Conclusions and reflections

Displacement and migration caused by organised crime in Northern Central America

The book advances understanding of displacement and migration driven by criminal violence and persecution in two principal ways. Firstly, it connects the internal and external dimensions of displacement, adding particular detail about the types of mobility and displacement dynamics provoked by different levels of risk linked to the three dimensions of criminal governance, why some people are compelled to flee their country, and their experience and choices when they decide to leave their home and during their journey. Secondly, it brings new insight into the agency and decision-making of people who have been forced to leave their homes and/or countries, throughout their migration journey. Analysis of atomised, seemingly unpredictable and ostensibly random movements in internal displacement caused by criminal gangs in Northern Central America reveals the rationale common to these decisions, deepening understanding about how decisions are made and how these shape the displacement dynamics, including its external dimension. It examines the speed at which decisions are made, the factors taken into consideration and the influence of determinants – such as social capital, the absence of state protection and access to information about rights – in determining people’s choice of destination and whether or not they claim asylum. My unique contribution is to provide causal explanations that extend understanding of how and why this happens.

Analysing agency and decision-making in people’s reasons for leaving and how this produces different types of mobility, and locating this in the context of mixed migration, adds depth to our understanding of the motivation of flows and the type of mobility produced at the initial flight and during transit. It also acknowledges that the economic reasons that may cause people to migrate are often deeply linked to pervasive criminal activity, which inhibits economic growth. Analysis in Chapters 1 and 5 builds on understanding about cycles of deportation and circular migration between Northern Central America and the USA and Canada in the context of criminal violence (Burt et al. 2016, Kwan et al. 2017), bringing new understanding about how people make the decision to migrate following deportation and the speed in which repeat migration takes place. All decisions were analysed equally and without distinction, showing the decisions to migrate again as part of this broader migration journey. Chapter 5 explains how respondents with potential international protection needs who had been previously deported to their country of origin from Mexico immediately migrated again. These people reported leaving as soon as they arrived back in their country of origin, because the threat remained the same. This shows how the decision for repeat mobility can be as quick and flight as acute as at the point of initial mobility (as described by Kunz, 1973, 1981). In other words, ‘emergency flight’ repeats itself because the factors that drove initial flight remain.

This book adds to the scholarship on asylum claims and international protection on grounds related to organised crime and criminal violence in the USA (Corsetti 2006, Pong 2014, Carlson and Gallagher 2015, McNamara 2017) and the regional and international systems (Cantor 2016b, Serna 2016, Medrano 2017) by generating new knowledge about how people decide whether to apply for international protection when they learn of this right during transit. It locates this decision about whether to apply for asylum in the context of mixed migration and in the social and historical context of migration in the region, revealing some of the nuance about these decisions, the factors that people consider in them, and how these may determine people’s destination or sway the decision to apply for asylum in Mexico. Access to rights information and civil-society support is of critical importance for those who have fled criminal violence and have potential international protection needs. Nonetheless, the actual process of applying for asylum was itself a deterrent for some people because they were unable to apply concurrently for the humanitarian visa, which would permit them to work and live more freely in Mexico, while their asylum application was being processed.

Abuse during transit in Mexico

While an environment of impunity was known to have aggravated the widespread and systematic abuse of migrants in Mexico (Jácome 2008, Velasco 2009, Ángeles Cruz 2010, Casillas 2011, Dudley 2012), looking more squarely at the causal roles of impunity and the state in enabling this abuse advances understanding in two core ways. First, this reveals the causal mechanisms that led to criminal abuse becoming a structural factor during transit. In doing so, it demonstrates the foreseeable nature of the adverse consequences of policy delivered in an environment of endemic impunity, criminality and corruption, establishing that subsequent abuse was ‘collateral damage’ arising from the policy. Second, it challenges notions of state responsibility for the consequences of this impunity and for the criminal acts that were perpetrated because of it. Given that impunity was a causal mechanism of persistent, widespread and systematic abuse, there is some degree of direct state responsibility for subsequent abuse, which goes beyond states’ due diligence obligations to take reasonable measures to prevent and punish. This provides a clearer understanding of the role of the Mexican state in sustaining abuse against migrants in transit and allows us to consider these findings within broader debates on the foreseeable adverse consequences of policy and on state accountability.

