Chapter 2 Refugee reception policies in Africa
This chapter presents and reflects upon current academic explanations of why states in Africa adopt specific refugee reception policies. It is structured around three academic debates which illustrate existing ways in which, via bigger picture trends, research has endeavoured to explain responses to refugee arrivals in Africa. The chapter starts by investigating the ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus, which observes a negative correlation between democracy and states’ approaches to asylum. The nexus has previously been employed to help explain the remarkable shift in reception policies witnessed on the continent over the last sixty years. The section sets out a case for reinvigorating this area of research by proposing new avenues for investigation in relation to the reception of refugees in Southern Africa.
Next, the chapter shifts to examine the role of the ‘global’ at the national and local levels, in the context of Africa. The section investigates the influence of international legal frameworks and UNHCR on reception policies, with a considerable body of research having been developed over the past two decades on the role of the global refugee regime and specifically UNHCR in the day-to-day practice of reception. Nonetheless, more contemporary work has begun to question the regime’s continuing relevance for many refugees on the ground in Africa.
Finally, the chapter reviews research that has adopted a security lens to explain state responses to refugees. This analysis shows how the increasingly popular framing of migrant movement as a security threat inevitably influences the implementation of refugee reception policies. Yet, the chapter also questions whether there now exists an overreliance on a security lens to explain all state responses to refugees. As a response, a stability lens is introduced to help draw out a more nuanced discussion on how states understand the arrival and movement of refugees on their territory.
In terms of the selection of the debates, the scope of the literature reviewed for this chapter has been refined by the adoption of Betts and Orchard’s theory of norm implementation as the book’s conceptual framework.1 As such, the chapter interrogates specific themes identified through the process of selecting and adapting the framework. Thus, the three debates were chosen as they each speak to why state reception policies in the region regularly diverge from international regime norms. Indeed, by examining relevant literature it is possible to elicit key causal mechanisms (that is, material, ideational and institutional factors) that appear to regularly contest, alter or stop the implementation of regime norms, thus creating unique reception policies on the ground for refugees in this region. By critically engaging with each of these contemporary academic discussions, the intention of the chapter is to elucidate key themes and factors that influence states’ responses to the arrival of refugees.
The ‘democratic-aslyum’ nexus: shifting policies to refugees in Africa
The political and spatial dynamics of refugee reception in Africa have changed dramatically over the last sixty years (van Garderen and Ebenstein, 2011; Crisp, 2010). Between the 1960s and 1980s, states traditionally maintained an open-door policy towards refugees. Rutinwa (1999) sees the period following the adoption of the OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (‘1969 OAU Refugee Convention’) as the ‘golden age’ of asylum in Africa. The period embraced a free-settlement approach which, while varying in implementation, is a reception policy whereby refugees are permitted to freely move within the host state and select their place of residence (Masuku and Nkala, 2018).
The enduring nature of the free-settlement approach during these decades can be understood through the ideational concepts of pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism, economic prosperity and the characteristics of refugee movements seen during that period. Many refugees during this time were ‘the product of independence struggles and wars of national liberation, most notably in countries such as Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South Africa and South-West Africa’ (Crisp, 2000:3). This was also helped by resilient and politically stable leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, who set positive examples in their refugee policies (Crisp, 2000). In addition, during the years immediately after independence, the size of refugee populations remained modest, and individual economies were relatively prosperous. Indeed, there were around a million refugees in Africa in the early 1970s (Crisp, 2000). The combination of these factors meant host states were happy to give generous hospitality to refugees. In turn, local communities generally saw these refugees as victims of colonial rule and thus received them warmly (Lindley, 2011).
In contrast, the 1990s witnessed sweeping shifts in reception policies, with states beginning to favour methods of containment and the refugee camp emerging as the dominant approach to welcoming refugees within the continent. Key reasons for this shift in policy are well established. Firstly, the sheer size of the refugee populations, and their unequal distribution between host countries, created problems. To illustrate this, the refugee population had rapidly grown to almost six million people by the early 1990s (van Garderen and Ebenstein, 2011). Secondly, a lack of economic growth in the region added to the strain of absorbing new populations into host communities (Crisp, 2000).2 A third reason, which has perhaps received less academic attention than it warrants, is the ‘democracy turn’ observed on the continent during the 1980s and 1990s. This has also played a significant role in shifting attitudes towards the form of welcome given to refugees.
Indeed, what can be understood as the ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus may still be playing a significant role in how states respond to refugee arrival and movement. In essence, this nexus refers to the observed association between increases in democratic structures and practices within a state and the deteriorating attitudes and responses to asylum (Milner, 2009). This apparently negative association between the practices of democracy and asylum appears to run counter to the assumption that democracy is indispensable for the effective exercise of fundamental freedoms and human rights.
The loss of popularity of free-settlement reception policies in the 1990s occurred during the same period as the introduction of democratic structures and shifts away from authoritarian political settlements towards more competitive ruling political settlements.3 When ruling political parties move towards democratic ideologies and become competitive, elites within the government become more concerned with short-term goals, such as re-election (Khan, 2011; Abdulai and Hickey, 2016). Thus, political elites tend to prioritise engaging and reacting to public opinion. This time of democratic change on the continent coincided with shifting attitudes seen among local populations who were exercising new voting power. During the period of decolonisation in Africa (1950s–1960s), refugees were perceived as kin and as ‘brothers’ linked in the fight against an external power. However, by the 1990s, the reasons for flight were changing and becoming about ongoing civil wars or aspirations of economic betterment. This in turn led to an ideational shift occurring whereby refugees began being seen solely as outsiders and/or as a threat to limited resources (Crisp, 2000). It is perhaps not, therefore, surprising that xenophobia towards refugees and forced migrants emerged in the 1990s, ‘at a time when most of Africa [was] democratising and governments [were] compelled to take into account public opinion in formulating various policies’ (Rutinwa, 1999:2).
