Introduction
Countries within Southern Africa regularly host large numbers of refugees and forced migrants, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reporting around one million refugees and asylum-seekers in the sub-region in 2023 (UNHCR, 2023a). However, the modes and sites of reception vary greatly between states in Southern Africa, from the confines of refugee camps and settlements to local neighbourhoods in sprawling, contemporary African cities. Most states adopt a form of encampment reception policy, with refugees expected to move to, and reside in, these confined spaces once their stay has been regularised. Yet there is wide variation on the ground in terms of implementation of these approaches. Within many states, movement between refugee camps and rural and urban areas is often permitted, with some refugees even finding official or de facto acceptance for settling long term in urban spaces. Conversely, a minority of states adopt a free-settlement approach, whereby newly arrived refugees are permitted – at least in law – to move freely and settle anywhere on the territory, including urban centres.
This variation in state-based reception shapes how, and the extent to which, refugees find protection and formal and informal solutions to displacement in Southern Africa. Furthermore, refugees discover that each of these different reception sites (from the refugee camp to the urban space) has its own unique restrictions and opportunities. Each is shaped by political, bureaucratic and economic factors permeating from the international, national and local levels. These variances are particularly intriguing given that most Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states have signed up to key international and regional conventions related to refugees that all promote a level of uniformity regarding how refugees should be received.
The book develops analysis and understanding of the processes involved in refugee reception policies in Southern Africa. Significantly, we know little about how states make choices regarding refugee reception policies in the context of Africa, including which factors (or stakes) play a role in these policies. Thus, this book examines why states in the sub-region respond to refugee arrivals in such diverse ways – and how these varied reception policies shape a refugee’s ability to move around the host state in pursuit of their own personal and economic aims.
These objectives are achieved by analysing two country case studies: Zambia and South Africa. These are the two principal destination countries in Southern Africa for refugees (Crush and Chikanda, 2014), yet maintain dissimilar reception policies. Zambia has retained a dominant camp policy towards receiving refugees since its independence in 1964. In contrast, its close neighbour South Africa continues to diverge from regional trends by adopting a liberal free-settlement policy. Through a state-focused analysis, these opposing approaches to reception are compared in terms of the behaviour of key state and international actors in how refugees access protection and rights within these host states. By asking why states behave in specific ways towards refugees, the aspiration is that academia and policy practitioners will be in a better position to understand the realities of reception policy implementation on the ground, and to then offer pragmatic modifications to policy, which will ultimately improve the welcome refugees receive (Betts, 2009b).1
This introduction chapter starts by contextualising the topic of the book and providing the justification for the focus on refugee reception, as well as the state-focused approach. Then refugee reception in Southern Africa is introduced within the context of the book’s thematic focus. The chapter concludes with an outline of the whole book.
Disparate responses to the reception of refugees
Most states within Africa are party to the core international conventions that underlie the global refugee regime.2 As such, they have obligations to implement the associated human rights norms, which include rights to employment, provision of travel documents and freedom of movement for refugees. This might be expected to create some conformity among state approaches to the reception of refugees. Certainly, during the 1960s and 1970s there was wide recognition and praise of the ‘open door’ policy to refugees on the continent (Rutinwa, 2002; van Garderen, 2004). In essence, this involved states maintaining open borders with neighbouring states and affording a generous welcome to refugee and other forced migrant populations. This reception regularly included access to services, markets, and the freedom to move unimpeded around the territory (Crisp, 2000; Rutinwa, 2002).
Yet from the 1980s onwards, approaches to the reception of refugees changed dramatically, with different policies emerging (such as encampment) which restricted many fundamental rights. As a result, implementation of key international norms contained within the global refugee regime, such as freedom of movement, were more readily contested or simply blocked. Today, refugee camps remain the preferred reception choice in the region (UNHCR, 2019b).
Nevertheless, there exists considerable variation in how refugee reception policies operate in practice (Abdelaaty, 2021). As examined in the next chapter, refugee reception in this book is understood as a process. This process encompasses the host state’s (and other key actors’) behaviour which shape a refugee’s ability to engage with local communities and markets when attempting to pursue their own personal and economic aims. Thus, this understanding repositions reception as more than simply an ephemeral moment (such as crossing a border or a formal registration process). Instead, it sees it as a process that reflects the multi-directional and multi-locational dynamics of contemporary refugee arrival including, significantly, the role reception policies play in a refugee’s ability to move within the host state and engage with local populations and economies.
By conceptualising reception in this way, it becomes evident that there are significant variations in how host states in Africa receive refugees – even though most states maintain dominant encampment-style reception policies. In rare instances, countries have attempted to maintain the more traditional free-settlement approach whereby refugees and asylum-seekers are granted freedom of movement almost immediately upon arrival. In countries which adopt encampment policies, some embrace more development-style settlements, rather than the traditional closed-camp approach, where one of the principal goals is for refugees to become self-reliant within that space. Furthermore, in many countries which adopt encampment approaches, there co-exist state-run policies that permit frequent movement between refugee camps and neighbouring urban and rural areas (Krause and Gato, 2019). In addition, there are the more informal activities that occur at the fringes of implementation of reception policies, whereby host states regularly turn a blind eye to refugees settling in urban spaces in contravention of the dominant encampment policy (Hovil, 2016). Here, refugees can find de facto acceptance by the host state via local government structures.3
These observed differences in contemporary approaches to the reception of refugees by states provide the motivation for this book. In particular, the book seeks to offer new ways of understanding why states behave in different and specific ways towards the arrival and movement of refugees. The focus is therefore on the role of the state in administering these policies and the effect that different approaches have on refugees’ ability to move around the host state in pursuit of their own personal and economic aims. Justification for a state-focused approach to analysing the topic of refugee reception comes from situating this book within the broader body of literature on the differing forms of welcome offered to refugees in Africa.