People-smuggling through Mexico

Analysis of people-smuggling from a structure–agency perspective offers new understanding of the symbiotic relationship between agency and people-smuggling (Baird 2013, Sanchez 2015) and of the impact of migration control on people-smuggling (Andreas 2001, 2011, Sanchez 2015, Kyle and Dale 2011). It further demonstrates the transforming properties of people-smuggling networks and migrant agency in precipitating the implementation of Plan Frontera Sur, and their subsequent emergent properties in response to its implementation. In particular, it sheds new light on the role of corruption in people-smuggling and the impact of people-smuggling on the state. It builds on previous commentary that focused on the impact of people-smuggling on the destination state (for example, Koslowski 2011) and progresses beyond previous conceptualisations of this as solely a violation of the state’s sovereign right to control its borders, by showing how it inherently subverts the state through corruption. Chapters 4 and 5 generate new understanding about how Plan Frontera Sur led to increased corruption related to people-smuggling and show how this weakens state integrity in the transit country, adding a new dimension to the “multiple ways in which States make smuggling and smuggling (re)makes States” (Kyle and Koslowski 2011: 16–17).

Policy and state responsibility

The externalisation of a blunt deterrent policy in the context of mixed migration resulted in a significant gap between protection on paper and in practice in Mexico. The implementation of in-country migration controls in Mexico under the auspices of Plan Frontera Sur seriously affected people’s access to protection. As shown in Chapters 2 and 5, people with international protection needs could be deterred from making applications or be deported without due process, thus their right to apply for asylum was not being guaranteed. As found in contemporaneous human rights reports, as a result of implementing this policy, Mexico appeared to be violating its international obligation to uphold the principle of non-refoulement and failing to comply with its own domestic laws.

Analysis of agency and decision-making generated two interesting insights about this policy and its effectiveness and appropriateness. Firstly, we were able to see why Plan Frontera Sur was ineffective as a deterrent in a situation of mixed flows. Although the agency of those who were forced to displace because of criminal violence is constrained by structural factors in countries of origin, this agency is potent and must be exercised because of the level of risk, regardless of structural factors such as restrictive migration controls. Secondly, we saw that it is at this intersection of migrant agency and deterrent policy where human rights violations are particularly acute. Those who exercise agency and flee by irregular routes experience human rights violations connected with three aspects of the policy’s implementation. Violations occur in the delivery of the policy, such as deportations that do not comply with international obligations. Violations arise in the execution of the policy, such as harm during apprehensions or detention. Violations result as ‘collateral damage’ from the adverse consequences of policy, such as increased criminal attacks, which were shown to be foreseeable, given the context of pervasive criminality and systemic corruption and impunity. This raised pertinent questions about state accountability for these and for the acts of non-state actors – organised criminal groups – and the corruption and impunity that sustain them.

Agency, decision-making and displacement dynamics in forced migration

This book builds on current understanding of migrant agency during forced migration, as well as bringing together previously distinct theories about initial mobility and the transit portions of migration. It promotes the critical role of human agency of those who are compelled to leave their country of origin and who must operate within the specific structural constraints. Richmond’s (1988, 1993) continuum between ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ mobility conceives forced movement as “only an extreme case of the constraints that are placed upon the choices available to an individual in particular circumstances … Flight is one of these options” (Richmond 1988: 14). Indeed, agency is exercised by people at all points on this proactive–reactive continuum, and “most migrants make their decision to migrate in response to a complex set of external constraints and predisposing events [… that] vary in their salience, significance and impact, but there are elements of both compulsion and choice” (Turton 2003: 8–9). The study also shows how the agency of people at the reactive (or forced) end of the continuum is potent and not stopped by structural elements such as migration controls. This is demonstrated by the failure of Plan Frontera Sur and other externalisation tools to prevent people leaving Northern Central America and travelling north.

Although Richmond (1988) questioned whether the acknowledgement of structural constraints can be accommodated in a theory that focuses on agency or voluntariness, the morphogenetic approach and its critical realist analysis successfully balance these elements, while keeping agency central to the analysis at key points. Taking an approach that examines contextual factors in relation to that agency, it furthers understanding of how agency operates under varying levels of constraint or enablement, showing how people exercise agency within a continuum of choice (Van Hear 1998). Analysis of initial mobility and the decision to migrate externally rather than internally in Chapter 1 builds on this, adding nuance to the decision-making process by capturing the contextual factors that restrict options, influence choice and define the displacement trajectory. This adds to understanding of people’s ‘active decision-making’ in forced migration, such as “how they reach the decision to leave; what information is available to them when they make the decision; the way in which their journey is financed, the degree to which it is planned with a specific destination in mind” (Turton 2003: 14). It also demonstrates there is more nuance to the time-sensitive nature of decision-making than Kunz’s (1973, 1981) kinetic model appears to accommodate. This is indicated by people’s decisions for initial mobility under different levels of risk, which I describe as emergency, evasive or pre-emptive flight, rather than Kunz’s dichotomous acute–anticipatory flight. Thus, the immediate exercise of agency at the reactive (or forced) end of the continuum also reflects the potency of such agency.