In response to this shift in attitudes and with the added pressures of re-election, governments started closing borders and severely restricting the rights of refugees (Crisp, 2000). In essence, as governing political settlements on the continent moved from authoritarian rule towards democratic and competitive political approaches, the space for asylum started to shrink. As a result, refugees were increasingly confined to geographical spaces away from large urban areas and the voting public.
The ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus accordingly helps explain why states within Africa shifted from more open reception policies to more closed camp-based approaches in which the constraint of movement became the new norm on the continent. In addition, the shift from long-term integration to new forms of temporary reception was intended to facilitate the eventual return of refugees to their home states. Yet with internal conflicts persisting for decades, repatriation never materialised as a workable option for most refugees (Deardorff, 2009). Thus, this switch of reception approach left millions of refugees in limbo in protracted situations (Schmidt, 2003; Deardorff, 2009; Zetter, 2015).
Based on this observed nexus, Milner in 2009 noted that ‘the relationship between democratization and asylum policies in Africa is not always good for human rights’ (p. 178). Yet despite this noteworthy – if troubling – finding, the ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus has received little attention in the literature since Milner’s work in the late 2000s. To investigate the continued relevance of the nexus today, the book examines connections between democratic structures and how host states in Southern Africa respond to refugee arrival and movement. Subsequent chapters will develop this work in three key areas: firstly, by examining the significance of the nexus in the context of the two selected reception sites in Southern Africa, specifically its continued relevance in the maintenance of camp policies and its influence over national reception policy and practice relating to urban spaces; in particular it will consider the increasing urbanisation of refugee populations and the potentially disruptive role increased refugee movement can have in contemporary African cities.
Secondly, the association between democracy and asylum will be investigated at the local level. Given the global trend of decentralisation witnessed on the African continent since the early 2000s, increased powers at the city level are likely to affect the form of reception refugees receive in urban spaces. As explored by academics such as Hickey et al. (2015), decentralisation can create the possibility of achieving improved implementation of development projects and international norms at sub-national levels, even when there is a lack of political will at the national level.4 At the same time, increased democratic power at the local level also raises the possibility that any reception offered could deteriorate if the local population becomes hostile to forced migrants and refugees (Kihato and Landau, 2016).
Finally, the book interrogates the possibility of the reverse situation to the historical one observed by Milner also holding true (2009), that is, can a slide to a more authoritarian style of political settlement open up the possibility of improved reception conditions for refugees? According to some political theorists, when a political settlement moves towards an authoritarian style of governance, the state is free to implement long-term programmes based on self-interest and ideological commitments, without being overly concerned about opposition parties or losing re-election (Khan, 2010). If a state is experiencing ‘democratic backsliding’ and has a president who subscribes to the ideology of pan-Africanism – as was witnessed in Zambia between 2016 and 2021 – could this potentially assist in initiating long-term improvements in the implementation of regime norms within national refugee reception policies? Future chapters will investigate this contrary hypothesis inferred by the ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus.
The role of the global refugee regime in shaping refugee reception policies
The global refugee regime is in essence made up of three components: the regime’s main international legal framework – the 1951 Refugee Convention; the regime’s key global actor – UNHCR; and the common principles and norms that govern how states should treat refugees, such as guaranteeing the right to seek asylum (Loescher et al., 2008; Maple et al., 2023). Traditionally, a great deal of academic attention has focused on the first two elements when research has investigated refugee displacement in Africa. In fact, the level of importance placed on the global regime has meant that the host state is commonly framed as a secondary actor in the initial welcome given to refugees on the continent. In addition, academic attention has also mainly concentrated on examining refugee camps, and UNHCR’s role in overseeing them. In the last ten years, with research on refugee arrivals shifting more towards urban displacement, a growing body of work has begun to debate the regime’s continuing relevance in the urban spaces of Africa. The following subsections interrogate these connected areas of research pertaining to camp and urban reception spaces, to assess the extent to which the global refugee regime continues to shape refugee reception policies in the region.
Role of the global in the reception of refugees: the refugee camp
A key debate that has dominated academic scholarship engaged with refugee protection on the African continent over the last twenty years has been the role of UNHCR in responding to refugee displacement. As noted above, attention has concentrated on the refugee camp, and on the role of UNHCR, as guardian of the 1951 Refugee Convention,5 in setting up and maintaining the camp system (Slaughter and Crisp, 2008).6 Certainly, since the 1980s, UNHCR (and by extension the global refugee regime) has been profoundly involved in the architecture of refugee reception in Africa.7
UNHCR is regularly compelled by host states in the majority world to offer protection and assistance to refugees within the confines of refugee camps (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998). Two material factors emerge in explaining why host states have so readily handed responsibility for refugee reception (and effectively for a portion of their territory) to UNHCR: capacity and security concerns. In terms of capacity, developing countries host over 84 per cent of the world’s refugees (UNHCR, 2017b). As van Garderen and Ebenstein (2011) note, this highly skewed distribution of refugees has had pronounced effects on host countries. As a result, many states in the majority world find themselves ill-equipped to carry out their duties towards refugees (Field, 2010).