Specifically, as investigated in Chapters 1 and 2, the academic scholarship on refugee arrival within the continent has traditionally been guided by state responses to this form of cross-border movement, and the modes and spaces of reception these responses dictate. During the 1990s and early 2000s, with states in the majority world4 and international donors from the minority world preferring strict encampment policies, research within refugee and forced migration studies focused on the refugee camp (Long, 2019). Due to this spatial focus and corresponding lack of attention given to urban refugees by policymakers and practitioners, urban displacement during this period was overlooked by researchers (Schmidt, 2003).5 However, in the last ten to fifteen years, the focus of relevant academic fields has slowly shifted towards a consideration of the urban space (Maple et al., 2023; Hovil and Maple, 2022). This is at least in part due to academic research now reflecting the realities on the ground, with regional trends of urbanisation meaning more refugees are rejecting the restrictive reception approaches of states and self-settling in cities (Landau, 2018a).
As research on refugee reception has shifted from the refugee camp to include the urban space, the role of the host state has, for the most part, remained underexplored. Instead, emphasis has moved from actors at the international level to those at the local and sub-local level, missing out on the national level (Landau, 2007). During the 1990s, the host state’s role was habitually framed as a minor one in the reception of refugees in Africa (Slaughter and Crisp, 2008). Rather, attention remained on UNHCR, with the agency regularly placed in charge of running refugee camps (Schmidt, 2003). When motivations for states’ actions were considered in academic literature, there was a tendency to frame host states as ‘black boxes’ (Betts, 2009b).6 Thus, states were represented as one complete entity (with blanket inputs and outputs), with all states having similar motivations for how they behaved towards refugees.
The recent shifts in academic scholarship towards engaging with: (i) urban displacement on the continent;7 and (ii) connections between the camp and urban space have appropriately concentrated on the perspective of the refugee.8 These contemporary investigations have drawn out novel areas of research looking at alternative forms of welcome, and localised citizenship and resilience (Hovil, 2016; Subulwa, 2019).9 With these advances have come new understandings of the different actors and their agendas at the ground level (including host communities, refugees and refugee networks). In particular, contemporary research highlights how local networks, refugee-led initiatives and other localised contextual factors (often beyond the reach of the state) can explain how refugees find alternative forms of reception at the local and sub-local level (Berg and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2018).
The new emphasis on the refugee in these situations has, nevertheless, led to the role of host states in the reception of refugees remaining somewhat overlooked. Indeed, in the African context, little is known about how states make choices regarding refugee reception policies and what factors (or stakes) play a role in this (Bakewell and Jónsson, 2011; Milner, 2009; Zanker and Moyo, 2020). This includes the role played by national bodies, national frameworks, local governments and local norms in reception policies (Landau, 2014). By way of illustration, there has been minimal academic work on the juxtaposition between a host state maintaining an overarching refugee camp policy (which demands all refugees remain housed in the camp space), while at the same time implementing policies that permit movement between the camp and urban spaces. A core aim of this book is to complement the existing work on key actors in refugee reception at the ground level, by investigating the role and influence of state bodies and structures at the national and international levels.
This will be achieved by adopting a conceptual framework based on the theory of norm implementation by Betts and Orchard (2014). This framework is utilised to investigate the causal mechanisms embedded within state behaviour (separated into material, ideational and institutional factors) that are influencing the responses of states to the arrival of refugees. By deploying Betts and Orchard’s theory, the book sets out an analytical approach to investigate why states respond to refugee arrivals in differing ways. Within this framework, the book introduces a multi-scalar approach to investigate the role of the ‘state’. This approach acknowledges that host states are not one single uniform entity (nor a ‘black-box’), but rather, made up of different structures at different levels, from the local to the provincial and national, all of which can interact, contest and/or influence refugee reception policies. This book therefore contributes to academic learning by adding an important new perspective on this hitherto neglected area of research.
Moreover, ultimately, with a more holistic understanding of what influences the decisions of the plurality of actors involved in refugee reception, the academic community and international policy practitioners will be in a better position to engage with states. This is particularly pertinent if academia and policy advocates seek to encourage alternative ways of welcoming refugees that do not restrict fundamental rights. Indeed, without a nuanced understanding of why states maintain encampment policies, a paradigm shift in how states receive refugees in Africa remains unlikely (Maple et al., 2021; Kagan, 2014; Hovil 2016). As Betts (2009b) observes, anyone who wishes to influence state responses towards refugees must first understand the rationale for their existing behaviour.
To investigate the disparate state responses to the arrival of refugees in Africa, the book sets out to answer two key questions. First, how do we explain the diverse ways in which states receive refugees in their territories? Second, how do the refugee reception policies of host states shape a refugee’s ability to pursue their own personal and economic aims?
