Chapter 1 Criminal violence as a driver of internal displacement and external migration

Historical context of displacement and migration in the region

The first large flows out of Northern Central America started during the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, declining in the early 1990s when the conflicts ended. The main destination for all these flows was the USA, although there was also significant relocation to Mexico and elsewhere in Central America. Large flows of migration out of Honduras began later, triggered by economic problems in the 1990s. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a series of natural disasters in the region provoked further out-migration, and the USA granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Salvadorans and Hondurans who were in the country. Throughout the 2000s, immigrant social networks in the USA influenced migration for economic reasons and family reunification, and there was a significant increase in the number of women migrating from the region.

Criminal violence as a driver of migration

In the early part of the twenty-first century, there were indications that some people’s reasons for leaving countries in Northern Central America were shifting, and that criminal violence and gang activity in the region were major drivers in shaping this trend. During this time, there was a marked shift in the demographic composition of migratory flows, indicated by high volumes of children, unaccompanied minors and entire families. Humanitarian organisations noted this demographic shift – both between 2006 and 2008, and again from 2013 – and reasoned that there could be something happening in the region; that some new factors could be driving people to leave their countries.

From 2011, a growing number of unaccompanied minors and family groups arrived at the US border from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. At first these were mostly adolescent boys (of fifteen to seventeen years), but then increasingly numbers of unaccompanied minors, children and entire families were arriving at the border, with a notable rise in the number and proportion of girls and younger children (Krogstad et al. 2014). In June 2014, after more than 68,000 unaccompanied Central American minors were apprehended at the US–Mexico border in one year, US President Obama declared the situation an “urgent humanitarian situation”.¹ The flow continued to increase and in April 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) clarified that the number of people fleeing violence in the region had reached levels not seen since the region was affected by civil wars and that pervasive violence and persecution by criminal actors had become the principal cause of migratory movement from Northern Central America (UNHCR 2016a).

The other contemporary reasons for migration did not disappear, but widespread gang and criminal violence also began to drive urgent flight and an increasingly large amount of external migration and internal displacement. The USA was the main destination for people fleeing Northern Central America, with huge influxes at its border. Many also migrated to other neighbouring countries, resulting in a surge of people seeking safety across the region. Violence, insecurity and organised crime in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras also aggravated other social and economic problems that can be a factor in driving migration (Clemens 2017). In turn, these economic and social problems themselves aggravated the levels of criminal activity and insecurity, resulting in a vicious circle of poverty and crime. Thus, while criminal violence emerged as a discrete push factor, it also exacerbated existing push factors, such as economic reasons. Given the historical context of migration from the region, this indicates a shift in the trends of human mobility in the region, rather than an entirely new phenomenon of movement.

New in-country migration controls in Mexico – Plan Frontera Sur

In response to what US President Obama termed the “urgent humanitarian situation” of the arrival of tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors and family groups at the southern US border, new in-country migration controls were implemented in Mexico in 2014. Known as Plan Frontera Sur (also Programa Frontera Sur), or the Southern Border Plan, this was widely understood to be the outsourcing of US migration controls (Riesenfeld 2015, Tuckman 2015, Vogt 2020, Hiemstra 2019, see Hiemstra 2019: 48–9 for technical aspects of Plan Frontera Sur).² As such, it was designed to treat the situation as an issue of migration rather than one of possible refugees, thus enabling the USA to avoid direct responsibility for the safety and welfare of these people – including potentially granting them asylum (Swanson et al. 2015, International Crisis Group 2016, Hiemstra 2019).

Due to the increased migration controls in Mexico, people fleeing criminal violence in Northern Central America faced additional dangers during migration from both state officials and criminal actors, as well as the arduous nature of the journey. Yet these new migration controls did not stop the wave of migration towards the USA, but instead led to unexpected outcomes – notably that many Central Americans chose to regularise their stay in Mexico and thus avoid further risks on the journey north (Natera 2015). Nonetheless, by the end of 2015, figures from US Customs and Border Protection showed that the numbers of unaccompanied minors and family groups arriving at the US border had once again risen to the levels seen before the implementation of Plan Frontera Sur, despite a substantial increase in deportations from Mexico to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. The period in which solely these controls were implemented (2014–16) provided the time window for my analysis of the changes Plan Frontera Sur provoked to various dynamics in Mexico. It should be noted, however, that the controls continued after this date, absorbed into other actions by Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM).³

Criminal violence in Northern Central America

During the first twenty years of the century, there was a dramatic increase in violence perpetrated by criminal groups in Northern Central America (see Introduction), particularly in El Salvador and Honduras. All three countries have suffered from endemic violence and citizen insecurity, had some of the highest rates of intentional homicide in the world between 2000 and 2020, and were acknowledged to be the deadliest countries outside of declared war zones (Cantor 2016a). Members of organised crime and criminal groups appeared to be responsible for the overwhelming majority of these homicides, although there are a range of perpetrators, including hitmen (or sicarios), intimate partners and state actors. However, homicide rates alone do not explain the nuance, dynamics or interlocking nature of personal and societal violence or how these contribute to displacement (Cantor 2016a). In El Salvador, sudden increases in violence and murders followed government crackdowns on gang activity, as well as atomisation and rifts within the gangs and cells (until 2022, that is).⁴ In Honduras, gang activities and violence rose dramatically after the 2009 coup, resulting in criminal groups having total dominance and de facto control in certain areas. Guatemala appeared to have been less dramatically affected than Honduras and El Salvador, although the situation of insecurity remained extremely poor, with localised areas of very high violence and several provinces understood to be under the control of transnational organised crime groups (Dudley 2011, 2016a, 2016b, Ávalos and Puerta 2017).