In Africa, the absence of equitable burden-sharing (Rutinwa, 1999) results in states viewing encampment as a smarter and more visible strategy for gaining international support than allowing for integration (Kagan, 2011; Jamal, 2003).8 For the donor states in the minority world, funding refugee camps allows them to ‘pay’ their way out of burden-sharing (Hovil and Maple, 2022). Meaning, while offering the basics of humanitarianism, this approach is also based on the reasoning of control, to prevent large numbers of refugees from moving to the minority world (FitzGerald, 2019; Arar and FitzGerald, 2023).9
In terms of security, as examined fully below, various security worries frequently arise when large numbers of refugees cross a border (Milner, 2009). Concerns ranging from the fear of armed elements infiltrating the refugee population, to the additional stresses being placed on infrastructure and services mean that the refugee figure quickly becomes framed as a disquieting element to the normal order of states and citizens (Agamben, 1998).10 For these reasons, refugees are placed in camps, stripped of social and political rights and left to be governed and regulated outside the state’s normal legal framework (Owens, 2009; Nyers, 2006). Thus, security and capacity concerns at the national level become contained and reduced when refugees are excluded and placed in refugee camps (where they become the responsibility of global refugee regime actors).11
These imposed locational dynamics to reception leave UNHCR in a precarious situation. By acquiescing to the pressures favouring encampment, fundamental regime norms are relinquished by the agency. For instance, freedom of movement is surrendered to focus purely on the right to life and the principle of non-refoulement (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, 2005). This ‘care and maintenance’ approach to the reception of refugees has been critiqued by scholars (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, 2005; Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998). Chief amongst the criticisms has been the accusation that violations of refugees’ right to freedom of movement are often too readily accepted by UNHCR as part of a state’s right to manage their own territory (Jamal, 2000).
UNHCR’s involvement in reception policies on the ground is also complicated by a lack of political or legal power. Indeed, it has to rely on moral authority, persuasion and inducement in its dealings with sovereign states (Lewis, 2012).12 This lack of power is coupled with working within a political landscape where ‘power and interests dominate and define outcomes’ (Loescher et al., 2008:2).13 Put another way, it is difficult to persuade host states to implement global refuge regime norms when key material factors, such as capacity and national security concerns, continue to take precedence over the fundamental freedoms of newly arrived guests. In addition, as already noted, pressure comes from donors, who regularly fund UNHCR projects in the majority world, to grant certain rights to refugees but at the same time severely limit forms of movement (Barutciski, 2013).
In summary, the research on UNHCR and refugee camps in the last twenty years has been extensive. Much of it has been largely critical, despite the fact that many authors recognise the unenviable position that the UN agency is regularly placed in. In terms of the overarching themes of the book, this body of literature highlights several issues relevant to investigating state-based reception policies. These include the common perception that refugees are the responsibility of the international community. Some key contradictions are also revealed. On the one hand, there is a broad understanding that refugee camps are insisted upon by many host states (for the reasons set out above) leaving UNHCR in a difficult position in relation to offering protection and global regime norms in these countries. On the other hand, due to the UN agency regularly accepting spatial restrictions on reception (and taking responsibility for managing, funding and running refugee camps), the host state has constantly been framed as a secondary or minor player in the reception of refugees on the continent.14 The result is that: (1) the role of the global refugee regime (and UNHCR) is regularly elevated, despite appearing at times to be entirely confined to the refugee camp; and (2) little research has investigated the role of national actors or national frameworks, beyond the initial request that camps be set up.
These interrelated points are especially pertinent when you consider how contemporary research highlights the various ways that the refugee camp and the urban space are connected on the continent (Fábos and Kibreab, 2007). With movement regularly seen (and often permitted by key state bodies) between these different sites of reception, it calls into question whether the host state’s role (in terms of policy and actors) in camp-based reception is as hands-off as some of the literature implies. Equally, if refugees are regularly moving between these reception spaces, yet the global regime (and its international actors) remains confined to the refugee camp, where does this leave the regime in terms of ongoing relevance in Africa? These lines of enquiry will be developed throughout the book.
Role of the global in the reception of refugees: the urban space
In Africa, the role and influence of the global refugee regime outside of the refugee camp remains less clear than it does within it. Certainly, relatively little work has been conducted looking at the influence of the regime in the urban space on the continent (Maple et al., 2023). Work that does exist consists of preliminary investigations into recent UNHCR global policies on urban protection and general critiques concerning the lack of UNHCR’s involvement in these spaces (Ward, 2014; Crisp, 2017; Landau, 2018a; Pavanello et al., 2010).
Turning first to consider the influence of international frameworks, the global refugee regime is represented in national legislation, national discourse and national institutions (Schmidt, 2014). Indeed, most African states have signed both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention (Maple, 2016). Nevertheless, incorporation of the global regime into domestic legal frameworks has been patchier, with the domestic legislation of some states lacking reference to either convention (Canefe, 2010).15 Furthermore, as observed in the last chapter, the implementation of core norms from the 1951 Refugee Convention into policy on the ground appears to be regularly contested. As Schmidt (2014) notes, traditionally the implementation of the refugee regime on the African continent within national institutions has been seen as high in normative content but low in practical application.
Beyond the refugee camp, available research suggests that the influence of the global refugee regime (in terms of implementing international norms) remains weak. Additionally, implementation of national refugee legal frameworks, or even written policy documents relating to refugee reception, is seen as poor on the ground in Africa (Schmidt, 2014). Indeed, state responses to refugees in urban spaces often appear to come about through ad hoc local level policy and practice (Landau, 2018a; Schmidt, 2014). This understanding, of reception policies being conducted via impromptu methods rather than being influenced by the global refugee regime or national frameworks, makes the shortage of empirical data at the national and local government level surprising.