Refugee reception in Southern Africa
This section starts by outlining the book’s central epistemological position and how the case studies derive therefrom. An overarching constructivist epistemological position has been adopted, emphasising the importance and particularity of the domestic sphere. The theoretical approach, the case studies and the methods adopted to investigate the reception of refugees, flow from this position (Crotty, 1998). Specifically, two perspectives linked to a constructivist epistemology have been adopted, namely realist and interpretivist (Gray, 2004; Veroff, 2010b). These are sometimes seen as contrasting epistemes, but in line with the work of Grey (2004) and Veroff (2010b), they have been adopted as compatible perspectives that provide complementary insights. The focus of interpretivists is on ‘how members of society understand their own actions’, while realism ‘involves looking behind appearances to discover laws or mechanisms which explain human behavior’ and thus state action (Travers, 2001:10).
By embracing this approach, the aim is two-fold: first, to produce ‘thick descriptions’ of key actors’ experiences with refugee reception policies and investigate the dynamics of bureaucratic and socio-cultural frameworks. Inherent within this interpretivist approach to data collection is the flexibility to consider new issues or concepts during the research process, which may not have been part of the original research focus (Gray, 2004). Second, to develop theory – in other words, to produce ‘a set of interrelated categories that describe or explain some phenomenon’ (Travers, 2001:10) – around the particularity of state responses towards the arrival of refugees. As examined in Chapter 3, there is no reason why studies that adopt a political science lens cannot balance ‘insights of ethnography with the broader comparative insights of political science’ (Betts and Orchard, 2014:20). Indeed, this deliberately inter-disciplinary approach offers a way through which micro-level processes can be followed and understood so as to speak back to macro-level theory.10
A direct consequence of this overarching epistemological position is the choice to use comparative case studies of two countries (Zambia and South Africa) from within Southern Africa. Following the work of Merriam (2009) and Stake (2003), the most relevant criterion of case selection should be the opportunity to investigate a phenomenon. Thus, the case studies are investigated from an interpretivist perspective, with the aim of studying contemporary and complex social phenomenon, namely the reception of refugees, in its natural context (Yin, 1994). Consequently, this approach devotes considerable attention to unpacking complex relationships within state and society: in this book, this means examining the relationships between state bodies, refugee policy and refugees’ attempts at pursuing personal and economic aims. In line with this position, the clear benefit of a ‘few country comparison’, rather than a larger sample, is the ability to generate an in-depth and insight-generating study of specific cases (Lor, 2011). By analysing these relationships, a more nuanced understanding of state-based refugee reception within each country emerges. In doing so, the book offers an important contrast with recent large-N quantitative studies and efforts to theorise refugee policy at a global scale.11
Southern Africa as a setting for investigating refugee reception
There are several reasons for electing to study refugee reception in Southern Africa. The sheer variety in patterns and dynamics of refugee movement makes it an essential terrain of study: it ranges from mass influxes, constant but small-scale cross-border movements, to multiple forms of ‘secondary’ movement. In terms of numbers, in 2023 there were around one million refugees and asylum-seekers in Southern Africa (UNHCR, 2023a). Most refugees come from the Great Lakes, the East and Horn of Africa, Central Africa, and SADC countries (UNHCR, 2019c). Refugees normally travel by land, in part because Southern Africa is a porous sub-region of Africa, with large numbers of irregular cross-border movements (Nshimbi and Fiormonti, 2014). Furthermore, a prominent feature of this movement is the large distance many refugees travel, with South Africa hosting sizeable numbers of people coming from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia (Long and Crisp, 2011; World Bank, 2019). These refugee movements are also paralleled by flows of historic and contemporary economic migration into the Southern African region, and in particular, South Africa (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016).
The sub-region is also a useful context within which diverse forms of refugee reception policy can be compared. For instance, many states contest or place formal reservations on specific norms, such as the freedom of movement and employment rights. As a result, countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Botswana house refugees in sites of long-term encampment. In contrast, South Africa, and to a lesser extent Angola, permit refugees to settle immediately in urban spaces as part of their official reception policies. Additionally, the mode of reception can change depending on the composition of a particular refugee population. For example, large, urgent cross-border movements gain the attention of the international humanitarian system and international funding. Consequently, emergency camps and services are often provided. In contrast, sporadic cross-border movements of small groups of refugees are often left to local state structures, local communities and civil society, and thus ignored at the national level and by the wider international community (broadly defined). The urbanisation trend seen in contemporary global refugee movements is also replicated in Southern Africa, with increasing numbers of refugees rejecting camp-based reception policies for urban cities such as Johannesburg (Landau, 2018b; Long and Crisp, 2011).
Lastly, this sub-region of Africa has received relatively limited academic attention in terms of analysis of refugee issues. Indeed, current academic focus in Africa is showing worrying signs of a lack of diversity by disproportionately concentrating on refugee populations solely within a select few countries experiencing medium-intensity conflict and displacement, such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Thus, the chosen geographical area is a modest attempt to widen academic knowledge on refugee issues on the continent.