By placing decision-making at the centre of analysis at specific points, we can accommodate mixed flows of people on Richmond’s (1988, 1993) continuum equally and without distinction. My analysis examines with equal weight people’s decisions at initial mobility and during the transit portion of migration, the decisions of people with varying degrees of compulsion in their reasons for mobility, and the contextual factors that affect people’s trajectory, whatever their reasons for mobility. Evaluating all decisions within the same framework of analysis enabled this book to successfully tackle some of the difficulties in addressing situations of mixed migration (Van Hear et al. 2009, Schuster 2016). For instance, this allowed additional focus on access to international protection while simultaneously understanding decision-making within the broader historical and cultural context of migration in the region, where social capital may determine planned destinations. Inasmuch, it resolves some of the issues around how to address mixed flows, especially when these flows may look like voluntary movements when examined from a structural perspective (Bakewell 2010).

The agency and decision-making of forced migrants are of interest not only because these drive migratory processes, but they are critical to the synthesis of theory. This allows us to move away from a dichotomous “focus on public policy and private needs – that is, on policy issues on the one hand and on the needs – physical and psychological – of forced migrants on the other” (Turton 2003: 14) towards a hybrid approach where these structure and agency elements can be understood together. Richmond’s model, for example, “recognises the interaction between motivational factors, on the one hand, and the social structural determinants, on the other”, but also highlights “the complex interaction between political, economic, environmental, social and bio-psychological factors in determining the propensity to migrate” (Richmond 1993: 21–2). Morphogenetic analysis revealed this type of contextual detail, bringing new understanding about the decision-making of people fleeing criminal violence. It also revealed the critical role that agency has in structural elaborations and system feedback.

Policy gaps and adverse consequences

There are significant policy gaps in Plan Frontera Sur that reflect those typically defined by commentators (Castles 2004, 2010, Cornelius et al. 2004, Massey et al. 2008, Czaika and De Haas 2013, 2016, Schmoll 2016). Although any ‘implementation gap’ is difficult to ascertain given the lack of transparency and documentation surrounding the policy, the ‘discourse gap’ or ‘discursive gap’ was indicated by talk of improving security and guaranteeing human rights when the empirical facts demonstrate increased insecurity and violations of human rights. The ‘efficacy gap’ was marked by continued arrivals at the US border despite the high number of deportations from Mexico, which was shown to be due to people-smuggling and migrant agency. Chapter 4 exposed the structural elaboration of people-smuggling operations following the implementation of Plan Frontera Sur, as well as the secondary impact that this has had on corruption related to this in Mexico. Analysis revealed the contextual factors (for example, impunity, corruption, established presence of organised crime groups) and elements of structure and agency that result in adverse outcomes of policy. Thus, it explains the underlying causes of these gaps and the adverse consequences of policy, extending this debate by giving more texture to the nature of these gaps and why adverse outcomes may happen.

Although some commentators argue that agency should be considered in the evaluation of why policies fail (Castles 2004, 2010), there appears to be little analysis of this in practice. While dealing with a mixed flow in transit, this book has given considerable attention to the agency of people who have been forced to leave their country. Migrant agency is exercised despite the policy aimed at curbing it and despite other structural constraints unconnected to this policy, such as the threat from organised crime during transit. Restrictive migration controls are an attempt to halt agency and deter migration. Their failure – or the efficacy gap – is defined to a large extent by the continued exercise of agency despite them, indicated by the continuation of migratory flows. This is particularly pertinent in the context of forced migration, where, although migrant agency may be constrained by circumstance, it is potent and cannot be stopped by deterrent policies.