This period of increased and extreme violence resulted in a parallel increase in the displacement of people in the region. This manifested as both internal displacement and external migration, as more and more people were forced to leave their homes to protect their lives and families in the absence of effective state protection (Ferris 2013, Cantor 2014, IDMC 2015, CIPPDV 2015, Haugaard 2016, La Mesa 2016). This also generated a new demographic of displaced people fleeing their countries – notably, significant numbers of unaccompanied minors and entire families (UNHCR 2014a, 2014b, 2015). Empirical reports showed that escalating levels of crime and violence had become a primary push factor for migration out of Northern Central America (Hiskey et al. 2014, UNHCR 2014a, Haugaard 2016). While extant pull factors were still pertinent and continued to prompt migration, it appeared that these were of lesser – or different – consideration for those fleeing violence.

Understanding external migration driven by organised crime as this new factor emerged

Organised criminal activities were causing significant displacement in the region, both in Central America and in parts of Mexico, and continue to do so. As this new phenomenon emerged, understanding about it started to develop (Ríos 2014a, 2014b, Albuja 2014, Cantor 2014, 2016b, UNHCR 2014a, 2015, 2016a, Amnesty International 2016, Sanchez Soler 2016a). However, at the start, it was unclear to what extent organised crime was a standalone factor or a contributory factor in the decision to migrate externally for the different groups of people affected.

By the mid-2010s, reports indicated that the proportions fleeing violence within the broader context of regional migration were significant. One study found that, while 56% of Central American migrants had decided to migrate for economic reasons, 43% had left because of violence in their countries of origin and were frightened to return (REDODEM 2014). Researchers consistently found that the vast majority of unaccompanied Central American minors they interviewed in migration detention in the USA and Mexico said that violence was the primary reason for leaving their country. Many described an urgent need to flee the increased influence of organised crime groups, the degenerating security situation or a threat to their life, with about half saying that a specific violent incident had triggered their exit (WRC 2012, Kennedy 2014, UNHCR 2014a, 2014b). These studies indicated that the majority of those leaving El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras were doing so because of reasons connected to criminal violence, and that they had often personally experienced violence in their country of origin, giving reasons for leaving their country that indicated potential international protection needs.

There was growing evidence that family ties were now determining destination, rather than prompting migration, for those fleeing violence and threats. In other words, people who fled their home country decided to go where they already had family, rather than leaving in order to reunite with family (Kennedy 2014, UNHCR 2014a, Nazario 2015b). For those fleeing criminal violence, pull factors such as family reunification appeared to have become a consequence of flight rather than a cause of it, often determining the intended destination (UNHCR 2014a). These pull factors were still critically important for those who had to flee, but in informing migration trajectory rather than influencing in any significant way the actual decision to migrate.

Human rights organisations raised concerns about the risk of return for people who had fled from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, which was particularly pertinent after the implementation of Plan Frontera Sur, and about the increased and expedited deportations of Central Americans (see Chapter 5). People who had fled were justifiably scared for their safety and even their life if they were deported, and human rights organisations and researchers documented that many people had been killed or were at serious risk on their return (Human Rights Watch 2016, Amnesty International 2016). With the situation that originally drove people out of their country persisting, this led to repeat migration because it was not safe to remain (Nazario 2015b). People who fled targeted threats or violence and who were deported back to their countries of origin were unable to return to the place where they experienced violence and had no other option but to migrate again. One study found that nearly half of people deported back to El Salvador from Mexico planned to migrate again (La Mesa 2016: 20). Other studies examined the cyclical nature of forced migration–deportation–remigration caused by inadequate state responses to people in need of protection in countries of origin and destination and by the persistence of pervasive violence and weak state institutions in Northern Central America (Burt et al. 2016, Kwan et al. 2017, Carlson and Gallagher 2015, Clemens 2017).

Internal displacement caused by gang violence in Northern Central America

While accurate data on internal displacement was not available or being methodically captured – a challenge that persists today – studies revealed that significant and increasing numbers of people were being affected throughout the 2010s (Knox 2018, 2019a). A study on internal displacement in Honduras found that 4% of people in the twenty counties (departamentos) evaluated had resorted to internal displacement, and that the vast majority (68%) of these displacements were caused exclusively by acts of violence and insecurity (CIPPDV 2015). Similarly, in El Salvador annual surveys through the 2010s found that between 2% and 5% of Salvadorans had moved internally because of criminal violence and threats – a third of them multiple times in the year – and more than one in ten said that a member of their household had left the country during the last year because of threats or violence (IUDOP 2012, 2015, IDMC 2015). These trends of internal displacement continued throughout the 2010s and into the start of the 2020s, according to data from the UNHCR and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC).