Country case study selection
The book is interested in why states behave differently towards the arrival of refugees. For this reason, within the broader comparative case studies method, a diverse case study technique was adopted. As noted by Seawright and Gerring (2008), this technique aims to select two cases which represent the ‘maximum variance along relevant dimensions’, in this case, state approaches to the reception of refugees. As the individual variable of interest is categorical (that is, the type of reception deployed), an investigator can choose one case from each category (encampment versus free-settlement approach) (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Thus, a key reason Zambia and South Africa were selected as case studies within the broader Southern Africa context is because they maintain contrasting approaches to the reception of refugees (encampment versus free-settlement approach).
Zambia is a ‘typical case study’ in relation to the diverse cases study technique (Gerring, 2008), in that it can be considered a representative case in relation to how states respond to refugees in Southern Africa. The national reception policy, like most states in the sub-region, demands that refugees are housed in a form of encampment. Refugees essentially remain in one of three main refugee settlements after regularising their stay until it is safe to return to their country of origin.
For this book, ‘encampment’ is understood as a reception policy adopted by states (often in conjunction with international organisations, such as UNHCR), ‘which requires refugees to live in a designated area set aside for the exclusive use of refugees, unless they have gained specific permission to live elsewhere’ (Bakewell, 2014:129). In turn, refugee camps and (formal) settlements are the modes (and geographical spaces) by which this policy is implemented. In forced migration and refugee studies literature, the terms ‘camp’ and ‘settlement’ have traditionally been used interchangeably (Schmidt, 2003). Since the 2000s, academic work has often made clearer distinctions between the two sites, likely at the behest of policymakers and donors keen to emphasise ‘new’ approaches.12 For example, planned refugee settlements in Uganda and Kenya (such as the Nakivale and Kalobeyei settlements) are regularly depicted as distinct entities from the more traditional closed-gated refugee camps, such as the Dadaab camp in Kenya.13
Nevertheless, in refugee settlements in Africa, freedom of movement is still regularly restricted and for this reason the book adopts the traditional framing and uses the two terms interchangeably. Specifically, the settlements in Zambia are designated areas set aside for the exclusive use of refugees, with refugees expected to reside in them, unless granted express permission to leave. As such, these qualities that severely restrict movement make them take on the character of a camp (Schmidt, 2003). As Malkki (1995) observes, when refugees cannot leave a location whenever they want to, that location has all the hallmarks of a refugee camp, even if it is labelled as a settlement.
Consistent with this approach, the Zambian state has placed reservations on key international norms contained within the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) (‘the 1951 Refugee Convention’), such as freedom of movement. There is also an understanding within the government that refugees are the responsibility of the international community, with UNHCR funding the running costs of the refugee settlements (Bakewell, 2004). Consequently, Zambia is a suitable choice for exploring the underlying causal mechanisms at work that make this approach so popular in Southern Africa and further afield on the continent.
Nonetheless, looking beyond this basic classification, the selection of one Southern African case study is unlikely to be representative of an entire category (Gerring, 2008). As set out in subsequent chapters, it is evident that the reasoning and motivations behind Zambia’s responses to refugee movement involves material, ideational and institutional factors, which are particular to the Zambian state and society. For these reasons, and due to the comparative nature of the investigation, the book is focused on the context of particular settings – namely South Africa and Zambia.
Zambia is a landlocked country, bordering eight neighbouring states, meaning it relies heavily on the stability of its neighbours (Subulwa, 2013). The history of Zambia, like so many countries in Africa, is a long history (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) of continuous movement (Subulwa, 2013). Since independence in 1964, major events such as the Angolan and Mozambican liberation struggles, the crisis caused by Rhodesia’s unilateral bid for independence, followed by progressive social unrest and economic collapse in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s and 2000s, and ongoing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), have affected geopolitical dynamics and social stability in Zambia (Burnell, 2005). As Subulwa (2013) notes, of Zambia’s eight neighbours, five have been directly involved in serious conflicts and associated mass migration in recent times (namely Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and the DRC). Due to these geopolitical factors, Zambia has hosted refugees for generations, even if officially the hosting of refugees, as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention, only started in the 1960s.
This contemporary understanding of receiving ‘refugees’ coincided with the start of the much-celebrated ‘open door policy’ on the continent (van Garderen and Ebenstein, 2011). Yet, this ‘open door policy’ also occurred at the same time as the wars of liberation in countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, which saw hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing to neighbouring states (Rutinwa, 2002). For this reason, the initial reception offered to refugees in Zambia during this period took the form of an encampment policy (Hansen, 1979). This approach to reception has continued to this day.
The country witnessed a peak in refugee numbers in 2001, with around 300,000 refugees living mostly in camps and settlements (with others self-settled in rural and border areas and cities). This peak was due to the intensity of the conflict in the DRC, and political repression and economic tumult in Zimbabwe (Frischkorn, 2013). During this time there were six camps and settlements (Darwin, 2005).14 As the numbers of refugees reduced (mainly due to the end of civil unrest in Angola, Rwanda and, for a period, the DRC), several of the camps and settlements closed. According to UNHCR figures, Zambia currently hosts around 94,618 persons of concern (UNHCR, 2022), with most refugees residing in the three main settlements, Meheba, Mayukwayukwa and Mantapala.15
Since 2018, Zambia has shown signs of potentially relaxing the encampment reception policy. Following the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016 and the formal adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees (which consists of a plan of action and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)), the now former president, Edgar Lungu made public commitments to consider allowing more freedom of movement and enhancing measures to enable refugees to engage in income-generating activities (Carciotto and Ferraro, 2020).16 Part of this overall approach was the establishment of the Mantapala settlement in the north-east of the country in early 2018. The intention has been for this settlement to realise a more inclusive approach to housing refugees, with locals given land next to refugees in the settlement (Maple, 2018; Carciotto and Ferraro, 2020).