Moving away from the notion of ‘unintended consequences’ of migration controls (Cornelius 2001, 2004, Cornelius et al. 2004, Massey et al. 2008), my analysis positions adverse consequences objectively, detaching the empirical facts from subjective conjecture about intent. This enables a neutral view that is better suited to the human rights lens. This is because it is the fact that a human rights violation occurred within a state’s jurisdiction that invokes state liability under international human rights law, rather than any potential intent. While these commentators’ arguments are still valid, they have been further developed by Grant (2011a) and Weber and Pickering (2011), who frame such negative policy outcomes more neutrally as ‘adverse consequences’ and touch upon the foreseeable nature of some consequences of border control policies, such as increased border deaths.

It is these latter debates that this book extends in four ways. Firstly, it builds on analysis that primarily concerns indirect violence, by looking squarely at direct violence linked to organised criminal groups. Secondly, it looks more broadly at policy and the context within which it is implemented, additionally evaluating the effect of non-migratory policy and state action and inaction – both individually and together – on the situation during transit. This reveals their direct and indirect causal properties and enables clearer lines of accountability to be traced. Thirdly, it adds depth by identifying secondary adverse consequences, such as the increase in corruption related to people-smuggling and its impact on state integrity. Fourthly, it shows how the morphogenetic framework can be used to determine the likely foreseeable nature of adverse consequences, both retrospectively and in future iterations of policy.

State accountability

These findings have implications for our understanding of state responsibility in three areas. The first of these areas is state accountability for the adverse consequences of migration controls and policy, in particular when these are foreseeable. By identifying the indirect causal mechanisms behind policy outcomes, analysis revealed aspects of state action and inaction that extend our understanding of state accountability within this context. For instance, in Chapter 3 we saw how the tolerance of indirect violence together with impunity had an indirect causal role in the development of organised crime as a structural factor during transit. When we read the findings about indirect and direct causal mechanisms together with Jácome’s (2008) conceptualisation of structural violence against transit migrants, we can clearly see the state’s role in this development. This advances debates about state accountability for policy-produced deaths and indirect violence (Koser 2005, Spijkerboer 2007, Grant 2011, Weber and Pickering 2011, Slack and Whiteford 2013, Michalowski and Hardy 2014) by drawing similar lines of accountability for direct violence perpetrated by criminal actors (Guercke 2021).

The concept of foreseeable adverse consequences enables new perspectives on state accountability. Because of the foreseeable nature of adverse outcomes, their impact can be conceptualised as ‘collateral damage’. This is particularly relevant in the context of states implementing policy while aware of the likely ‘collateral damage’ – an act that some commentators argue is a ‘state crime’ because it sanctions human rights violations (Weber and Pickering 2011, Michalowski and Hardy 2014). As demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, policies have affected organised crime’s involvement in the systematic abuse of transit migrants and have also increased people-smuggling and corruption related to this. Analysis revealed the causal role of impunity and corruption in this, enabling us to draw clear lines of accountability for the outcome and to demonstrate its foreseeability. Notwithstanding this, the foreseeable nature of adverse consequences of policy (or, indeed, their ‘unintended’ nature) is less applicable when the policy process is so obscure and lacking in transparency, as Chapter 5 showed Plan Frontera Sur to be. This obscurity of policy process is beneficial to states as it buffers them against arguments that they may have been aware of such consequences.

The second of these areas is the notion of state responsibility for the externalisation of migration controls. Although there has been some good analysis of some specific policies and their human rights impact (Podkul and Kysel 2015, Frelick et al. 2016, Danze 2023), there is less consideration of these in relation to state responsibility in the context of externalised controls, or beyond the rights of refugees and indirect violence. Chapter 5 extends this by detailing three types of adverse outcomes resulting from the implementation of Plan Frontera Sur: human rights violations perpetrated in order to deliver the policy – namely, deportations that may not comply with the principle of non-refoulement; human rights violations perpetrated in the execution of policy – such as violations by state actors during apprehension and detention; and adverse consequences of the policy – such as the increases in criminal attacks and in people-smuggling and related corruption.