Throughout most of the 2010s, Northern Central America was the most violent region of the world that was not a declared conflict zone, but the manner in which displacement was occurring appeared to be somewhat different from movement out of warzones (Cantor 2016a). People living in certain areas – such as poor, marginalised urban areas with mara presence – were most vulnerable to displacement, although people in some wealthier areas affected by gang extortion may also be compelled to relocate, as might members of rural communities affected by drug-trafficking gangs (Cantor 2014). Displacement tended to occur after an event or threat of violence and affected individuals or entire families, who often fled immediately if they understood themselves to be at risk (Cantor and Serna 2016, Refugees International 2015, UNHCR 2014a, 2015, La Mesa 2016). Displacement was clandestine and not overtly visible, as people would abandon their homes individually and flee discreetly and cautiously, so as to move beneath the radar of the criminal actors that they were fleeing (La Mesa 2016, Cantor 2014, Cantor and Serna 2016, Knox 2018, 2019a). All these atomised and individual moves happened in a drop-by-drop manner (Cantor 2014, CIPPDV 2015: 22) but, together, could result in entire streets, neighbourhoods or even small communities gradually emptying, breaking the social fabric and tearing apart neighbourhoods, as well as disrupting the lives of individuals (La Mesa 2016, Cantor 2014, Knox 2018).

There did not appear to be distinct patterns of movement to specific places, although at first, the movement was predominantly intra-urban and inter-urban (Cantor 2014). Family connections and social capital were important determinants in the choice of destination for internal displacement and in post-displacement outcomes, and those with limited access to these had poorer outcomes (Cantor and Serna 2016). Wealthier families and members of the middle class with access to economic resources might rent a home in a safer area of their hometown or use these resources to leave the country (Cantor 2014, Knox 2018, 2019a). Risk might persist after internal displacement, depending on the circumstances, with gangs able to locate and harm people who have fled due to widespread control and strong communications networks, as well as the small size of the countries (Cantor 2014, Cantor and Serna 2016, Knox 2018, 2019a).

Many people initially attempted to relocate within their home country but, when they were unable to find protection and escape the danger internally, their only option was to leave their country (Kennedy 2013, 2014, Refugees International 2015). A 2015 study carried out by the UNHCR found that two-thirds of women they interviewed who had fled to the USA from Northern Central America had previously tried relocating in their countries but had been unable to find safety there (UNHCR 2015). Another study found that some people had been reluctant to resort to internal flight before leaving their country and that this decision was often influenced by any social capital they had outside El Salvador and/or access to people-smugglers (Ramos 2015). Internal displacement was not an effective protection strategy for some Central American youth because of the persistence of the reasons that spurred initial mobility. Limited resources and social connections may also have contributed to its failure, which led to their out-migration (Escamilla García 2021). A picture emerged of internal displacement either not being considered before external flight was taken or being abandoned in favour of external migration. In both cases, this was because of the reach of gangs and the inability or unwillingness of the states to provide protection and support for people who had been internally displaced (Knox 2018, 2019a). Cantor (2014) also stressed that more research was needed to identify the circumstances under which such internal migration in this region become external migration – a call to which this chapter and my analysis respond in part.

Understanding how organised crime was causing this emerging displacement trend

Evidence emerged that violence and threats perpetrated by Central American gangs had become a primary reason – and often the sole reason – for external migration. Studies found that those who were recent victims of a crime had an increased intention to migrate relative to those who had more general concerns about criminal violence (Hiskey et al. 2014, Pederzini et al. 2015). Contemporaneous studies of women who had a claim for asylum accepted in the USA after fleeing ‘epidemic levels’ of gender-based violence and other criminal violence in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras found that the vast majority had experienced direct threats or attacks from criminal gangs or maras, and cited this as their primary reason for leaving (UNHCR 2015). Some had children who had been killed by gangs, recruited by gangs or were at risk of being recruited, while others cited extortion and suspicion of being involved with rival gangs as the reason for their flight (UNHCR 2015, Human Rights Watch 2016). By the mid-2010s, reports consistently showed that escalating levels of crime and violence had become the primary factor for out-migration from the region, and that border enforcement and policies designed to deter migration were ineffective in the face of such a powerful push factor (Chishti and Hipsman 2016, Hiskey et al. 2018). These trends prompted additional attention from a perspective of international protection needs and asylum cases of those who had fled criminal violence in Central America (Pong 2014, Cantor 2016c, Carlson and Gallagher 2015, Serna 2016, Medrano 2017, McNamara 2017).

By the mid-2010s, there was a growing understanding about the way in which criminal groups drive forced displacement and migration in the region (Kennedy 2013, Cantor 2014, 2016b, Albuja 2014, Ríos 2014a, 2014b, Cantor and Serna 2016, Knox 2018, 2019a). Cantor (2014, 2016b) examined displacement caused by each of three types of criminal groups in Northern Central America (street gangs, local drug-trafficking groups or transportistas, and Mexican cartels), arguing that the nature of the criminal group – rather than the victim – should be the starting point for analysis because these provoke different types of violent interactions and displacement. Cantor (2014) differentiated between displacement deriving from everyday activities (for example, betrayal, rivalry, resistance, confiscation of property or land, and general insecurity) that generated varying levels of individual risk and displacement deriving from periodic incidents (for example, violent disputes between different groups) that generated rising levels of violence and the broadening of targets for revenge and retaliation.

Much focus was given to the immediacy of flight after a pivotal event, such as the murder of a close relative, although the decision to flee across borders could also be made after a long period of consideration or a failed internal displacement (Nazario 2015b, Ramos 2015, Tuckman 2015, Human Rights Watch 2016b, La Mesa 2016). People who had received threats to their lives and/or had been victims of criminal violence, or whose close relatives had been victimised, took these incidents seriously and might consider leaving their home and sometimes their country: “if they have the resources to do so, these families pack up and run” (Refugees International 2015). Incidents within this wave of gang violence that are linked to displacement include the murder of a close relative or partner, attempted murder or violent assault, death threats to individuals and/or extending to family members, forced recruitment to gangs, extortion and sexual violence, including the threat of forced intimate involvement with gang members (Cantor 2014, Ramos 2015, La Mesa 2016, Knox 2018, 2019a, 2019b).

