A boroughs, which because of their insufficient populations had been scheduled to be completely disfranchised.³² Littleton’s primary concern, however, was that all available options for extending Droitwich’s boundaries were likely to have a significant impact on electoral politics in Worcestershire. He feared that extending Droitwich into 20,000 acres of surrounding countryside would remove hundreds of voters from the county, and also that extending the borough to Bromsgrove (through either continuous lines or grouping) would remove an important town influence from Worcestershire’s county elections.³³ These problems were compounded for Littleton by the fact Worcestershire was proposed to be divided; Dudley and Kidderminster were due to be enfranchised; and Evesham and Bewdley also appeared to require large boundary extensions. He wrote in his diary on 31 October: ‘Bewdley will swallow Stourport, Evesham, Pershore, Droitwich, Bromsgrove, Kidderminster to be enfranchised – There will not be a town left [in Worcestershire] except Stourbridge’.³⁴

For Littleton, the question of extending borough boundaries to obtain 300 £10 householders required careful thought. He feared that the blanket removal of town voters from England’s counties, through either boundary or franchise changes, would lead to a reformed Commons divided between ‘a town party and a county party – and jealousy and hatred would thus be engendered, and would endure till one party destroyed the other’.³⁵ His preferred option was to not divide the counties. Or, if the counties were to be divided, disfranchise Droitwich altogether so as to ensure that some town influence remained in the county division in which both Droitwich and Bromsgrove fell. Similar considerations, Littleton felt, would be required in other counties that contained a high number of boroughs in need of extensive boundary change.³⁶

Littleton maintained close contact with the cabinet throughout November and December in an attempt to address his concerns. His first port of call was Russell, whom he met on 8 November. From this initial meeting Littleton discovered that the cabinet had not considered the question of these boundaries in detail and had not intended to do so until additional cabinet members, particularly Brougham, had returned to Westminster following parliament’s recent prorogation.³⁷ Littleton continued to discuss the ongoing work of the boundary commission with Russell over the following days, and on 15 November, Russell, Grey and Althorp met the sitting committee at the Privy Council office.³⁸ Unfortunately for Littleton, the primary purpose of this meeting was not, as he had presumed, to provide clarity over boroughs such as Droitwich. Rather, Grey had spotted an opportunity to use the information already collected by the commission to put him one step ahead in his negotiations with the ‘Waverers’ – a group of peers who sought to moderate the reform bill in return for its safe passage through the Lords.³⁹

One concession that Grey was willing to make to the Waverers was the removal of plans for single-member boroughs from the reform bill (those in Schedule B and Schedule D).⁴⁰ In the unreformed electoral system, the English double-member constituency was widely celebrated for its ability to allow for compromise agreements between parties, reduce the need for contested elections and ensure a level of minority representation.⁴¹ It transpired that Grey and Althorp had seized on grouping as a means of retaining the double-member borough principle across England’s reformed electoral map. They enquired into the viability of an elaborate scheme that disfranchised some Schedule B boroughs; grouped some Schedule B boroughs with each other; grouped some Schedule D boroughs with each other; and extended the number of £10 householders in others in order that all boroughs could return two members.⁴² Such a scheme would have inadvertently addressed the sitting committee’s misgivings over boroughs like Droitwich, as twenty-one of the twenty-nine boroughs in which grouping had already been proposed were in Schedule B.⁴³ In such a proposal, Droitwich could have been grouped with Evesham (which also stood in Schedule B), leaving Bromsgrove and Pershore to participate in Worcestershire’s county elections.

Even though this scheme satisfied one of Littleton’s concerns, both he and Russell expressed reservations over its impact. They feared that anti-reformers would claim the right of grouping for Schedule A boroughs, as well as the electoral consequence of indiscriminately forcing together boroughs with conflicting interests. Russell suggested an alternative arrangement, which proposed to abolish Schedule B but increase the amount of total disfranchisement from fifty-seven to seventy-two boroughs; reduce the number of enfranchisements from forty to thirty but allow all new boroughs to return two MPs; and reduce the borough franchise to all rated houses. This latter option appeared preferable to Littleton, as it removed the need for extensive boundary change in the remaining Schedule B boroughs and double-member boroughs that contained fewer than 300 £10 householders.⁴⁴

Ultimately, Grey and Althorp’s grouping scheme was proposed to the Waverers the following day.⁴⁵ By early November 1831, then, as far as Littleton was aware, the government’s plan to appease the Waverers by abandoning Schedule B was genuine. Furthermore, although the solution may not have been to his liking, it appeared to have settled the question of boundaries in boroughs such as Droitwich. Over the following days, the increased participation of the Waverers’ chief cabinet allies, Lansdowne and Palmerston, in discussions over boundary changes at the Privy Council office seemed to confirm this view.⁴⁶ Unknown to Littleton, however, these negotiations had stalled by the end of November, following the cabinet’s growing concerns over the political unions, the Waverers’ increasingly impractical demands and Brougham’s return to London.⁴⁷ The cabinet decided on 29 November to retain Schedule B, but offer the Waverers a slight reduction in the amount of boroughs to be partially disfranchised – news that did not reach Littleton until 2 December, and returned the sitting committee to its original impasse.⁴⁸

The cabinet agrees a way forward

In the three weeks prior to the government’s introduction of their third reform bill on 12 December, the priorities of the boundary commission shifted to the remodelling of the disfranchisement schedules (see Chapter 4). Following this, Littleton renewed discussions with Russell and Althorp in an attempt to clarify the government’s intentions over boroughs with fewer than 300 £10 householders. Littleton now preferred that the sitting committee be granted authority to consider each of these boroughs on a case-by-case basis (with grouping allowed when appropriate) in order that boundaries could be based on local circumstance.⁴⁹ Such a decision would have allowed the commission to draw from its vast amount of socio-economic investigation, while also allowing Littleton the power to design boundaries, to his liking, in the midlands. Such a decision was not forthcoming, however, and following cabinet discussions on 20 December 1831 an alternative solution was identified.