The third of these areas is responsibility for the acts of organised crime groups. An emerging line of debate (for instance, Gallagher 2010, Hauck and Peterke 2010, 2016, Gallagher and David 2014, Guercke 2021) relies on interpretations of the state responsibility for non-state actors to draw parallels between responsibility for the acts of armed groups and for the acts of organised criminal groups. However, there are some features of organised crime that the interpretations fail to address in a meaningful way – notably, criminal groups’ lack of explicit political objectives (beyond to maintain criminal governance), the meaning of territorial control as a criminal strategy, and state complicity – a core dimension of criminal governance (Lessing 2015, 2017, Moncada 2016, 2021, Barnes 2017, Arias 2017, Durán-Martínez 2018, Trejo and Ley 2020, Magaloni et al. 2020, Feldmann and Luna 2022). This complicity manifests as impunity and corruption, each of which implies a greater degree of state accountability (Gallagher 2010, Gallagher and David 2014, Guercke 2021).

This book makes a particular contribution to understanding state responsibility for impunity and corruption, by revealing their causal role in enabling abuse of migrants in transit, as well as the foreseeability of adverse consequences when policy is implemented in an environment of endemic criminality, impunity and systemic corruption. Chapter 3 showed how state tolerance of indirect violence, together with impunity, played a role in the development of organised crime as a structural factor during transit. This impunity was, in itself, a violation of state obligations under the principle of due diligence. However, impunity for direct violence and abuse against migrants then acted as a causal mechanism in subsequent elaborations, such as in the development of the abuse’s widespread and systematic nature. There is a strong argument that a greater degree of state responsibility should be attributed to subsequent criminal acts that were catalysed by this impunity (see Guercke 2021).

The role of corruption in facilitating people-smuggling was detailed in Chapters 4 and 5. We saw how increased migration controls led to increased people-smuggling, which facilitated the unauthorised entry of people in contravention of the state’s sovereign right to control its borders. This also amplified corruption to facilitate the passage of people-smugglers, thus producing an adverse impact on state integrity, by further entrenching corruption. Regardless of whether state complicity is condoned or authorised, the state has responsibility for the ultra vires or unauthorised acts of state agents and for the state crime of corruption (Gallagher 2010, Gallagher and David 2014). The state also has obligations under due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish corruption (Gallagher 2010, Gallagher and David 2014, Guercke 2021), although it violates this with further impunity, informally codified in its pax narcotica and the complex interactions between the state and criminal entities (Arias 2017, Moncada 2016, 2021, Durán-Martínez 2018, Lessing 2020, Magaloni et al. 2020, Trejo and Ley 2020, Feldmann and Luna 2022).

There are also points where these three areas of state responsibility intersect. For instance, the implementation of policy in an environment of endemic impunity and systemic corruption links areas concerning foreseeable adverse consequences together with areas concerning responsibility for the acts of organised crime. This is because impunity and corruption are causal mechanisms in these adverse outcomes. Another intersection is found when externalised migration controls may have foreseeable adverse outcomes for human rights but are implemented nonetheless and are externalised to the transit state by the destination state. A further complex situation arises where the externalisation of migration controls then has adverse consequences on organised crime activity and state integrity in the country where they are implemented (here, in Mexico). This is further complicated by the complicity of state agents, and by its likely foreseeable nature. Perhaps it is at these intersections that additional complexity is presented, and future lines of inquiry are opened.

Synthesising these debates

Synthesis of these different lines of debate is made possible in large part by the morphogenetic approach and the equal weight it gives to all elements in the analysis. This demonstrates how a structure–agency approach can enable the synthesis of debates and approaches. For instance, the book brings together and extends previously distinct lines of debate concerning the agency and decision-making of people within the context of forced and mixed migration (Kunz 1973, 1981, Richmond 1988, 1993, Van Hear 1998, Castles 2003, Turton 2003, Van Hear et al. 2009) with those concerning policy gaps (Cornelius 2001, 2004, Cornelius et al. 2004, Czaika and De Haas 2013, 2016, Schmoll 2016) and the adverse consequences of policy (Koser 2005, Spijkerboer 2007, Grant 2011, 2016, Weber and Pickering 2011, Slack and Whiteford 2013, Michalowski and Hardy 2014). This enables us to see what happens at the intersection between the agency of forced migrants and deterrent migration policies. This then allows us to simultaneously see, on one hand, how continued agency contributes to the ‘efficacy gap’ of policy and, on the other hand, how the adverse consequences of policy serve to punish those who exercise agency, and that this ‘collateral damage’ is foreseeable and even anticipated. We can then better understand the implications for policy development and implementation and for notions of state responsibility.