Serious, targeted persecution can be a standalone driver of external migration, whereas fear of victimisation or generalised violence may act as one of several compound reasons, together with such factors such as family reunification and lack of socio-economic opportunities. The testimonies of unaccompanied child migrants indicated that, while the threat of violence can be one of several cumulative reasons for migration, it is frequently a significant or decisive factor, with a specific incident or threat often being the tipping point (UNHCR 2014a). Hiskey et al. (2018) found that people who had been the victim of multiple incidents of crime over a year were the most likely to flee, reflecting the importance of this as a driver of flight and noting that “The desire to flee from violence appears to overshadow considerations about any future risks they might face if they flee that reality” (Hiskey et al. 2018).

Just as people fled because of a targeted threat to personal security, they also fled from a generalised fear of violence. Poor perceptions of local safety and higher levels of criminal violence increased the likelihood of migration intentions and, as previously mentioned, this intention was most likely to be realised after being the victim of a crime (Hiskey et al. 2014, 2018, Cutrona et al. 2023). This reflects similar findings from Ríos’s (2014b) study on migration outflows linked to violence perpetrated by organised criminal groups in Mexico. However, the complex and compound reasons for migration were also outlined – external migration from the region was happening because of growing violence but also had dimensions linked to family reunification and economic reasons (Associated Press 2015, Wiltz 2015, Clemens 2017). Criminal violence also aggravated or intersected with other drivers of migration. The adverse impact of pervasive violence and endemic criminal activity on economic security, business opportunities and personal freedom can also act as a factor in the decision to migrate externally (Clemens 2017).

As these dynamics persisted, subsequent studies demonstrated that people were continuing to leave because of rising levels of local risk as well as when they have been the victim of crime. Clemens (2021) found that increased apprehensions of unaccompanied minors from Northern Central America in the USA correlated with increases in homicides in their hometowns, concluding that such violence is a major determinant for external migration. Other factors, such as economic reasons and social capital in the destination, were also found to be important. Cutrona et al. (2023) consider external migrations from El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico that are linked to criminal gangs and activity within the broader context of migration – in particular for economic reasons. They found that criminality and physical insecurity were drivers of migration out of all three countries and that social capital – a close friend or family member – in the destination country was an important factor in supporting migration.

Understanding the role and response of the state as this new wave of displacement emerged

The violence and threats that people fled stemmed from the increased territorial control of organised crime groups and maras. This situation was both created in the vacuum of adequate state control and compounded by inappropriate and ineffective state response and protection. The ‘absent’ or ineffective state, repressive security-led responses to gangs, and the criminalised or corrupt parts of state apparatus all play a role in fomenting gang violence in marginalised communities, thus contributing to displacement rather than addressing the root causes of violence and providing effective response to victims (Boerman et al. 2023, Knox 2018, 2019a, 2019b, Bergmann 2019, Wolf 2017). An absence of effective state presence in poor and marginalised areas – from the perspectives of both security and social provision – created vacuums in which criminal groups were able to establish and assert their authority, enforcing it with violence. The political, economic and social exclusion of people – especially the young – who live in these marginalised areas further contributed to this, making them vulnerable to involvement in criminal activities as a survival strategy, for both economic and protection reasons.

Rather than addressing the root causes of violence and this widespread criminal presence, the repressive and security-led responses by states to criminal violence provoked the displacement of citizens in both El Salvador and Honduras. Such citizens fled night-time raids and the fear of being arbitrarily targeted by the security forces, and this shifted gangs into previously unaffected areas, causing yet more displacement (Lakhani 2017, Knox 2018, 2019a, 2019b, Bergmann 2019). From my interviews with experts and migrants, I learned that ‘death squads’ had been conducting ‘social cleansing’ in affected neighbourhoods since the mid-2010s, resulting in the disappearance or killing of suspected gang members and criminals. My interviewees noted that there was complexity about the range of state and non-state actors involved in these extrajudicial executions, particularly in Honduras.

Violence and displacement are perpetuated by a failure of states to respond in an effective manner to victims, violence prevention and internally displaced people. In both Honduras and El Salvador, impunity derives from three intersecting factors: practical challenges due to weak institutions; corruption that means that information could be leaked to gangs or that institutions are infiltrated; and a reluctance to report on the part of citizens (Knox 2018, 2019a). This reluctance to report or approach the authorities is deeply linked to gangs’ code of silence and the risk of violent retribution against those who breach this, as well as a lack of trust due to corruption and ineffective institutions (Cantor 2014, Knox 2018, 2019a).

Concern was expressed about the initial reluctance of Central American governments to recognise that this type of internal displacement was an issue, to monitor it systematically and to gather comprehensive data about patterns and numbers (Dudley 2016a, Marroquín Parducci 2015). While Guatemala still does not recognise displacement caused by violence, Honduras has done so since 2013, and El Salvador and Honduras passed legislation on displacement caused by gang violence in 2020 and 2023, respectively. However, as I write in 2025, these reportedly remained inadequately funded and no public policies have been adopted, with the roles and responsibilities of the state ceded to civil society.