In terms of recent economic history, Zambia still bears the legacy of the colonial state’s extractive political economy, and the ‘hollowing out of the state’ during the Structural Adjustment period (1980s–1990s) (Onuoha, 2008; Jepson and Henderson, 2016). Indeed, the country ranks amongst those with the highest levels of poverty and inequality globally. In 2015, 58 per cent of Zambia’s 16.6 million people were earning less than the international poverty line of $1.90 per day (compared to 41 per cent across Africa) (World Bank, 2019). In respect of governance, Zambia is a unitary state with two levels of government: the National (or Central) and Local. There is also technically a provincial level, although in practice this is seen as an extension of the national government (Mutesa and Nchito, 2003; UN-Habitat, 2012). Power and responsibility for refugee matters are predominantly retained within the national government, although some relevant services are the responsibility of local government, such as public transport (UNHCR, 2012).17
From 2016 to 2021, under the presidency of Edgar Lungu, Zambia moved towards an authoritarian (or dominant) style of political settlement (Bebbington, et al., 2017; Phiri, 2016). Opposition political parties were threatened and their members imprisoned (Siachiwena, 2021a). In addition, civil society was increasingly silenced and the independent press shut down (Quak, 2019). As a result of this democratic ‘backsliding’, the president became less concerned about the risk of losing re-election (Quak, 2019) and was implementing long-term planning based on political self-interest and ideological commitments, such as pan-Africanism. It was, therefore, a surprise to many political commentators, that in 2021 Lungu lost the national election to Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND) (Siachiwena, 2021a). Siachiwena (2021a) calls the election a ‘silent revolution’. With the democratic space essentially closed, there was no open or public agitation for change. Yet behind closed doors, Zambians had lost confidence in the president. Since the election, there exists some optimism that the new president can reverse the authoritarian shifts and oversee a refiguration of the country’s political settlement (Siachiwena, 2021b). Early signs, however, are not encouraging in terms of greater freedom for civil society or the press (USDS, 2023). Similarly, time will tell if Hichilema will follow-up on the state’s recent international commitments regarding more inclusion for refugees. The removal of all reference to refugees in the recent 8th Zambian National Development Plan raises concerns in this regard (8NDP, 2022).
In contrast to Zambia, South Africa can be seen as a ‘deviant’ case study in the context of Southern Africa (Gerring, 2008). A deviant case is selected to demonstrate a ‘surprising’ value, in this case, the decision by the state to maintain a broad free-settlement approach to refugee reception, when most neighbouring countries in Southern Africa adopt camp-based approaches. A key purpose of a deviant case study is, therefore, ‘to probe for new – but as yet unspecified – explanations’ to understand why the case defies the general approach or understanding (Gerring, 2008:106).
A free-settlement approach, while varying in implementation, can be understood as a reception policy, where upon arrival or once their stay has been formalised, refugees are permitted to freely move and settle in the host state (Masuku and Nkala, 2018). Thus, in the context of South Africa, refugees can move and reside wherever they choose. By selecting these two countries, the book can uniquely investigate two disparate overarching refugee reception policies, as well as two very different geographical reception sites (the refugee camp and the urban space) within the same sub-region of Africa.
South Africa has a comparatively short history of involvement with the global refugee regime, with institutionalisation at the national level commencing in the early 1990s. Equally, while post-apartheid South Africa is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the state maintains an arms-length approach to UN agencies such as UNHCR (Landau and Segatti, 2009). Regardless of this tense relationship with global refugee regime institutions, the state maintains a generous approach to refugee reception, with no restrictions (at least in law) on freedom of movement for asylum-seekers or refugees. Even at times of crisis – for example with the large intake of forced migrants from Zimbabwe between 2003 and 2010 – the state avoided using encampment policies (Crush and Chikanda, 2014).18
In terms of numbers, UNHCR reported 250,250 persons of concern in the country in 2023 (UNHCR, 2023b). The real number, however, is higher due to the number of refugees living in cities like Johannesburg without documentation (Segatti, 2011). Due to patterns of mixed migration in the region, there are also large numbers of forced migrants living without formal documentation (Tati, 2008; Crisp and Kiragu, 2010). Since 2010/2011, reception policies at the national and local level have, however, noticeably shifted, with the Department of Home Affairs implementing several policies and regulations that have begun to shrink the asylum space (Crush et al., 2017). Furthermore, recent policy recommendations at the national level have proposed the creation of reception centres in border areas, which would severely restrict freedom of movement for asylum-seekers and refugees (Moyo, 2020).