This book demonstrates that the role of the state is critical to our understanding of these three links between organised crime and migration. Ultimately, failure to address state complicity with organised crime is perhaps the biggest challenge to migration control in Mexico, and the human rights situation for transit migrants and people who have fled their countries will not improve until this is resolved. Parallel to this, forced migration caused by criminal violence in Northern Central America cannot be addressed with deterrent policies and externalised migration controls, but can only be resolved by guaranteeing access to appropriate protection mechanisms in countries of origin and destination and by adopting suitable policy measures to resolve the situation of organised crime and violence and the root causes of these.

The evolving situation in Mexico and Central America

My research findings and analysis contribute to the growing body of knowledge about displacement dynamics in Mexico and Central America. They help us understand how organised criminal groups cause displacement more broadly, as well as highlighting the involvement of organised crime in the facilitation of migrant journeys and the abuse of those in transit. These contribute to understanding about how decision-making shapes displacement dynamics in the context of human mobility driven by organised crime and violence outside of conflict and to developing responses to this. My findings underscore the ineffectiveness of internal displacement as a protection strategy as well as states’ roles in fomenting and facilitating criminal violence through ineffective state presence, impunity and corruption. Given the considerable rise in asylum claims in Mexico and elsewhere in the last decade, these findings are particularly important in supporting arguments for international protection and asylum claims by demonstrating the lack of internal relocation options, the insufficiency of state protection and the complicity of the state apparatus in such violence.

The findings are also pertinent for understanding how effective responses to gang violence and presence might be developed in Northern Central America and elsewhere. In El Salvador and Honduras, repressive responses have included security-led responses that resulted in state violence and extrajudicial executions and caused displacement. The states of emergency that followed appear to have become semi-permanent, violate fundamental human rights and fail to address the root causes of violence and organised criminality. While the crackdown on gangs in El Salvador since April 2022 appears to have reaped notable success in terms of improved citizen security, this has been at great cost to human rights (Medrano 2023). Emergency measures in Honduras since late 2022 have yet to yield any genuine and long-lasting achievements, with recent investigations discerning no effect on gang activity and violence, instead noting an increase in extortion and new criminal presence and violence in rural areas, as gangs flee crackdowns in cities (Pellegrini and Pappalardo 2023). Nonetheless, the findings of my research show how we must question the longer-term success and sustainability of policy responses that fail to promote non-violent conflict resolution or address the root causes – not just poverty, inequality and social exclusion, but also entrenched corruption and impunity. This links directly to the criminal governance framing of organised crime groups within post-authoritarian spaces and emerged democracies where the state apparatus has not been addressed to remove aspects of the state that foment or facilitate the presence and operationality of organised crime (Trejo and Ley 2020, Feldmann and Luna 2022).

Analysis in the morphogenetic framework can help explain the impact of policies implemented during the first Trump administration (2017–21). These include changes in people-smuggling in Mexico, which came to be dominated by large organised crime groups (including the Gulf Cartel, Northeast Cartel, Sinaloa Cartel and Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación) between 2016 and the start of 2025. Dudley et al. (2023) analyse the “unintended consequences” of US externalisation or deterrence policies put in place under the first Trump administration – notably the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP, known as ‘Remain in Mexico’)¹ and Title 42 (also known as ‘Return to Mexico’²) – in fomenting organised criminal groups’ involvement with migration in the region and increasing corruption. As a result of such policies, large organised crime groups ‘industrialised’ people-smuggling and the cost of smuggling journeys ‘exploded’, as did the profits to be made. In this context, the journey through Mexico “metastasized into a gauntlet controlled by vast networks of smugglers, intermediaries, corrupt government officials, and transnational criminal organizations” (Dudley et al. 2023: 10). This should be understood as another elaboration in the developments set out in Chapter 4 and, as such, anticipated. Furthermore, these consequences should be framed as ‘adverse consequences’ rather than ‘unintended’, given their foreseeability and the apparent acceptance of violence and abuse as an informal way of controlling immigration (see Chapter 3). These same policies – ‘Remain in Mexico’ and Title 42 – also resulted in the increased abuse and exploitation of those forced to remain in Mexican border areas and makeshift camps, further consolidating migrants as a source income for large organised crime groups as well as corrupt state actors (Slack 2019, Hiemstra 2019, Vogt 2020, Dudley et al. 2023).³ Further, my framework for analysis demonstrates how such adverse consequences of these policies, rather than being mere unintended consequences, would have been foreseeable given the context in which they were delivered – just as those of future policies would be.