Criminal governance: framing the source of risk

Violence and the resulting displacement are intrinsically linked to all three dimensions of criminal governance: territorial control, social control and gang–state relations (Magaloni et al. 2020, Barnes 2017). This manifests as violence to seize, maintain control or defend control of territory from other criminal actors, confrontations with state forces, and violence and threats to maintain social control over the population within the territory and further protect against enforcement. By analysing the violence and displacement from the perspective of criminal governance (albeit, a body of theory that has developed since his studies), I further develop Cantor’s argument that there are two main types of displacement linked to criminal groups: those caused by “periodic violent disputes” and those resulting from “everyday activities” (Cantor 2014: 44). Within this reading of criminal governance, three types of actor are set as potential adversaries: people whose actions could threaten the integrity of the gang’s territory (territorial control); residents and others who refuse to comply with gang demands or respect gang authority (social control); and state security actors in confrontations, rather than allegiance (state–gang relations).

Territorial control generates violence that contributes to displacement through “periodic violent disputes” to defend, maintain or seize territory or in confrontations with state security forces, but also sets up several figures or groups as adversaries in the defence of this territory and the maintenance of gang control and authority over it. There is enmity towards these state actors and rival gang members who are considered opponents in territorial control. In addition, people whose actions or interactions are perceived to present a risk to criminal governance are perceived as traitors or betrayers. These may be residents who are believed to be related to or interact with opponents in territorial control (rival gang members or the police), suspected or actual informants who breach the code of silence, young people who refuse forced recruitment, and those who work in violence prevention, justice or journalism.

Social control – governance over the population – generates violence in “everyday activities” (Cantor 2014) and is linked to how a mara sees itself “not as just controlling the territory, but also as controlling the people who live there, subjecting the inhabitants to its rules and control” (Weir 2022). Gangs demand loyalty, obedience and respect for their authority from all those living in areas they control. People must comply with gang rules, the code of silence (ver, oír y caller or ‘see, hear and be silent’) and any orders or demands issued – including orders to leave their territory. Within this context, violence and threats – whether explicit or implicit – are employed as contingent violence to force compliance with gang demands, codes and rules. Extreme violence is employed to punish those who do not comply, both as vengeance and to publicly reinforce gangs’ authority. Gangs consider the bodies of women and girls to be part of their territory and dictate strict patriarchal heteronormative norms. Women and girls are targeted for forced relationships or sexual exploitation at all ages – including as very young teenagers – while boys and young men are targeted for forced recruitment into gangs. This is all done with threats, coercion or grooming and considered modern slavery and human trafficking (Knox 2018, Boerman and Golob 2020).

The state dimension of criminal governance generates violence, risk and displacement when there are confrontations and this extends to the civilian population, not just gang members. Raids by the security forces in specific urban areas targeted residents based on their demographic profile (generally young men living in marginalised communities) and included the indiscriminate use of violence and extrajudicial executions, particularly in El Salvador. During night-time raids in such marginalised neighbourhoods, armed police would knock on doors demanding information about local gangs. This terrified residents, who are bound by the gangs’ code of silence but fearful of being targeted by state agents if they do not comply. These confrontations and repressive responses in urban areas led to gang members moving to previously unaffected rural areas, particularly in El Salvador in the mid-2010s following the breakdown of a truce with the authorities (Knox 2018). This shift of gang presence, activity and violence to rural areas in turn led to people – including entire communities – fleeing these areas.

Triggers of flight: levels and immediacy of risk

People may flee generalised criminal violence or rising levels of insecurity in their local area, but there is a particular threat to those who have been individually targeted by gangs. This must be understood as a continuum of risk (Knox 2018) that affects flight decisions, the immediacy of flight, options for a place of safety and people’s risk after displacement. In the context of an absence of appropriate state response and of citizens’ fear of violent retribution if they approach the authorities, there are implications for protection needs and the dynamics of displacement that result. To understand how and why maras interpret people’s actions and what this means in relation to gang control is critical to understanding the level and immediacy of risk, to whom this risk extends and the persistence of this risk over time. My conceptualisation of this within criminal governance assists in this and extends understanding beyond Cantor’s (2014) definition of the grounds of displacement that are defined by acts understood to be enmity, betrayal and resistance.

Extreme risk derives from the territorial control dimension of gangs’ criminal governance. Acts and actors are perceived as enmity or betrayal (see Cantor 2014) because they have the potential to threaten the integrity of a gang’s territory. Those who attract enmity from the gang – people who are or are suspected of being from a rival gang or the security forces – are at greatest risk of extreme violence and murder, along with their partners and close family members who are at risk by association. Acts perceived by gangs as betrayal are usually punished with murder and, as mentioned, this risk can extend to partners and family members. Reporting a crime or cooperating with authorities – or being suspected of doing so – is perceived as an act of betrayal that violates the gang code of silence. Merely witnessing a gang crime puts people at risk. The infiltration of institutions and the corruption or coercion of police officers (a key component of state–gang relations) means that information about crime reports may be leaked to gangs. These factors result in a fear of approaching the authorities – particularly the police – and help to ensure people’s silence. Refusing forced recruitment is also considered betrayal, with the threat of murder against those who refuse that extends to their families (Knox 2018, 2019a, Boerman and Golob 2020).