In one final concession to the Waverers, the cabinet agreed to a boundary scheme that, it transpired, Lansdowne and Palmerston had been advocating since late November.⁵⁰ Both wanted to extend every ancient borough that contained fewer than 300 £10 householders into its surrounding agricultural district in order to provide a blanket increase in the influence of voters associated with the ‘landed interest’ in the boroughs.⁵¹ In effect, they wanted to revive proposals for a slightly tamer version of what had happened in the four corrupt boroughs that had been thrown into their surrounding hundreds since the late eighteenth century – and which, as discussed above, had been proposed as a solution to these boroughs since February 1831. Palmerston and Lansdowne hoped such reforms would appeal to moderates as they promised to counterbalance the increased influence of resident, but not necessarily property-owning, voters in newly enfranchised boroughs, but also provide greater opportunities for candidates supportive of political issues connected with the landed interest at future elections. The reform bill had already sought to provide for an increased representation of these interests by giving additional seats to the counties and extending the county franchise to copyholders and £50 occupiers, and, as discussed in Chapter 2, by dividing the counties and removing large portions of town populations from the county franchise by enfranchising new boroughs.⁵²

In November, Lansdowne had proposed that the commissioners draw a two-mile radius around each borough containing fewer than 300 £10 householders.⁵³ However, the data already gathered by the commission suggested that in most cases this would not supply 300 £10 voters. After consulting the commissioners’ draft reports during December, Lansdowne and Palmerston instead proposed that these boroughs should be extended up to four miles into their neighbouring parishes or townships until the requisite number of £10 householders was achieved.⁵⁴ On 20 December the cabinet agreed to Lansdowne’s scheme (with the support of Grey and Goderich), which they hoped would ‘ensure’ the reform bill’s success.⁵⁵ As a result, they provided new instructions to the commissioners that were backdated to 24 November when published, so as to prevent parliament from discovering that they had agreed to this plan after the introduction of their third reform bill.⁵⁶ Following news of the cabinet’s decision, Littleton discovered that his attempts since November to influence the cabinet through Russell had been futile. Russell, according to Melbourne, had been less than forceful in raising the issue at cabinet during November and December, or advocating on Littleton’s behalf when he did.⁵⁷

The cabinet’s new instruction was not received well by the boundary commission. Having just completed a last-minute survey of England’s smallest boroughs for the purpose of remodelling the disfranchisement schedules, the commissioners were now required to complete an immediate visit to every borough that contained fewer than 300 £10 householders, and for which their proposed boundaries did not meet the new criteria. Littleton wrote in his diary on 21 December: ‘poor Drummond [is] at work trying to coax the commissioners into good humour with the government instructions. Many of their reports must be torn, and reconstructed, and many of them must revisit their boroughs in the frost and snow’.⁵⁸

The commissioners were now required to shelve their proposal to group Bromsgrove and Droitwich. Instead, they drew a circle with a four-mile radius on top of their map of the borough and gathered new £10 householder data for each of the parishes within this circle (Map 6.2). This provided an addition of 130 £10 householders to the existing borough of Droitwich’s 128 £10 householders. As this was still below the desired level of 300, the commissioners extended their search into three adjoining parishes (parts of which were within four miles of the borough), where they discovered an additional 53 £10 householders. In stark contrast to the commissioners’ initial report in September, which had discounted Droitwich’s surrounding parishes as inappropriate for extension on the basis of the size of the boundary and the fact that the surrounding population was ‘wholly rural’, their final proposed boundary now covered 37.4 square miles and contained a majority of rural, previously county freehold, voters.⁵⁹

The 20 December instructions led to wholesale changes in the commissioners’ recommendations ahead of the publication of their proposals in February 1832. Instead of proposing to extend Tavistock and Chipping Wycombe to encompass their modern town, the sitting committee now felt no qualms in extending both boroughs into their extensive surrounding parish due to doubts over the number of £10 householders in both boroughs.⁶⁰ Similar doubts about the number of £10 householders in Shaftesbury led to the borough’s extension into thirteen parishes.⁶¹ The sitting committee also had little hesitation in now recommending that five boroughs (Banbury, Peterborough, Tamworth, Grantham and Tewkesbury) whose ancient boundaries had included just over 300 £10 householders should be extended into their surrounding parish. Four further boroughs (New Woodstock, Midhurst, Eye and Petersfield) that had recently escaped disfranchisement due to the remodelling of the disfranchisement schedules were extended into multiple surrounding parishes.⁶² And, as was the case with Droitwich, the commissioners’ final reports recommended large extensions to twenty-six of the thirty-four boroughs where grouping had originally been considered. Of the seven that were not, five were disfranchised (Aldborough, Amersham, East Grinstead, Okehampton and Saltash) as a result of the remodelled disfranchisement schedules, and the remaining three (Thetford, Penryn and Hythe) were all considered anomalies. It was agreed to leave Thetford’s existing boundary (which already encompassed three parishes) unchanged, as the addition of every parish within four miles of the borough (an area that cut across two counties) only contained an additional thirty-nine £10 houses.⁶³ As parliament had already agreed to associate the borough of Penryn with nearby Falmouth during debates on the second reform bill, and both towns combined contained over 300 £10 householders, they were connected by an arbitrary line that the commissioners reported allowed for future growth between the two towns.⁶⁴ And, the commission proposed that Hythe be connected to Folkestone (which was five miles from the borough) by arbitrary lines on the basis that the former was on the coast, half of the area included in a four-mile radius around the town included the sea, and its surrounding parishes on land contained insufficient £10 householders.⁶⁵

Hythe was one of eight of the commissioners’ published proposals that were subsequently overruled by parliament during debates over the boundary bill. In June 1832 parliament agreed to extend the four-mile limit for expanding Hythe, in order that the parish that contained Folkestone could be included in the borough without drawing arbitrary lines.⁶⁶ Following a close reading of the commission’s reports by anti-reformers, particularly Croker, the government also agreed to extend Cirencester and Leominster into their surrounding parish to maintain consistency with boroughs that contained just over 300 £10 householders, and which the sitting committee had agreed to throw into their parish. Similarly, the government agreed to extend Rye, Helston and St. Ives into even more surrounding parishes than originally proposed, on the basis that the number of £10 houses in the commissioners’ original published recommendations were on the cusp of 300.⁶⁷ Wareham was also extended even further than initially recommended, after the government eventually decided to risk offending several MPs who had a personal interest in the borough by moving a Lords amendment that lifted the four-mile limit for borough extension in order to ensure the borough contained over 300 £10 householders – creating a reformed borough that spread over 50 square miles.⁶⁸