A counter to this industrialisation of people-smuggling and the associated increases in costs following Plan Frontera Sur was the emergence of ‘migrant caravans’, with vast groups of Central Americans walking together through Mexico in 2018 and 2019 as a collective protection strategy (Frank-Vitale 2023). This can be understood as the exercise of agency in response to the constraints imposed by these increased costs and the risk on the journeys. Frank-Vitale describes how people-smuggling and the migrant caravans are “parallel strategies that migrants employ to navigate the shifting terrain of immigration enforcement, exploitation, corruption, and organized crime in the space of transit” (Frank-Vitale 2023: 64). In a similar vein, others have examined how Central American migrants and refugees exercised agency within the constraints of the new administrative hurdles presented to them under Plan Frontera Sur, which were then hardened under subsequent US-driven policy, such as Title 42 and the Migrant Protection Protocols (Danze 2023, Torres et al. 2022).

At the start of the second Trump administration in January 2025, policy shocks occurred, affecting the US–Mexico border, the USA and Mexico. The administration reinstated the ‘Remain in Mexico’ policy, shut down the app used to book asylum appointments (CBP One) and issued an executive order to suspend asylum claims at the southern border. The administration designated several Latin American organised crime groups – many in Mexico – as terrorist organisations and threatened to intervene with force.⁴ As a result of these policies, people-smuggling all but stopped overnight (Dittmar 2025). While there remains a certain lack of clarity about what people-smuggling was happening in the year after the policy changes were implemented – 2025 – initial reports attest to large organised crime gangs remaining as some of the sole players in a more exclusive industry that now only caters discreetly to high-end clients (Dittmar 2025). There were also changes in various groups’ activities in Mexico following this, with some groups that had been involved in people-smuggling turning to the exploitation and abuse of migrants without regular status, made more vulnerable by new barriers to regularisation in Mexico (Asmann 2025). In northeast Mexico, local groups who were involved in people-smuggling have reportedly turned to extortion, kidnapping and violence perpetrated against local residents and Mexican citizens as well as migrants (Dittmar 2025). While the morphogenetic approach cannot predict policy shocks, it can – together with the broader findings of this study – assist in understanding the adverse consequences of these, the way in which criminal groups might evolve and adapt in response, and the multifaceted vulnerability of migrants who remain in limbo in Mexico without recourse to regularisation or state protection.

Global relevance

The analysis in this book not only advances understanding of the ongoing situation and evolving dynamics in the region but has potential for application to a range of global situations. The findings have broader relevance, given the increasing use of externalisation instruments on a global level, particularly in situations of mixed migration flows. They are particularly pertinent for understanding the potential impact and adverse consequences of externalisation tools and policy, and the implications of developing and implementing policy in contexts that are affected by corruption and/or organised criminality, including groups that are only involved in people-smuggling. This also raises salient questions about state accountability for the adverse impact of policy (including but not limited to externalisation tools) and for the acts of non-state actors – namely organised crime in a context of corruption and impunity.

The region-specific findings also have relevance for situations in other countries where organised crime has emerged as a driver of displacement. Displacement and forced migration caused by criminal violence and persecution are emerging concerns in several regions around the world, and new situations can arise rapidly – such as happened in Ecuador and in the context of the breakdown of state authority in Haiti – or intersect with other displacement drivers, such as the exploitation of natural resources. The book’s findings can assist in understanding the dynamics of movement that might be provoked and the protection needs that might arise, so as to develop responses to both violence and displacement, as well as prevention strategies that tackle the root causes in a meaningful, effective and sustainable way.

The book’s global relevance is perhaps most explicit in the analysis of people-smuggling and the associated corruption in Chapters 4 and 5, where we saw how territory is opened with increased payments to corrupt state agents, usurping the sovereign right to control borders and weakening state integrity. In this scenario, organised crime becomes a more effective controller of territory and a more powerful geopolitical force than states in terms of enforcing migration control. This has relevance beyond the book’s regional focus because of the transnational nature of people-smuggling networks and the similar networks and patterns of movement in other regions, which provoke dilemmas in various governments about how to confront people-smuggling.