In respect of recent economic history, as one of the richest countries on the continent, South Africa is at a different stage of socio-economic development to Zambia (AWR, 2020). Yet, it also represents a unique fusion of mature socio-economic and bureaucratic development, and a developing state with limited capacity and acute needs (Mulaudzi, 2015). Advancements in poverty reduction have slowed recently, with the $1.90 per day poverty rate increasing from 16.8 per cent to 18.8 per cent between 2011 and 2015. A key challenge remains unemployment, standing at 27.6 per cent in the first quarter of 2019 (World Bank, 2019).
Modern-day South Africa is a constitutional democracy with a three-tier system of government (national, provincial and local).19 Each level has legislative and executive authority in specific spheres, with local government including eight metropolitan municipalities, such as Johannesburg and Cape Town (SAgov, 2020). The primary needs of refugees including shelter, access to education, health and economic opportunities are the responsibility of the national government (and to a lesser extent, the provincial government) (Landau et al., 2011). Nevertheless, some key services such as public clinics do fall under the purview of the local government (Musuva, 2015).
Despite the post-1994 political dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) at the national level, post-apartheid South Africa can be characterised as a competitive state with power dispersed across political parties (Levy et al., 2015). However, twenty years after the end of the apartheid regime, cracks in the political settlement are showing, with risks of internal conflict ever-present. Nevertheless, with recent local municipality elections being won by political parties opposing the ANC, for now the settlement remains competitive with elites focusing on short-term goals (Levy et al., 2015).20 Finally, with the ruling competitive political settlement willing to listen to xenophobic attitudes within the voting public, refugees have recently found that the reception offered is increasingly restrictive (Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti, 2011; Misago et al., 2010).
As set out above, it is evident that there are significant differences in approach to the reception of refugees between the two countries. The intention, therefore, is to develop an understanding of the reasons behind these alternative responses through a state-focused analysis. Notwithstanding, it also becomes apparent that as well as differences, there are also numerous themes and concepts that connect the two neighbouring states, both of which share the task of welcoming considerable numbers of refugees onto their territory. These connections will be utilised to draw out a conceptualisation of refugee reception in Southern Africa at the end of the book.
Potential limitations of comparative case studies
Concerns raised about in-depth case studies commonly relate to selection bias, which occurs when a project intentionally chooses the countries that are to be compared (Collier, 1995). In essence, selection bias can under- or over-emphasise the relationship between variables and is likely to be particularly misleading when findings are generalised to a wider setting (Collier and Mahoney, 1996). As will be examined further in Chapter 3, small sample case studies produce insights with a limited capacity to generalise beyond the specific cases. To minimise this risk, any attempts in the book to generalise the findings beyond the chosen countries and sub-region are deliberately modest. Indeed, the assertion is that the two cases, in and of themselves, are of sufficient academic interest rather than just being bearers of a set of variables.21 Despite being close neighbours, they adopt divergent national refugee reception policies, they exhibit contrasting relationships with the global refugee regime (including the implementation of global refugee norms and engagement with UNHCR) and there have been recent noticeable (and divergent) signs of shifts in approaches to reception policies in each country.
Finally, inherent in these discussions are concerns about verification bias. This is the belief that case studies contain a bias toward verification, meaning a tendency to frame a project in a specific way so that it confirms a researcher’s preconceived notions. To guard against this possibility, a researcher needs to remain open to alternative explanations. Indeed, if conducted correctly, an advantage of the case study approach can be that it ‘closes in’ on real life situations and tests ‘views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006:19). In this way, it is common for case material to test and subsequently show how preconceived assumptions and concepts were wrong, and in doing so force researchers to re-evaluate their understanding of an issue (Bennett, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2006). As examined in future chapters, pre-existing assumptions I held about why states respond to refugee arrivals in specific ways were tested by the book’s case material. For example, preconceived notions regarding the role and importance of the global refugee regime in reception policies in Southern Africa were continually tested and had to be re-evaluated in light of the empirical evidence.
The structure of the book
Chapter 1 examines the notion of reception in relation to the arrival of refugees within the country of asylum. The chapter’s emphasis is on urban and camp spaces as reception sites. The chapter outlines a working understanding of refugee ‘reception’ that frames it as a process whereby state, international and local actors shape a refugee’s ability to engage with local communities and markets when attempting to pursue their own personal and economic aims. In this way, reception is more than just a one-off event, or the end to a singular journey or the act of finding immediate shelter. It can be all these things, but it also includes the process of refugees engaging with local networks and structures to settle within a particular area.
On this basis, the first chapter introduces the book’s conceptual framework. By adopting Betts and Orchard’s (2014) theory of norm implementation as a conceptual framework, the book sets out an analytical approach to investigating why states respond to refugee arrivals in divergent ways. At the heart of this framework is a heuristic tripartite model that outlines key ‘causal mechanisms’ (namely ideational, material and institutional factors) embedded within state behaviour that can constrain, alter or aid in the implementation of core global refugee regime norms. This trilogy of factors is adopted to analyse key variables that are influencing the responses of states to the arrival of refugees. The theory of norm implementation suggests that finding neat and constant causal links between a factor (or factors) and a state-run refugee reception policy is, nevertheless, improbable. Rather, the creation and continual implementation of reception policies are likely to reflect ongoing processes of negotiation and renegotiation between institutional actors. During these ‘negotiations’, different factors interact, reinforce and/or contest with each other to create a given response. This explains why reception policies are often prone to incremental or sudden shifts over time.