The only other modification that took place to the commissioners’ boundary proposals for boroughs with fewer than 300 £10 householders was in Arundel. Commissioners Drinkwater and Saunders’s proposal to extend the borough into the parish of Leominster (Lyminster) and Littlehampton unwittingly invoked the anger of local inhabitants, and, unfairly prompted accusations from anti-reformers that the commissioners had identified their boundary in order to give the Whig Duke of Norfolk control of the borough.⁶⁹ In reality, Littlehampton had initially been identified as a suitable socio-economic partner for grouping with Arundel, and following the 20 December instruction the sitting committee had agreed to include Littlehampton and two further parishes in the borough to ensure it contained 300 £10 householders.⁷⁰ As the dispute over the commission’s recommendations threatened to disrupt the relatively smooth discussions that had taken place over the boundary bill up to that point, a select committee was established to consider the borough’s boundaries and a surveyor was sent to Arundel to re-count the number of £10 houses in the ancient borough. Somewhat conveniently for the government, who were willing to compromise if it meant passing the boundary bill quickly, the surveyor reported that there were over 300 £10 householders within Arundel’s ancient limits, negating any need to extend the borough’s boundary.⁷¹ This appears to be one of the few examples where the government actively doctored figures provided by the commissioners (who had originally reported that after ‘very minute discussion’ with local officials the maximum number of £10 houses in the ancient borough was 254) in order to ensure the passage of the boundary bill.⁷²

‘Deference communities’ and political impact

After the various modifications to the commissioners’ original proposals following the 20 December instruction, as well as parliamentary negotiations over the boundary bill, the 1832 Boundary Act extended fifty ancient English boroughs into their surrounding parish or parishes. Following 1832, Lyme Regis was the smallest of these boroughs by area at 2.9 square miles, while Wilton at 50.8 square miles was the largest. The median area of these fifty boroughs prior to 1832 was 0.55 square miles; after 1832 it was 17.31 square miles (Table 6.2). Such extensive boundary changes had not been envisaged by the government until the end of December 1831, and were inconsistent with the principles by which the boundary commission had redrawn the rest of England’s reformed borough map. However, the government had been forced into making these boundary changes as a result of the commission, whose work revealed that England’s small boroughs and their surrounds contained considerably fewer £10 householders than had ever been envisaged when the £10 franchise level was agreed in February 1831. Drummond and his commissioners had initially sought to address this problem by proposing the introduction of the grouping principle into England’s borough representation – a process that previous histories of the 1832 reform legislation have not acknowledged. They did so in the hope that boroughs with fewer than 300 £10 householders might remain as consistent as was possible with their ancient socio-economic profile and associated parliamentary interest after 1832. The rejection of the second reform bill in October 1831, and the government’s negotiations with the Waverers during November led to a considerable delay in establishing whether these boundary designs would be sanctioned. Ultimately, the commission’s efforts were disregarded in favour of arbitrary boundary changes that caused indiscriminate alterations to the socio-economic profile of these boroughs, and were intended to appease wavering parliamentarians over the reform bill by increasing the influence of the landed, agricultural interest in borough elections.

Two questions arise from this episode. First, what does it tell us about the intention of the reform bill’s architects, and second, what impact did these boroughs have on the reformed electoral system? In 1966 D. C. Moore suggested that the creation of these fifty extensive boroughs had been a constituent part of a Whig plan to transform England’s parliamentary constituencies, via socio-economic investigation, into ‘deference communities’. Namely, communities that consisted of ‘men who lived in close contact with one another, who had the same occupation or were connected by the same “interest”, and – most important of all – who recognised the same individual as their social, economic and ideological leader’.⁷³ Moore made use of the commissioners’ August 1831 instructions to contend that in boroughs containing fewer than 300 £10 householders the government had intended to create electoral communities that were deferential to leaders associated with a ‘rural-agricultural-aristocratic complex’.⁷⁴ A key aspect of this, Moore argued, had been the process through which the boundary commission designed boundaries that ensured these boroughs represented ‘one interest, and … one interest only’.⁷⁵ Doing so allegedly provided local elites in each of these reformed boroughs with a deferential electorate – as long as those elites took steps to identify themselves with ‘the interests their constituencies symbolized’.⁷⁶

Table 6.2: Area of boroughs extended into their parish or parishes following 1832.1

On one level, the working papers of the commission reveal that Moore was correct to identify that geographic, economic and social investigation, as well as a consideration of interest representation, underpinned the work of the boundary commission. However, Moore’s suggestion that the desired end of this investigative method was the creation of deference communities is less defensible. At a basic level, Moore incorrectly supposed that the boroughs discussed in this chapter were created as a result of the commissioners’ original instructions, when in fact they were agreed to in late December 1831 as a last-minute concession to the Waverers. Furthermore, in stark contrast to what Moore claimed, the ultimate extension of (for example) Droitwich into its rural surrounds created a borough that the boundary commission knew contained a mixture of commercial and agricultural interests – not a rural-agricultural-aristocratic complex. Even if Moore’s theory regarding how the government intended that elites should control deferential communities was correct, in reformed Droitwich a multiplicity of local interests existed with which prospective local elites had to align themselves in the reformed system. Far from simplifying the electoral conditions of boroughs for prospective local candidates and their agents as Moore supposed, these changes complicated them.

It might be contended that the government’s original intention for deference communities manifested itself in the commissioners’ proposals for grouped constituencies – due to the fact that these more closely resembled single-interest boroughs. However, even if the commission’s proposals for grouping had been implemented, the geographic position of England’s ancient boroughs was more likely to have led to the creation of an assortment of mixed-interest commercial or mixed-interest agricultural boroughs. For instance, Droitwich’s salt-makers would have been united with Bromsgrove’s nail-makers. Even though both together could have been held to represent the commercial interest, broadly defined, it is unlikely that prospective candidates would have found the ensuing electorates easy to manage. The commission’s work more often than not discovered subtle complexities in the economic and social make-up of the population groupings that surrounded England’s deficient boroughs. Given this, the commission would have quickly realised that any governmental ambition to create deference communities (even accepting the anachronism of such a concept) would have been unrealistic.⁷⁷

If their ambition had not been to create deference communities, why did the commission base their investigation around socio-economic investigation? Furthermore, why was the commission so eager to conceptualise the boroughs and towns they investigated by interest? As discussed in the previous three chapters, resort to geographic and socio-economic investigation had provided the commission with a bureaucratic framework with which they could rationalise their investigation into England’s constituency structure, and which avoided a direct consideration of the political and electoral consequences of their boundary changes. The second question is perhaps best answered by a rephrasing of the question. Why would the commission not have conceptualised boroughs by interest? As the first chapter of this book demonstrated, for contemporaries, interest representation was integral to understanding how constituencies operated, and a rebalancing of the representation of interests underpinned the Grey ministry’s ambitions for parliamentary reform.