Conversely, the role of global actors in the urban space has received more academic attention than international and regional governance frameworks. Until recently, however, this body of research has remained quite broad and has been largely critical (Landau and Amit, 2014), in a way that is reminiscent of the work done on UNHCR’s more customary role in the camp space. Unquestionably, the UN agency has been slow to react to key trends in the urbanisation of refugee populations (Kagan, 2013). Large transnational cities in Africa, like Kampala, Nairobi and Johannesburg, have always received refugees and forced migrants. Indeed, they have in many respects been reshaped by the arrival of international migrants (Landau, 2014). Yet, UNHCR has either ignored urban refugees (concentrating on refugee camps instead) or viewed their claims for refugee status with mistrust (Sanyal, 2019; Landau, 2014). In the case of Southern Africa, for example, large numbers of refugees who move through the sub-region originate from counties in eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa. These patterns of movement denote passage through numerous other ‘safe’ countries, and as a result UNHCR regularly labels this form of movement as ‘secondary’, ‘irregular’ or ‘onward’ (UNHCR, 2004; UNHCR, 2015c). This kind of perspective on urban refugees in Southern Africa on the part of the global refugee regime’s key international actor inevitably has implications for reception policies in these spaces.
This perceived historical indifference to the urban space is exemplified by UNHCR first publishing a workable global urban policy only in 2009.16 In the 2009 Urban Policy the agency did finally acknowledge that most refugees worldwide live in cities (Sanyal, 2019). The document also emphasised the need to assist refugees where you find them, rather than telling them where to go (Kagan, 2013). Yet in the same document, refugees still theoretically need a ‘good reason’ to justify living in an urban setting (Verdirame and Pobjoy, 2013).17
Since the publication of the 2009 Urban Policy (UNHCR, 2009) and the subsequent 2014 ‘Policy on alternatives to camps’ (UNHCR, 2014a), there has been a growing body of literature that consistently highlights the protection issues and challenges faced by urban refugees on the continent (Pavanello et al., 2010; Kihato and Landau, 2016). Nevertheless, UNHCR continues to struggle to adapt programming and interventions specifically for the urban space (Crisp, 2017). Equally, as observed by Crisp (2017:94), policy shifts on paper do not automatically translate into support and training for UNHCR staff on the ground. Agency officials are often ‘expected to engage much more thoroughly with urban refugees but have not been given the capacity to do so’.
In defence of UNHCR, the urban space is a highly politicised space, making the role and position of the agency in assisting with reception complex and often extremely delicate. Essentially, this geographical space is still ‘new’ to UNHCR and because of this, forming partnerships with urban partners (such as mayors, municipal councils, civil society and development actors who work with the urban poor) has proved harder than anticipated (Crisp, 2017). Equally, the agency’s role in cities in Africa is further complicated if the host state maintains a dominant camp-based reception policy.
Finally, recent attempts by UN bodies to implement initiatives on the African continent under the normative frameworks of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, Global Compact on Refugees and the CRRF, do show some promise in terms of UNHCR attempting to improve reception in urban spaces. Yet even with the momentum of these new global frameworks, initiatives supported by UNHCR in many CRRF implementing countries (including Djibouti, Uganda and Kenya) are still chiefly focused in refugee camps (Carciotto and Ferraro, 2020).
The analysis of the role of the ‘global’ in refugee reception in Africa thus identifies several important themes and ideas pertinent to the question of why states respond to refugees in specific ways. For example, key material and ideational factors emerge that appear to influence states’ preference for maintaining encampment policies, including the ability to shift responsibility and costs for hosting refugee populations, at least in part, onto the international community. The section has also raised several topics which to date have been under-explored within the literature owing to the global refugee regime having traditionally dominated a considerable amount of the research surrounding refugee arrival on the continent. This attention appears justified in terms of the setting-up and management of refugee camps for the last twenty years, nevertheless, this dominance has meant that national legal and policy frameworks and institutions are regularly ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. With evidence consistently showing how the implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention on the continent is patchy at best, and how movement regularly connects the refugee camp to the urban space, this lack of attention to national law, policy and local norms is somewhat surprising.
Also, research continues to adopt a critical stance to UNHCR’s role in Africa, perceiving an over-engagement in the camp space, at the expense of other reception sites, such as the urban space. This juxtaposition between inactivity in cities and towns versus activity in refugee camps suggests the potential for the geographical confinement of the global refugee regime in Africa. In turn, the lack of the ‘global’ in urban spaces raises questions about the continuing relevance of the global refugee regime in the everyday practice of refugee reception and UNHCR’s attitude and decision-making concerning refugee movement and agency. By not proactively engaging with urban refugees, UNHCR run the risk of merely reinforcing the concept of the refugee figure as a helpless sedentary victim.
The security and stability nexus
Security is a recurring issue within research that attempts to understand why states continue to respond to new arrivals in specific ways, often in direct contravention of their commitments to the global refugee regime. Research ranges from examining the material factors (such as direct and indirect security concerns) associated with the arrival of refugee populations in the host country, to looking at the increasingly globalised practice of states securitising all forms of cross-border movement. In contrast, there has been less work on the concept of stability (and its inverse, instability). The importance placed on the perception of stability by host states appears worthy of further exploration. Importantly, this can shed light on how states understand the effect refugees (and crucially their movement) have on host communities and national and local political structures. While intrinsically connected to security concerns, a stability lens is also able to move discussions beyond the popular yet binary notion that all refugee movement is understood by states via a security prism.