Chapter 2 examines three academic debates that are key to framing an understanding of why states receive refugees in different ways. The debates have been selected because they attempt to identify and explain wider factors that influence the reception of refugees in Africa. The first debate investigates why, since the 1980s, the majority of states in the region have shifted from free-settlement to encampment reception policies. The ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus is introduced as a credible reason for these behaviours. In essence, the nexus idea posits a negative correlation between democratic structures and the accessibility of asylum measures. As states on the continent introduced more democratic processes in the 1980s, the space for asylum started to shrink, with refugees increasingly being moved to refugee camps. The chapter highlights how the ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus concept can be applied to explain contemporary refugee reception policies. This forms the platform for subsequent chapters to investigate links between the disruptive role refugee movement can have on urban spaces and democratic structures (including electoral accountability) in the host state.
The second debate considers how the ‘global’ inserts itself into the national and local levels. Specifically, the section examines the continuing influence of the global refugee regime (via its international governance frameworks and main actor, UNHCR) in the context of refugee reception in Africa. In contrast to the regime’s apparently dominant presence in refugee camps, the section questions the regime’s continued relevance in the everyday practice of reception in urban spaces. The third debate addresses the ongoing influence of ‘securitisation’ theory in research on state responses to refugee movement (including both cross-border and within territory movement). The section raises concerns about how contemporary academic studies can at times appear one-dimensional, namely by portraying states as seeing all cross-border movement of low-skilled migrants/refugees as negative when viewed through a security lens. The chapter introduces a complementary ‘stability’ lens to that of security as necessary to bring more nuance to discussions on the relationship between refugee movements, state structures and reception policies. Subsequent chapters will develop understanding related to these three debates through their examination of reception policies in Southern Africa.
Chapter 3 explores how the methodology for the book was developed from the conceptual investigation of refugee reception and the examination of the literature on state responses to refugee arrivals in Africa. Specifically, the chapter builds on the previous two chapters, by explaining the research methodology step-by-step through the distinct phases of the project, from choosing the research design through to collecting and analysing the data. The chapter also offers a critical reflection on the methodological and ethical choices made during the life of the book project. By taking this systematic approach to methodology, the chapter aims to be a model for future work by scholars developing and designing similar projects.
Chapters 4 to 7 examine the empirical data collected concerning the urban and camp spaces as reception sites in the two case studies. Analysis in these chapters is predominantly conducted from the perspective of the ‘state’, with a focus on the dominant national-level refugee reception policy. Nevertheless, incorporating a multi-scalar approach to the state perspective enables engagement with processes relating to refugee reception at different levels of analysis (the international, the national, the local and sub-local). This allows for possible variations in reception policy at different levels of the state to also be examined.
Chapter 4 questions why Zambia has adopted and maintained an encampment policy for receiving refugees over the last sixty years. The chapter highlights the importance of national refugee legal frameworks in relation to the implementation of policies at initial registration.22 Indeed, a former legal framework, which focuses entirely on the creation and maintenance of refugee settlements, continues to inform and influence the understanding of refugees at the national level. As a result, refugees are essentially understood by large portions of the national government as ‘regime refugees’, who reside within the confines of the settlements.
Even so, the chapter shows how, in Zambia, the refugee camp is profoundly connected to the urban space, with the Commission for Refugees (COR) allowing a certain number of refugees to leave the camp space either to engage with nearby communities or to travel to large urban areas. The empirical evidence shows that the aim of the dominant camp reception policy is not about stopping all movement of refugees; rather, it can be understood as a filter to regulate and manage the numbers of refugees in urban spaces. In this way, the chapter highlights how, paradoxically, the adoption of camp-based reception creates sufficient stability for some movement. Finally, because of this perceived stability (via the managing of refugee movement), the camp reception policy continues to help prevent the emergence of top-down and bottom-up securitisation of refugees in Zambia.
Chapter 5 investigates post-registration reception in Zambia. The chapter engages primarily with the behaviour of key actors from the international and national level inside and outside the settlements. International protection in Zambia – as implemented by UNHCR – is essentially restricted to the refugee camp. Indeed, the UN agency is reluctant to work with, or assist, refugees outside of the settlements. This stance essentially confines the global refugee regime to the camp space. Therefore, for many refugees, they have little choice but to give up certain key rights and freedoms to gain access to essential humanitarian services. In contrast, urban refugees in Zambia are understood by both the state and UNHCR to have full human agency. As such, they are seen as fundamentally distinct from the ‘regime refugees’ in the settlements. By conducting journeys to the urban space in their attempts to pursue personal and economic goals, refugees are in effect moving outside of the construct of a refugee in Zambia. In this way, the chapter shows how urban refugees are slowly being shifted away from the refugee label (and the associated protections of the global refugee regime that this brings), towards a more general (and often illegal) migrant label.