As far as the boroughs discussed in this chapter were concerned, what eventually trumped this focus on interests was a need to ensure that every reformed borough contained over 300 £10 householders. The boundary commission, Grey and Althorp, Russell and Littleton, and then Palmerston and Lansdowne all developed different schemes that they hoped would ensure these conditions. Each scheme, if accepted, would have introduced its own set of electoral variables into a small number of England’s reformed boroughs and was based on its own conception of an ideal balance of interest representation. An advanced and all-encompassing desire to create deference communities, as Moore posits, did not underpin any of these schemes. In reality, the scheme that was finally agreed to had been conceived as a means of tempering the electoral influence of the non-property-owning £10 householder in small boroughs with voters who had historically proved their constitutional worth as freeholders in the counties. While this makes Moore’s deference thesis less plausible, it does reveal that the Grey ministry was open to the kind of constitutionally curative thinking that he has argued influenced the 1832 reform legislation.⁷⁸

Even if Moore’s deference thesis is unconvincing, it is clear that the extension of constituency boundaries in these fifty boroughs ensured that landed proprietors continued to wield significant electoral influence in reformed borough politics. In at least twenty-one cases, patrons maintained, or re-established, a preponderating influence over a constituency for most, if not all, of the reformed period.⁷⁹ In thirteen boroughs power was diffused between two or more landlords.⁸⁰ And in a further nine, new landed proprietors assumed a major influence over constituency politics after 1832.⁸¹

The path to establishing, or re-establishing influence was rarely straightforward, however. And while these boroughs – many of which were included in Gash’s enduring categorisation of post-1832 ‘proprietary boroughs’ – retained their pre-reform names, the drastic changes to their electoral geographies and electorates meant the reality of local proprietorial influence and electoral politics was much more complex after 1832 than it had been before.⁸² Building on Edwin Jaggard’s reappraisal of the nature of politics in England’s small boroughs, the retention of proprietorial influence required one, or several, of the following electoral strategies: close attention to the electoral register; the cultivation of local parties; continual patronage of a borough between elections; ensuring candidates were broadly in line with shifts in local opinion; the provision of pecuniary benefits to electors and non-electors; and more dubious corrupt practices such as vote creation.⁸³ Furthermore, securing influence was not always immediate and, in many instances, took several years of constituency nursing to achieve. In most of these boroughs too, the influence of a known patron was regularly susceptible to challenges from ‘independent’ Liberal or Conservative interests and could be lost if continual attention was not paid to the electorate, or if a new landed, financial or commercial interest emerged in a constituency’s limits.

Of the twenty-one boroughs that remained under an established interest, even the most blatant pocket boroughs such as Calne (under the Whig marquess of Lansdowne), Wilton (under the Conservative, and later Peelite, Pembroke interest) and Huntingdon (under the Conservative Sandwich interest) experienced occasional, if not doomed, challenges to proprietorial control between 1832 and 1868.⁸⁴ On paper, the former burgage borough of Eye, which had been controlled by the Conservative Kerrison interest prior to 1832 and returned a Kerrison unopposed at each election following 1832, appears as one of the most obvious examples of Gash’s proprietary boroughs.⁸⁵ Under the surface, however, the Kerrison family worked consistently to maintain their influence, via continued local philanthropy, assuming a prominent position in Conservative county politics and keeping close ties with Eye’s Conservative Association in this sprawling agricultural borough.⁸⁶ Securing influence was less straightforward for successive dukes of Northumberland in the previously restricted freeman borough of Launceston, which required massive levels of organisation and expenditure during the 1830s to manage registration and the provision of pecuniary rewards for voters.⁸⁷

Once in control, proprietors could not rest on their laurels. Even though the local Conservative party was able to claim a majority in the parishes added to Peterborough in 1832, the established Whig Fitzwilliam interest was able to maintain control of the borough’s two seats through to the 1850s, via a tacit alliance with the borough’s numerically significant ‘independent’ Liberals. However, when the fifth Earl Fitzwilliam overplayed his hand in forcing a moderate second candidate on the constituency in 1852, a coalition of independent Liberals and Conservatives united over a seven-year period of frenzied electoral activity (with all sides employing a range of corrupt practices) to finally capitalise on the borough’s reformed electoral geography and secure one of the borough’s seats by 1859.⁸⁸ Unexpected shifts in a borough’s economy could also spell the end for a proprietor who had maintained control of a borough after 1832. In Reigate the ‘Somers interest’ quickly assumed electoral control after purchasing the property of the borough’s other pre-reform patron, the earl of Hardwicke. This allowed successive earls of Somers to control the seat until 1857, when new railways, the town’s proximity to London, its small electorate and the Somers’s decision to let out sizeable portions of land for building over the previous decades, transformed the borough into a battleground for competing prospective Liberal MPs with deep pockets and business interests in London.⁸⁹

In the thirteen boroughs that saw influence divided between multiple landlords, the forms that electoral power assumed also varied hugely. The massive disfranchisement of non-resident freemen in Bridgnorth in 1832 destroyed the pre-existing independent reforming-Whig interest, and allowed the old Tory interests of the Pigot and Whitmore families, whose estates dominated the borough’s new boundaries, to cultivate extensive power bases and defeat Liberal challenges at most elections prior to 1868.⁹⁰ By contrast, the expansion of Clitheroe’s boundaries and the introduction of the £10 franchise destroyed the power of the borough’s former ‘aristocratic overlords’ who had controlled the constituency’s historic burgage properties. Instead, after 1832 organisation of Clitheroe’s vibrant, often corrupt, party politics and the battle for its single seat and small electorate fell under the oversight of multiple Conservative and Liberal families within the constituency’s boundaries.⁹¹ Tensions between landed proprietors of the same political faith could also come to the fore, as in St Ives, which saw multiple contests during the period between rival Conservative landowners who sought control of the borough’s single seat.⁹² And in Christchurch and Hythe, the sheer size of the 1832 boundary extensions led to unforeseen power struggles between established proprietors and those associated with the newly thriving towns of Bournemouth and Folkestone, which developed within each borough’s limits, respectively, after 1832.⁹³