People living in areas controlled by gangs are subject to risk related to the social-control dimension of criminal governance. Targeting has a degree of arbitrariness, in that it could happen to anyone because they live or work in a certain area or are attractive to gang members. Not complying with gangs’ demands, an unwillingness or inability to pay extortion, or resisting the authority of a gang are considered acts of resistance and an affront to gang authority. As such, they carry severe consequences including actual or threatened violence and death threats to the individual concerned and their family. There is implicit risk in any demand – whether for extortion, collaboration or professional services (such as medical care or transport) – that starts as soon as someone is targeted. Threats and harassment often become explicit, although “the threat of violence is usually intended to secure payment rather than provoke displacement” (Cantor 2014). Resisting such demands – whether by unwillingness or inability – will incur death threats that could be realised at any point. Extreme violence is employed against those who do not comply, both as a punishment for violating the gang’s social control and as a means of demonstrating and reasserting its authority to the broader community. Refusing forced sexual relations with gang members is considered an affront to their machoism, especially if women or girls refuse the demands of senior gang members, with the threat of extreme violence, sexual violence, torture and murder against those who refuse and their families (Knox 2018, 2019a, Boerman and Golob 2020).

Criminal groups also employ displacement as a deliberate strategy to secure property or land or to remove certain people from territory. Groups can order individuals, households or entire communities to flee with the use of death threats or actual violence. LGBT+ people, for instance, may be harassed or ordered to leave a gang’s territory because they do not conform with patriarchal heteronormative norms demanded by gangs (Knox 2019b, Winton 2016, Amnesty International 2017). Maras in both El Salvador and Honduras expropriated strategically located houses for use as lookouts or places where they could store illicit goods, or just for themselves or their families to live. Street gangs in Honduras also expropriate properties to use as casas locas (‘crazy houses’), where they conduct illicit activities, from drug taking to gang initiations to the sexual exploitation of girls. Experts I interviewed said that the police tended to be reluctant to intervene when people were at risk of being forced from their homes and described numerous recorded incidents. In El Salvador, police were known to attend the scene to supervise or assist people vacating their homes, rather than to prevent them from being forced to flee. Where displacement is employed as a strategy and is the required outcome, to flee is to comply with a gang’s demands and resisting this demand would incur extreme risk and the realisation of death threats or violence.

Confrontations with security forces in gang-controlled and marginalised areas present risk to both individually targeted people and the broader population. Young men who lived in marginalised areas in both El Salvador and Honduras were forced to flee for fear of being targeted in organised raids because of their demographic profile. Members of the broader community would also flee because of anti-gang operations by the security forces, fearing both the state actors who demand compliance with requests for information about gangs and the criminal actors themselves who would seek violent retribution – including death – if community members were to cooperate with the authorities.

Fleeing risk: who flees, when and how

Depending on the situation and to whom risk extends, individuals who have been targeted may flee or the whole nuclear or extended family may leave – although older people tend to stay if possible. Risk of retribution often extends to people’s partners and family groups if they are perceived to have committed an act of betrayal or enmity. The whole family is at risk if a child or young person is targeted for forced recruitment or sexual exploitation, and all will flee, sometimes separating into two groups, each with one parent. In other instances, such as avoiding extortion, it is just the individual targeted that may leave. Those who do remain may be harassed about their relative’s whereabouts or face threats and violence related to this. Mass displacement also occurs, after orders for households to leave, rising levels of crime and violence or new incursions of criminal groups causing families, extended family groups and even entire communities to flee.

Displacement may be resorted to as a matter of urgency, with people fleeing as soon as a threat arises, if it poses serious and immediate risk, or when a risk level rises. For those who violate the gangs’ code of silence, risk is immediate and extends to family members, and people who do report crimes often flee immediately. People flee at different points in the continuum of risk presented by such gang demands as extortion: some may leave in a less-hurried manner when they are targeted, some when they find themselves unable to make payments, and others may leave urgently if they receive explicit death threats or if a relative is killed for failing to comply with gang demands. Other people leave in a less-urgent manner because of community breakdown caused by the gradual emptying of neighbourhoods as people flee, rising levels of violence in the local area or economic issues caused by violence and criminal activity.

Initial flight is made in a discreet and clandestine manner to avoid raising suspicions, due to the risk of being noticed by criminal actors with an adverse interest in those leaving. Experts described how people would leave without any belongings – perhaps with a small bag at most – or make it appear that they were going about their normal daily movements, such as going to work or collecting children from school, and just never return home. Others might leave at dawn, using a private vehicle rather than public transport to leave the area and taking carefully planned routes that avoid gang posts. The exception to this discreet movement is where displacement is employed as a deliberate strategy and people are ordered to flee. In such instances, people may leave in a visible manner because, in doing so, they are complying with gang demands. People who are displaced in this manner may not be obliged to resort to such strategies as leaving without coming to the attention of criminal actors during initial flight or living in hiding because of ongoing risk, although new risk could arise after displacement or if they approach the authorities, provoking further displacement.

Where people go to is often unpredictable. Experts described how, while earlier movement was intra-urban and inter-urban, by the late 2010s, people were moving all over the country, from urban to rural, rural to urban and rural to rural. People who flee are unable to relocate to any territory of the same gang, because they would be identified, and nor could they relocate to any area controlled by a rival gang, for risk of being suspected of enmity if they have lived in the other gang’s territory. This significantly limits options for relocation, especially for those with few resources.