Security and securitisation
Security issues have long been discussed in reference to state responses to refugee movement in Africa. The concept itself, though, is often left ill-defined or employed broadly in order to cover a multitude of issues (such as the infiltration of refugee warriors into a refugee population or the risks of increased crime in urban spaces). To gain more precision, particularly in relation to the role security plays in reception policies, the book utilises Milner’s (2009) distinction between: (1) direct security concerns; (2) indirect security concerns; and (3) securitisation. Milner sees direct security concerns as those that relate to who is coming into the host country. In contrast, indirect security concerns refer to increased levels of insecurity or crime within the areas that refugees settle. These initial two categorisations (direct and indirect threats) are valuable, as they can help to identify genuine security issues facing host states. This contrasts with political securitisation agendas that target refugee movements in order to justify restrictive reception policies and/or to ‘scapegoat’ refugees.
Direct security concerns
Numerous security issues potentially arise when refugees cross a border. This is particularly so in situations of mass influx, when armed elements may be able to infiltrate refugee camps or local communities (Milner, 2000, 2009). In the African context, the frequency of civil unrest, war and liberation movements since the 1960s have meant that states are particularly cognisant of these issues (Crisp, 2006). Thus, the separation of refugees from the local population by setting up refugee camps, at least during an emergency period, can be regarded as a state defending its territory against perceived external threats (Newman, 2003).
Equally, however, the refugee camp itself can become the location of direct security concerns. Zolberg et al. (1989) notably documented the issue of ‘refugee warriors’ infiltrating refugee camps close to the border to recruit soldiers during the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, refugee camps can become ‘a breeding ground for refugee warriors: disaffected individuals, who … equip themselves for battle to retrieve an idealized, mythical lost community’ (Stedman and Tanner, 2004:3). This manipulation of the refugee camp and the refugee regime inevitably has had ramifications for national and international security (Stedman and Tanner, 2004).
The issue of armed elements infiltrating refugee populations has nevertheless not stopped states within Africa and the international community from continuing to utilise encampment as a dominant reception policy. Indeed, the existence of refugee warriors actually reinforces the idea of keeping refugee populations separated from the local population (Adleman, 1998; Milner, 2000). Nonetheless, these direct security concerns have persuaded states and international humanitarian organisations to now construct camps further away from state borders (Crisp, 2006).
As is evident from these discussions, between the 1980s and 1990s security concerns were central to refugee reception policies on the continent. Since the 1990s, incidences of civil wars in Africa had been declining steeply (Straus, 2012). However, due to renewed violence in South Sudan, the DRC, Mozambique, Central African Republic and Somalia, this trend has recently been reversed (UNHCR, 2020).18 Nonetheless, current conflicts on the continent are generally limited to specific geographic areas (Bakken and Rustad, 2018), meaning that large parts of the continent (including most of Southern Africa) are currently experiencing relative peace. This is not to say states do not retain concerns around who is entering their territory – indeed, many states in Africa remain politically fragile (Bakken and Rustad, 2018). However, the risk of ‘refugee warriors’ or foreign military infiltrating refugee camps or local populations has been significantly reduced for many countries on the continent over time.
Indirect security concerns
In line with broader trends in the refugee and forced migration fields, indirect security concerns that arise in local populations close to refugee camps, have received a good deal of academic attention. In contrast, similar security concerns relating to the urban space in Africa have typically seen less consideration. This has recently started to change, however, with a growing body of literature now investigating tensions between refugee and host populations in large urban spaces on the continent (Barbelet and Wake, 2017). Work from both streams of research remains largely focused at the ground and local levels, with less work investigating the effect indirect security concerns have on state reception policies – particularly in relation to the refugee camp. The available literature is examined to gain an initial understanding of the concerns of host states in relation to refugee populations present in both reception sites. As will be seen, incorporating state-focused analysis offers a more rounded understanding of how indirect security concerns may influence reception policies.
In terms of the refugee camp, refugees can have an impact on the environment in the host state. This is especially an issue when a refugee population outnumbers the available resources (Whitaker, 2002), for example, when refugees depend on the environment near the refugee camp for firewood, cultivation and fishing (Crisp, 2003; Whitaker, 2002; Martin, 2015).19 Studies in Tanzania, though, highlight mixed opinions within the local populations living near refugee settlements about the positive effect refugees have on the economy (Kreibaum, 2016; Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014). Similarly, in terms of increased crime and violence around camp spaces, research is mixed (Whitaker, 1999).20
Ultimately, it remains uncertain from the literature whether indirect security concerns surrounding established refugee camps influence state reception policy in a profound way. In Kenya, insecurity surrounding the Dadaab Camp has undoubtedly contributed to the repeated threats by the state to close the camp (Chkam, 2016; Cannon and Fujibayashi, 2018). Yet, the securitisation of refugees in Kenya also plays a large role in the response by the state (Abebe et al., 2019). Equally, for these purposes, it is noteworthy that these repeated threats were not focused on shifting to a different reception policy, but rather on the return of refugees to their countries of origin. Finally, if historical incidences of ‘refugee warriors’ infiltrating refugee camps have not induced drastic changes in reception policy more broadly on the continent, it remains open to debate whether these forms of localised insecurity ever will.
In contrast, relevant contemporary literature has made concrete links between concerns over insecurity in urban spaces and national reception policies. Specifically, the danger of increased insecurity in cities is a key reason cited for the adoption and continued maintenance of refugee camps in Africa (Milner, 2000, 2009). Thus, indirect security concerns appear to hold far greater influence over state-run reception policies within the context of the urban space compared to similar concerns about the refugee camp.