One of the nine cases where boundary extension led to a power shift to a new landed interest was Droitwich. By the 1837 election, the extensive changes to the borough’s boundaries had thrown the constituency out of the control of the Whig corporation, and into the power of the Conservative, Sir John Pakington, whose Westwood Park estate was the major property within the borough’s new limits. Pakington gradually asserted himself as the leader of the local Conservatives after 1832, by supporting the party to maintain the borough’s register of majority Conservative, rural voters, staying in tune with local protectionist opinion after 1846 and deftly shifting to a more moderate Conservatism as the risk of Liberal challenges increased during the 1850s.⁹⁴ By contrast, the influence of property within the parishes of Charlton and Brokenborough within Malmesbury’s new boundaries was sufficient for the Whig earl of Suffolk to seize control of the former Tory corporation in the borough after 1832. However, consistent attention to, and funding of, registration and electoral organisation were required to stave off constant Conservative electoral challenges.⁹⁵ Shifts in influence to new landowners could take time, as was the case in the householder borough of Honiton, whose reputation for ‘shameless venality’ continued throughout the period.⁹⁶ After 1832 the majority of Honiton’s £10 properties within its extended boundaries were in the manor of Honiton, whose ownership was tied up in a legal dispute until 1846 when the Liberal engineer Joseph Locke purchased the property. Locke’s primary reason for purchasing the manor had been to facilitate the building of the South Western Railway, but his patronage of the borough (which was helped by his power over railway employment) also meant he was elected as one of the borough’s MPs.⁹⁷

In the remaining cases the control of landed proprietors was less significant to post-1832 electoral dynamics. Liskeard was thrown out of the control of the Tory Earl St Germans after 1832 and into the hands of the local Liberal Association which easily fended off the borough’s largest landed proprietor, and chief Conservative electoral interest, Samuel Kekewich.⁹⁸ By the end of the period, however, the Liberal Daily News warned that employment in the customs department had become a major factor at Liskeard’s elections, regretting that government influence had destroyed a previously ‘pure’ Liberal electorate.⁹⁹ Banbury did not fall under the sway of the marquess of Bute as had been predicted (see Chapter 4), and a thriving independent radical and Liberal culture ensured the return of one of the boundary commissioners, Henry Tancred, until 1859.¹⁰⁰ And in Ashburton, Hythe, Lyme Regis, Maldon and Tewkesbury the power of money, via consistent and flagrant practices of treating, bribery, patronage and voter creation during, and between, elections proved the ultimate influence over the return of candidates. This certainly required the participation, and deep pockets, of local landowners. However, none of these boroughs could be considered to have remained, or fallen, under the power of the landed interest after 1832.

At the 1832 election the extension of borough boundaries into their surrounding parishes, the introduction of the £10 franchise and the reduction of thirty of these boroughs to single-member seats appeared to have paid off for the Grey ministry. Having returned a slight majority of MPs willing to support a Tory administration at the 1831 election (when these boroughs returned 108 MPs), at the 1832 election (when these boroughs returned 78 MPs) the party labels of 59 per cent of MPs indicated they were willing to support a Whig administration (Table 6.3).¹⁰¹ As in the English counties this pro-Whig-Liberal majority proved short-lived. At every subsequent general election until the Second Reform Act, the party labels of MPs representing these boroughs indicated majority support for Conservative administrations or, as in 1835 and 1857, was split 50:50. The generally pro-Conservative bias of these MPs was borne out by their behaviour at Westminster in confidence and policy divisions between 1832 and 1868. As well as usually voting against Whig-Liberal administrations, MPs representing these boroughs were consistent in offering the lowest levels of support among borough MPs to free trade, the ballot and the abolition of church rates (Graphs C.1, C.3, C.5 and C.7 and Tables C.3, C.5, C.7 and C.9).

These boroughs provided majorities in favour of the short-lived Peel ministry in 1835. And in 1846, 48 per cent of Conservative MPs representing these boroughs signalled their continued commitment to protectionism by voting against the Peel ministry or abstaining on corn law repeal (the same figure for boroughs with unchanged boroughs was 19 per cent, and 33 per cent for boroughs extended to their modern town). There were some instances of majority Whig-Liberal voting activity – a single-seat majority in support of the Russell administration in 1850, and a two-seat majority against Disraeli’s Conservative budget of 1852. The latter vote was thanks to four Peelite MPs, however, who subsequently voted against the Aberdeen coalition’s management of the Crimean War in 1855.¹⁰² And during the 1859 Parliament, six of the eight Liberal-Conservatives returned for these boroughs at the 1859 general election ensured a slim majority for the Palmerston administration. Several subsequent Liberal by-election victories ensured that by 1864 a majority of five MPs representing these boroughs supported Palmerston in the vote of censure over Denmark. The 1865 election saw a decisive swing back to Conservative majorities, following which these constituencies were the only type of English borough to vote against the Liberal government’s reform legislation, the ballot, the abolition of church rates and the disestablishment of the Irish Church.

Table 6.3: Whig-Liberal support by party label in English boroughs, 1832–68 (seat count and percentage support).

What lay behind this pro-Conservative bias among MPs returned for these boroughs? While it is wise not to over-emphasise the electoral power of public opinion, given the clear levels of proprietorial influence in the selection, and election, of candidates, the mixture of rural and town voters in these constituencies does appear to have tempered MP behaviour at Westminster. It was also generally the case that where Whig landed proprietors maintained influence, representatives veered towards the moderate side of the Liberal political spectrum. As well as the declining popularity of Whig governance and the increasingly ruthless organisation of Conservative interests during the 1830s (which were factors evident in the Conservative surge by 1841 across England), it was significant that by 1841 the Conservatives had become the party of agricultural protection. Electoral support for Whigs and reformers in these boroughs was much higher when the corn laws remained a cross-party issue. At the 1832 election only 20 per cent of Whigs and reformers returned for these boroughs were willing to support alterations to the corn laws. The comparative figure was 42 per cent in the rest of the ancient boroughs and 72 per cent in the new boroughs. By 1841 in boroughs that contained a sizeable minority, and sometimes majority of agricultural constituents, candidates had to take the rallying cry of protectionism seriously. This was reflected in the consistently high levels of protectionist opposition to the Peel ministry among MPs in boroughs extended into their surrounding parishes by 1846. Even after the repeal of the corn laws, the need to accommodate political opinion in these mixed constituencies led to a decline in MPs willing to support free trade between 1846 and 1850. The need for MPs to straddle divergent constituency opinion over free trade also meant that at the 1847 election Grimsby, Shaftesbury, Thirsk and Wareham were the only boroughs in the UK to return MPs that ascribed to the now apparently contradictory party labels of ‘protectionist’ Liberals, Reformers or Whigs.¹⁰³