Notwithstanding the specific factors that make the situation in Mexico unique – its geographical location, the long-established and trusted business of people-smuggling, and the territorial control of organised crime groups – comparative regional analysis is valuable because similar networks and patterns of movement appear to have emerged in various regions over the past decade or so. While there may be diverse operating models in different regions – from loose networks of individuals to organised criminal groups – these share some operational commonalities in terms of hierarchical structures, the increasingly transcontinental links of people-smuggling groups, the increasing involvement of organised crime in operations and the ability to rapidly evolve in response to state actions and controls (Aziz et al. 2015, Young and Abbott 2015, Holman 2016, Yildiz 2021, Brooks 2023, Mayblin et al. 2024, GIATOC 2024). Engaging with analysis of the situation and dynamics in another region could allow for some understanding of the nature of such groups, their interactions with each other and their ability to respond agilely to emerging ‘market landscapes’ – be these political changes (such as new policy implementation or policy shocks), new or expanding criminal actors, or displacement trends and vulnerabilities.

Further, the morphogenetic approach developed and applied here provides an appropriate and timely framework for analysis to provide insight into how people-smuggling in other regions may develop and respond to changing criminal landscapes, emerging displacement crises, and the delivery of new policy or externalised migration controls. States in the Global North are becoming increasingly concerned about people-smuggling and irregular migration, resulting in attempts to deter this through the criminalisation of migration and asylum-seekers and a range of externalisation tools and bilateral agreements. This is currently the case in the United Kingdom, where there are ongoing concerns around people-smuggling from France via the English Channel in ‘small boats’. A handful of studies have explained the current actors, networks and dynamics involved, including the significant role of transnational people-smuggling networks based in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (Saleem and Al-Shakeri 2024) and some of the profiles of people travelling by this route. Emerging work has highlighted the ineffectiveness of previous government policy to address this, as well as the adverse impact that unrelated policy had on the use of this route in the post-Brexit context (Morris and Qureshi 2022, Brooks 2023, Mayblin et al. 2024). The morphogenetic approach could provide future studies and government analysts with a critical framework to assess the dangers of implementing policy in a context where criminal gangs and people-smuggling networks exist, and identify the potential adverse consequences or efficacy gaps that could arise, given this context. Another context where this framework for analysis might be applied is in the analysis of externalisation tools that are implemented in states affected by corruption (such as bilateral agreements with Libya), as countries increasingly seek to outsource their responsibilities through third-country agreements.

Future research directions

A few areas for potential future research emerge from the findings and analysis in this book. Since the mid-2010s, asylum claims by Central Americans in Mexico have risen considerably, although the details of these remain largely unresearched. Investigation into how asylum claims are being processed and the reasoning and outcomes in these asylum decisions would benefit understanding of how protection is being secured and of how Mexico’s Asylum Law is being delivered in practice. This legal and processing perspective would complement the analysis of decision-making and practical barriers to claiming asylum provided in Chapter 2. Research could also investigate the longer-term outcomes for those who are granted international protection in Mexico, particularly for certain vulnerable groups, where the same type of risk and persecution that drove them from Northern Central America could continue in Mexico. For instance, unaccompanied minors and young people could be targeted for recruitment by criminal actors, and LGBT+ persons could continue to be vulnerable to persecution or discrimination on grounds of gender identity or sexual orientation. Further investigation could examine the potential for the integration of former internally displaced persons (IDPs) or failed asylum-seekers who are returned to their country of origin from Mexico or other countries.

There are also opportunities for future research and analysis at an international level. The externalisation of migration controls is increasingly being used as a strategy around the world, and this book has explored a novel strand within that: how the emergent and transformative properties of individual agency can affect policy and its efficacy. This is of interest to a potential line of investigation that further considers agency in the evaluation of policy outcomes and efficacy. As this book shows, it is at the intersection of migrant agency and deterrent policy where human rights violations are particularly acute. This line of inquiry could also investigate to what extent some externalisation instruments and deterrent policies have inbuilt punishment of agency, either through planned outcomes or ‘collateral damage’, connecting this with debates on foreseeable adverse consequences and state accountability for adverse outcomes and for the acts of non-state actors.

Displacement caused by organised crime also merits some further attention on an international level, particularly at its intersection with other displacement drivers. Displacement and forced migration caused by criminal violence and persecution is an emerging issue in several regions around the world, especially as organised crime continues to expand into new territories and economic activities – including natural-resource exploitation – and as growing links develop between organised crime groups and conflict actors or terrorist groups in some regions. Nonetheless, this is a significantly under-researched topic on a global level, despite its increasing salience and the importance of establishing it on the international agenda.