In terms of the empirical evidence to support these fears, it is evident that insecurity can arise when large numbers of refugees arrive en masse into urban areas. Tensions often revolve around competition for employment, health and education, and can be particularly salient over the short-term (Milner, 2000). For example, a surge in demand for basic support needs can create challenges for local social services (Muggah, 2009). Similar effects over time have been observed in relation to the economy and labour market (Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014). Over the longer term, there appears to be a board consensus that any negative short-term effects impacting the labour market are eventually reversed (Muggah, 2009; Grindheim 2013). Yet, this view is not universal and is inevitably context-dependent (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2015). Indeed, the range of findings in relation to the long-term effect of refugees on the urban space suggests that more work is needed in different contexts (Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014).
There has also been a lack of engagement with the role of the host state in these long-term processes (with the emphasis again being on the refugee population and the host community).21 For example, over the mid-to-long term, the settling of refugees within a local population regularly shows clear benefits for the whole community (Jacobsen, 2017). Yet important questions often remain unasked at the national level, for instance concerning refugees’ free access to social services and their ability to contribute to national tax systems. In addition, with competitive political settlements keenly interested in short-term goals such as winning elections, convincing these states of the long-term benefits of integrating refugee populations remains challenging. This is particularly the case if they are likely to experience initial (albeit hopefully temporary) problems relating to increased security concerns.
Securitisation
The two material security concerns that have been set out above also play into a wider ideational factor, namely the broader securitisation of refugees and cross-border movement. Analysis adopting this lens, with notable exceptions, commonly remains at the international level and looks at trends across states, regions or globally.22 Developed from work conducted by the Copenhagen School in the early 1990s, the securitisation of forms of migration refers to the conception of ‘migration’ as a security threat to a state or society (Buzan et al., 1998). As Donnelly (2017) notes, the current and dominant response of states to all forms of international migrants is reliant on the language of security and securitisation. In terms of refugees, the past fifteen years have seen a global shift in asylum policy, from a focus on ‘humanitarian-driven refugee protection ensconced in international law, to one prioritising the protection of national security interests’ (Saunders, 2014:72). Indeed, states and the media have increasingly viewed the movement of refugees as a threat to national security (Hammerstad, 2010; FitzGerald, 2019).23
This framing justifies responses that are both rapid and exceptional, such as reception policies that have veered away from norms contained within the global refugee regime (O’Driscoll, 2017). Indeed, the securitisation process (via discourse) produces the threat and response – resulting in an implied consensus within the political space over the issue (Oelgemöller, 2017). As UNHCR notes, the viability of the refugee protection regime now ‘hinges on its real and perceived impact on international security’ (UNHCR, 2006b:63). In this way, states gain public approval for ignoring or constraining key refugee regime norms, such as by keeping refugees in refugee camps (Hammerstad, 2010; Lindley, 2011).
The securitisation of cross-border movement and refugees not only comes from the national and international level but also ‘from below’. Hammerstad (2012) observes how grassroots level actors also have the potential to become ‘securitisers’. Ground-level sentiments (such as the rising levels of xenophobia seen in Southern Africa) can filter up to the national level, ultimately causing changes in discourse and policy (UNHCR, 2006b). Global tendencies towards neo-liberal economics and democratisation support this ‘from below’ construction of refugees as a security risk. As observed via the ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus, the shift in the 1980s and 1990s from authoritarian-style political settlements to more competitive ones on the continent has led states to become more amenable and reactive to anti-refugee and anti-immigrant feelings in the local population (Crisp, 2000; Seidman-Zager, 2010).
The incorporation of a security lens into discussions on how states respond to refugee movement has generated a wealth of understanding in terms of explaining the slow decline seen globally in the overall treatment of refugees. Nevertheless, this body of literature is not immune from critique. Firstly, within the context of Africa, academic work on securitisation often remains focused on how mobility on the continent informs understanding around security borders in the minority world (Mayblin and Turner, 2020; Obi, 2010; Zanker, 2019). Secondly, McGahan (2009) suggests there is a need to examine the dynamics of individual host countries when analysing the securitisation of refugees. Common positions taken in the literature see analysis remain at the international level, observing broad trends or applying these broad trends to the national context, without fully engaging in the social, economic and political dynamics of a particular state. Or as O’Driscoll (2017) notes, there is a need to understand how these in-country specificities impact on how and what issues are securitised. Giving attention to the state-level is particularly pertinent in relation to the question of why states have adopted specific refugee reception policies that contest or undermine the implementation of core regime norms such as freedom of movement.
Thirdly, research that focuses on the securitisation of refugee movement can be one-dimensional (Vigneswaran and Quirk, 2015). By insisting that host states are increasingly seeing refugee movement solely as a security threat, the resulting analysis remains relatively inflexible. For example, it is unclear how a security lens can fully explain why states with security concerns regarding the movement of refugees regularly allow some movement between refugee camps and urban spaces.
The concept of stability
Interconnected with the ideational factor of securitisation, is the notion of stability (Weiner, 1992). This concept (and its converse, instability) has not received a great deal of attention within the forced migration literature. When it is discussed, it is typically mentioned within a broader discussion on potential insecurity concerns linked to migrant movement into urban spaces. Yet, recent research has started to investigate the concept of stability as a way to critique the perceived overreliance on a security lens in the literature. By developing the work on stability as a complementary concept to the prevalent security lens, the book aims to draw out a more grounded state-focused understanding of refugee movement. This in turn will help to develop further clarity about how states respond (in the form of policy) to refugee movement at the point of reception.