As protectionism was replaced with the defence of the established Church as a Conservative rallying call after 1852, the abolition of church rates remained a divisive issue. In Tamworth, for instance, discontent with support for abolition from one of its Liberal MPs during the 1850s was not seen to ‘fairly represent the view of the borough’ and by 1865 its Liberal and Liberal-Conservative MPs both voted against abolition.¹⁰⁴ The issue of electoral reform, for often self-serving reasons, also served to unite these constituents and MPs from the 1850s. These boroughs consistently exhibited the highest level of opposition to the ballot among Liberal MPs in the English borough system. In 1861 only 44 per cent of Liberal MPs returned for these boroughs were willing to vote for the ballot, the equivalent figure for other ancient boroughs was 80 per cent and for the new boroughs it was 97 per cent. In boroughs with generally small electorates, where proprietors and agents realised the benefit of open voting in terms of knowing how their tenants were voting, and electors and non-electors were able to fully capitalise on the pecuniary benefits of a household’s vote being public knowledge, it is perhaps unsurprising that the introduction of secret voting held little positive prospect.

On a wider level, by the 1850s Liberal proposals for parliamentary reform posed a very real threat to the survival of these boroughs, due to the combination of their continually small electorates and Conservative bias. By the 1865 election, 39 of the 50 boroughs discussed in this chapter still contained fewer than 500 registered electors, and 8 of these contained fewer than 300. Historians have previously observed the importance of these ‘small boroughs’ to the Conservative electoral interest after 1832. They have, however, failed to note that the majority of boroughs with fewer than 500 voters were actually some of the largest in geographic terms.¹⁰⁵ Successive Liberal reform proposals from 1852, which primarily emanated from Lord John Russell, sought to neuter the influence of these boroughs at Westminster by either disfranchisement, or grouping them together on the basis of their limited electorates. By contrast, Conservative reform proposals from 1859 discarded Liberal proposals for disfranchisement or grouping and proposed to keep these boroughs intact.¹⁰⁶ It did not escape Disraeli’s attention that the combination of small electorates and large boundaries had proved important to the forces of Conservatism in the reformed electoral system. In 1866 he understood that both factors had been crucial in allowing ‘about ninety borough seats’ to be ‘appended to the landed interest’ since 1832.¹⁰⁷ This was significant in ensuring the survival of all but four of these boroughs in the 1867–8 Conservative reform legislation, when the partial disfranchisement of most of the double-member boroughs in this group was the preferred means of redistributing seats to the counties and new boroughs.¹⁰⁸ When the electoral system was reformed again in 1884–5, the experience of these rural boroughs for the past-half century was surely crucial in prompting the Conservative administration to consent to a transformative move to single-member county divisions across England.¹⁰⁹ These constituencies proved, and continue to prove, the bedrock of Conservative power in the English electoral map.

Notes

1. 1. N. Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel: A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Representation (London, 1971), 68–72; T. Crosby, English Farmers and the Politics of Protection 1815–1852 (Hassocks, 1977), 81, 105.

2. 2. P. Salmon, ‘The English Reform Legislation, 1831–32’, in D. Fisher (ed.), The House of Commons, 1820–32, i. (Cambridge, 2009), 397.

3. 3. D. C. Moore, ‘Concession or Cure: The Sociological Premises of the First Reform Act’, Historical Journal, 9, 1 (1966), 54; D. C. Moore, Politics of Deference: A Study of the Mid-Nineteenth Century Political System (New York, 1976), 174–5.

4. 4. B. Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People?: England 1783–1846 (Oxford, 2006), 436, 501–2.

5. 5. DSC, Grey, B46/1/33, ‘Paper … based on Lord J. Russell’s plan of reform’, clause iv. 1.

6. 6. DSC, Grey, B46/2/36, Russell to Durham, 13 Feb. 1831, 5; PP1830–31 (247), ii. 5–6.

7. 7. PP1831–2 (232), iii. 85.

8. 8. Hansard, 3, vi. (1 Sept. 1831), 986–1009.

9. 9. PP1831–2 (141), xxxviii. 6–7.

10. 10. TNA, T72/9/39, ‘Honiton’; TNA, T72/8/11, ‘Ashburton’; TNA, T72/9/38, ‘Horsham’; PP1831–2 (141), xxxviii. 72–4.

11. 11. TNA, T72/9/41, ‘Huntingdon’, ‘Report for Huntingdon’, Sheepshanks and Tallents to Drummond, 20 Sept. 1831, Drummond to Sheepshanks, 1 Oct. 1831; TNA, T72/8/19, ‘Bedford’, Drummond to Sheepshanks and Tallents, 21 Sept. 1831.

12. 12. TNA, T72/11/41, ‘Tewkesbury’, Ord to Drummond, 18 Sept. 1831.

13. 13. TNA, T72/9/9, ‘Droitwich’, ‘Report on Droitwich’, Ord and Chapman to Drummond, undated (before 20 Sept. 1831).

14. 14. TNA, T72/9/9, Ord and Chapman to Drummond, 25 Sept. 1831.

15. 15. TNA, T72/9/9, ‘Report on Droitwich’.

16. 16. TNA, T72/9/12, ‘Evesham’, ‘Report on Evesham’, Ord and Chapman to Drummond, 16 Sept. 1831.

17. 17. TNA, T72/11/3, ‘Reigate’, ‘Report on Reigate’, Drinkwater and Saunders to Drummond, undated (before 29 Sept. 1831).

18. 18. PP1831 (232), iii. 11.

19. 19. TNA, T72/9/12, ‘Evesham’, Drummond to Ord and Chapman, 17 Sept. 1831; T72/11/46, ‘Truro’, Drummond to Birch, 27 Sept. 1831; T72/11/34 ‘Sudbury’, Drummond to Sheepshanks, 30 Sept. 1831.