Chapter 6 moves to consider the second case study, South Africa, and examines the initial registration of refugees. With South Africa currently adopting a free-settlement reception approach, the geographical focus of the chapter is on the urban space. The initial welcome granted to refugees – in law at least – is particularly generous, with no spatial restrictions, meaning refugees are free to move unimpeded around the territory. Here, the chapter again highlights the role and influence of the national refugee legal framework in the implementation of reception policies. Indeed, the 1998 Refugee Act, in combination with ideologies based on pan-Africanism and notions of fairness stemming from the need to find distance from the old apartheid regime, are helping to contest recent pushes by elements of the national government to move to a more camp-based approach to reception. In contrast, key elements of the global refugee regime, namely UNHCR, are ostensibly held at arm’s length by the ruling political settlement at this initial stage of reception.
The maintenance of a free-settlement approach to reception is not, however immune to institutional and material contestation. Since the 2010s, concerns surrounding instability brought on by increased cross-border movement have started to gain momentum. As the chapter observes, unrestricted movement of non-citizens is always likely to cause a reaction. The result of these concerns has been the adoption of a security lens at the national level to frame the movement of refugees (and other cross-border African migrants) into urban areas. As explained using the ‘democracy-asylum’ nexus, increased numbers of asylum-seekers and refugees has created negative democratic loops, whereby perceived additional competition for resources has created resentment amongst host populations, thus the state becomes politically motivated to move away from ideals based on solidarity and pan-Africanism, to ones framing migrants as a ‘problem’.
Chapter 7 analyses the self-settlement policy in South Africa after initial registration. Significantly, due to the length of journeys typically taken to arrive in cities like Johannesburg, coupled with the granting of freedom of movement and some employment rights, urban refugees are constructed as an entirely self-sufficient category of migrants by the national government and UNHCR. We therefore again see urban refugees in Southern Africa diverging from the framing of ‘regime refugees’ seen in camp spaces in the sub-region. This framing is then seen as justification by the national government and UNHCR for their choice to abandon several key obligations relating to protection and integration as set out by the global refugee regime. Instead, a delicate, if highly contested, relationship emerges between host and guest in the urban space, whereby the bulk of obligations falls on the visitor. Refugees are granted temporary access to cities as visitors, with an implicit understanding that they remain essentially invisible and unproblematic.
The focus on refugee movement at the level of the city nevertheless conflicts with the current broader national approach investigated in the previous chapter. Here a security lens is gradually being applied to all forms of cross-border movement. Thus, if there is too much perceived movement into urban spaces, this will likely cause contestation or even a rupture in the delicate host/guest relationship at the level of the city. A precarious and conditional form of reception therefore emerges in urban spaces.
The Conclusions chapter is split into four parts, each examining key conceptual and analytical findings from across both case studies. Firstly, the chapter questions current understandings of ‘reception’ by outlining a contemporary conceptualisation of refugee reception in Southern Africa. Secondly, the chapter interrogates the analytical benefits and limitations of the theory of norm implementation in this book. Thirdly, the chapter establishes the main contributions to academic knowledge made by the book in relation to the three debates about refugee responses in Southern Africa that are outlined in Chapter 2. Those findings are then utilised in the final section to examine the key implications of the book for national and international actors and advocates working on issues related to the reception of refugees in Southern Africa.
Notes
1. See also Arar and FitzGerald (2023).
2. These include the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the OAU [Organisation of the African Union] Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
3. Large numbers of refugees in Africa avoid or reject state reception policies by settling informally (d’Orsi, 2019).
4. This book replaces ‘global north’ with minority world and ‘global south’ with majority world. This is to emphasise how the privileged global north holds the minority of the global population, while the global south holds the majority (Alam, 2008; Punch, 2016).
5. There were notable exceptions: Kibreab (1996); Sommers (1999).
6. See Jaquenod (2014).
7. See Omata and Kaplan (2013).
8. See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015, 2016); Basok (2009); Varsanyi (2006); Landau (2014); Sanyal (2017).
9. See also Landau (2018a); Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015, 2016).
10. This is not to imply that political science vs. anthropology differences align with macro- vs. micro-level theories.
11. For example, see Abdelaaty (2021).
12. See Betts et al. (2018); Omata and Kaplan (2013); Betts et al. (2019).
13. This distinction is often based on the willingness of states to permit activities beyond humanitarian assistance (Omata and Kaplan, 2013).
14. Mayukwayukwa, Meheba, Kala, Mwange, Nangweshi and Ukwimi.
15. The number is higher when you include self-settled refugees in urban and border areas.
16. See UNGA (2016); UNGA (2018).
17. Both Zambia and South Africa governance structures are (in different ways) the result of European structures and concepts being ‘grafted onto them’ during colonial times. Yet, while these structures may look like Western norms, they develop politically, economically and culturally into unique hybrid entities (Somerville, 2017; Chabal and Daloz, 1999).
18. See Betts and Kaytaz (2009).
19. Debate remains over whether South Africa is a unitary or federal state (Schwella, 2016).
20. Power has started to shift at the city level in South Africa, with the Democratic Alliance (DA) winning control of Cape Town in 2006 and Johannesburg in 2016.
21. See Lor (2011); Ragin (1987).
22. For each country, analysis is broadly separated out into two stages – namely, ‘registration stage’ and ‘post-registration stage’, with a chapter for each stage. As examined later, there is analytical value in separating out reception into these phases. Nevertheless, at times these stages merge or become hard to distinguish. Additionally, refugees may remain indefinitely in the ‘registration stage’.