The ‘problem’ of refugees and their movement
The ‘problem’ of refugees can be understood conceptually as instability (Maple et al., 2021).24 That is to say, the belief or perception that instability of some kind will result from the cross-border movement of forced migrants (particularly those arriving en masse). This is particularly apparent with regards to the destabilising impact that refugee and migrant movements into large urban spaces are understood to have. Too many new arrivals into the urban space are deemed to cause instability for state structures and infrastructure, as well as creating additional competition for scarce resources with the local population (Jacobsen, 2002).25 This is particularly acute when host states are facing ongoing economic problems and/or political uncertainty before the new arrivals (UNHCR, 2006b). In recent years, states have responded to concerns about influxes of migrants by slowly replacing concepts such as universal human rights with a ‘new ideological rival’, that is, one of stability (Kagan, 2014). States ‘view more freedom for non-citizens (including movement) as creating chaos’, and because of this, maintaining the status quo is often seen as the best answer (Maple et al., 2021:11).
In response to this ideological shift in state behaviour, the literature explored above has shown how the cross-border and internal movement of refugees is increasingly being seen as a uniquely political concern via the process of securitisation (Bakewell, 2018; Betts, 2009b). As Vigneswaran and Quirk (2015:2) highlight, this approach solely frames refugee movement in terms of ‘government efforts first to prevent and then – when official efforts prove ineffective – to cope with unwanted movements across sovereign territorial borders’. This narrative is frequently adopted by states through the reception policies that emerge in response to refugee movement. Nevertheless, the emphasis in the research on the idea that stopping all movement (particularly in relation to forced migrants and refugees) is a state’s ultimate aim has meant that analysis often remains narrow. This stance tends to overlook several other key components of the relationship between refugee movement, reception policies and the host state. As Vigneswaran and Quirk (2015:2) acknowledge, movement plays a foundational role in ‘what states look like as spatial and political entities, how they accumulate power and resources, what types of policies and strategies they pursue, and how they relate to their peers and other political, social, and economic actors’.
In terms of reception within Africa, refugee and other forced migrant movement inevitably plays a role in the construction and the day-to-day running of host states. For example, at the level of the urban African city, these geographical spaces are not home to sedentary homogeneous populations which simply submit or conform to the will of the state. Refugees regularly move to avoid interacting with state structures entirely and find alternative forms of ‘local citizenship’ in urban spaces (Landau, 2018a). Equally, the movement of refugees can also engage with state structures (at the local and national levels) irrespective of whether that movement is officially permitted or is more illicit.
A central tenet of this book is that stopping all movement is rarely the overarching aim of a reception policy. Rather, it is about constraining or managing movement with the aim of maintaining the status quo and a resemblance of stability, particularly within the urban space. As a result, controlling movement is often balanced with efforts to exploit movement and the opportunities that it can ultimately create (Vigneswaran and Quirk, 2015). This juxtaposition of dissimilar goals is particularly apparent when analysis shifts from seeing the state as a unique unitary actor, to analysing it in a multi-scalar way (for example, across the international, national, local and even sub-local levels).
Stability and the paradox of human movement
This sub-section builds on these ideas surrounding states’ understanding of movement and stability by introducing the recent work of Kotef (2015). Kotef’s work offers insights into the apparently conflicting and contesting approaches to refugee reception displayed by host states. For example, a common occurrence in Africa is that a state will maintain a dominant refugee camp reception policy, but at the same time permit (by express or tacit agreement) considerable numbers of refugees to move and settle in urban spaces (Bakewell, 2014; Maple, 2016). Put differently, this area of research helps to examine and explain the balancing act that is seen between controlling the movement of new arrivals, while also exploiting the potential and opportunities that it can create. In addition, Kotef’s work ties directly into the debates highlighted above in relation to the material and ideational factors (such as security) that are influencing state approaches to the arrival of refugees.
Movement within a sovereign state has never been entirely seen as unrestrained or ‘free’, but rather secured by ‘many anchors that provided it with some stability’ (Kotef, 2015:4). Even in the most liberal states, there has always been a reaction to movement that seeks to stop it from being unrestrained. Such reactions are ultimately understood as being about creating or maintaining stability and even freedom. All key thinkers on the ‘state’ have regarded methods such as erecting walls or enclosures as a precondition for freedom, rather than necessarily being in direct opposition to the free movement of persons (Kotef, 2015). Conceptualisations of movement are therefore not conceivable in the modern world without the possibility of its management. According to Kotef (2015): ‘Regimes of movement are thus never simply a way to control, to regulate, or to incite movement; regimes of movement are integral to the formation of different modes of being.’
This complementary process can be explained in two steps. Firstly, citizenship is dependent on constraining and regulating movement to support the ‘sedentarist ideology’ of the nation state, even if in reality people are always mobile (Sassen, 1999). Secondly, once this image of stability has been achieved, citizens are granted more freedom to express their growing mobility. As such, movement and stability work hand in hand. Refugees and other forced migrants rupture this ongoing symbiotic relationship between citizens, movement and the state. Refugees are not citizens nor what Kotef refers to as ‘rooted’ people. For this reason, their movement is seen as a threat. This synopsis highlights the paradox of human movement today:
Movement here is seen both as a manifestation of freedom and as an interruption, as a threat to order. One of the functions of the state is, therefore, to craft a concept of order, stability and security that is reconcilable with its concept of freedom and its concept of movement. (Mbembe, 2018:1)
The movement of citizens of a state is deemed as an essential part of being ‘modern’ and as such is protected. In contrast, the movement of outsiders, such as refugees, regularly falls into the second category – namely that of an interruption or a threat. Indeed, refugees who refuse to remain sedentary are often perceived as a threat to the peace and stability of the host state.