20. 20. TNA, T72/9/9, ‘Droitwich’, Drummond to Chapman, 29 Sept. 1831.

21. 21. TNA, T72/9/9, Chapman to Drummond, 19 Nov. 1831.

22. 22. TNA, T72/11/11, ‘Rye’, ‘Report on Rye’, Drinkwater and Saunders to Drummond, 11 Oct. 1831; TNA, T72/8/10, ‘Arundel’, ‘Report on Arundel’, Drinkwater and Saunders to Drummond, 29 Sept. 1831.

23. 23. TNA, T72/10/25, ‘Maldon’, ‘Report on Maldon’, Drinkwater and Saunders to Drummond, undated.

24. 24. TNA, T72/10/20, ‘Lyme Regis’.

25. 25. TNA, T72/10/27, ‘Malmesbury’, ‘Report on Malmesbury’, Ansley and Gawler to Drummond, 5 Nov. 1831.

26. 26. TNA, T72/10/27, ‘Malmesbury’, Drummond to Ansley and Gawler, 14 Nov. 1831.

27. 27. See respective TNA, T72 folders; PP1831 (141), xxxviii–xli.

28. 28. TNA, T72/10/51, ‘Northallerton’; TNA, T72/11/6, ‘Richmond’; TNA, T72/11/43, ‘Thirsk’.

29. 29. See respective TNA, T72 folders; TNA T72/10/63, ‘Plymouth’, Drummond to Birch and Brandreth, 7 Nov. 1831; PP1831 (141), xxxviii–xli.

30. 30. For details on the sitting committee see Chronology and voting data.

31. 31. TNA, T72/9/9, ‘Droitwich’, Note by Beaufort, undated (before 31 Oct. 1831); SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 31 Oct. 1831, 195.

32. 32. TNA, T72/9/9, ‘Droitwich’, Note by Littleton.

33. 33. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 12 Nov. 1831, 205.

34. 34. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 31 Oct. 1831, 195, 8 Nov. 1831, 200.

35. 35. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 7 Dec. 1831, 253.

36. 36. TNA, T72/9/9, ‘Droitwich’, undated note by Littleton.

37. 37. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 8 Nov. 1831, 200.

38. 38. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 11–15 Nov. 1831, 204–9.

39. 39. M. Brock, The Great Reform Act (London, 1973), 247; J. Cannon, Parliamentary Reform 1640–1832 (Cambridge, 1973), 225–6; I. Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 1830–41: The Politics of Government (London, 1990), 72.

40. 40. DSC, Grey, B46/1/45, ‘Memorandum on Reform Bill, by Russell, 20 Oct. 1831’, 1–8; SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 12 Nov. 1831, 205.

41. 41. Salmon, ‘English Reform Legislation’.

42. 42. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 15 Nov. 1831, 205, 209; PRO, Russell Papers, 30/22/1B, ‘Althorp to Grey re: “Russell’s plan as to Reform Nov.1831”’, 64–7; TNA, T72/11/45, ‘Totnes’, note by Littleton, Beaufort and Russell, undated.

43. 43. This figure includes Helston, Clitheroe, St. Ives and Launceston.

44. 44. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 18 Nov. 1831, 220.

45. 45. DSC, Grey, B46/2/46, ‘Memorandum by 2nd Earl Grey on a conversation with Lord Wharncliffe’, 16 Nov. 1831, 1–8.

46. 46. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 20 Nov. 1831, 23 Nov., 28 Nov. 1831, 224, 231, 241; Kriegel, Holland House, 83–84.

47. 47. A. Kriegel, The Holland House Diaries, 1831–1840 (London, 1977), 84; SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 27 Nov. 1831, 227; Brock, Reform Act, 257–63; Cannon, Parliamentary Reform, 226.

48. 48. Kriegel, Holland House, 85–6; SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 2 Dec. 1831, 250.

49. 49. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 15 Dec., 17 Dec. 1831, 271, 279.

50. 50. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 23 Nov., 28 Nov., 20 Dec. 1831, 231, 241, 281; Kriegel, Holland House, xxxi, 83–4.

51. 51. Kriegel, Holland House, 99–100.

52. 52. Also see, D. C. Moore, ‘The Other Face of Reform’, Victorian Studies, 5, 1 (1961), 7–34; Hilton, Mad, Bad, 434–7; Salmon ‘English Reform Legislation’.

53. 53. Kriegel, Holland House, 83–4.

54. 54. Kriegel, Holland House, 99–100; SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 23 Nov. 1831, 231.

55. 55. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 27 Dec. 1831, 291.

56. 56. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 27 Dec. 1831, 291; PP1831–2 (141), xxxviii. 14.

57. 57. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 21 Dec. 1831, 285–7.

58. 58. SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/7, 21 Dec. 1831, 285–7.

59. 59. TNA, T72/9/9, ‘Droitwich’, ‘Report on Droitwich’, Ord and Chapman to Drummond, undated but prior to 20 Sept. 1831; PP1831–2 (141), xl. 141–2.

60. 60. TNA, T72/11/39, ‘Tavistock’; TNA, T72/11/74, ‘Chipping Wycombe’.

61. 61. TNA, T72/11/18, ‘Shaftesbury’.

62. 62. See reports, PP1831 (141), xxxviii–xli.

63. 63. TNA, T72/11/42, ‘Thetford’.

64. 64. TNA, T72/10/60, ‘Penryn and Falmouth’; PP1831–2 (141) xxxix. 12–13.

65. 65. TNA, T72/9/42, ‘Hythe’.

66. 66. HCJ, 87 (8 June 1832), 390; PP1831–2 (521), iii. 355; SRO, Hatherton, D260/M/F/5/26/8, 14 June 1832, 63–5.

67. 67. PP1831–2 (488), iii. 311; Hansard, 3, xiii. (7 June 1832), 513–33; HCJ, 87 (8 June 1832), 390, (22 June 1832), 427.

68. 68. Hansard, 3, xiii. (22 June 1832), 965–8, (3 July 1832), 1300, xiv. (4 July 1832), 73; S. Farrell, ‘Wareham’, in Fisher, Commons, ii. 344–45; Gash, Age of Peel, 71–2.

69. 69. H. Spencer, ‘Arundel’, in Fisher, Commons, ii. 102.