For some, the same risk that caused displacement may persist after flight, and may even increase, as fleeing is considered an affront to gang authority and social control. Risk does not necessarily diminish over time because of gangs’ vengeful quest to punish those whose acts are considered an affront to gang authority and their ability to leverage their communication and surveillance networks to locate people of interest to them. This depends on how serious the gang in question perceives the infraction to have been. If gangs believe someone is guilty of betrayal or enmity, or they have another serious grievance, they may pursue that person relentlessly after they have fled. For those who have fled after reporting to the authorities, risk is heightened significantly if the report could or does lead to arrests or prosecution, especially of senior gang members. Gangs may not actively pursue people who have fled after a perceived act of resistance, but if they are detected via the surveillance and communication network, or enter another area under control of the same gang, then punishment for fleeing may be meted out or violence employed to force compliance with the gang’s original demands – whether for money or cooperation.

Seeking safety: strategies in internal displacement

In the absence of effective state responses either to victims of organised crime or to internally displaced persons, people resort to a few distinct strategies when they have to move in search of safety. People with access to more economic resources may make different decisions, as they can use these resources to relocate to a more secure place inside the country, to leave the country by regular transport means and with documentation, or to avail themselves of the services of people-smugglers. Three distinct trends emerged from my research: a reliance on social capital to support relocation, sending at-risk children away to live with relatives, and resorting to self-containment.

Faced with the lack of state response and the need to move in a discreet manner, people tend to rely on social capital when they need to relocate – that is, the intangible assets of family and social relationships, networks and connections, and any resources derived through these (Bourdieu 1986). In the context of displacement and migration caused by violence and crime in El Salvador and Honduras, this goes beyond family links and networks of friends described by Cantor (2014), to also include networks of colleagues and members of civil society. People at risk may reach out to extended family and friends to receive them and assist with shelter, transport and money in internal displacement or to provide financial resources to facilitate their external migration. Those who are obliged to flee because of an innate characteristic (for example, their sexuality or gender identity) or their work (such as journalists, activists and trade unionists) may reach out to specialist support networks, which are often informal and operate beneath the radar, that provide safe houses and transport in the country or information and assistance to leave the country. The availability of social capital and networks, and their willingness or capacity to assist, can define the available – or limited – options for people in internal displacement and can affect its outcomes (Cantor 2014). Further to this, in the context of ongoing risk and the danger of being targeted by criminal actors by association, some people may not feel able to shelter a friend or relative of adverse interest to a gang.

Another risk-management strategy is sending adolescents and children who are at risk from gangs away from the parents or family they normally reside with to live with relatives in other parts of the country. This is done to protect them from persecution and threats from gangs or forced recruitment and appears to be a pre-emptive move when risk levels rise as well as to avoid imminent risk. This is somewhat different from the urgent flight that may include the family unit when a child or adolescent refuses forced recruitment or forced sexual relationships with gang members, when risk is higher.

Self-containment is a term I coined (Knox 2018, 2019a) to define a protection strategy (autoencarcelización or ‘self-imprisonment’) described to me by professionals working on the ground with displaced persons and at-risk young people in both Honduras and El Salvador. It describes how people resort to living in hiding due to persecution by gangs and the lack of effective state protection. People are obliged to confine themselves to a room or house for their own safety. They may resort to this strategy before or after internal displacement, or if they have been returned to their country despite ongoing risk. Young people or whole families may resort to living in this way if risk is high, if internal displacement does not bring security or if they need to live under the radar or discreetly in displacement because they have not been able to reach an area free of the gang’s influence. Some people may leave the house only for essential purposes, such as securing documentation or tickets to leave the country.

Displacement dynamics: ostensibly random, fundamentally precarious

Displacement caused by criminal violence and threats in El Salvador and Honduras is marked by precarity, multiple transitory movements and a strong cross-border aspect. Flight from organised crime does not appear to be a linear process, either in terms of where people go generally or their individual journeys, which can involve multiple moves within their country and across borders. Decision-making at point of initial mobility and throughout the migration journey results in disorganised displacement with unpredictable trajectories and ostensibly random patterns of movement and changes. These seemingly random movements were documented by experts in the late 2010s, who described people moving all over the country from one place to another with no apparent pattern or logic.

Displacement tends to be precarious and could fail at any moment. This precarity derives both from ongoing risk after displacement and on the reliance on social capital in displacement. People fleeing violence, persecution and threats from maras face significant difficulties in finding genuine and lasting safety through internal displacement. People living in poverty and those without a network of social capital away from gang-affected areas will have fewer options for internal displacement and so poorer outcomes. Moreover, given the lack of effective state response, the small size of the countries and the sphere of influence that maras have across the countries, risk can persist after displacement. Gangs can leverage their communication and surveillance networks to locate and harm people after they have fled, meaning that displacement can fail as a protection strategy at any point. In addition, new risk can arise after displacement if people are only able to relocate in marginalised areas or resort to negative coping strategies or unsafe work in displacement. The failure to provide protection or effective state responses results in internal displacement that is insecure, unsustainable and often abandoned for secondary internal displacement or cross-border flight.

Insecurity and unsustainability provoke secondary displacement, often resulting in people making multiple transitory movements. This happens because of a lack of safety and security and because of the reliance on social capital to support them in displacement. Experts working on the ground in both El Salvador and Honduras described how people moved from place to place in search of safety, going where they have family links and staying a short time – sometimes even just one night – and then moving again when they are unable to find security, economic sustainability, or friends and family who are able and willing to receive and shelter them. This disorganised movement – marked by atomisation, precarity and multiple transient moves – appears to be one of the most defining patterns of displacement, given the absence of state protection and resources.