For Kotef, the idea of stability (and with it controlled or managed movement) is based on a core relationship with the geographical space. People who have land and who are ‘rooted’ can be permitted to move freely, and this right needs to be protected. The state is at ease with this form of self-regulated movement because here movement is framed as being in moderation and regulated. In contrast, for others (‘non-rooted people’) who have no fixed relationship with the land (such as refugees), movement may be restricted. This restriction is not conceived as an infringement upon a freedom, but rather as controlling a security problem. As Mbembe (2018:1) notes, to the state, these people are often ‘enemies, both of freedom, because they do not exercise it with restraint, and of security and order’. As discussed previously, stability in this sense has become a new ideology: one that rivals human rights and democracy (Kagan, 2014). Excessive refugee movement can be seen as a threat to this stability and as such, while some movement is regarded as a permissible freedom, other forms are deemed as a threat (Mbembe, 2018). These points also add further nuance to previous discussions on the role of the ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus, whereby violations of the rights of non-voting individuals can be reframed as in the interests of protecting the rights and freedoms of the ‘rooted’ voting public.
In line with this understanding, reception spaces become political spaces for refugees via the movements they allow and prevent (Kotef, 2015). Movement is thus inextricably linked to the form of reception afforded to the new arrival (Gill et al., 2011). For example, the literature has long observed how encampment policies provoke a reaction, whereby refugees reject this enforced immobility to self-settle illicitly (Darling, 2017; Basok, 2009; Varsanyi, 2006). Equally, the mobility strategies adopted by refugees trigger reactions by states, regardless of whether the strategies are broadly in line with a state’s reception policy or adopted as a way to resist repressive reception policies. In South Africa, refugees and asylum-seekers have adopted mobility strategies in large numbers, in line with the official reception policy. Yet as long as this form of movement remains unchecked or unmanaged, a political reaction that restrains and brings some order to this movement is likely. Thus, a delicate balance emerges between the movement of refugees and host states, with some movement accepted and even encouraged as long as it adds ‘value’ and does not reach a level perceived to be unstable. In this way, the movement of refugees (particularly into the urban space) informs the conditional nature of refugee reception, which was examined in the previous chapter.
Current academic literature shows how security and stability, at both a material and an ideational level, continue to play a significant role in reception policies in Africa. Indeed, due to the complex relationship between these concepts and refugee movement, reception policies regularly diverge from international commitments. This is seen starkly in the case of freedom of movement, with many states in Africa still understanding encampment as the most rational way of combating forms of insecurity and instability linked to the arrival of refugee populations. Nevertheless, key gaps in the literature exist, particularly in relation to this kind of state behaviour. Using a state-focused lens, the book will develop a deeper understanding about the influence that concepts related to security and stability have on state-based responses to the arrival of refugees.
The chapter has set out three key academic debates in which research has attempted to explain approaches to reception in Africa through reference to broader trends. In doing so, the chapter has made significant observations pertinent to the book’s core aim of investigating the disparate state responses to the arrival of refugees in Africa. It has also highlighted some key gaps in the research that are worthy of further examination. Finally, through the debates presented in this chapter several key material, ideational and institutional factors have been introduced that seem to influence state-based reception policies and influence the degree of implementation of regime norms. Equally, due to the volatility of specific factors (such as security and stability concerns), the analysis recognises the possibility that reception policies are likely to be subject to change and revision via contestation between different factors. These observations and hypothesis are interrogated and developed through the two case studies of Zambia and South Africa that follow the next chapter, which considers the methodology used to examine reception in the two countries.
Notes
1. See van der Waldt (2020).
2. See also Okoth-Obbo (2001); UNHCR (1997).
3. A political settlement is defined as ‘informal and formal processes, agreements, and practices that help consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a means for dealing with disagreements about interests, ideas and the distribution of and use of power’ (Laws, 2012:1). Ultimately, ‘analysing political settlements supports a more detailed understanding of how the interests, ideas and relations of power among leaders, elites and coalitions can assist or obstruct the process of positive change’ (Laws and Leftwich, 2014:1).
4. See Levy et al. (2015).
5. See Loescher et al. (2008).
6. UNHCR remains involved in the running of many RSD (Refugee Status Determination) processes in Africa (Kagan, 2011, 2013).
7. Although key actors attached to the global refugee regime have been assisting states in offering protection to refugees since the 1950s (Glasman, 2017; Rahal and White, 2022).
8. The visibility of refugees also delays the onset of donor fatigue (Jamal, 2003; Crisp, 2003).
9. See also Agier (2011); Hyndman and Giles (2011). States in Africa nonetheless appear cognisant of the uncomfortable truth that these spaces are funded as part of broader containment policies (Hovil and Maple, 2022; FitzGerald, 2019). See the work on refugee commodification (Tsourapas, 2019; Freier et al., 2021).
10. See also van Garderen and Ebenstein (2011).
11. See Malkki (1992:34). The significance of applying the global regime in the host state can be seen as transferring refugees from the political realm to the supposedly non-political or humanitarian realm (Karadawi, 1999).
12. See also Saunders (2014).
13. See also Chimni (2009); Betts (2009a).
14. Often the running of refugee camps has been left entirely to UNHCR (Slaughter and Crisp, 2008).
15. See Cantor and Chikwanha (2019).
16. In 1997, UNHCR published a ‘Policy on Refugees in Urban Areas’ but this was widely criticised (Kagan, 2013).
17. Therefore, in some situations, camps are deemed as a necessity (UNHCR, 2009).
18. In the last ten years, the number of refugees in Africa has tripled to over 6 million (UNHCR, 2020).
19. See Whitaker (2002); Milner (2000).
20. See also Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2018).
21. There are notable exceptions, see Kibreab (2007).
22. See Hammerstad (2010, 2012).
23. The securitisation of refugees was first looked at in the 1990s (Loescher, 1992; Weiner, 1992).
24. See Kotef (2015); Maple et al. (2021).
25. See also Hove et al. (2013).