70. 70. TNA, T72/8/10, ‘Arundel’, Initial Report, 29 Sept. 1831; PP1831–2 (141) xl. 63–4.

71. 71. PP1831–2 (537), v. 1–2.

72. 72. TNA, T72/8/10 ‘Arundel’, Initial Report, 29 Sept. 1831.

73. 73. Moore, ‘Concession or Cure’, 56.

74. 74. Moore, ‘Concession or Cure’, 54.

75. 75. Moore, ‘Concession or Cure’, 44.

76. 76. Moore, ‘Concession or Cure’, 44; Moore, Politics of Deference, 174–5.

77. 77. R. W. Davis, ‘Deference and Aristocracy in the Time of the Great Reform Act’, American Historical Review, 81, 3 (1976), 532–9.

78. 78. Moore, ‘Other Face’, 7–34.

79. 79. Buckingham, Calne, Chippenham, Eye, Great Marlow, Huntingdon, Launceston, Malton, Marlborough, Morpeth, New Woodstock, Peterborough, Petersfield, Reigate, Richmond, Shaftesbury, Tamworth, Tavistock, Westbury, Wilton, Wycombe.

80. 80. Bewdley, Bodmin, Bridgnorth, Christchurch, Cirencester, Clitheroe, Cockermouth, Grantham, Helston, Northallerton, St. Ives, Thirsk, Wareham.

81. 81. Droitwich, Grimsby, Honiton, Horsham, Leominster, Malmesbury, Midhurst, Rye, Wallingford.

82. 82. Gash, Age of Peel, 438–9.

83. 83. E. Jaggard, ‘Small Town Politics in Mid-Victorian Britain’, History, 89, 1 (2004), 3–29.

84. 84. Cambridge Chronicle and Journal, 2 Jan. 1835; Cambridge Independent Press, 17 July 1847, 2 Mar. 1867; The Times, 13 Feb. 1852; South Durham & Cleveland Mercury, 24 Feb. 1877; Liverpool Echo, 24 Mar. 1884.

85. 85. Gash, Age of Peel, 438–9.

86. 86. J. Owen, ‘Eye’, in Salmon and Rix, Commons 1832–1868.

87. 87. T. Jenkins, ‘Launceston’, in Fisher, Commons, ii. 161–2; E. Jaggard, Cornwall Politics in the Age of Reform, 1790–1885 (London, 1999), 117–19, 177–8.

88. 88. M. Spychal, ‘Five elections in seven years: Peterborough, Whalley and the Fitzwilliam interest’, Victorian Commons, https://victoriancommons.wordpress.com/2017/04/28/five-elections-in-seven-years-peterborough-whalley-and-the-fitzwilliam-interest/ [accessed 19 Aug. 2022]; T. Bromund, ‘ “A Complete Fool’s Paradise”: The Attack on the Fitzwilliam Interest in Peterborough, 1852’, Parliamentary History, 12, 1 (1993), 47–67.

89. 89. Berkshire Chronicle, 14 Mar 1857; Illustrated London News, 16 May 1857; British Standard, 15 Jan. 1858; Morning Advertiser, 16 Jan. 1858.

90. 90. Daily News, 24 Sept. 1868; M. Escott, ‘Bridgnorth’, in Fisher, Commons, ii. 869–70.

91. 91. K. Rix, ‘Clitheroe’, in Salmon and Rix, Commons 1832–1868.

92. 92. T. Jenkins, ‘St. Ives’, in Fisher, Commons, ii. 190–91; Jaggard, Cornwall Politics, 121–2.

93. 93. P. Salmon, ‘Christchurch’, in Salmon and Rix, Commons 1832–1868; H. Spencer and P. Salmon, ‘Christchurch’, in Fisher, Commons, ii. 429–30; Daily News, 24 Aug. 1868.

94. 94. S. Ball, ‘Droitwich’, in Salmon and Rix, Commons 1832–1868.

95. 95. C. Dod, Electoral Facts, from 1832 to 1853, Impartially Stated (London, 1853), 204; S. Farrell, ‘Malmesbury’, in Fisher, Commons, iii. 205; Salisbury and Winchester Journal, 4 Apr. 1857; Wilts and Gloucestershire Standard, 15, 22 July 1865.

96. 96. T. Jenkins, ‘Honiton’, in Fisher, Commons, ii. 276–7.

97. 97. M. Spychal, ‘Honiton’, in Salmon and Rix, Commons 1832–1868.

98. 98. Jaggard, Cornwall Politics, 124–5.

99. 99. Daily News, 10 Sept. 1868.

100. 100. B. Trinder, Victorian Banbury (Chichester, 1982), 50–64, 205; M. Spychal, ‘Banbury’, in Salmon and Rix, Commons 1832–1868.

101. 101. This figure includes the four Clause 4 boroughs extended into their surrounding hundreds prior to 1832.

102. 102. Lord Bruce, Henry Baring (Marlborough), Jonathan Peel (Huntingdon) and James Hogg (Honiton).

103. 103. K. Rix, ‘Bell, John (1809–1851)’, and M. Spychal, ‘Sheridan, Richard Brinsley (1806–1888)’, in Salmon and Rix, Commons 1832–1868; John Drax (Liberal, Wareham) and Edward Heneage (Whig, Grimsby) voted for a reinstatement of protection in 1850.

104. 104. H. Miller, ‘Tamworth’, in Salmon and Rix, Commons 1832–1868.

105. 105. B. Coleman, Conservatism and the Conservative Party in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London, 1988), 102–5; R. Stewart, The Foundation of the Conservative Party, 1830–1867 (London, 1978), 215–16; J. Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (London, 1993), 338–41; A. Hawkins, Victorian Political Culture: Habits of Heart and Mind (Oxford, 2015), 181–2, 189–94.

106. 106. R. Saunders, Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848–1867: The Making of the Second Reform Act (Farnham, 2011).

107. 107. Disraeli to third Earl Grey, 2 July 1866: Benjamin Disraeli Letters, 1865–1867, ed. M. Wiebe et al. (Toronto, 2009), ix. 91–2.

108. 108. D. Rossiter, R. Johnston and C. Pattie, The Boundary Commissions: Redrawing the United Kingdom’s Map of Parliamentary Constituencies (Manchester, 1999), 27–49.

109. 109. M. Chadwick, ‘The Role of Redistribution in the Making of the Third Reform Act’, HJ, 19, 3 (1976), 665–83.