This also results in a strong cross-border aspect to flight, with more people fleeing across borders by the end of the 2010s than previously. Experts I interviewed explained that internal displacement was not always a viable option or a successful protection strategy for many people because of ongoing risk from gangs and a lack of access to effective state protection. Some people flee the country if internal displacement fails and they are unable to find safety. Others flee across borders without attempting to move internally, because they know that they would be unable to find security and state protection in-country and that risk from their persecutors would persist, given their wide sphere of influence. Others have been advised to leave the country after approaching the authorities, by officials who do not believe the state can provide effective protection. For many, cross-border flight is made by irregular means, but those with access to economic resources may be able to secure the documentation and plane tickets needed to leave in a regular manner or to facilitate journeys to the USA with people-smugglers, and they may use a brief period in internal displacement to make these arrangements.

Decision-making underpinned by the same logic

This disorganised movement presents challenges for response, because movements are ostensibly random and unpredictable. However, analysis can define the nature of these contexts to better explain decision-making and movements in a more policy-relevant manner. This shows how these disorganised movements are all underpinned by the same logic, with decisions considering the same factors and agency being exercised within the same constraints – especially for those with access to limited economic resources.

Within the context of flight from gang violence, a place of safety is highly subjective. This indicates a conceptual difference from situations of natural disasters and some conflict scenarios, where there may be an objective place of safety for all or some people. Just as we can understand areas where criminal governance and gang violence occur as being distinguished by their characteristics – as places of social exclusion and an absence of effective state presence – rather than as specific geographical locations, likewise we can understand these places of safety by the factors that people consider when making decisions about displacement. There are structural factors that restrict options for a safe place for all people and these include gangs’ sphere of influence and communication networks, and the lack of state protection and effective response to violence, victims or internally displaced persons. A place of safety in this specific context is based on highly individualised factors. It is dependent on the nature and source of risk or targeted persecution as well as on the options available to each person or family, based on their social capital and economic resources.

What might be a safe place for one person or family, may not be so for another, as this depends on highly individualised factors – such as what options are available and the precise reasons someone is fleeing. An available place where someone has social capital may not be safe and viable because the gang’s sphere of influence easily reaches there. Likewise, it may not be viable because friends and family are fearful of receiving people who are fleeing from gangs because of the risk of association or indeed because they cannot afford to. While this presents challenges for all people fleeing rising levels of violence or risk, there are much greater challenges and limitations for people fleeing individual persecution and targeted threats or violence. This is particularly acute for those perceived to have committed an act of betrayal, for whom risk – including the risk of being actively pursued – will persist after flight.

The failure of both El Salvador and Honduras to provide a response is comprised of three strands. A failure to provide an adequate and effective response to violence enables it to provoke displacement, a failure to provide an adequate and effective response to victims generates insecurity and vulnerability, and a failure to provide an effective response to internal displacement causes a reliance on social capital. The urgent, discreet and immediate nature of initial mobility and movement can thus be traced to the lack of state response to victims and violence. The precarity, transience and unsustainability of internal displacement is manufactured by the lack of state response to internally displaced persons. These factors are heightened by risk that may continue after displacement, as well as new manifestations of risk that may arise due to a lack of state response to internal displacement. The intersection of these failures in state response causes the strong cross-border aspect of displacement in El Salvador and Honduras, including both the abandonment or failure of internal displacement and the decision not to attempt it and to flee across borders instead.

All of these factors are further aggravated by entrenched impunity and the reluctance of affected people to approach the authorities to seek protection after being the victim of a crime or for potential support in displacement. These structural factors are deeply linked to the choice by people to abandon internal displacement in favour of external migration. As a result, internal displacement has become a transit stage – or part of the transit trajectory – for many people.

Factors that contribute to external flight

Of the fifty-eight respondents, thirty-three expressed reasons for leaving their country linked to organised crime and violence, the majority having fled direct threats or persecution by these gangs. Often people expressed compound reasons for leaving their country, citing fleeing generalised violence and fear of being killed, together with poverty and lack of opportunities. However, those who had left their country because of immediate risk to their life tended to give multiple reasons that were all connected to criminal violence. Of those whose given reasons for leaving their country indicated potential international protection needs – and in particular those who had fled with their life in immediate danger or after a violent attack or attempted murder – all had either fled internally but were unable to find safety or had not considered internal flight to be a viable option. Those who had not attempted to relocate internally before external flight said that it was futile to try to move in-country, that their whole country was dangerous and that the risks to them would be the same or higher if they moved within their country.

Personal experience of threats or violence and the decision to migrate

Large numbers of people have fled – and continue to flee – Northern Central America because of criminal violence and insecurity. Many of these have been the victim of a gang-related crime. Analysis is needed to determine the degree to which acts of violence and threats against an individual influence their decision-making, and particularly the decision to leave their country. This section analyses the narratives of those people who left their country to flee criminal violence, in order to understand what prompted their migration and how specific events and contextual factors are considered in their decisions. It reveals what prompts people to try to move internally, to abandon their internal displacement in favour of external migration or to immediately leave their country.

Of the fifty-eight people interviewed at the Albergue and the Returns Centre, more than a third said that they had moved to another place within their country prior to deciding to leave their country, because of the same reasons that caused them to leave their country. Of the twenty-eight people who expressed reasons for migrating that included fleeing criminal violence and individual persecution by gangs, such as death threats or forced recruitment, the proportion was significantly higher: two-thirds had resorted to internal displacement before leaving the country. All the people interviewed had migrated externally, so it can be concluded that any internal flight had been in some way unsuccessful or had not been attempted.